JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Shubham Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, Mr. Binod Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India, Mr. Alok Lal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.10-Insurance Company. 2. Petitioner has preferred this writ petition for direction upon the respondents for payment of amount of ex-gratia in terms of insurance as well as Memorandum of Understanding entered between the Insurance Company and the Government of Jharkhand. 3. Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was seriously injured in terrorist/anti naxal operation on 19.05.2009 near hath Nanda village due to Improvised Explosive Devise (IED). The petitioner was immediately admitted in Appollo Hospital, Ranchi and undergone several test and it was detected that the petitioner has lost vision and sustained multiple injuries and the petitioner was referred to the All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) New Delhi for better treatment. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that photocopy of medical prescriptions are on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. He further submits that the petitioner lost his vision in the said terrorist/anti naxal operation and is permanently disabled which is evident from the certificate issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Etah and the said medical certificate is Annexure-2 to this writ petition. He further submits that there is welfare scheme of the Government of Jharkhand for payment of Ex-gratia to Central Reserve Police Force personnel injured in terrorist anti naxal operation and the said welfare scheme has been brought on record vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition. He further submits that petitioner by way of Annexure-4 represented his case before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.R.P.F., Rampur, U.P. praying therein for payment of ex-gratia and other benefits as per the welfare scheme of the Government of Jharkhand. Pursuant to that enquiry committee was set-up by the Central Reserve Police Force and the said committee after properly considering the statements of the witnesses and documentary evidences available on record submitted its report. On the basis of said enquiry report the Commandant-7 Battalion Central Reserve Police Force passed an order recommending that the seriously injured C.R.P.F. personnel including the petitioner shall be given all allowances and benefits of medical expenses. On the basis of said enquiry report the Commandant-7 Battalion Central Reserve Police Force passed an order recommending that the seriously injured C.R.P.F. personnel including the petitioner shall be given all allowances and benefits of medical expenses. The said order is dated 08.12.2009 which is on the record as Anenxure-5 to the writ petition. He further submits that the Commandant C.R.P.F., Jamshedpur wrote a letter to the Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa to take necessary steps for payment of the said amount to the petitioner on account of injury sustained to him in course of anti naxal operaion. 4. Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that inspite of repeated request and reminders of the petitioner as well as Commandant, C.R.P.F, Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa-respondent no. 3 has not made payment of exgratia benefit to the petitioner which is evident from the letter dated 04.10.2012 issued by the Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum and letter dated 05.02.2013 issued by the Commandant, C.R.P.F to the Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited. He further submits that in view of counter-affidavit filed by the Insurance Company, it transpires that Insurance Company repudiated the claim of the petitioner on the ground that application for grant of ex-gratia has been received after more than 3 years of accident. He submits that this plea cannot be accepted in view of Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the Government of Jharkhand and Insurance Company. He further submits that moreover laches on their part, the writ petition may be allowed. 5. Mr. Shubham Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submits that the State has already forwarded the claim of the petitioner to the Insurance Company in terms of Memorandum of Understanding and liability is upon the Insurance Company to release the ex-gratia payment in terms of MoU. He further submits that pursuant to earlier order of the Court, the State has further requested to the Insurance Company to release the amount in question. He further submits that application was received in the year, 2012 and the same was immediately forwarded to the Insurance Company and as such State has got no liability. 6. Mr. Binod Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India submits that the petitioner is entitled for the said prayer as made in the writ petition. He further submits that application was received in the year, 2012 and the same was immediately forwarded to the Insurance Company and as such State has got no liability. 6. Mr. Binod Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India submits that the petitioner is entitled for the said prayer as made in the writ petition. He further submits that it is duty cast upon the State to pay the amount in question as it is on the failure of the State, the same has been repudiated by the Insurance Company. He further submits that the State may recover the amount paid to the petitioner by the State from the erring officer of the Insurance Company. 7. Mr. Alok Lal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Insurance Company vehemently opposes the prayer made in the writ petition on the ground that the condition of the Memorandum of Understanding is very much clear wherein time limit is in view of the said Clause, Insurance Company has repudiated the claim of the petitioner. He draws the attention of the Court to the Memorandum of Understanding and submits that in view of Clauss-11, the policy was in force for one year only. He submits that at the time of receiving of application, the policy was not in force. He further submits that there is arbitration Clause in terms of Clause-8 of the said Memorandum of Understanding. He further submits that in view of the Arbitration Clause, writ petition is not maintainable. 8. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for the Insurance Company relied on judgment in the case of “Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.” reported in 2015 (7) SCC 728 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “66. At this stage, we would like to discuss at length the judgment of this Court in ABL International Ltd.8, on which strong reliance is placed by the counsel for both the parties. In that case, various earlier judgments right from the year 1954 were taken note of. One such judgment which the Department in support of their case had referred to was the decision of the Apex Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd. wherein the Court had held that ordinarily in a matter relating to contractual obligations, the Court would not examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. One such judgment which the Department in support of their case had referred to was the decision of the Apex Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd. wherein the Court had held that ordinarily in a matter relating to contractual obligations, the Court would not examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. The following passage from the said judgment was relied upon by the respondents: If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the company, like any other shareholder. This Court dealt with this judgment in the following manner: “We do not think this Court in the above case has, in any manner, departed from the view expressed in the earlier judgments in the case cited hereinabove. This Court in LIC proceeded on the facts of that case and held that a relief by way of a writ petition may not ordinarily be an appropriate remedy. This judgment does not lay down that as a rule in matters of contract the court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is ousted. This Court in LIC proceeded on the facts of that case and held that a relief by way of a writ petition may not ordinarily be an appropriate remedy. This judgment does not lay down that as a rule in matters of contract the court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is ousted. On the contrary, the use of the words ‘court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it’ itself indicates that in a given case, on the existence of the required factual matrix a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution will be available.” 