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2020 DIGILAW 425 (GAU)

Tongonagaon Tea Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Das

2020-03-24

KALYAN RAI SURANA

body2020
JUDGMENT : Kalyan Rai Surana, J. 1. Heard Mr. B. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. T. Islam, learned counsel appearing for respondents no. 1 and 2 and Mr. C.K.S. Barua, learned Govt. advocate appearing for the State respondent nos. 3, 4 & 5. 2. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 23.09.2019 passed by the learned Special Tribunal, Tinsukia constituted under the Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act. 2010 in Misc. (J) Case No. 23/2019 in L.G Case No. 4/2019. In this application, the petitioners have also prayed for quashing of the proceedings of L.G Case No. 4/2019 pending before the said learned Tribunal. It is submitted that the Appellate Tribunal as provided under the said Act has not been constituted, as such, the petitioners having no other alternative, has approached this Court. 3. The respondents are the complainant in L.G. Case No. 4/2019, filed before the learned Special Tribunal on 24.06.2018. In the said application, allegation of land grabbing was made against the petitioners herein in respect of a plot of land measuring 3B-0K-17L, which is covered by a part of dag no. 147 and 20 of Tea Patta No. 1, Grant No. 114 of Village- Tongana Gaon, Mouza-Saikhowa, in the district of Tinsukia, morefully described in column no. 9 of the said complaint and hereinafter referred to as the "schedule land". It was projected that the petitioners possessed the schedule land for last 70-80 years since the days of their forefathers. It was alleged that the petitioner no. 2 along with his staff and associates had illegally entered into a part of the schedule land of the petitioners by employing JCB, dumpers, etc., as such, they had filed FIR before the concerned police, who registered (i) Tongana P.S. Case No. 9/2019 under Section 447/323/379/506/34 IPC, and (ii) Tongana P.S. Case No. 13/2019 under Section 447/325/294/506/34 IPC. It was further projected that by letter dated 25.2.2019, the Circle Officer, Doomdooma had requested the Deputy Commissioner, Tinsukia for granting patta to the occupants of Grant No. 114 under Tongana Gaon. A statement was made to the effect that the respondents had filed a petition before the Executive Magistrate, Tinsukia, but the interim order initially granted was vacated by the learned Sessions Court, Tinsukia. 4. A statement was made to the effect that the respondents had filed a petition before the Executive Magistrate, Tinsukia, but the interim order initially granted was vacated by the learned Sessions Court, Tinsukia. 4. Along with the said application, an in-j unction application was filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, which was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 23/2019, wherein the respondents had prayed for ad interim injunction to restrain the petitioners from raising any construction on the schedule land and from transferring, alienating or disposing of the schedule land. The petitioners had contested the said petition by filing their written objection and by the order dated 23.09.2019, ad interim injunction as prayed for was made absolute till the disposal of the L.G Case No. 4/2019. The said order is impugned in this application. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the schedule land stands in the name of Tongana Tea Estate, and that its lawful owner had assigned its rights in favour of the petitioner no. 1 and, as such, the petitioner no. 1 had acquired all the right, interest etc. in respect of all the land of the said Tongonagaon Tea Estate. It is submitted that under corporate social responsibility and as per the guidelines of World Trade Union Organization, the petitioner no. 1 had set up a Fair Trade Welfare Trust and as a part of the community development scheme, the said trust had taken a decision on 27.03.2017 to construct a community market. Thereafter, in the annual general meeting of the said trust held on 17.02.2018, a budget of Rs. 12.00 lakh was allocated for construction of the said community market on the basis of lay out plan dated 08.01.2018 prepared by a registered designer. Thereafter, on 01.02.2019, in the presence of the Tea Estate workers, a religious ceremony was held to start the construction. 