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2020 DIGILAW 435 (BOM)

Ananda Sakharam Padalkar v. Sachin Maruti Koli

2020-02-26

MILIND N.JADHAV

body2020
JUDGMENT :- 1. By the present petition fled under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the legality and propriety of the judgment and order dated 12th March 2018 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bench at Pune (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in Revision Application No.SS/II/2/2015 fled under the provisions of Section 76 of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The order dated 12th March 2018, inter aila, affirms and confirms the judgment and order dated 16th September 2013 passed by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala in proceedings bearing No.32G/Suit No.3/2010 under the provisions of Section 32-O of the Act and judgment and order dated 23rd January 2015 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Walva Division at Islampur in Appeal proceedings bearing No.04 of 2013 under the provisions of Section 74 of the Act. The aforesaid three proceedings have been fled before the statutory authorities by the petitioner and the petitioner is faced with three concurrent orders passed under the provisions of the Act. 2. The relevant facts pertaining to the lis between the parties is stated at the outset. The disputed land between the petitioner and respondents is land bearing Survey No.331/9 (old Survey No.582/9) admeasuring H.00.75R, P.K.0.02 assessed at Rs.2.06 situated at village Mangale, Tal. Shirala (hereinafter referred to as “the suit land”). This suit land was originally owned by the predecessor of respondents namely one Valmiki Krishna Koli. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 are the present landlords of the suit land to the extent of 50% of the share holding therein. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the suit land was let out to the petitioner’s father namely Shri Sakharam Rama Padalkar for jirayat crops by an agreement and receipt dated 14th June 1950 by the predecessor in title of the respondents. It is the further case of the petitioner that since 1950 the suit land was cultivated by the petitioner’s father until his demise and thereafter it is the petitioner who is cultivating the suit land as tenant thereof. 4. The original owner of the suit land namely Valmiki Krishna Koli during his lifetime transferred the suit land in the name of his son Maruti Valmiki Koli which was effected by mutation entry No.12095. 4. The original owner of the suit land namely Valmiki Krishna Koli during his lifetime transferred the suit land in the name of his son Maruti Valmiki Koli which was effected by mutation entry No.12095. After the demise of Shri Maruti Valmiki Koli, the name of respondent Nos.1 to 3 came to be mutated against the suit land by mutation entry No.26446 dated 16th December 2006. 5. In the year 2010, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 fled an application under the provisions of Section 32P of the Act for seeking resumption and disposal of the suit land not purchased by the tenant before the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal. 6. It is the respondents’ case that the petitioner had not paid rent regularly nor exercised his right to purchase within the stipulated period as prescribed under the Act and therefore sale of the suit land under the provisions of Section 32-O had become ineffective before the Tahsildar. In reply to the aforesaid application (which was numbered as No.32/G/Case No.3/2010), the petitioner preferred a counter claim dated 29th November 2010 under the provisions of Section 32G of the Act seeking grant of tenancy rights in respect of the suit land before the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 contested the counter claim of the petitioner on merits before the Tribunal as also pressed their application under Section 32P of the Act. 7. By a common judgment and order dated 16th September 2013 the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala allowed the application fled by the respondents under Section 32P of the Act and dismissed the application fled by the petitioner under Section 32-O of the Act. 8. Being aggrieved the petitioner preferred appeal under Section 74 of the Act before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Walva, at Islampur (hereinafter referred to as “the first Appellate Authority”). By judgment and order dated 23rd January 2015 the first Appellate Authority considered the case of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. 9. Being further aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Authority i.e. Sub-Divisional Officer, Walva at Islampur, the petitioner fled revision application under the provisions of Section 76 of the Act before the Tribunal to challenge the order dated 23rd January 2015. 9. Being further aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Authority i.e. Sub-Divisional Officer, Walva at Islampur, the petitioner fled revision application under the provisions of Section 76 of the Act before the Tribunal to challenge the order dated 23rd January 2015. By judgment and order dated 12th March 2018 the Tribunal passed a detailed speaking order and dismissed the revision application fled by the petitioner upholding the judgments and orders passed by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala and the first Appellate Authority. In addition thereto, the Tribunal directed the petitioner to pay costs of Rs.15,000.00 to the respondent Nos.1 to 3. Hence the present petition. 