JUDGMENT : These cases are disposed of on the basis of this common judgment as the main issue arising is the same in these matters. W.P(C).No.4704/2020 is taken as the leading case and the exhibits and respondents' status will be described mainly in terms of that Writ Petition unless otherwise indicated. 2. The petitioner in W.P.(C).No.4704/2020 has been selected as LPG distributor by M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited. He had taken the property in Re.Sy.No.97/11 and 97/12-1 of Kadapra Village belongs to the 5th respondent on lease for a period of 15 years and is in possession of the same. The petitioner has obtained building permit from the Panchayath concerned and has completed the construction and has obtained the requisite clearance from the authorities concerned for the running of the LPG distribution centre and had also tentatively fixed the inauguration of the said centre and the first load of the cylinders was to reach the godown on 20.2.2020. In order to reach the godown, the petitioner is using a road through Re.Sy.No.97/12 and the same was in existence for the past more than 40-45 years and the said road has also been used by the petitioner in W.P.(C). No.4216/2020 as well for reaching her house. Exts.P-4 & P-6 are the draft data bank documents which would show that the said road and surrounding properties are noted as 'purayidam' (residential property). Ext.P-5 is the certificate dated 16.7.2019 issued by none other than the Village Officer concerned, wherein it is clearly certified that the said pathway/road is going through the purayidam mentioned in the abovesaid draft data bank. That due to rivalry, the 6th respondent has preferred a false complaint to the 2nd respondent-District Collector, without impleading the petitioners in these cases as well as nearby residents as respondents, who are all beneficiaries of the alleged road. The 6th respondent has raised a factually wrong complaint alleging that the property through which the pathway is lying is a paddy land or wet land and that it has been unauthorisedly filled up by the 5th respondent and that action should be taken under the provisions of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008 and to direct the 5th respondent to reconvert the said property as paddy land, etc. Since the property has been given on lease by the 5th respondent to the petitioner and since the pathway lying through the said subject property is mainly used by the petitioners and nearby residents, the persons who are directly affected by any decision on the said complaint was persons like the petitioners. That without impleading the petitioners herein in the said proceedings and without conducting any inspection with due prior notice to the petitioner and without giving copies of such inspection reports, if any, to the petitioners as well as 5th respondent, the 3rd respondent-RDO has passed impugned Ext.P-8 order dated 29.1.2020 inter alia directing that the subject property mentioned therein should be reconverted as paddy land purportedly in exercise of the powers under Sec.13 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008. One of the prime contentions raised in these matters is that after the amendment made to Sec.13 of the 2008 Act with effect from 30.12.2017, the only power under Sec.13 for directing reconversion of the property can be exercised only by the District Collector of the District concerned and not by an officer like the 3rd respondent, who is subordinate to the 2nd respondent-District Collector. The 3rd respondent-RDO has taken the stand that since the 2nd respondent has proceeded on leave and since the 3rd respondent-RDO has been given full additional charge of the post of District Collector, the 3rd respondent-RDO is competent to pass an order in the nature of Ext.P-8. 3. The petitioner in W.P(C).No.4704/2020 has subsequently filed the aforesaid W.P(C).No. 6487/2020 stating that in view of the issuance of the abovesaid Ext.P-8 order, the 4th respondent-Regional Fire Officer, Fire & Rescue Department, Kottayam, by proceedings dated 1.3.2020 has refused to grant NOC of that department and copy of the said proceedings dated 1.3.2020 has been produced as Ext.P-12 in W.P.(C).No. 6487/2020. The petitioner has filed the said latter Writ Petition seeking quashment of Ext.P-12 proceedings marked therein as well. The petitioner in W.P.(C).No.4216/2020 is also a nearby resident, who is using the said pathway to reach her property and she is also equally affected like the other petitioner as she has been using the said pathway lying through the subject property for a quite long number of years and in view of the abovesaid proceedings at Ext.P-8 in W.P.(C). The petitioner in W.P.(C).No.4216/2020 is also a nearby resident, who is using the said pathway to reach her property and she is also equally affected like the other petitioner as she has been using the said pathway lying through the subject property for a quite long number of years and in view of the abovesaid proceedings at Ext.P-8 in W.P.(C). No.4704/2020 [marked as Ext.P-6 in W.P.