6. It is submitted that on the basis of petition filed by the respondents and two other individuals, the Executive Magistrate- cum-Circle Officer, Doomdooma Revenue Circle, by notice dated 02.03.2019, directed the petitioners to maintain status quo until further orders. On the basis of said notice, the police personnel from Tongana P.S. stopped the construction work. 6. It is submitted that on the basis of petition filed by the respondents and two other individuals, the Executive Magistrate- cum-Circle Officer, Doomdooma Revenue Circle, by notice dated 02.03.2019, directed the petitioners to maintain status quo until further orders. On the basis of said notice, the police personnel from Tongana P.S. stopped the construction work. The petitioners contested the said case by filing Written objection and thereafter, the said Circle Officer, by an order dated 13.03.2019, vacated the order dated 02.03.2019 to maintain status quo, which was communicated to the O/c. Tongana P.S. Thereafter, the construction work has resumed. However, by an order vide memo dated 19.03.2019, the Addl. Deputy Commissioner (Rev.), Tinsukia forwarded the copy of complaint made by the respondent No. 2 and others to the Tongana RS with direction to look into the matter and to maintain status quo until further orders, as such, the construction activity was again stopped by the police. It is submitted that in the said complaint, the previous order dated 13.03.2019, by which the Circle Officer had vacated the order of status quo was concealed. Aggrieved by the order dated 19.03.2019, the petitioners had filed Criminal Revision No. 10(1) of 2019 before the learned Sessions Court, Tinsukia and the said learned Court, upon hearing both sides, by an order dated 28.05.2019, set aside the order dated 19.03.2019 passed by the Addl. Deputy Commissioner (Rev.), Tinsukia and thereafter, once again the petitioners had resumed their construction work on the schedule land. It is also submitted that by concealing all the previous orders, the respondents again filed a petition under Sections 107/145/147 Cr.P.C. before the learned Addl. District Magistrate, Tinsukia on 17.06.2019, whereupon the said authority had passed an order dated 18.06.2019 on the margin space of the said petition, thereby directing the police to maintain status quo. Consequently, the O/c, Tongana P.S. by a notice dated 19.06.2019, asked the petitioner no. 2 to stop construction, and also provided a photocopy of the said order to the petitioners. Thereafter, after the said authority had perused the judgment passed by the learned Session Court in case No. 10(1)/2019, by an order dated 20.6.2019, which was passed in the side margin of the said petition dated 17.06.2019, the status quo order was withdrawn. 7. 2 to stop construction, and also provided a photocopy of the said order to the petitioners. Thereafter, after the said authority had perused the judgment passed by the learned Session Court in case No. 10(1)/2019, by an order dated 20.6.2019, which was passed in the side margin of the said petition dated 17.06.2019, the status quo order was withdrawn. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that save and except making a short statement about the order of status quo passed by Executive Magistrate and vacating of the same by the learned Sessions Court, reference to all other three proceedings was concealed in the petition filed for initiating land grabbing case which was filed before the learned Special Tribunal on 24.06.2018, which was registered as L.G Case No. 4/2019. 8. It is submitted that a report was called for by the learned Special Tribunal and accordingly, the Circle Officer had submitted a report dated 19.07.2019, inter-alia, stating that land under dag no. 147 is recorded and mutated in the name of Saikhowa Assam Tea Company Ltd., and that about 4 months ago, a joint verification was made by the Circle Officer, Doomdooma with the revenue staff and the Manager of the petitioner no. 1 and found that the respondent no. 1 had illegally occupied a plot of land measuring 1 bigha by building a house and by digging a pond and it was also reported that recently the Tea garden had filled up the pond by earth filling. It is submitted that the petitioners had submitted their written statement and written objection. It is submitted that by the impugned order dated 23.09.2019 passed in Misc.(J) Case No. 23/2019, the learned Special Tribunal had restrained the petitioners from raising any construction over the disputed land or from transferring, alienating or disposing of the disputed land and further prohibiting them from disturbing the peaceful enjoyment of the disputed land by the respondents. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners had meticulously referred to the various provisions of the Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") including Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 5 and 8 of the said Act. It is submitted impugned order was not sustainable because the ad-interim injunction was issued in respect of schedule land measuring 3B-0K-17L, whereas as per Circle Officer's report, the respondent no. 1 was occupying 1 bigha land. It is submitted impugned order was not sustainable because the ad-interim injunction was issued in respect of schedule land measuring 3B-0K-17L, whereas as per Circle Officer's report, the respondent no. 1 was occupying 1 bigha land. It is also submitted that the respondents were rank trespassers over a part of the schedule land, as such, the learned Special Tribunal had issued injunction against the true owner. In view of the suppression of material facts, the filing of land grabbing case was an abuse of the process of court. It is also submitted that neither the conduct of the respondents were bona fide, nor they had approached the Court with clean hands. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the case of (1) Premji Ratansey Shah & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 547 , (2) Konda Lakshmana Bapuji Vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 258 , and (3) In Re: State of Assam, 2017(5) GLT 854 : (2018) 2 GLR 313. 10. Per-contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the respondents was occupying 1K-17L land of dag no. 20 and 1K-17L land of dag no. 147, which accounted for 3K-14L of land and the remaining 2B-2K-3L land under the occupation of the petitioners was cultivable land under dag no. 147. It also submitted that only after the issuance of a letter dated 25.02.2019 by the Circle Officer, Doomdooma to the Deputy Commissioner, Tinsukia for granting patta to the occupants of land covered by Grant no. 114 under Tongana Gaon, the petitioners had started to disturb the possession of the respondents over the schedule land which they were enjoying for last 70-80 years since the days of their forefathers. It is submitted that if the order of injunction is set aside at this stage, the petitioners would change the nature and character of the schedule land, and that in such an event, the respondents would suffer irreparable prejudice. 11. It is seen that in L.G Case No. 4/2019, as well in the three proceedings initiated before the Executive Magistrate/Addl. It is submitted that if the order of injunction is set aside at this stage, the petitioners would change the nature and character of the schedule land, and that in such an event, the respondents would suffer irreparable prejudice. 11. It is seen that in L.G Case No. 4/2019, as well in the three proceedings initiated before the Executive Magistrate/Addl. Deputy Commissioner, neither there is any statement by the respondents that they are the owners and/or the title holders of the schedule land, nor any document is annexed to show that they were possessing the schedule land since last 70-80 years since the days of their forefathers. The documents appended to this application shows that the land measuring 20B-0K-5L under Dag No. 114 and land measuring 242B-2K-13L under dag no. 147 of Tea Patta no. 1 under Tongana Grant no. 114 of Saikhowa Mouza is mutated in the name of Saikhowa Assam Tea Company. Moreover, as per the direction by the learned Special Tribunal, the Circle Officer by letter dated 19.07.2019 reported to the said learned Tribunal that Dag no. 147 was recorded and mutated in the name of Saikhowa Assam Tea Company Ltd. and that about four months ago, a joint verification was made by the Circle Officer, Doomdooma with the revenue staff and the Manager of the petitioner no. 1 and found that the respondent no. 1 had illegally occupied a plot of land measuring 1 Bigha by way of constructing a house and by digging a pond and that the petitioner no. 1 had recently filled up the pond by earth. 12. From the documents available on record, it is seen that the respondents had initiated four proceeding against the petitioners in respect of the schedule land. The first proceeding was by filing a petition dated 2.3.2019 before the Executive Magistrate-cum-Circle Officer, Doomdooma Revenue Circle. The initial order of status quo was enforced by the police, but after filing of the written objection on 06.03.2019, said order was vacated. It is seen that the stand of the petitioners in their written objection in the said first proceeding was that vide letter dated 18.05.2017, they were directed by the Block Project Manager, Kakopathar BMMU to propose a location for setting up Bagan Bazar at Tongana Gaon Tea Estate, which should be central and have support system of all infrastructure, such as road, electricity and security. Accordingly, the petitioners had chosen the site of the schedule land for setting up the proposed Bagan Bazar and Children Park. The second proceeding was before the Addl. Deputy Commissioner (Rev.), Tinsukia and the said authority had passed an order of status quo on 19.03.2019, which was enforced through the Tongana P.S., however, the said order of status quo was vacated by the learned Sessions Court, Tinsukia vide judgment dated 28.05.2019 in Crl. Rev. 10(1) of 2019. The third proceeding was by filing petition dated 17.06.2019 under Section 107/145/147 Cr.P.C. before the Addl. District Magistrate, Tinsukia and the said authority by passing an order dated 18.06.2019 in the side margin of the said petition, directed the O/c, Tongana P.S. to maintain status quo. However, the order of status-quo was vacated on 20.06.2019 after the said authority had perused the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Tinsukia in Case no. 10(1)/2019. It is seen that in the said proceedings under Section 107/145/147 Cr.P.C., no declaration whatsoever was made by the Addl. District Magistrate, Tinsukia in favour of the respondents from which it can be culled out that the respondents were having any semblance of right, title, interest or possession over the schedule land or any part thereof, rather on the side margin of the said petition, vide order dated 20.06.2019, a declaration has been made by the said authority to the following effect- "The status quo is withdrawn and the 2nd party has all right over the disputed land and proper... (illegible) as (illegible) purpose." 