ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the respondent no. 3-the Rent Controller-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer, Madhupur in Building Eviction Case No. 2 of 2014-15, whereby the respondent no. 3 has directed the defendant/petitioner to vacate the house of the plaintiff/respondent no. 4 and to pay arrears of rent. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 15.12.2017 passed by the respondent no. 2-the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar in Revenue Miscellaneous Appeal No. 68 of 2014-15, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order of the respondent no. 3 passed in Building Eviction Case No. 2 of 2014-15 has been affirmed. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the plaintiff/respondent no. 4 filed an eviction suit being Title Eviction Suit No. 02 of 2014 under Section 19(1)(d) of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2011”) praying inter-alia for the following reliefs: (i) For adjudication of the suit and eviction order be passed against the defendant from the suit property. (ii) A decree of recovery of arrears of rent for Rs. 5400/- be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. (iii) Possession of the suit property be delivered to the plaintiff through the process of court. (iv) Cost of the suit. (v) Any other relief/reliefs as the court may deem fit and proper. 3. The petitioner appeared in the said suit and filed an application on 06.08.2014 under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC for rejection of the plaint filed by the respondent no. 4 under Section 19(1)(d) of the Act, 2011. The respondent no. 4 filed rejoinder to the said application of the petitioner on 17.12.2014. The respondent no. 3 without deciding the said application dated 06.08.2014 disposed of Building Eviction Case No. 2 of 2014-15 vide order dated 21.01.2015 directing the defendant/petitioner to vacate the house of the respondent no. 4 and to pay the arrears of rent. The petitioner preferred appeal before the respondent no. 2 being Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 68 of 2014-15 contending that the respondent no. 3 acted without jurisdiction as per the provisions of Section 1(3) of the Act, 2011 since no power was conferred to the Respondent no. 3 to adjudicate the eviction suit. The respondent no. The petitioner preferred appeal before the respondent no. 2 being Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 68 of 2014-15 contending that the respondent no. 3 acted without jurisdiction as per the provisions of Section 1(3) of the Act, 2011 since no power was conferred to the Respondent no. 3 to adjudicate the eviction suit. The respondent no. 2, however, dismissed the said appeal vide order dated 15.12.2017 and affirmed the order of the respondent no. 3. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that both the courts below have passed the impugned orders mechanically without applying the judicious mind. The respondent no. 3 had no jurisdiction to try the eviction suit as the Act, 2011 was not enforced during the said period. The said vital issue was also ignored by the respondent no. 2 while passing the impugned order dated 15.12.2017. 5. In support of the said argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court passed in the case of Basant Prasad vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, W.P. (C) No. 5499 of 2014. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the petitioner is a tenant, however, he wants to make out a case of title over the property in question. It is a settled law that a tenant cannot challenge a title of the landlord. Moreover, the respondent no. 3 cannot adjudicate the question of title, rather the competent civil court only has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of title. The main issue before respondent no. 3 was of eviction due to non-payment of rent, which has already been adjudicated. The writ petition is, therefore, not maintainable and the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submits that the petitioner failed to make payment of rent w.e.f. January 2006 and as such, he was liable to be evicted from the premises in question. The petitioner is a habitual defaulter who lastly paid the rent in the month of December, 2005. The respondent no. 4 demanded rent from the petitioner several times, but he failed to make payment of the same. The respondent no. 4 has waited for considerable period to receive lawful rent from the petitioner. The petitioner is a habitual defaulter who lastly paid the rent in the month of December, 2005. The respondent no. 4 demanded rent from the petitioner several times, but he failed to make payment of the same. The respondent no. 4 has waited for considerable period to receive lawful rent from the petitioner. The petitioner is a tenant, but he wants to make out a case of title dispute, which could not have been adjudicated by the respondent no. 3. So far as the jurisdiction of the respondent no. 3 to adjudicate the Building Eviction Case No. 2 of 2014-15 is concerned, the respondent no. 4 has put reliance on the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Md. Aslam Ansari vs. State of Jharkhand, W.P. (C) No. 3744 of 2014. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned orders passed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 are without jurisdiction since the Act, 2011 was not notified/enforced at the relevant point of time. The learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court passed in the case of Basant Prasad (supra), the relevant paragraphs of which read as under: “4. Having heard the counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 has not been brought into force because the State of Jharkhand has not issued necessary notification under Section 1 thereof. In view of this submissions by the Additional Advocate General of the State, the power delegated to Sub-Divisional Officer cannot exercise his power under the Act, 2011 much less under Section 19 thereof. In view of the aforesaid facts, we hereby quash and set aside the proceeding before Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar) Ranchi, who is also a Rent Controller under the Act, 2011 in connection with J.B.C. Case No. 57 of 2013. In view of the aforesaid facts, we hereby quash and set aside the proceeding before Sub-Divisional Officer (Sadar) Ranchi, who is also a Rent Controller under the Act, 2011 in connection with J.B.C. Case No. 57 of 2013. We also direct the Sub-Divisional Officers of the State of Jharkhand not to exercise their powers under Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011, because this Act has not been brought into force within the State of Jharkhand, as the necessary notification has not been issued under Section 1 of the Act, 2011. 