(C).No.4216/2020] she is faced with serious adverse consequences. The said petitioner has also challenged the said proceedings dated 29.1.2020 issued by the 3rd respondent-RDO. 4. The prayers in W.P(C).No.4704/2020 are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order calling the records of Ext.P8 and quash the same holding that the same is illegal. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order directing the 2nd respondent, District Collector to reconsider the matter afresh after notice to and hearing petitioner and the beneficiaries of alleged road. (iii) To declare the Deputy Collector in charge of the District Collector has no power to pass an order under S.13 of Act 2008, unless there is an authorisation mentioned in S.2(IA) of Act 2008. (iv) To declare that Deputy Collector in charge of District Collector is not the District Collector as specified in S.13 of Act 2008 and not empowered to exercise the power conferred on District Collector. (v) To declare that the maintenance of existing road through the alleged paddy is not a reclamation as defined under S.2(XV) of Act 2008. (vi) To declare that it is not possible to pass an order under S.13 of the Act on a property, which noted as purayidam (residential property) in draft data bank prepared under S.5(4) of Act 2008. (vii) To declare that the alleged property of the 5th respondent, which is using as a road is not a paddy or wet land in view of Ext.P4 and P6 draft data bank and P5 certificate. (viii) Issue such other appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper, in the circumstances of the case.” 5. The prayers in W.P(C).No.6487/2020 are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order calling the records of Ext.P12 and quash the same holding that the same is illegal. (viii) Issue such other appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper, in the circumstances of the case.” 5. The prayers in W.P(C).No.6487/2020 are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order calling the records of Ext.P12 and quash the same holding that the same is illegal. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order directing the 4th respondent, Regional Fire Officer to issue final NOC to the petitioner to start the LPG Godown without considering the Ext.P8 order which was stayed by this Hon'ble Court. (iii) To declare the Ext.p9 interim order passed by this Hon'ble Court staying the Ex.P8 order is applicable to the 4th respondent and the Ext.P8 order has no effect in issuing final NOC. (iv) Issue such other appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper, in the circumstances of the case.” 6. The prayers in W.P(C).No.4216/2020 are as follows: (i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order calling the records of Ext.P6 and quash the same holding that the same is illegal. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order directing the 2nd respondent, District Collector to reconsider the matter afresh after notice to and hearing petitioner and the beneficiaries of alleged road. (iii) To declare the Deputy Collector in charge of the District Collector has no power to pass an order under S.13 of Act 2008, unless there is an authorisation mentioned in S.2(IA) of Act 2008. (iv) To declare that Deputy Collector in charge of District Collector is not the District Collector as specified in S.13 of Act 2008 and not empowered to exercise the power conferred on District Collector. (v) To declare that the maintenance of existing road through the alleged paddy is not a reclamation as defined under S.2(XV) of Act 2008. (vi) To declare that it is not possible to pass an order under S.13 of the Act on a property, which noted as purayidam (residential property) in draft data bank prepared under S.5(4) of Act 2008. (vii) To declare that the alleged property of the 5th respondent, which is using as a road is not a paddy or wet land in view of Ext.P2 and P4 draft data bank and Ext.P3 certificate. (vii) To declare that the alleged property of the 5th respondent, which is using as a road is not a paddy or wet land in view of Ext.P2 and P4 draft data bank and Ext.P3 certificate. (viii) Issue such other appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper, in the circumstances of the case.” 7. Heard Sri.K.K.Unni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri.K.J.Mohammed Anzar, learned Special Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for the official respondents, Sri.K.N.Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for contesting respondent No.6 in W.P.(C). Nos.4704/2020 & 4216/2020 and Sri.U.Sreedev, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5 in those Writ Petitions. 8. When the matter had earlier come up for consideration, this Court has passed interim order dated 19.2.2020 staying the operation and enforcement of the impugned Ext.P-8 proceedings dated 29.1.2020. Thereafter, all the parties have been heard in extenso on 20.3.2020 and listed for judgment. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has made submissions in tune with the pleadings in the Writ Petition. Sri.K.J.Mohammed Anzar, learned Special Government Pleader would support impugned Ext.P-8 order and would submit that the proceedings were initially dealt with by the 2nd respondent- District Collector and that therefore in view of exigency of service and as the incumbent District Collector has proceeded on leave, the competent authority concerned has passed proceedings granting the full additional charge of the post as that of the 2nd respondent-District Collector to the 3rd respondent-RDO and that moreover, the District Collector has also passed proceedings dated 21.12.2019 authorising the RDO/Deputy Collector (LR) to pass orders in the matter which led to the issuance of the impugned Ext.P-8 order issued by the 3rd respondent acting in his capacity as full additional charge of the District Collector. The 3rd respondent has been given the full additional charge of the 2nd respondent-District Collector, Pathanamthitta. The former is having jurisdictional competence to pass an order in the nature of Ext.P-8. Further it is only on the basis of adequate inspection referred to in the proceedings that the said proceedings has been passed. 10. Moreover, it is also alleged by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents that parties like the petitioners have no right to be heard in the matter and appropriate property owner, who is the 5th respondent, has been given notice, etc. 11. 10. Moreover, it is also alleged by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents that parties like the petitioners have no right to be heard in the matter and appropriate property owner, who is the 5th respondent, has been given notice, etc. 11. At the outset, it is to be noted that item references 2, 3 & 4 in Ext.P-8 proceedings are the report dated 30.12.2019 by the Sub Collector, report dated 31.12.2019 of the Village Officer and report dated 3.1.2020 issued by the Agriculture Officer. It appears that official respondents do not have any case that such inspection has been duly conducted with due prior notice to the affected persons concerned. At any rate, it appears that copies of those inspection reports have not been given to the affected persons before the issuance of Ext.P-8 order. Moreover, a reading of Ext.P-8 itself would make it clear that it has been specifically represented by the 5th respondent before the 3rd respondent-RDO that the lease has been effected in favour of the abovesaid petitioner as aforesaid and that he is running a LPG distribution outlet of M/s. BPCL etc., and that the only way to the said LPG distribution centre is through the abovesaid property, etc. Moreover, there does not appear to be serious dispute that the property of the petitioner in W.P.(C).No.4216/2020 is also passing through the subject property. If that be so, this Court has no hesitation to overrule Ext.P-8 proceedings that the petitioners have no right to be heard before issuing an order in the nature of Ext.P-8. There cannot be any dispute that Ext.P-8 is enforced, it will directly and adversely affect his right to use the pathway. It is the only pathway to the LPG distribution centre of the main petitioner as well as the residences of other persons and their right of way/access will be directly obstructed and blocked and at any rate, this would certainly inflict very grave adverse civil consequences on these petitioners. Therefore, since the official respondents were fully aware of the factual situation about the running of the LPG distribution centre and also that the abovesaid pathway is being used by the petitioners, it was incumbent on the official respondents concerned to have issued prior notice to them and their version should have heard. Therefore, since the official respondents were fully aware of the factual situation about the running of the LPG distribution centre and also that the abovesaid pathway is being used by the petitioners, it was incumbent on the official respondents concerned to have issued prior notice to them and their version should have heard. Further any such inspection should have been conducted only with prior notice to the petitioners and 5th respondent and copies of the inspection report should have been given to them and they should have been heard before passing Ext.P-8 order. None of these elementary norms in procedural fairness have been adhered to and therefore there is blatant violation of elementary principles of natural justice and fairness. This is all the more so, as the petitioners have a very specific case that the said pathway is in existence for the past 40-45 years and has been used by the persons concerned including nearby residents. Further the petitioners have a definite case that the subject property is 'purayidam' on the basis of vital documents like Exts.P4 & P-6, which are said to be draft data bank documents. Very crucially, the petitioner also place reliance on Ext-P5 certificate issued by the Village Officer, which would show that the said pathway lying through the purayidam mentioned in the draft data bank is purayidam and not paddy field. Therefore, these vital and highly relevant factual aspects have not even been remotely considered by the 3rd respondent-RDO while passing an order in the nature of Ext.P-8. Therefore, on this ground alone, the impugned order is liable for interdiction. 