13. Thus, in three consecutive proceedings, the concerned authorities had directed the police for enforcing the order of status quo, which indicates that the petitioners were carrying out some land development activity on the schedule land. 14. It is also seen that in the land grabbing case, the respondents had not pleaded any particular date when the petitioners had purportedly entered the schedule land illegally. The respondents had also not stated the date on which two FIRs were filed by them before the Tongana P.S., which was registered as Tongana P.S. Case No. 9/2019 and 13/2019. Under such circumstances the respondents have not been able to, prima facie, show that till which date they were holding possession of the disputed land. 15. The respondents had also not stated the date on which two FIRs were filed by them before the Tongana P.S., which was registered as Tongana P.S. Case No. 9/2019 and 13/2019. Under such circumstances the respondents have not been able to, prima facie, show that till which date they were holding possession of the disputed land. 15. The Court is of the considered opinion that for taking cognizance of offence under the Act, an allegation is sufficient that land grabbing has taken place. 16. The following two points of determination arise in this case:- i. What is the scope of an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC in connection with a complaint filed under Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2010? ii. Whether the impugned order warrants any interference? The point of determination No. (i):. 17. It is deemed appropriate that few of the relevant provisions of the said Act are examined for the purpose of the point involved. The relevant sections of the said Act are extracted below:- "8(2) The Special Tribunal may, either suo-moto, or on application made by any aggrieved person or any officer or authority, take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and title to or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit. 8(7) Every finding of the Special Tribunal in a trial under this section with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing, ownership and title to, or possession of the land grabbed shall be conclusive such land grabbing, and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Tribunal with regard to the determination of title and ownership to or lawful possession of any grabbed land shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. 8(8) Every case under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of by the Special Tribunal as far as possible within a period of twelve months from the date of institution of the case before it and a proceeding under sub-section (6) shall be disposed of as far as possible within a period of six months from the date of framing of the charges against the person or persons responsible for alleged commission or abetment of the offence punishable under this Act. 8(9) It shall be lawful for the Special Tribunal to pass such order as it may deem fit in the interest of justice. It may award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession of the grabbed land which shall not be less than an amount of equivalent to the market value of the land so grabbed as on the date of the order and the profits accrued from the land, payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct redelivery compensation and profits, so awarded and cost of redelivery, if Government is the owner, or as a decree of a Civil Court in any other cases. It may also impose such punishment to a land grabber for Commission of any offence punishable under this Act. 9. Special Tribunal to have the powers of the Civil Court and the Court of Session.- Save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974), in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Tribunal mutatis enactment, Special Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court, or as the case may be, a Court of Session and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court and a and a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before the Special Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. 