JUDGMENT : A.J. DESAI, J. 1. The State of Gujarat, through Public Prosecutor has filed the present Appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Code”) against the judgment and order dated 03.08.1996 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, at Palanpur, Banaskantha (hereinafter referred to as “trial Court”) in Sessions Case No. 25/1993, whereby the respondents accused have been acquitted from the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case as under. 2.1 That, one Thanaji Tagaji Brahaman lodged an FIR being I-CR No. 145/1992 with Dhanera Police Station, District Banaskantha on 10.11.1992 alleging that he is one of the four brothers and out of the said four brothers, one Masro Tagaji was the eldest one aged about 28 years (who is alleged to have been murdered in the incident in question). It was further alleged that one Bhaniben D/o Brahaman Natha Rama was married to said Masra before around 38½ years from the date of lodging of the FIR, who committed suicide at her matrimonial home prior to two years for which an FIR was lodged at the instance of one Raja Natha, who is accused No. 1 herein and son of Brahaman Natha Rama. That, at the end of trial, the said Masra was acquitted for the charges under Sections 306 and 498(A) of the IPC and subsequent thereto Masra was residing at village Dhanera Bhukpura. It was further alleged that the sister of the complainant viz. Gitaben was married to one of the sons of Brahaman Natha Rama i.e. Brahaman Lerabhai Nathabhai and was residing with her inlaws. However, subsequent to the suicide committed by the daughter of Brahaman Natha Rama, Gitaben was not permitted to visit her parental home i.e. family of the complainant. It was further alleged that the sister of the complainant viz. Gitaben was married to one of the sons of Brahaman Natha Rama i.e. Brahaman Lerabhai Nathabhai and was residing with her inlaws. However, subsequent to the suicide committed by the daughter of Brahaman Natha Rama, Gitaben was not permitted to visit her parental home i.e. family of the complainant. 2.2 It was further alleged that on 10.11.1992 when he alongwith his brother attended the fair at village Jadia and when they were traveling in Jeep Car No. GJ-2-1675 and when the jeep reached near a building of a Cooperative Mandali, complainant’s brother Masra who was sitting on the front seat, all the accused came near the jeep and Masra was dragged out of the jeep and accused No. 1 Raja Natha who had knife in his hand had given a knife blow on the abdominal part of Masra and all other accused i.e. accused Nos. 2 and 3, who are real brothers of accused No. 1 and accused No. 4, who is cousin brother of accused No. 1, had given kick and fist blows on the deceased Masra and immediately thereafter, all the accused left the place of incident. Thereafter, the injured was taken in another Jeep Car No. GJ-8T-4744 and was being shifted to Dhanera Hospital, however Masra succumbed to the injuries before he could be shifted to the hospital. Accordingly, the FIR came to be filed against all the accused. 2.3 The FIR was recorded at around 16.45 hours on 10.11.1992 i.e. immediately after the incident. 2.4 Initially, the investigation was carried out by one Mr. Karamshibhai Tulshibhai Desai (PW-10, Exh.40) and further investigation was carried out by one PSI Mr. Kalusinh Bhathisinh Khant (PW-11, Exh.46), who submitted the charge-sheet against the accused persons before the Court of concerned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhanera, who in turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction to deal with the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 2.5 The charge came to be framed at Exh.3 on 04.04.1996 for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, which was denied by the respondents accused and, therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Court proceeded with the trial. 2.6 The prosecution examined in all 11 witnesses to prove the case. The respondents accused also examined one witness viz. 2.6 The prosecution examined in all 11 witnesses to prove the case. The respondents accused also examined one witness viz. Gitaben as DW-1 at Exh.54 in their defence. Further statements of the respondents accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Code. 2.7 The trial Court after considering the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution and after scrutinizing the oral evidence of all the witnesses examined by both the parties acquitted all the accused giving benefit of doubt. Hence, the present appeal. 3. That, the appeal came to be admitted on 03.04.1997. Respondent No. 1 viz. Brahaman Rajabhai Nathabhai, who had given knife blow to the deceased Masra, expired on 15.04.2006 during the pendency of present appeal and death certificate is produced on record. In view of the fact that respondent No. 1 expired during the pendency of the appeal, criminal appeal came to be abated qua respondent No. 1. Therefore, the present appeal is to be decided against the remaining respondent Nos. 2 to 4-original accused Nos. 2 to 4 only. 4. Learned APP Mr. D.M. Devnani appearing for the appellant-State of Gujarat has vehemently submitted that the trial Court has committed grave error in acquitting the respondents accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He would submit that the cause of death is injury due to knife, which was used by accused No. 1, which is proved by the prosecution by examining Dr. Punmaji Hakmaji Bhati (PW-1, Exh.11) who has conducted the postmortem and has prepared the notes accordingly. By taking us through his deposition, learned APP would submit that the deceased Masra had succumbed to the knife injury which was of measurement 2.5 cm x 1.5 cm x 5 cm on the chest of the deceased. He would submit that apart from the said injury there are three abrasions found on the person of the deceased i.e. on his cheeks, neck as well as on the right shoulder which suggests the involvement of all the accused. He would submit that apart from the said injury there are three abrasions found on the person of the deceased i.e. on his cheeks, neck as well as on the right shoulder which suggests the involvement of all the accused. By taking us through the deposition of the complainant Thanaji Tagaji Brahaman (PW-2, Exh.14), he would submit that he was eyewitness and he had seen that when he alongwith the deceased Masra was sitting in the jeep, all the accused came jointly with common intention and the deceased was attacked by all the accused and therefore, the trial Court ought to have convicted the respondents herein for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. He would submit that since their sister had committed suicide, who happened to be wife of the deceased Masra, and deceased Masra was acquitted for the offences alleged against the deceased Masra, the intention of the respondents herein was to kill Masra and therefore, the respondents herein had jointly attacked the deceased and therefore, trial Court ought to have convicted all the accused accordingly. He has also taken us to evidence of various witnesses who have supported the case of the prosecution. He would submit that accused Nos. 2 to 4 had given kick and fist blow to the deceased and therefore, they had common intention to see to it that the deceased do not run away from the place of incident. He, therefore, would submit that appeal be allowed and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 herein be convicted and sentenced accordingly. 5. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Vipul Sundesha has vehemently opposed the present appeal and would submit that the trial Court has committed no error in acquitting all the accused. He would submit that accused No. 1-respondent No. 1 herein who is alleged to have given knife blow to the deceased has expired and therefore, if the role of the remaining accused is perused, the only allegation against them is that they had given kick and fist blow to the deceased, however there is no medical support at all to that effect. He would submit that Dr. He would submit that Dr. Punmaji Hakmaji Bhati (PW-1, Exh.11), who has conducted the postmortem and has prepared the notes, has categorically stated that the abrasions are not possible by kick and fist blow and therefore, the trial Court has rightly observed that the prosecution has failed to establish the involvement of all the accused and that too in the offence under Section 34 of the IPC. He would submit that though the deceased had sustained serious injury and was bleeding profusely, there were no blood stains on any of the clothes of the person of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4, which prima facie, establishes their presence at the scene of offence. Learned advocate Mr. Sundesha appearing for the respondents accused has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Muralidhar alias Gidda and Another vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2014 SC 2200 and would submit that the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down principles to be kept in mind while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal. He, therefore, would submit that the appeals be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned advocates appearing for respective parties and gone through the record and proceedings and scrutinized oral evidence of witnesses and postmortem note, panchnama etc. It is an admitted position that the allegation of giving a knife blow is against accused No. 1, who gave one blow to the deceased, however he has expired during the pendency of the appeal and therefore, the case is to be examined qua respondent Nos. 2 to 4 herein-original accused Nos. 2 to 4. If the allegations leveled against them are concerned, all the witnesses, who claimed that they have seen the incident, have stated that these three persons had given kick and fist blow to the deceased. However, Dr. Punmaji Hakmaji Bhati (PW-1, Exh.11) who has conducted the postmortem and has prepared the notes, had categorically stated that other injuries of abrasions are not possible by kick and fist blow. Even, we have gone through the postmortem note (Exh.12) which suggests no other injuries except referred to in the deposition by the said doctor. However, Dr. Punmaji Hakmaji Bhati (PW-1, Exh.11) who has conducted the postmortem and has prepared the notes, had categorically stated that other injuries of abrasions are not possible by kick and fist blow. Even, we have gone through the postmortem note (Exh.12) which suggests no other injuries except referred to in the deposition by the said doctor. 6.1 At the outset it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In Para-54 of the decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below.” 6.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the following principles: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 6.3 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 6.4 Even in a recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para-16 of the said decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with.” 6.5 Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Veer Singh and Others, 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of M.P. 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 6.6 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under: “......This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi vs. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary, (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.” 6.7 Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary. 6.8 Considering the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Muralidhar alias Gidda and Another (supra) conjointly with the facts of the case on hand, in our opinion the said decision would be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 12 of the said decision has observed as follows: “12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu, Madan Mohan Singh, Atley, Aher Raja Khima, Balbir Singh, M.G. Agarwal, Noor Khan, Khedu Mohton, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade, Lekha Yadav, Khem Karan, Bishan Singh, Umedbhai Jadavbhai, K. Gopal Reddy, Tota Singh, Ram Kumar, Madan Lal, Sambasivan, Bhagwan Singh, Harijana Thirupala, C. Antony, K. Gopalakrishna, Sanjay Thakran and Chandrappa. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal. (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified. (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 6.9 We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the trial Court in acquitting the accused of the charge levelled against him are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings given and the findings arrived at by the trial Court. No interference is warranted with the judgment and order of the trial Court. Even otherwise, It is well settled principle of law that the appellate Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal unless the Court finds it contrary to evidence or palpably erroneous or the view which has been taken by the Trial Court, could not have been taken by the Court of competent jurisdiction while dealing with the appeal against acquittal, the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, has been fortified for its acquittal. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and may not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice where interference is imperative and the ends of justice was required and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience. Hence, the trial Court having committed no error in acquitting the respondents accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, it does not warrant any interference of this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 7. In view of the aforesaid discussion, present Appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. The impugned judgment and order dated 03.08.1996 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, at Palanpur, Banaskantha in Sessions Case No. 25/1993 is confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled. Registry to return the R&P, if any, to the trial Court forthwith.