12. Apart from the abovesaid aspect, it is also to be noted that the prime jurisdictional facts required to be satisfied for the invocation of the powers under Sec.13 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land & Wet Land Act is that the subject property concerned should have been 'paddy land', as per Sec.2(xii) of the Act or 'wet land' as defined as per Sec.2(xviii) of the Act as on the date of coming into force of the said Act. If the subject property has been converted as 'nilam' before the commencement of the 2008 Act, there is no question of even proposing any adverse action under Sec.13 of the Act. If the subject property has been converted as 'nilam' before the commencement of the 2008 Act, there is no question of even proposing any adverse action under Sec.13 of the Act. The petitioner had a specific case that the property concerned through which the pathway lies is described as 'purayidam' in Exts.P-4, P-5 & P-6, etc. Even if the subject property is technically described as 'nilam' in the BTR records or any other records, so long as the property has been converted prior to 12.8.2008 (date of enforcement of the 2008 Act), there is no question of even proposing any action under Sec.13 thereof. These are all elementary and settled aspects in the matter. 13. Lastly, it has to be examined as to whether the 3rd respondent-RDO has jurisdiction to pass an order in the nature of Ext.P-8 even if he has been given full authorisation for having additional charge of the 2nd respondent-District Collector. 14. Sec.13 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008 reads as follows: “Sec.13. Power of the District Collector.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the District Collector may take such action, as he deems fit, without prejudice to the prosecution proceedings taken under the Act, to restore the original position of any paddy land or wetland reclaimed violating the provisions of this Act, and realize the cost incurred in this regard from the holder or occupier of the said paddy land or wetland, as the case may be, so reclaimed after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) Where the decision is to restore the original position of paddy land or wetland, the District Collector may take any action in such manner, as may be prescribed, to dispose clay, sand, earth etc. removed from the paddy land or wetland or any brick or tile made of all or any of them, in the process of such restoration and cause to remit the sums collected to the Fund.” It has to be noted that Sec.13 has been amended with effect from 30.12.2017 and prior to the amendment the expression used therein was that “........Collector may take action”, etc. By the enforcement of Act 29 of 2018 with effect from 30.12.2017, the word “Collector” appearing therein has been substituted as “District Collector”. Sec.2(iA) defines “Collector” as follows: “Sec.2. By the enforcement of Act 29 of 2018 with effect from 30.12.2017, the word “Collector” appearing therein has been substituted as “District Collector”. Sec.2(iA) defines “Collector” as follows: “Sec.2. Definitions – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires – (iA) “Collector” means the Collector of the district and includes any other officer appointed or authorised by the Government to perform the functions of the Collector.” Sec.2(xii) defines “paddy land” as follows: “Sec.2(xii) 'paddy land' means all types of land situated in the State where paddy is cultivated at least once in a year or suitable for paddy cultivation but uncultivated and left fallow, and includes its allied constructions like bunds, drainage channels, ponds and canals.” Sec.2(xviii) defines “wetland” as follows: '2(xvii1) “wetland” means land lying between terrestrial and aquatic systems, where the watertable is usually at or near the surface or which is covered by shallow water or characterized by the presence of sluggishly moving or standing water, saturating the soil with water and includes backwaters, estuary, fens, lagoon, mangroves, marshes, salt marsh and swamp forests but does not include paddy lands and rivers.' Prior to coming into force of the abovesaid amendment Act, 2017, the power under Sec.13 could have been exercised by the “Collector” as defined in Sec.2(iA). As per the definition of Sec.2(iA), “Collector” means either the Collector of the District concerned or any other Officer appointed or authorised by the Government to perform the functions of the Collector in terms of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, as per the unamended provisions, an officer like the RDO, who is subordinate to the District Collector concerned, could have been empowered or authorised by the Government to perform duties and functions of the Collector as per the 2008 Act. This discretion given by the Government to authorise any other officer to perform functions of the Collector has been now totally taken away by the amendment of the 2018 Act made effective from 30.12.2017 inasmuch as Sec.13 has been substituted by the words 'District Collector' on and with effect from 30.12.2017 and the powers under Sec.13 can be exercised only by the 'District Collector' concerned and not by any other officer. There cannot be any quarrel with that aspect of the matter. There cannot be any quarrel with that aspect of the matter. The learned Government Pleader would contend that since the Government/competent authority has already issued appropriate proceedings ordering that the 3rd respondent will hold the full additional charge of the District Collector, Pathanamthitta, during the latter's leave period, the said 3rd respondent can exercise the powers of District Collector in view of his holding of the additional charge as aforesaid. 