10(2) After taking cognizance of a case under sub-section (2) of Section 8, the Special Tribunal shall try and dispose of the civil liability at first and decide and pass order as to the title, ownership and lawful possession of the grabbed land whether before or after the commencement of this Act as it deems fit. 10(2) After taking cognizance of a case under sub-section (2) of Section 8, the Special Tribunal shall try and dispose of the civil liability at first and decide and pass order as to the title, ownership and lawful possession of the grabbed land whether before or after the commencement of this Act as it deems fit. After completion of the civil proceeding, if the Special Tribunal decides and pass order that the land in question has been grabbed, the Special Tribunal may order that the possession of the land be restored to the person whose land has been grabbed after evicting the land grabber or any other person who may be in possession of land, if necessary by use of such force as may be required for the purpose: Provided that execution of the order for restoration of the possession of the grabbed land shall not be made till expiration of the period of appeal provided under Section 13 of the Act. If within a reasonable time after the expiry of the appeal period no order of stay of execution has been received from the Special Court or produced before the Special Tribunal shall proceed for execution of its order and simultaneously frame charge against the land grabber to prosecute him for the alleged act of land grabbing. Provided further that in the event of preferring an appeal from the order of the Special Tribunal before the Special Court where stay of execution of the order has been made by the Special Court, the Special Tribunal shall not further proceed in the proceeding to prosecute the land grabber till final disposal of the appeal by the Special Court. Provided also that after hearing the appeal, if the Special Court decides the appeal against the alleged land grabber, in that event charge for prosecution against the land grabber shall be framed by the Special Tribunal and proceed with the criminal proceeding for prosecution of the land grabber. 13. Appeal.- (1) Any person, aggrieved by the Judgment and order (not being an interlocutory order) of the Special Tribunal, may prefer an appeal before the Special Court or any question of law or of fact. 13. Appeal.- (1) Any person, aggrieved by the Judgment and order (not being an interlocutory order) of the Special Tribunal, may prefer an appeal before the Special Court or any question of law or of fact. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Limitation Act, 1963, (Act No. XXXVI of 1963) an appeal under this section shall be preferred it within a period of sixty days from the date of passing of the Judgment and order by the Special Tribunal. 16. Special Court to have the powers of the Civil Court and the Criminal Court.- Save as expressly provided in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act of 1908) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to the purposes of the provisions of this Act, the Special Court shall be Court and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court and a Criminal Court competent to hear and dispose of Appeal. The persons conducting a prosecution before the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. 20. Prohibition of alienation of grabbed land- Any transaction relating to an alienation of a grabbed land or any part thereof by way of sale, lease, gift, exchange, settlement, surrender, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise, or any partition affected or a trust created in respect of such land which has taken place whether before or after the commencement of the Act shall, except ordered by the Special Court or Special Tribunal, be null and void." 18. It is seen that Section 20 of the said Act provides for prohibition of alienation of grabbed land. It is envisaged thereunder that any alienation of grabbed land, would be null and void. Therefore, if the said provision of Section 20 is read in harmony with the provisions of Sections 8(2), 8(9) and 10(2) and of the Act, the Tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to pass interim orders. It is envisaged thereunder that any alienation of grabbed land, would be null and void. Therefore, if the said provision of Section 20 is read in harmony with the provisions of Sections 8(2), 8(9) and 10(2) and of the Act, the Tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to pass interim orders. Therefore, there is no bar for the Special Tribunal constituted under the Act to pass interim orders including ad interim injunction under the provisions of Order XXXTX Rules 1 and 2 and/or by invoking inherent powers available under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which would be in aid to the main relief in the land grabbing case so that the reliefs as envisaged under the Act is not frustrated or rendered unenforceable. 