10. Mr. S.M. Kamble learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the authorities below have not considered the agreement cum receipt dated 14th June 1950 which was in the nature of agreement issued to the father of the petitioner in its proper perspective. According to the petitioner this receipt dated 14th June 1950 ought to have been considered as a valid and legal document to establish the possession of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-title of the suit land on the relevant day i.e. “Tillers Day” as contemplated under the provisions of the Act. He submitted that the finding of the authorities to discard the receipt dated 14th June 1950 as being forged, without taking any expert evidence on record was questionable and as such the said finding was untenable in law. He submitted that the respondents’ witness had clearly admitted that the possession of the suit land was always with the petitioner’s father and this piece of evidence ought to have been considered by the authorities below. Finally he has submitted that invocation of the power under Rule 36 of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal’s Rules to impose costs of Rs.15,000.00 on the petitioner was unnecessary and should not have been invoked considering that the petitioner was agitating his legal right to the suit land and was a senior citizen. 11. PER CONTRA, Mr. Pratap Patil learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3 has drawn my attention to the orders dated 16th September 2013, 23rd January 2015 and 12th March 2018. He submitted that the petitioner’s right and entitlement as tenant in respect of the suit land was effected from the year 1965 – 66 and the same was culminated in the year 1978. He submitted that the petitioner’s right and entitlement as tenant in respect of the suit land was effected from the year 1965 – 66 and the same was culminated in the year 1978. He has further drawn my attention to the findings recorded in paragraph No.2 of the order dated 16th September 2013 passed by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala in respect of the above. He submitted that the petitioner had failed to provide any documentary evidence of his possession/petitioner’s predecessor’s possession in respect of the suit land from 1950 onwards. He submitted that there is a clear finding which records that the petitioner had submitted a false receipt which on close scrutiny revealed that though the paper appeared to be very old, but the writing on the said paper appeared to be done recently. He submitted that the petitioner had failed to provide any evidence in respect of the same and had also ignored and neglected to provide such evidence before the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal resulting in the aforesaid finding. He submitted that the order dated 16th September 2013 which allowed the application of the respondents under the provisions of Section 32P extinguished the right of the petitioner in the suit land completely and thus the petitioner had no right, title or interest in the suit land thereafter. He has further drawn my attention to the detailed reasoning given in the orders dated 23rd January 2015 and 12th March 2018, inter alia, upholding the order passed by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala. He submitted that the petitioner was given adequate opportunity to examine witnesses. The petitioner has examined himself and also two independent witnesses on his behalf. He submitted that there is a clear finding in the order dated 12th March 2018 which stated that the petitioner had himself moved an application dated 20th April 1976 under the provisions of Section 70(b) of the Act in respect of the suit land and the copy of the same was available on record in the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. He submitted that in the said application, it was the petitioner’s own case that he was cultivating the suit land through the landlord Maruti Valmiki Koli since 1965 - 66 on the base of “Batai”. He submitted that in the said application, it was the petitioner’s own case that he was cultivating the suit land through the landlord Maruti Valmiki Koli since 1965 - 66 on the base of “Batai”. He therefore submitted that on the basis of the aforesaid admission/confession of the petitioner himself the statutory authorities have correctly rejected the petitioner’s claim and therefore prayed for dismissal of the petition. 12. I have considered the rival submissions and gone through the order dated 16th September 2013 passed by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala, order dated 23rd January 2015 passed by the first appellate authority and the impugned order dated 12th March 2018 passed by the Tribunal. 13. Before I advert to the merits of the case, it is apposite to state the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 32G of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 reads thus :- “32G Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of land to be paid by tenants. - (1) As soon as may be after the tillers' day the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon,- (a) all tenants who under section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands, (b) all landlords of such lands, and (c) all other persons interested therein, to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The Tribunal shall issue a notice individually to each such tenant, landlord and also, as far as practicable, other person calling upon each of them to appear before it on the date specified in the public notice. (2) The Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. (2) The Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. (3) Where any tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective: Provided that if such order is passed in default of the appearance of any party, the Tribunal shall communicate