15. After hearing both sides, this Court is constrained to overrule the abovesaid contention of the official respondents and to uphold the contention in that regard of the petitioners. Reference in this regard is to be made with to the decisions of this Court as in Sindhu v. State of Kerala & ors. [ 2009 (4) KLT 725 ] and Jose v. Maintenance Appellate Tribunal, Ayyanthole, & anr. [ 2018 (3) KLT 500 ]. In Sindhu's case (supra), the Division Bench has dealt with a case arising under the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act [KAPPA Act]. The question raised therein was that the Additional District Magistrate in charge of the District Magistrate can pass detention orders under Sec.3(2) of the KAPPA. In that regard, it may have prudence to refer to para 5 of the decision of the Division Bench judgment. “5. The Ground: It will be necessary and apposite for this court at the very outset to survey the relevant provisions of the statute. Section 3(1) and 3(2) of KAAPA read as follows: 3. Power to make orders for detaining known Goondas and known Rowdies:- (1) The Government or an officer authorised under sub-section (2), may, if satisfied on information received from a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, that with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing, or likely to prevail in any area, the Government, if satisfied that it is necessary so to do, may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the said order, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction may exercise the powers under sub-section (1) in respect of such persons residing within his jurisdiction or in respect of such persons not so resident who have been indulging in or about to indulge in or abet any anti-social activities within such jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied)” The Division Bench of this Court after elaborately considering the contentions of both sides noted that the respondent officer who passed the impugned proceedings under Sec.3 of the KAPPA was the Additional District Magistrate and not the District Magistrate. The Division Bench has held in Sindhu's case (Supra) in paras 18 & 22 thereof as follows: “18. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent is not a District Magistrate. He is only an additional District Magistrate. As an Additional District Magistrate, without dispute, the powers under the KAAPA have not been delegated to him under Section 20(2) of the Code. Needless to say, there can be no delegation under Section 3 of the KAAPA of any such powers to the 3rd respondent who is only an Additional District Magistrate and not a District Magistrate. xxx xxx xxx 22. We are unable to agree. The expression 'District Magistrate having jurisdiction' appearing in Section 3(2) must be understood in the light of the expressions “his jurisdiction” and “such jurisdiction” appearing later in Section 3(2). They deal with territorial jurisdiction. There are 14 districts in the State and 14 District Magistrates. Each one can exercise jurisdiction only within the territory of his district. The expression “District Magistrate having jurisdiction” read in the context and in the light of the expressions 'his jurisdiction' and “such jurisdiction” appearing later in Section 3(2) must definitely be held to mean the District Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction and not any person occupying the seat of the District Magistrate temporarily to meet administrative exigencies. The expression “District Magistrate having jurisdiction” read in the context and in the light of the expressions 'his jurisdiction' and “such jurisdiction” appearing later in Section 3(2) must definitely be held to mean the District Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction and not any person occupying the seat of the District Magistrate temporarily to meet administrative exigencies. At any rate, the language of Section 3(2) cannot enable us to construe that any incumbent holding the office of the District Magistrate temporarily will also be competent to pass an order under Section 3(2) in exercise of the delegated authority.” In Jose's case (supra) [ 2018 (3) KLT 500 ], this Court dealt with a case under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents sand Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In that case, the impugned appellate order was rendered by an officer of the rank of Sub Collector/Deputy Collector, who was having additional charge of the post of the District Magistrate/District Collector, as the services of the regular incumbent in the post of District Collector/District Magistrate was not then