19. Thus, from the scheme of the said Act, the learned Tribunal has the power to pass interlocutory orders. However, the Act envisages a definite timeline for the disposal of the land grabbing case. However, the learned Tribunal is required to take up the proceeding in such a manner so that the hearing of interlocutory application does not frustrate the time line to dispose of the land grabbing case as fixed by Section 8(8) of the said Act. This Court in the case of In Re: State of Assam (supra), has held, inter-alia, that under the provisions of the 2010 Act, the criminal trial would be postponed or kept in abeyance till determination of the civil liability in a summary manner, if taken up as a defence plea by the accused having regard to the requirement of Section 11 whereby and where under presumption would be that land grabbing had taken place and burden would be on the accused to prove otherwise. The provision of Sub-section (8) of Section 8 gives a time line to decide a proceeding, as far as practicable, within 12 months from the date of institution and 6 months after framing of charge; under Section 10(2), the Special Tribunal has the power to order restoration of possession of land and also to execute such orders. 20. Upon a perusal of the provisions of Section 13 of the said Act, it is seen that although the provision for appeal is provided, but interlocutory orders is excluded from the purview of appeal. 21. 20. Upon a perusal of the provisions of Section 13 of the said Act, it is seen that although the provision for appeal is provided, but interlocutory orders is excluded from the purview of appeal. 21. In view of the discussions above, the point of determination No. (i) is answered by holding that is the Special Tribunal constituted under the Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2010 would have the jurisdiction and power to grant interim orders, by invoking the provisions of Order XXXTX Rules 1 and 2 as well as under Section 151 CPC in connection with a complaint filed under the said Act. However, as under Section 13 of the said Act, it is provided that the party aggrieved by judgment and order (not being interlocutory order) of the Special Tribunal may prefer an appeal, by virtue of the said provisions, any party aggrieved by the interlocutory order is precluded from filing an appeal. Point of determination No. (ii): 22. The plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondents are themselves land grabbers and, as such, they are not entitled to protection by granting ad interim injunction. In this regard, while discussing the provision of Section 11 of the said Act, this Court in paragraph 15 of the case of In Re: State of Assam (supra), held as follows:- "17. There is one more relevant provision which is Section 11. It says that in a proceeding relating to land grabbing, the presumption is that the accused is a land grabber and the burden of proving that the land has not been grabbed by the accused would be on him. This section is a pointer to how seriously the legislature has viewed, the menace of land grabbing in the State of Assam." 23. As already indicated herein before, the provisions of Section 20 of the said Act prohibits alienation of grabbed land. It is noticed that in the present case in hand, although the petitioners have set up the defence of being the owners and right- holders of the schedule land, yet under the scheme of the Act, they are the accused in the case instituted under the said Act. 24. It is noticed that in the present case in hand, although the petitioners have set up the defence of being the owners and right- holders of the schedule land, yet under the scheme of the Act, they are the accused in the case instituted under the said Act. 24. Therefore, as the proceedings as envisaged under the said Act has been held to be summary in nature, in the considered opinion of the Court, in light of the allegation that the schedule land was grabbed, in view of the prohibition contained in Section 20 of the Act, the learned Tribunal need not intrinsically examine the claims and objections of the parties, and it would be permissible to grant injunction in furtherance of the objective of Section 20 of the Act by restraining the alleged land grabber from undertaking any transaction relating to an alienation of a grabbed land or any part thereof by way of sale, lease, gift, exchange, settlement, surrender, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise, or any partition affected or a trust created in respect of such land which has taken place whether before or after the commencement of the Act. However, if any other prayer for injunction is made, then the Special Court or the Special Tribunal shall have to decide the matter in light of three golden principles for grant of ad-interim injunction i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury. Hence, for the purpose of grant of ad interim injunction, the learned Special Tribunal in seisin of land grabbing matter is not required to determine the truth or otherwise of the allegation regarding land grabbing. In the case of In Re: State of Assam (supra), this Court had held that in the trial of the land grabbing case, when the alleged land grabber claims or put up a defence of proprietary right of ownership or possessory right over the land in question, then the civil liability would be adjudicated first and it was further held that if he fails to establish any such right, then criminal proceeding for prosecution of the land grabber would recommence. In the said case, this court had further held that by setting