such order to the parties and any party on whose default the order was passed may within 60 days from the date on which the order was communicated to him apply for the review of the same. (4) If a tenant is willing to purchase, the Tribunal shall, after giving an opportunity to the tenant and landlord and all other persons interested in such land to be heard and after holding an inquiry, determine the purchase price of such land in accordance with the provisions of section 32H of sub-section (3) of section 63A : [Provided that where the purchase price in accordance with the provisions of section 32H is mutually agreed upon by the landlord and the tenant, the Tribunal after satisfying itself in such manner as may be prescribed that the tenant's consent to the agreement is voluntary may make an order determining the purchase price and providing for its payment in accordance with such agreement.] (5) In the case of a tenant who is deemed to have purchased the land on the postponed date the Tribunal shall, as soon as may be after such date determine the price of the land. (6) If any land which, by or under the provisions of any of the Land Tenures Abolition Acts referred to in Schedule III to this Act, is regranted to the holder thereof on condition that it was not transferable, such condition shall not be deemed to affect the right of any person holding such land on lease created before the re-grant and such person shall as a tenant be deemed to have purchased the land under this section, as if the condition that it was not transferable was not the condition of re-grant.” Sections 32-O and 32P of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 reads thus :- “32(O) Right of tenant whose tenancy is created after Tillers' day to purchase land. - (1) In respect of any tenancy created after the Tillers' day [by a landlord (not being a serving member of the armed forces)] notwithstanding any agreement or usage to the contrary, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled within one year from the commencement of such tenancy to purchase from the landlord the land held by him or such part thereof as will raise the holding of the tenant to the ceiling area. [****] [(1A) A tenant desirous of exercising the right conferred on him under sub-section (1) [***] shall give an intimation in that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period specified in that sub-section.] (2) The provisions of sections 32 to 32N (both inclusive) and of sections 32P, 32Q and 32R in so far as they may be applicable shall apply to the purchase of the land by a tenant under sub-section (1). [***] 32P. Power of [Tribunal] to resume and dispose of land not purchased by tenant. - (1) Where the purchase of any land by tenant under section 32 becomes ineffective under section 32G or 32M or where a tenant fails to exercise the right to purchase the land held by him within the specified period under section 32F, [32-O, 33-C or 43-ID], the [Tribunal] may suo motu or on an application made in this behalf [***] [and in cases other than those in which the purchase has become ineffective by reason of section 32G or 32M, after holding a formal inquiry] direct that the land shall be disposed of in the manner provided in sub-section (2). (2) Such direction shall provide- (a) that [***] the [former tenant] be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of section 15, be surrendered to the [former landlord]; (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be surrendered in accordance with the provisions of section 15, the entire land or such portion thereof, as the case may be, notwithstanding that it is a fragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person in the following order of priority (hereinafter called "the priority list") :- (i) a co-operative farming society the members of which are agricultural labourers, landless persons or small holders or a combination of such persons; (ii) agricultural labourers; (iii) landless persons; (iv) small holders; (v) a co-operative farming society of agriculturists (other than small holders) who hold either as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant, landless in area than an economic holding and who are artisans; (vi) an agriculturist (other than a small holder) who holds either as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant, landless in area than an economic holding and who is an artisan; (vii) any other co-operative farming society; (viii) any agriculturist who holds either as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land larger in area than an economic holding but less in area than the ceiling area; (ix) any person, not being an agriculturist, who intends to take to the profession of agriculture: [Provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette give in relation to such local areas as it may specify, such priority in the above order as it thinks ft to any class or persons who, by reason of the acquisition of their land for any development project approved for the purpose by the State Government have been displaced, and require to be re-settled.] (3) Where any land is to be surrendered in favour of the [former landlord], under sub-section (2), the [former landlord] shall not be entitled to the possession thereof until any amount refundable to the [former tenant] is refunded to him or recovered from the [former landlord]; and until such refund or recovery is made, the [former tenant] shall continue to hold the land on the same terms on which it was held by him previously. (4) Where any land or portion thereof cannot be surrendered in favour of the landlord and where such land or portion is offered for sale under sub-section (2), but no person comes forward to purchase such land