ORDER : SONIA GOKANI, J. 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner seeks writ of habeas corpus for his release from the illegal detention by the respondent in connection with FIR being I-CR No. 55 of 2010 registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1986. 2. The facts in the capsulized form leading to the present petition are as follows:- 2.1. The petitioner married the daughter of the complainant who was minor and therefore, First Information Report came to be lodged against him being I-CR No. 55 of 2010 registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station, Morbi. He therefore approached this Court by preferring Criminal Misc. Application No. 1141 of 2017 for quashing and setting aside the FIR. 2.2. This Court (Coram:- Mr. J.B.Pardiwala, J.) passed the following order on 05.05.2017:- "Leave to amend the prayer clause. RULE returnable on 5th May 2017. The learned APP waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent no.1 – State of Gujarat. The respondent no.2 shall be served directly through the Investigating Officer of the concerned Police Station. Let there be an ad-interim order in terms of para-9(c). Direct service is permitted." 2.3. The prayers sought of not to further proceed with the investigation with the prayer of staying the investigation - further proceedings of the impugned FIR being I-CR No. 55 of 2010, pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of the CRMA No. 1141 of 2017 has been granted by the Court. 2.4. A writ also has been served upon the Morbi Taluka Police Station on 01.04.2017. It is necessary to make a mention at this stage that the FIR is of the year 2010. The 'A' summary report came to be filed on 11.06.2012, which has been accepted by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Morbi and it directed the police to continue with the investigation. It appears that between the year 2012 and 2017, no fruitful results could be found. 2.5. So far as the arrest of the petitioner is concerned, the warrant continued to be in operation further. In the year 2017, the petitioner moved this Court by preferring the CMRA No. 1141 of 2017 and obtained the interim relief in his favour on 23.01.2017. 2.5. So far as the arrest of the petitioner is concerned, the warrant continued to be in operation further. In the year 2017, the petitioner moved this Court by preferring the CMRA No. 1141 of 2017 and obtained the interim relief in his favour on 23.01.2017. This possibly was not communicated to the SOG who was in possession of the warrant issued earlier at the time when the Court accepted the 'A' summary report and therefore, despite the reliefs granted in favour of the petitioner by this Court, the warrant came to be executed on 03.03.2020 and the petitioner was produced before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Morbi. They nab the petitioner and then handed over the custody to the local police who had arrested him on 03.03.2020 at 14 hours. No remand had been sought but with the Court's order he has been sent to the judicial custody. 3. The petitioner therefore is before this Court with the following prayers:- “(a) To allow this petition; (b) To issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the concerned respondents to immediately release the petitioner herein from detention/custody in connection with the FIR being I-CR No. 55/2010 registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station and to pass all other consequential orders in that regard; (c) To quash and set aside the order, if any, remanding the petitioner to custody passed in connection with FIR being I-CR No. 55/2010 registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station, as the same would be in violation of the order dated 23.01.2017 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1141/2016; (d) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, to direct that the petitioner be released from confinement forthwith; (e) To pass any other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper to this Hon'ble Court.” 4. This Court had issued notice realizing that there was an interim relief in favour of the petitioner. 5. Today, we have heard learned advocate Mr. Virat Popat appearing for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Ronak Raval, who on instructions from the concerned police officer and the police station has relied on the various papers and urged that by virtue of the order of learned JMFC, he has been sent to the judicial custody. 6. According to the learned advocate Mr. Virat Popat appearing for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Ronak Raval, who on instructions from the concerned police officer and the police station has relied on the various papers and urged that by virtue of the order of learned JMFC, he has been sent to the judicial custody. 6. According to the learned advocate Mr. Popat, once this Court has already granted interim relief in favour of the petitioner staying the very proceedings of I-CR No. 55 of 2010, no investigation could have been proceeded since the Court had stayed the investigation as well as the further proceedings. According to him, the decision rendered in case of President Of India vs In the Matter of Madhu Limaye [1969 (3) SCC 154] would be applicable in case of the present petitioner. 7. Learned APP Mr. Raval, on instructions, has urged before this Court that there was no deliberate attempt on the part of any of the officers to evade the order or to overlook the implications of such order. At no stage the petitioner brought to the knowledge of the police officer that the said order of year 2017 is yet subsisting. He does not dispute the fact that the said writ was received by the police station in the year 2017 itself. He submits that computerization has not fully done and many of the registers are being maintained manually. 8. This Court noticed the decision rendered in case of Madhu Limaye (supra) where the case before the Apex Court was Madhu Limaye, Member of Lok Sabha and several other persons were arrested and a communication was sought under Article 32 of the Constitution of India making a grievance that at the time of the arrest they had not been communicated the reasons or the grounds for arrest. The prayer was made before the Apex Court for the writ of habeas corpus for restoring the liberty on the ground that the arrest and detention were illegal. 