up a defence of title, no person becomes entitled to take law into his own hands and unlawfully dispossesses another person from a plot of land without following the due process of law. 25. In the said case, this court had further held that by setting up a defence of title, no person becomes entitled to take law into his own hands and unlawfully dispossesses another person from a plot of land without following the due process of law. 25. In the case of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), the Supreme Court of India held that it must be borne in mind that for purposes of taking cognizance of a case under the Act, existence of an allegation of any act of land grabbing is the sine qua non and not the truth or otherwise of such an allegation. But to hold that a person is a land grabber it is necessary that the allegations satisfying the requirements of land grabbing are proved. It was further held that to make out a case in a civil case that the appellant is a land grabber the first respondent must aver and prove both the ingredients- the factum as well as the intention that the appellant falls in the categories of the persons, mentioned above [clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act], has occupied the land in dispute, which belonged to the first respondent, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to or with the intention of illegally taking possession of such land or entering into the land for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act. 26. As per the report dated 19.07.2019 submitted by the Circle Officer to the learned Special Tribunal, it is mentioned that about four months prior to the said report, the respondent no. 1 had illegally occupied a plot of land measuring 1 bigha by building a house and digging a pond and that the pond was recently filled up by the petitioner no. 1 by earth filling. Thus, in so far as 1 bigha land is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the learned Special Tribunal had power to issue order of injunction to prohibit the petitioners from alienating only the said part of schedule land. Thus, the grant of injunction on the remaining 2B-0K-17L land (out of schedule land measuring 3B-0K-17L, save and except 1 bigha land) is held to be not sustainable on facts and in law. 27. Thus, the grant of injunction on the remaining 2B-0K-17L land (out of schedule land measuring 3B-0K-17L, save and except 1 bigha land) is held to be not sustainable on facts and in law. 27. Coming to the plea taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Special Tribunal had granted injunction against the true and lawful owner of the schedule land and thereby protected the illegal possession of a trespasser and in this context, he had cited the case of Premji Ratansey Shah (supra). In the said case, the Supreme Court of India load held as follows: "4... The question, therefore, is whether an injunction can be issued against the true owner. Issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts, injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right under Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest of right not shown to be in existence, cannot be protected by injunction. 5. It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore, the courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who have no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not bean excuse to claim injunction against true owner." 28. In this regard, the Court is of the considered opinion that a ratio of the case is determined on the facts under which the case has been adjudicated. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2010 was enacted with the avowed objecting of arresting and curbing unlawful activity of land grabbing which was adversely affecting the public order. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2010 was enacted with the avowed objecting of arresting and curbing unlawful activity of land grabbing which was adversely affecting the public order. In the case of In Re: State of Assam (supra), this Court had held that the main object of the Act is to protect the owner and possessor of the land from unlawful land grabbing and to punish the criminal land grabbers. It was also held that the principle object of the Act is not to adjudicate right, title or possession over the land in question and that by its very nature the determination of civil liability was held to be of a summary nature and cannot partake the character of a full- fledged civil suit. However, in the case cited, the facts was not related to the accusation of land grabbing. Moreover, Section 20 of the Act prohibits alienation of grabbed land. Therefore, even if the true and lawful title holder of the land grabs the same from its occupier, the grant of injunction against alienation can still be validly ordered as per the mandate of Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, on facts the case of Premji Ratansey Shah (supra), which was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is distinguishable from the facts of the present case in hand. 29. Therefore, notwithstanding that the petitioner No. 1 has the right and interest over the suit land, but whether the Act of entering into the suit land is covered by the meaning of land grabbing is a matter which requires adjudication of the civil liability first. 