or portion, as the case may be, shall vest in the State Government and the [Tribunal] shall determine the price of such land or portion in accordance with the provisions of section 63A and the amount of the price so determined shall, subject to the provisions of section 32Q, be paid to the owner thereof. (5) Where any land is sold under sub-section (2), the [Tribunal] shall determine the price of the land in accordance with the provisions of section 63A and the price so determined shall be payable by annual instalments not exceeding six with simple interest at the rate of 4½ per cent, per annum as the [Tribunal] may determine and the price of the land recovered from the purchaser shall, subject to the provisions of section 32Q, be paid to the owner thereof. [(6) On the deposit of the last instalment of the purchase price, the Tribunal shall issue a certificate of purchase in the prescribed form from the purchaser in respect of the land. Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of purchase. If the purchaser is at any time in arrears of two instalments, then unless the [Tribunal] after holding such inquiry as it thinks ft is satisfied with the reasons given and allows a further period not exceeding one year to pay the arrears, the purchase shall be ineffective and the amount deposited by such purchaser shall be refunded to him.]” 14. It is an admitted position that the respondents fled application in the year 2010 under the provisions of Section 32P of the Act. Section 32P of the Act states that the Tribunal can dispose of land not purchased by any tenant under Section 32G or 32M of the Act or where the tenant has failed to exercise the right to purchase the land held by him within the specified period under Section 32F of the Act either suo motu or on an application made as above after holding a formal inquiry. In the present case, it is clear that the application under Section 32P of the Act fled by the respondents (being applicants therein) has been decided by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal by its order dated 16th March 2013 after following the due process of law. In reply to the said application the petitioner fled counter claim seeking entitlement under Section 32G of the Act. The petitioner was given adequate opportunity to prove his case under Section 32G by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. The petitioner examined himself as also two other witnesses in support of the petitioner’s case. The Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal framed five issues and decided the said issues against the petitioner by giving detailed reasons and findings in its order dated 16th September 2013. One of the notable features of the order dated 16th September 2013 that is required to be quoted is that there is reference to tenancy case No.70b/9/76 which was fled by the petitioner himself before the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, wherein the petitioner had himself pleaded that the petitioner/petitioner’s predecessor-in-title had been in possession of the suit land from 1965 – 66 onwards. This very own admission of the petitioner goes against the petitioner’s case and his attempt to establish that the petitioner/petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was in possession of the suit land on “Tillers Day” i.e. 1st April 1957 under the provisions of the Act. Before the first Appellate Authority the petitioner has also taken an additional ground challenging the locus of the respondents. The first Appellate Authority has however held that if the petitioner desired to challenge the locus of the respondents, then the petitioner should approach the appropriate Civil Court for a decision with respect to the same. There is also a clear finding given by the first Appellate Authority that the petitioner/petitioner’s predecessor-in-title was asked to cultivate the suit land from 1965 – 66 onwards on the yearly payment of Rs.30.00 and therefore this relates to the possession of the petitioner/petitioner’s predecessor-in-title from 1965 onwards and not on “Tillers Day”. 15. The impugned judgment and order dated 12th March 2018 passed by the Tribunal framed the following issues for consideration. Points Findings 1. Whether the applicant/landlord has proved his right for the relief of the possession u/s 32P of the Act, against the Opponent/tenant ? Affirmative 2. 15. The impugned judgment and order dated 12th March 2018 passed by the Tribunal framed the following issues for consideration. Points Findings 1. Whether the applicant/landlord has proved his right for the relief of the possession u/s 32P of the Act, against the Opponent/tenant ? Affirmative 2. Whether the judgment & order under revisions calls for interference therein as prayed for ? Negative 16. While deciding the above issues, the Tribunal in its revisional jurisdiction in paragraph nos.8 to 14 of its judgment has returned the following findings :- “8. Point No.1 : At first I may state here, that the revision preferred by the aggrieved tenant is against the concurrent findings recorded by the tribunals below, particularly on the point of facts. Still then, after considering the submissions made by the advocate for the opponent/tenant at the stage of revision, I may state here that the submissions made by the advocate are somewhat purely on legal aspect and i.e. the proof of documents produced and the right of tenancy prior to 1/4/1957. On this aspect, I may state here that, herein this case, the proceedings received from Ld. trial tribunal are self explanatory to the effect, that on the basis of application moved by the Opponent/tenant on 20/4/1976, tenancy proceedings have been conducted u/s 70(b) of the Act, in respect of the disputed property. The certified copy of the said applicable is available from the record of ALT. In the said application, the Opponent/tenant has specifically pleaded that, he is cultivating the disputed land through the landlord Maruti Koli since from 1965-66 on the basis of Batai and cultivating the same till this date. The averments made to that effect in the original proceedings of file No.70(b)/9/76 from Para – 1 runs as under :- xxx These pleadings put forth in the earlier proceedings subsequently reflected in form of judgment & order passed therein and reached to its finality. Not only that, but, by relying upon the judgment & order passed in said tenancy file No. 70b/9/76, dt.28/8/76, M.E.No.8655 came to be certified and name of the present Opponent came to be recorded as ordinary tenant thereafter. 