8.1. The Apex Court extensively discussed the scope of Article 22 and also other questions including the question of malafide. The Court eventually issued a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the release of Mr. Madhu Limaye and others on the sole ground of violation of provisions of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. 8.1. The Apex Court extensively discussed the scope of Article 22 and also other questions including the question of malafide. The Court eventually issued a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the release of Mr. Madhu Limaye and others on the sole ground of violation of provisions of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. It expressed no opinion on the legality or illegality on the arrest since some of the issues raised before the Court still subjudise. Apt would be to reproduce the relevant findings and observations of the Apex Court:- “11. Article 22(1) embodies a rule which has always been regarded as vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal liberty in all legal systems where the rule of law prevails. For example, the 6th amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America contains similar provisions and so does Article XXXIV of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. In England whenever an arrest is made without a warrant, the arrested person has a right to be informed not only that he is being arrested but also of the reasons or grounds for the arrest. The House of Lords in Christie & Another v. Leachinsky ((1947) 1 All EER 567) went into the origin and development of this rule. In the words of Viscount Simon if a policeman who entertained a reasonable suspicion that X had committed a felony were at liberty to arrest him and march him off to a police station without giving any explanation of why he was doing this, the prima facie right of personal liberty would be gravely infringed. Viscount Simon laid down several propositions which were not meant to be exhaustive. For our purposes we may refer to the first and the third : "1. If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not require a warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other words, a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized. 2. … … ... 3. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other words, a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized. 2. … … ... 3. The requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained." Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested. "There is no need to explain the reasons of arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven." The two requirements of clause (1) of Article 22 are meant to afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to remove any mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in the minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him. Clause (2) of Article 22 provides the next and most material safeguard that the arrested person must be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest so that an independent authority exercising judicial powers may without delay apply is mind to his case. The Criminal Procedure Code contains analogous provisions in Section 60 and 340 but out Constitution-makers were anxious to make these safeguards an integral part of fundamental rights. This is what Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said while moving for insertion of Article 15-A (as numbered in the Draft Bill of the Constitution) which corresponded to present Article 22 : "Article 15-A merely lifts from the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code two of the most fundamental principles which every civilised country follows as principles of international justice. It is quite true that these two provisions contained in clause (1) and clause (2) are already to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code and thereby probably it might be said that we are really not making any very fundamental change. It is quite true that these two provisions contained in clause (1) and clause (2) are already to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code and thereby probably it might be said that we are really not making any very fundamental change. But we are, as I contend, making a fundamental change because what we are doing by the introduction of Article 15-A is to put a limitation upon the authority both of Parliament as well as of the Provincial Legislature not to abrogate the two provisions, because they are now introduced in our Constitution itself." 12. As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi & Ors. this court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously, observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release. 13. It remains to be seen whether any proper cause has been shown in the return for declining the prayer of Madhu Limaye and other arrested persons for releasing them on the ground that there was noncompliance with the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. In Ram Narayan Singh's case it was laid down that the court must have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return. In the present case the return, dated November 20, 1968, was filed before the date of the first hearing after the rule nisi had been issued. The return, as already observed, does not contain any information as to when and by whom Madhu Limaye and other arrested person were informed of the grounds for their arrest. It has not been contended on behalf of the State that the circumstances were such that the arrested persons must have known the general nature of the alleged offences for which they had been arrested; vide proposition No. 3 in Christie & Another v. Leachinsky. ((1947) 1 All ELR 567) Nor has it been suggested that the show cause notices which were issued on November 11, 1968, satisfied the constitutional requirement. Madhu Limaye and others are, therefore, entitled to be released on this ground alone. 14. ((1947) 1 All ELR 567) Nor has it been suggested that the show cause notices which were issued on November 11, 1968, satisfied the constitutional requirement. Madhu Limaye and others are, therefore, entitled to be released on this ground alone. 