30. In the present case in hand, there is a specific declaration by the Addl. District Magistrate by his order dated 20.06.2019 that the petitioners had all the right over the disputed land without returning any finding under proviso to sub- section (4) of section 145 Cr.P.C. as to whether the respondents had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate. However, from the report of the Circle Officer dated 19.07.2019, it is mentioned therein that the respondent no. 1 was illegally occupying apart of the schedule land measuring 1 bigha. However, from the report of the Circle Officer dated 19.07.2019, it is mentioned therein that the respondent no. 1 was illegally occupying apart of the schedule land measuring 1 bigha. Therefore, a prima facie case for trial is definitely present requiring determination of the civil liability and criminal liability of the petitioners in the land grabbing case. The report dated 19.07.2019 by the Circle Officer that the respondents are themselves trespassers and/or illegal occupant of a part of the schedule land measuring about 1 bigha would not disentitle the respondents for an order of injunction so as to prohibit the petitioners from alienating the schedule land. 31. In view of the provisions of Sections 8(9) and 10(2) of the Act, the Special Tribunal is not powerless to restore possession of the remaining 2B-0K-17L portion of the schedule land to the respondents if they are successful in the trial of the case. Thus, the balance of convenience is found tilting in favour of grant of injunction in so far as 1 bigha part of schedule land is concerned, but not in respect of remaining 2B-0K-17L portion of the schedule land. For the same reason, the Court is of the opinion that the respondents would suffer any irreparable loss or injury if injunction is granted in respect of 1 bigha part of schedule land is concerned, but not in respect of remaining 2B-0K-17L portion of the schedule land. The court of if the considered opinion that the Special Tribunal constituted under the said Act is not powerless to restore possession of the said remaining 2B-0k-17L portion of the schedule land or any part thereof to the respondents, if the petitioners are unable to discharge their burden to prove that they had not indulged in land grabbing over the schedule land or any part thereof. Thus, the Court is of the considered opinion that as the Circle Officer's report dated 19.07.2019 that the respondent no. 1 was in occupation of 1 bigha land out of schedule land measuring 3B-0K-17L, the same having not been discarded, the grant of ad- interim injunction by the learned Special Tribunal in respect of remaining 2B-0K-17L (exceeding 1B-0K-0L), covered by dag no. 147 of Tea Patta no. 1, Grant no. 114 under Tongona Gaon, Mouza- Saikhowa is not sustainable on facts and in law. 32. 147 of Tea Patta no. 1, Grant no. 114 under Tongona Gaon, Mouza- Saikhowa is not sustainable on facts and in law. 32. In the view of the discussion above, the order of ad-interim injunction granted by judgment and order dated 23.09.2019 passed by the learned Special Tribunal, Tinsukia in Misc.(J) Case No. 23/2019 stands modified so as to operate only in respect of 1 bigha portion of the schedule land (wherein as per the report dated 19.07.2019 by the Circle Officer, the respondent no. 1 has built the house) and not in respect of remaining 2B-0K-17L portion of the schedule land. 33. However, it is clarified that in so far as remaining 2B-0K-17L portion of schedule land is concerned, any activity undertaken therein by the petitioners shall be subject to the outcome of the land grabbing case. 34. However, taking note of the fact that the land grabbing in the State has to be kept at checked and keeping in mind that the intention of the said Act is to first decide the civil liability of the petitioners who have taken the plea of having lawful right title and interest over the disputed land. However, by setting up the defence of title, no person becomes entitled to take law into his own hands and unlawfully dispossess another person from a plot of land without following the due process of law, as such, no case is found to be made out by the petitioners for quashing of the proceedings of L.G Case No. 4/2019 and, as such, the said prayer made by the petitioners stands refused and rejected. 35. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Special Tribunal on the date fixed. However, if the proceeding of L.G. Case No. 4/2019 is stayed for any reason whatsoever, the parties shall appear before the said learned Tribunal on 20.04.2020 and by producing the certified copy of this order, seek further instruction from the said learned Tribunal. 36. The parties are left to bear their own cost.