9. Regarding maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company has relied on judgment in the case of “Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Narbheram Power and Steel Pvt. Ltd.” reported in (2018) 6 SCC 534 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “25. The aforesaid communication, submits the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, does not amount to denial of liability under or in respect of the policy. On a reading of the communication, we think, the disputation squarely comes within Part II of Clause 13. The said part of the clause clearly spells out that the parties have agreed and understood that no differences and disputes shall be referable to arbitration if the company has disputed or not accepted the liability. The communication ascribes reasons for not accepting the claim at all. It is nothing else but denial of liability by the insurer in toto. It is not a disputation pertaining to quantum. In the present case, we are not concerned with regard to whether the policy was void or not as the same was not raised by the insurer. The insurance company has, on facts, repudiated the claim by denying to accept the liability on the basis of the aforesaid reasons. No inference can be drawn that there is some kind of dispute with regard to quantification. It is a denial to indemnify the loss as claimed by the respondent. Such a situation, according to us, falls on all fours within the concept of denial of disputes and non-acceptance of liability. It is not one of the arbitration clauses which can be interpreted in a way that denial of a claim would itself amount to dispute and, therefore, it has to be referred to arbitration. Such a situation, according to us, falls on all fours within the concept of denial of disputes and non-acceptance of liability. It is not one of the arbitration clauses which can be interpreted in a way that denial of a claim would itself amount to dispute and, therefore, it has to be referred to arbitration. The parties are bound by the terms and conditions agreed under the policy and the arbitration clause contained in it. It is not a case where mere allegation of fraud is leaned upon to avoid the arbitration. It is not a situation where a stand is taken that certain claims pertain to excepted matters and are, hence, not arbitrable. The language used in the second part is absolutely categorical and unequivocal inasmuch as it stipulates that it is clearly agreed and understood that no difference or disputes shall be referable to arbitration if the company has disputed or not accepted the liability. The High Court has fallen into grave error by expressing the opinion that there is incongruity between Part II and Part III. The said analysis runs counter to the principles laid down in the three-Judge Bench decision in Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd.5 Therefore, the only remedy which the respondent can take recourse to is to institute a civil suit for mitigation of the grievances. If a civil suit is filed within two months hence, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will enure to its benefit.” 10. In the light of above submission of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has examined clauses of the Memorandum of Understanding and documents which are annexed with the writ petition. It is admitted fact that the petitioner has received injury in terrorist operation and he has received injury which has been declared as permanent in nature by the medical certificate which are on record. Considering the terrorist activities in the State of Jharkhand, Government of Jharkhand has taken care of and has entered into Memorandum of Understanding with the Insurance Company. The petitioner was treated in All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) and it was duty cast upon the State knowing about the Memorandum of Understanding which is meant for injured person in such operation to forward it on time to the Insurance Company. The petitioner was treated in All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS) and it was duty cast upon the State knowing about the Memorandum of Understanding which is meant for injured person in such operation to forward it on time to the Insurance Company. The sacrifice of the petitioner cannot be over-looked by the Court particularly considering the injury he has sustained in that terrorist operation. With regard to maintainability of the writ petition in contractual matters for where there is disputed question of facts or even when monetary claim is raised, at the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, can refuse to exercise extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, can exercise its jurisdiction to have a substantial justice. Normally, the Court should not exercise such discretion:- (i). The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. (ii). Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. (iii). If there are serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. (iv). Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not be entertained in exceptional circumstances. 11. By applying said principle of present case if the case where the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction firstly matter when in the realm of public law character, as the petitioner who is in C.R.P.F was discharging his duty for the benefit for the State and for the people of the State and in view of the matter, the State has entered into said Memorandum of Understanding. In para 65 of the judgment in the case of “Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.” the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken care of the public law character aspect. For laches on the part of State, the petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer. In view of Annexure-3 of the writ petition, which is welfare scheme, Government of Jharkhand has decided to pay a sum of Rs. 13.75 lakh if he becomes injured in naxal operation. For laches on the part of State, the petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer. In view of Annexure-3 of the writ petition, which is welfare scheme, Government of Jharkhand has decided to pay a sum of Rs. 13.75 lakh if he becomes injured in naxal operation. In view of the cumulative effect of the discussions made above, facts and finding, the court comes to the conclusion that the prayer of the petitioner is fit to be allowed in this writ petition. Accordingly, the State is directed to release Rs. 13.75 lakh in favour of the petitioner in terms of welfare scheme which is on record within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. It is open to the State to recover the said amount from the Insurance Company in accordance with law. 12. The writ petition stands allowed and disposed of. I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.