14. Once it is shown that the arrests made by the police officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters. This State has failed to do. The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have been made mechanically. All that Mr. Chagla has said is that if the arrested persons wanted to challenge their legality the High Court should have been moved under appropriate provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. But it must be remembered that Madhu Limaye and others have, by moving this court under Art. 32 of the Constitution, complained of detention or confinement in jail without compliance with the constitutional and legal provisions. If their detention in custody could not continue after their arrest because of the violation of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution they were entitled to be released forthwith. The orders of remand are not such as would cure the constitutional infirmities. This disposes of the third contention of Madhu Limaye. 15. We have been pressed to decide the question of mala fides which is the fourth contention of Madhu Limaye. Normally such matters are not gone into by this court in these proceedings and can be more appropriately agitated in such other legal action as he may be advised to institute or take. 16. We would like to make it clear that we have ordered the release of Madhu Limaye and the other arrested persons with regard to whom rule nisi was issued on the sole ground of violation of the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. We desire to express no opinion on the legality or illegality of the arrests made on November 6, 1968, of these persons with reference to the first point, namely, that the police officers purported to have effected the arrests for the offences under Section 188, Indian Penal Code and under Section 151 as also in respect of proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr. P.C., as these matters are sub judice. P.C., as these matters are sub judice. We may also proceed to add that any expression of opinion or observation in these proceedings shall not affect the course of the enquiry or trial of the arrested persons concerning the occurrences on November 5 and 6, 1968, which may be pending in the Courts in the State of Bihar and such proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with law. ” 9. This Court noticed the decision in case of Manubhai Ratilal Patel through Ushaben vs. State of Gujarat [ 2013 (1) SCC 314 ], where the appellant was arrested on 16.07.2012 in connection with the serious charges. The High Court on 17.07.2012 had stayed the further investigation but on the said date the Magistrate had already remanded the accused to the police custody. The application for grant of interim relief was rejected and the writ of habeas corpus was prayed for. What was contended before the concerned Court was that the investigation was stayed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Magistrate could not have exercised powers under Section 167(2) remanding accused either to police or judicial custody pending petition for quashment of FIR and that detention of accused was unlawful. 9.1. The Apex Court held that the arrest had taken place day prior to the passing of the order of stay. It is manifest that the order of remand passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 167(2) after considering allegations in FIR and not in a routine or mechanical manner. The Apex Court, therefore, upheld the judgment of this Court which refused the grant of writ of habeas corpus. While so holding, the Apex Court held the importance of writ of habeas corpus and also examined its history and held that this is a weapon for direction of individual liberty through judicial process. 9.2. The reference was also been made of the decision of Madhu Limaye (supra) and Mr. Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Delhi [ AIR 1953 SC 277 ] to urge that the Court must have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of considering writ of habeas corpus. 9.2. The reference was also been made of the decision of Madhu Limaye (supra) and Mr. Ram Narayan Singh vs. State of Delhi [ AIR 1953 SC 277 ] to urge that the Court must have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of considering writ of habeas corpus. However, noting the fact that the order of High Court staying the investigation was not prior to the order of remand and the order of remand was also not mechanical nor wholly illegal, the Apex Court chose not to interfere with the order passed by this Court. Moreover, at the time of passing of the order of remand by the learned JMFC, in a matter before the Apex Court, the order of stay of investigation was not served upon the Court concerned. The finding and observations of the Apex Court as follows:- “12. At this juncture, it is seemly to note that the appellant had knocked at the doors of the High Court in a habeas corpus petition. The writ of habeas corpus has always been given due signification as an effective method to ensure release of the detained person from prison. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon (1997 edition), while defining “habeas corpus”, apart from other aspects, the following has been stated: - “The ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus takes its name from the two mandatory words habeas. corpus, which it contained at the time when it, in common with all forms of legal process, was framed in Latin. The general purpose of these writs, as their name indicates, was to obtain the production of an individual.” 13. In Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, it has been observed that it is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty third year of Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously maintained by the courts of law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the executive at the cost of liege. 14. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty third year of Edward I. It has through the ages been jealously maintained by the courts of law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the executive at the cost of liege. 14. In Ranjit Singh v. The State of Pepsu (now Punjab), after referring to Greene v. Secretary of States for Home Affairs, this Court observed that the whole object of proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus is to make them expeditious, to keep them as free from technicality as possible and to keep them as simple as possible. The Bench quoted Lord Wright who, in Greene’s case, had stated thus: “The incalculable value of Habeas Corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the right to the appellant’s freedom.” Emphasis was laid on the satisfaction of the court relating to justifiability and legality of the custody. 15. In Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling and others, it was laid down that the writ of habeas corpus deals with the machinery of justice, not the substantive law. The object of the writ is to secure release of a person who is illegally restrained of his liberty. 