available. Sec.15(1) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, mandates that the appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District Magistrate. In contradistinction to that Sec.7(2) of the Act mandates that original Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of Sub Divisional Officer of the State. This is the hierarchy of Tribunals constituted under the abovesaid Act. The appellate powers can be exercised only by an officer of the rank of District Magistrate and not an officer who holds the additional charge of District Magistrate and who is inferior in rank to the regular incumbent in that post and that an officer like the Deputy Collector/Sub Collector, who was actually inferior in rank to the District Collector/District Magistrate cannot be permitted in law to assume appellate functions as per the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, this Court has ordered and declared that the powers under Sec.15(1) of the Act can be exercised only by an officer of the rank of the District Magistrate/District Collector and not by an inferior officer, who was having additional charge of post of District Magistrate/District Collector. This Court in Jose' s case (Supra), has held in para 6 as follows: “6. This Court in Jose' s case (Supra), has held in para 6 as follows: “6. In the nature of the orders that is proposed to be passed by this Court in this petition, it is not necessary for this Court as of now to decide any of the contentions of the petitioner other than the one that the officer, who had passed Ext.P-5 appellate order lacked jurisdiction to assume such appellate function. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that Ext.P-5 order was rendered by an officer of the rank of Sub Collector/Deputy Collector, who was having additional in charge of the post of District Magistrate/District Collector, presumably as the services of the regular incumbent in the post of District Collector was not then available. Sec.15(1) mandates that the appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District Magistrate. In contradistinction to that, Sec. 7(2) of the Act mandates that original Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of Sub Divisional Officer of the State. When that is the hierarchy of the Tribunals constituted under the above Act, it is clear like the day light that the appellate powers and functions can be assumed and rendered only by an officer of the rank of District Magistrate and an officer, who happened to have additional charge of the post of District Magistrate/District Collector and who is actually inferior in rank to the regular incumbent in the post of District Magistrate/District Collector cannot be employed to assume the appellate jurisdiction. In the Writ Petition it is specifically pleaded that the impugned Ext.P-5 appellate order has been rendered by one Sri.C.V.Sajan, who is in the rank of Deputy Collector/Sub Collector. It is also urged in the Writ Petition that the appeal was actually heard by the regular incumbent in the post of District Collector, one Sri.Kousikan, but that later the impugned Ext.P-5 appellate order was rendered by one Sri.C.V.Sajan, who is in the rank of Deputy Collector/Sub Collector. These factual averments are not in any manner disputed by the 2nd respondent. In these circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that the officer, who had actually passed Ext.P-5 order was an officer in the rank of Deputy Collector/Sub Collector did not have jurisdiction to assume appellate functions under Sec.15 read with Sec.16 of the abovesaid Act. These factual averments are not in any manner disputed by the 2nd respondent. In these circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that the officer, who had actually passed Ext.P-5 order was an officer in the rank of Deputy Collector/Sub Collector did not have jurisdiction to assume appellate functions under Sec.15 read with Sec.16 of the abovesaid Act. On that ground alone, the impugned appellate order is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, it is ordered that the impugned Ext.P-5 order is set aside solely on the abovesaid ground and the matter will stand remitted to the appellate Tribunal presided over by an officer of the rank of District Magistrate/District Collector to pass orders afresh on Ext.P-3 appeal. The petitioner and respondent No.2 should be afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard and the respective rival contentions should be adverted to and considered by the appellate Tribunal and a considered order should be passed on Ext.p-3 appeal, without much delay preferably within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. It is made clear that this Court has set aside the impugned Ext.P-5 order on the sole ground that the officer, who passed the said order does not have jurisdiction to do so and all other contentions of either side are left open to be considered afresh for decision by the appellate Tribunal.” 