5. Registrar General of this Court is hereby directed to send photo copy of this order to all the Deputy Commissioner of the State of Jharkhand who will percolate this order to his subordinate officer in vertical hierarchy. 6. This writ petition (civil) is hereby allowed to the aforesaid extent without entering into the provisions of the Act, 2011. This change is left open to the petitioner and if need arises, the petitioner can challenge the vires of the Act, 2011.” 9. It would thus be evident that the respondent no. 3 could not have exercised the power conferred to it under the Act, 2011 till the issuance of notification by the State Government under Section 1(3) of the Act, 2011. 10. It appears from the record that the notification as required under Section 1(3) of the Act, 2011 for enforcing the provisions of the Act, 2011 was issued by the State Government on 15.04.2015. The eviction suit in question filed under Section 19(1)(d) of the Act, 2011 was entertained by the respondent no. 3 in the year 2014 during which the provisions of the Act, 2011 was not in force. Thus, in my view, the impugned order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the respondent no. 3 is without jurisdiction. I have also perused the judgment rendered in the case of Md. Aslam Ansari (supra) as has been relied upon by the respondent no. 4. On perusal of the said judgment, it would be evident that the issue with regard to enforceability of the Act, 2011 on account of non-issuance of notification under Section 1(3) of the said Act was neither raised nor decided. Aslam Ansari (supra) as has been relied upon by the respondent no. 4. On perusal of the said judgment, it would be evident that the issue with regard to enforceability of the Act, 2011 on account of non-issuance of notification under Section 1(3) of the said Act was neither raised nor decided. On the contrary, the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Basant Prasad (supra) has put the said issue at rest and as such, the judgment rendered in the case of Md. Aslam Ansari (supra) has no relevance in the present case. 11. Further, in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana, (2013) 10 SCC 136 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. United Commercial Bank Ltd. vs. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230 , Nai Bahu vs. Lala Ramnarayan, (1978) 1 SCC 58 : AIR 1978 SC 22 , Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. vs. Navrang Studios, (1981) 1 SCC 523 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 . 10. In Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 , this Court, after placing reliance on a large number of its earlier judgments particularly in Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496 , Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 and Chandrika Misir vs. Bhaiya Lal, (1973) 2 SCC 474 , held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity. It is a coram non judice; when a special statute gives a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the common law court has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner “performance cannot be forced in any other manner.” 11. The law does not permit any court/tribunal/authority/forum to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such an authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject-matter. For the reason that it is not an objection as to the place of suing “it is an objection going to the nullity of the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction.” Thus, for assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the court or tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory facts or facts in issue. Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju vs. Maharaja of Jeypore, (1918-19) 46 IA 151 : (1919) 10 LW 362 : AIR 1919 PC 150 , State of Gujarat vs. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot, (1996) 5 SCC 477 , Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. (2005) 7 SCC 791 and Carona Ltd. vs. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons, (2007) 8 SCC 559 .” 12. It may thus be construed that the jurisdiction is conferred only by legislative function and if any decree is passed by a court having no jurisdiction, the same would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the case. Though by now, the Act, 2011 has been notified, yet the same cannot validate the orders passed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3. In the case of TRF Ltd. vs. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. 13. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the impugned order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the respondent no. 3 in Building Eviction Case No. 2 of 2014-15 is quashed and set aside having been passed without jurisdiction. Consequently, the order dated 15.12.2017 passed by the respondent no. 2 in Revenue Miscellaneous Appeal No. 68 of 2014-15 is also quashed and set aside. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstance, the impugned order dated 21.01.2015 passed by the respondent no. 3 in Building Eviction Case No. 2 of 2014-15 is quashed and set aside having been passed without jurisdiction. Consequently, the order dated 15.12.2017 passed by the respondent no. 2 in Revenue Miscellaneous Appeal No. 68 of 2014-15 is also quashed and set aside. It is further clarified that the present writ petition has been decided on the point of jurisdiction of the respondent no. 3 to adjudicate the eviction suit during the relevant period and as such, the merit of the respective cases of the parties has not been touched. The respondent no. 4 is, however, at liberty to file a fresh eviction suit before the respondent no. 3 in this regard. If such a suit is filed by the respondent no. 4, the respondent no. 3 shall make all possible endeavor to expeditiously dispose of the said eviction suit, preferable within a period of six months from the date of filing of the same. The petitioner shall co-operate in timely disposal of the said suit. 14. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.