16. Speaking about the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, a two- Judge Bench, in Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala and others, has observed as follows: - “…the writ of habeas corpus is the oldest writ evolved by the common law of England to protect the individual liberty against its invasion in the hands of the executive or may be also at the instance of private persons. This principle of habeas corpus has been incorporated in our constitutional law and we are of the opinion that in a democratic republic like India where Judges function under a written Constitution and which has a chapter on fundamental rights, to protect individual liberty the Judges owe a duty to safeguard the liberty not only of the citizens but also of all persons within the territory of India. The most effective way of doing the same is by way of exercise of power by the Court by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.” In the said case, a reference was made to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. The most effective way of doing the same is by way of exercise of power by the Court by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.” In the said case, a reference was made to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 11, para 1454 to highlight that a writ of habeas corpus is a writ of highest constitutional importance being a remedy available to the lowliest citizen against the most powerful authority. 17. Having stated about the significance of the writ of habeas corpus as a weapon for protection of individual liberty through judicial process, it is condign to refer to certain authorities to appreciate how this Court has dwelled upon and expressed its views pertaining to the legality of the order of detention, especially that ensuing from the order of the court when an accused is produced in custody before a Magistrate after arrest. It is also worthy to note that the opinion of this Court relating to the relevant stage of delineation for the purpose of adjudicating the legality of the order of detention is of immense importance for the present case. 18. In Col. Dr. B. Ramachandra Rao v. The State of Orissa and others, it was opined that a writ of habeas corpus is not granted where a person is committed to jail custody by a competent court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal. 19. In Re. Madhu Limaye and others, the Court referred to the decision in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi and opined that the court must have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of return. 20. In Kanu Sanyal v. Dist. Magistrate, Darjeeling and others, contentions were raised to the effect that the initial detention of the petitioner in District Jail, Darjeeling was illegal because he was detained without being informed of the grounds for his arrest as required under clause (i) of Article 22 of the Constitution and that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Darjeeling had no jurisdiction to try and, therefore, he could not authorise the detention of the petitioner under Section 167 of the Code. The two-Judge Bench adverted to the aforesaid aspects and referred to the earlier decisions in Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab, Ram Narain Singh (supra), B.R. Rao (Supra) and Talib Hussain v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and noted that three views had been taken by this Court at various times pertaining to the relevant date to determine the justifiability of the detention and opined as follows:- “This Court speaking through Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) said in A.K. Gopalan v. Government of India; [ (1966) 2 SCR 427 = ( AIR 1966 SC 816 )]. “It is well settled that in dealing with the petition for habeas corpus the Court is to see whether the detention on the date on which the application is made to the Court is legal, if nothing more has intervened between the date of the application and the date of the hearing”. In two early decisions of this Court, however, namely, Naranjan Singh v. State of Punjab, [( 1952 SCR 395 ) = AIR 1952 SC 106 )] and Ram Narain Singh v. State of Delhi, [( 1953 SCR 652 ) = ( AIR 1953 SC 277 )] a slightly different view was expressed and that view was reiterated by this Court in B.R. Rao v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1971 SC 2197 ) where it was said; “In habeas corpus the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings.” And yet in another decision of this Court in Talib Husain v. State of Jammu & Kashmir ( AIR 1971 SC 62 ) Mr. Justice Dua, sitting as a Single Judge, presumably in the vacation, observed that “in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of the hearing.” Of these three views taken by the Court at different times, the second appears to be more in consonance with the law and practice in England and may be taken as having received the largest measure of approval in India, though the third view also cannot be discarded as incorrect, because an inquiry whether the detention is legal or not at the date of hearing of the application for habeas corpus would be quite relevant, for the simple reason that if on that date the detention is legal, the Court cannot order release of the person detained by issuing a writ of habeas corpus. But, for the purpose of the present case, it is immaterial which of these three views is accepted as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be the correct view, the earliest date with reference to which the legality of detention may be examined is the date of filing of the application for habeas corpus and the Court is not, to quote the words of Mr. Justice Dua in AIR 1971 SC 2197 “concerned with a date prior to the initiation of the proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus”.” (emphasis supplied) After so stating, the Bench opined that for adjudication in the said case, it was immaterial which of the three views was accepted as correct but eventually referred to paragraph 7 in the case of B.R. Rao (supra) wherein the Court had expressed the view in the following manner: - “….in habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings.” Eventually, the Bench ruled thus: - “The production of the petitioner before the Special Judge, Vizakhapatnam, could not, therefore, be said to be illegal and his subsequent detention in the Central Jail, Vizakhapatnam, pursuant to the orders made by the Special Judge, Vizakhapatnam, pending trial must be held to be valid. This Court pointed out in AIR 1971 SC 2197 that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted “where a person is committed to Jail custody by a competent court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or wholly illegal”.” 