16. After hearing the parties in extenso, this Court is of the opinion that the legal principles laid down by this Court in the aforementioned decisions are applicable to the facts of this case. In this case also, admittedly, the 3rd respondent-RDO is an inferior officer to that of the 2nd respondent-District Collector. The District Collector has proceeded on leave and thereafter the competent officer of the Government has authorised that the 3rd respondent-RDO, who is inferior in rank to the 2nd respondent-District Collector will hold the additional post of District Collector. By holding such an additional charge of a superior officer, an inferior officer like the RDO cannot perform the statutory duties and functions in terms of Sec.13 of the abovesaid Act which can be exercised only by the District Collector of the District concerned with effect from 30.12.2017 as aforementioned. By holding such an additional charge of a superior officer, an inferior officer like the RDO cannot perform the statutory duties and functions in terms of Sec.13 of the abovesaid Act which can be exercised only by the District Collector of the District concerned with effect from 30.12.2017 as aforementioned. Therefore, the upshot of the discussion is that Ext.P-8 order has been passed by the 3rd respondent by illegally assuming jurisdiction in that regard and therefore the order is a nullity and deserves interdiction. 17. In that view of the matter, it is ordered that the impugned Ext.P-8 proceedings bearing No.C4-226872/2019 dated 29.1.2020 issued by the 3rd respondent-RDO purportedly under Sec.13 of the Act will stand quashed and set aside. Further it is also ordered that in case the 2nd respondent-District Collector wants to proceed with the matter any further, then he may do so, only after conducting meticulous examination through competent officials like the Village Officer, Tahsildar concerned, etc., and only if the 2nd respondent-Collector has objective materials of unimpeachable quality which would show that that the subject property concerned would satisfy the definition of 'paddy land' as per Sec.2(xii) of the 2008 Act or as 'wet land' as per Sec.2(xviii) thereof as on 12.8.2008, could he consider taking any further proceedings. If it is found that the subject property has been converted prior to 2008 Act, there is no question of taking any action under 2018 Act. Merely because the BTR and other records described the property as 'nilam' will not be of any relevance in that regard and the 2nd respondent can proceed further under Sec.13 of the Act only if the abovesaid prime conditions are satisfied regarding the actual state of affairs of the property as on 12.8.2008. If the 2nd respondent gets such objective materials to be satisfied that the subject property fulfils the definition of 'paddy land' as per Sex.2(xii) of the Act or 'wet land' as per Sec.2(xviii) of the Act as on 12.8.2008, then it shall be ensured that proper inspection is carried out by the competent revenue official concerned Tahsildar or Village Officer concerned with due prior notice not only to the 5th respondent but also to the petitioners herein as well as any other affected persons. The submissions of the petitioners should also be duly taken note of during the inspection and thereafter inspection report should be forwarded to the 2nd respondent and copies of the inspection reports should be furnished to the petitioners and 5th respondent, the objector and other affected persons concerned. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent will afford an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and the 5th respondent, objector, etc., either in person or through authorised representative/counsel, if any, and should render a considered decision in the matter strictly in accordance with the provisions under Sec.13 of the Act. The abovesaid liberty is given to the 2nd respondent subject to the fulfillment of the condition that state of affairs of the property as 'paddy land' as per Sec.2(xii) of the Act or 'wet land' as per Sec.2(xviii) of the Act as on 12.8.2008. It is ordered and declared accordingly. 18. The only other issue raised in W.P.(C).No.6487/2020 is that the impugned Ext.P-12 proceedings dated 1.3.2020 therein has been issued by the 4th respondent in that Writ Petition solely on account of the abovesaid Ext.P-8 proceedings in the main W.P(C). As the said Ext.P-8 proceedings has already been quashed, it is ordered that Ext.P-12 in W.P.(C).No.6487/2020 will stand quashed and set aside. The application of the petitioner for grant of NOC will stand remitted to the 4th respondent therein for consideration and decision afresh. The 4th respondent will afford a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner either in person or through authorised representative/counsel, if any, and should take a decision on the plea of the petitioner for grant of NOC, without much delay, at any rate within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. While deciding so, the 4th respondent will consider and decide whether the petitioner fulfils all the other requirements for grant of such NOC by that department and the application shall not be rejected on the ground as stated in Ext.P-12 as the same has already been quashed. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Petitions (Civil) will stand finally disposed of.