9. In the given set of facts, it is not lie in the mouth of the tenant to assert and plead his possession in the suit property as tenant in possession prior to 1/4/1997. 9. In the given set of facts, it is not lie in the mouth of the tenant to assert and plead his possession in the suit property as tenant in possession prior to 1/4/1997. Once these observations are made categorically by relying upon the earlier pleadings put forth, it has become evident that rent receipts produced by the Opponent are afterthought and same are not useful, as same are not based upon the pleadings put forth or facts proved in file No.70b/9/76. Therefore, the receipts dt.14/6/1950 & 5/7/-- appears to be fiscal, which has not seen the sunlight prior to the institution of the present proceedings. If at all those receipts were in existence, the question as to why the said documents have not reflected either in the pleadings or even in the earlier proceedings initiated u/s 70(b) of the Act, has remained unanswered. But, this fact is sufficient to observe here, that the receipts placed on record though old for the period more than 30 years, its genuineness is not free from doubt. Therefore, though the presumption is available in respect of existence and execution of the document, still then truthfulness of those receipts being not proved cannot be relied upon at the revisional stage. 10. Secondly, as per the case submitted by the Opponent/tenant before this Tribunal, he has submitted that the claims tenancy over the disputed land through his father since prior to 1/4/1957. However, it is apparent on record, that his tenancy was not ever recorded in revenue record either in form of mutation entry or in form of entry in the column of cultivation till 1965 – 66. Therefore, there is no question of application of “Deemed Purchase” to the present case. 11. Now, the only question remains is that, the right of landlord for possession of the property, particularly when the tenant has failed to exercise his right within the stipulated period, the effect thereof shall follow. In the given set of facts, it is sufficient to hold that the judgment & order passed in tenancy file No.70b/9/76, dt.28/8/76 has determined the right of tenancy and reached to its finality. Therefore, since after 28/8/76, there was no dispute between the landlord & tenant as regards their relationship interse as per the Statute. In the given set of facts, it is sufficient to hold that the judgment & order passed in tenancy file No.70b/9/76, dt.28/8/76 has determined the right of tenancy and reached to its finality. Therefore, since after 28/8/76, there was no dispute between the landlord & tenant as regards their relationship interse as per the Statute. Therefore, it was incumbent for the Opponent/tenant to exercise the right of purchase within one year from 28/8/76 and i.e. in form of strict compliance by issuing notice of willingness to purchase, in prescribed form, to the landlord as well as the Tribunal concerned. However, unfortunately there is no evidence or even positive averments of strict compliance carried out by the tenant prior to the initiation of the present proceedings i.e. till 2010. In short, if the tenant has failed to exercise the right to purchase within a stipulated period one year, after the tenancy has commenced and established, then such right to purchase become ineffective, then landlord if proved his case, he is entitled for possession u/s 32P of the Act, for which other grounds are not strictly required to be proved. Mandatory force of compliance u/s 32(O) of the Act, to the given case is equally applicable. In support of these observations, I may keep reliance on the precedent laid down by our Hon’ble High Court in the case of Dina Patil Vs. Dulba Patil, 2005 (4) MhLJ-1024, wherein Their Lordships have ruled as under :- “The tenancy commences from the moment when the tenant starts cultivating the land and therefore, it was incumbent upon the tenant to give intimation within one year from the date of commencement of tenancy. If such right is not exercised by the tenant, then the provisions of Sec.32P of the Act, attracted automatically”. Plain reading of Sec.32P are also self-explanatory to observe here that formal declaration of sale being ineffective is expected only in case of Sec.32G or 32M and not for 32-O of the Act. Herein this case, the claim put forth admittedly and also otherwise as proved governed by the provisions of Sec.32(O) of the Act. Therefore, automatic effect of sale being ineffective has to be followed when the tenant has failed to exercise his right in proper form in proper manner and in due time. 12. Herein this case, the claim put forth admittedly and also otherwise as proved governed by the provisions of Sec.32(O) of the Act. Therefore, automatic effect of sale being ineffective has to be followed when the tenant has failed to exercise his right in proper form in proper manner and