21. The principle laid down in Kanu Sanyal (supra), thus, is that any infirmity in the detention of the petitioner at the initial stage cannot invalidate the subsequent detention and the same has to be judged on its own merits. 22. At this juncture, we may profitably refer to the Constitution Bench decision in Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II) wherein it has been opined thus: - “It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order.”” 10. In this background, coming to the matter on hand, this Court notices that in the year 2010, when the allegation of having eloped with a girl who was minor, the present petitioner was arraigned as an accused in I-CR No. 55 of 2010. Despite the best of the efforts, when he could not be traced, the 'A' summary report came to be submitted before the Court, who also on noticing the non-availability of the petitioner – accused, chose to accept the 'A' summary report, however, he directed the police to continue with the investigation vide its order dated 11.06.2012. Thus, the warrant by than had already been issued under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also was given as a part of process to the special operation team. Thus, the warrant by than had already been issued under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also was given as a part of process to the special operation team. In the year 2017, for the first time, the petitioner approached this Court by way of CRMA 1141 of 2017 with the following prayers:- “(a) To allow this petition; (b) To quash and set aside impugned FIR (Annexure-A) being I- No. 55/2010 registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station, District Morbi and further be pleased to quash and set aside the further proceedings incidental thereto; (b) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this application, to stay the investigation – further proceedings of the impugned FIR I- No. 55/2010 registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station, District Morbi; (c) To pass any other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper to this Hon'ble Court.” 10.1. The Court after hearing learned advocate has granted the stay. There appears to be some inadvertent reference in the prayer numbered as prayer (b) twice which was later on amended and the same has been numbered as (c). The fresh writ which has been issued and delivered to the police authority makes it very clear that the Court has stayed both the investigation and further proceedings in relation to the I-CR No. 55 of 2010. 11. It is not in dispute that the same had been received by the concerned Police Station. It is always expected that when the proceedings and the investigation are stayed, the same is inverted and mentioned in the register maintained by the police either manually or in the computerized system. It is not challenged nor disputed by the police authority that the writ had been received by it, despite which, it has not followed the directions issued by this Court. Here is not the case where after the arrest, any order has been passed by the Court and debate could be permitted in wake of various decisions. It is nearly three years since the Court had directed the stay of the proceedings. 12. The SOG since was handed over the warrant under Section 70 of the Cr.P.C., it ought to have been communicated the grant of stay by this Court by the Investigating Officer. It is nearly three years since the Court had directed the stay of the proceedings. 12. The SOG since was handed over the warrant under Section 70 of the Cr.P.C., it ought to have been communicated the grant of stay by this Court by the Investigating Officer. A request could have gone to the concerned Court of learned JMFC from whom the warrant had been obtained that in wake of the Court's order, it was not desirable to continue the said warrant, however, this follow-up action has not been taken up on the part of the police authority. On nabbing of the present petitioner by SOG, he was handed over to the concerned police station, which without taking the requisite care of following the specific order of Court, arrested him and presented him before learned JMFC, who having no clue of the order of stay of proceedings sent him to the judicial custody. 13. Ordinarily, pursuant to the FIR when the arrest is made and the person is sent to the judicial custody, the writ of habeas corpus will not lie. Here is a case where this Court exercised the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had specifically directed the police authority neither to further investigate nor carry out further proceedings. The authority was bound by such directions, however, it never bothered to get the order challenged or altered and therefore, any subsequent actions of investigation or any proceedings in relation to I-CR No. 55 of 2010 while such a protective order is already existing, shall need to be held to be without authority. Even if the inherent jurisdiction will not be taken away, it is meant to be suspended for the time being, till the order of this Court remains in operation. In that view of the matter, all subsequent actions of the arrest and also of sending him to the judicial custody, even by virtue of the order of learned JMFC, shall need to be held without the authority of law and therefore, when any illegal custody is noticed by the Court, even if he continued to be an accused, in wake of this development from the year 2017, the Court needs to intervene rather than asking him to take recourse of law and get himself released on bail. Ensuring that the order of this Court is neither flouted nor in any manner overlooked by the authority, indulgence is shown. 14. Resultantly, it is a matter where the Court needs to exercise its power of addressing the action taken by the police authority and issue a writ of habeas corpus. 15. While allowing this petition and releasing the petitioner from judicial custody in connection with the FIR being I-CR No. 55 of 2010, registered with Morbi Taluka Police Station, Morbi, this Court directs the petitioner to furnish his undertaking in connection with his residence and his availability in the future process, as ensured by learned advocate Mr. Virat Popat and noticing the fact that the process in FIR being I-CR No. 55 of 2010 though stayed, is completely not over. 16. Direct service is permitted.