in due time. 12. Herein this case, before concluding the findings on the point of Point No.1, I may state here that the provisions of CPC are not strictly applicable to the functioning of Tribunal and the procedure before the Tribunal is mainly controlled by the provisions of Mamlatdar’s Court Act, 1906. After going through the entire Statute i.e. Mamlatdar’s Court Act, 1906, I do not find any similar provisions in the said Act, just like Order-8 Rule-6(a) as contended in CPC. In short, there is no provisions in Mamlatdar’s Courts Act, to present and put forth counter claim in the said proceedings. In short, relief put forth in form of counter claim in the same proceedings by the Opponent is not maintainable. In view of the consistent observations made supra, the Opponent/tenant has no such statutory right u/s 32G of the Act, particularly when his right of tenancy on the “Tillers Day” was not ever established or even not put forth at any point of time except oral submissions. 13. By keeping reliance on the above precedent quoted in Para-11 supra, I hold that the tenant has failed to exercise the right to purchase within one year from the relationship has been established and recognized by the Statute. In short, after perusing the judgment & order passed by the tribunals below, it has become evident that, the tenant has failed to exercise his right to purchase within a stipulated period. Therefore, findings recorded by tribunals below being based on sound reasonings therefrom, I have no hesitation to hold that the landlord/applicant has proved his case for possession u/s 32P of the Act, and accordingly answer the ‘Point No.1 in Affirmative”. 14. Point No.2 : In view of Affirmative findings of Point No.1 and observations made supra, it has become evident that the judgment & order passed by tribunals below are not only concurrent, but, same are based on sound reasonings in support thereof. 14. Point No.2 : In view of Affirmative findings of Point No.1 and observations made supra, it has become evident that the judgment & order passed by tribunals below are not only concurrent, but, same are based on sound reasonings in support thereof. Therefore, I am of the view, that having regard to the limitations of this Tribunal to interfere in the concurrent findings recorded by the tribunals below, this matter does not call for interference therein, but, to proceed to confirm the same by dismissing the revision as a whole. Accordingly, I answer ‘Point No.2 in negative’. 17. From the above, a clear finding of fact has been recorded that the petitioner as tenant had failed to exercise his right to purchase the suit land within the prescribed period of one year i.e. from the date on which the relationship was established with the landlord and as recognized by the statute. As held by this Court in the case of Dina Patil Vs. Dulba Patil (supra) it was incumbent upon the petitioner to give intimation within one year from the date of commencement of tenancy i.e. the date when he started cultivating the land. The petitioner failed to exercise this statutory right and thus the statutory provisions of Section 32P of the Act are attracted and as such the right of the petitioner to purchase the suit land became ineffective and the respondents/landlord are entitled to possession under Section 32P of the Act. It is also needed to be mentioned that the right of the petitioner was already determined by the judgment and order passed in Tenancy Case No.70/b/9/76 dated 28th August 1976 and the same had attained finality. It was also an admitted fact decided by the authorities below that the claim of tenancy of the suit land as claimed by the petitioner through his father from 1950 onwards was also not proved. There is no documentary evidence of any such proof to that effect which is placed before the Court. Such documentary evidence would relate to recording of the necessary entry in the revenue record either in the form of mutation entry or in the form of entry in the column of cultivation so as to enable the petitioner to claim a statutory right under the Act. Such documentary evidence would relate to recording of the necessary entry in the revenue record either in the form of mutation entry or in the form of entry in the column of cultivation so as to enable the petitioner to claim a statutory right under the Act. Therefore the case of the petitioner of being in possession of the suit land as on “Tillers’ Day” i.e. prior to 1st April 1957 cannot be accepted. Hence the petition fails on the above grounds. 18. In view of the above, it is clear that the concurrent findings returned by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal and the first Appellate Authority i.e. Sub-Divisional Officer have been correctly upheld by the Tribunal i.e. the Revisional Authority and I find no reason to disagree or digress from the same. 19. The writ petition is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs. 20. The judgment and order dated 12th March 2018 passed by the Tribunal i.e. the Revisional in Revision Application No.SS/II/2/2015 is confirmed and upheld as also the judgment and order dated 16th September 2013 passed by the Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Shirala in Application No.32G/case No.3/2010 and the judgment and order dated 23rd January 2015 passed by the first appellate authority i.e. the Sub-Divisional Officer, Walva, Division Islampur in Tenancy Appeal No.4 of 2013 are upheld. However, in the interest of justice, the costs of Rs.15,000.00 levied by the Tribunal on the petitioner with a direction to recover same as land revenue is set aside considering that the petitioner is 72 years old and a senior citizen. 21. Writ petition is dismissed on the aforesaid terms.