JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. This Appeal is at the instance of an accused-convict for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 393 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The appellant herein was put on trial in the court of the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, in the Sessions Case No. 65 of 2010 for the offences enumerated above. The trial court held the appellant accused guilty of the offences enumerated above and sentenced the accused for the offence of murder to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- in default of the payment of the amount of fine, six months of further rigorous imprisonment. 3. The accused also came to be sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default of the payment of the amount of fine, two months of further rigorous imprisonment. 4. The accused also came to be sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: 5. The incident in question occurred on 17th January 2009 in the evening opposite Shri Welcome Garden Restaurant situated on the main road leading from the Heerabaug Circle to Kamrej Varachha Road, Surat. The deceased was a businessman aged 50 years at the time of the incident. The deceased used to work between 8:00 in the morning till almost 8:00 in the evening. On the date of the incident, the deceased was passing through the street with a black coloured handbag in his hand. The bag contained money. It is the case of the prosecution that at that point of time the accused came near the deceased and tried to snatch away the bag containing money. The accused was not successful in snatching away the bag from the hands of the deceased as the deceased offered resistance and caught hold of the accused. The accused, at any cost, wanted to run away with the bag containing money, and at the same time, the deceased was not ready to give up. While the grappling was going on, the accused is alleged to have taken out a knife from his pocket and inflicted a blow straight into the chest of the deceased. The accused thereafter tried to make good his escape but the people in the surrounding area caught hold of the accused. While the grappling was going on, the accused is alleged to have taken out a knife from his pocket and inflicted a blow straight into the chest of the deceased. The accused thereafter tried to make good his escape but the people in the surrounding area caught hold of the accused. The mob also thrashed the accused severely. As the thrashing was quite serious at the hands of the people where the incident occurred, an ambulance had to be called for and the accused was sent for medical treatment to the Civil Hospital. On the other hand, on account of the injury suffered by the deceased in his chest, he started bleeding profusely. One Dharmeshbhai Jivrajbhai Patel (original first informant) known to the deceased incidentally happened to be present at the time of the incident. Dharmeshbhai Patel immediately called for 108-Ambulance and took the deceased to the Ayush Hospital. However, by the time the deceased could reach the hospital, he succumbed to the injury. The deceased was declared dead by the doctors of the Ayush Hospital on arrival. Dharmesh Jivraj Patel PW-14 lodged the FIR (Exh.49). The FIR (Exh.49) dated 17th January 2009 reads thus: “I, Dharmeshbhai Jivrajbhai Patel, aged 42, Occupation Business, residing at 5, Purvi Society, Heerabaug Varachha Road, Surat, Mobile No. 9825285180, Originally hails from Budhana, Taluka Sihor, District Bhavnagar, personally lodge the facts of my complaint as under: That I reside with my family at the above mentioned address and having an agency of Ultra Tech cement. I am running a shop in the name and style of Patel Traders situated at the Plot No. 2, Purvi Society, Heerabaug Society, Varachha. I am also having an office situated at the Shreeji Complex, which is 400 feet away from my shop, for the purpose of maintaining the accounts of my business. The aforesaid shop is looked after by my paternal cousin (aunt's son) Dhirubhai Parshottambhai Bodariya, aged about 50 years. My younger brother Dineshbhai is also attending the shop. My paternal cousin Dhirubhai is residing with his family at 136, Geeta Nagar, Vibhag-2, Punagam. He comes to the shop at 8:00 in the morning and return back to home at 8:00 in the evening. He used to deliver the goods and collect the money from the customers. My younger brother Dineshbhai is also attending the shop. My paternal cousin Dhirubhai is residing with his family at 136, Geeta Nagar, Vibhag-2, Punagam. He comes to the shop at 8:00 in the morning and return back to home at 8:00 in the evening. He used to deliver the goods and collect the money from the customers. The cash received from the sale proceeds is deposited daily in the evening at the office situated at the Shreeji Complex. Today, in the evening at about quarter past seven, I came to my Patel Trader's shop from the Amroli side. At that point of time, on seeing the mob just ahead the main road at the Shreeji Complex, I went towards that direction. Some of the persons from the mob were saying that someone has been thrashed. Thereafter, I went ahead towards my office at the Shreeji Complex. There I saw my cousin brother Dhirubhai lying in an injured condition near a sofa. He was holding a black bag in which our accounts were there. My younger brother Dineshbhai was also present there in the office. Dhirubhai could not able to speak, therefore, I asked my brother Dineshbhai about the incident. In reply, he told me that Dhirubhai came to the office in an injured condition. Someone had called 108-Ambulance, however, without waiting further for the ambulance to arrive, my younger brother Dinesh took Dhirubhai to the Ayush Hospital in our car for treatment and I stayed there and took the accounts' bag which contained some office papers and a cash of Rs. 43,000. During my presence over there, I came to know from the mob that the person who injured Dhirubhai was caught by the mob on the road and was taken to the Civil Hospital in 108-Ambulance by the police personnels. As he was thrashed by the mob, he was taken to the Civil Hospital for treatment. It was also learnt from the mob that a knife was lying on the road at the place of the incident. At that time, Arvindbhai who was having a shop adjacent to ours, as well as Harishbhai and Rajubhai, who work in our shop, and many other persons had gathered there. Thereafter, when I came to the Ayush Hospital, Dhirubhai was in the operation theater and his treatment was going on. At that time, Arvindbhai who was having a shop adjacent to ours, as well as Harishbhai and Rajubhai, who work in our shop, and many other persons had gathered there. Thereafter, when I came to the Ayush Hospital, Dhirubhai was in the operation theater and his treatment was going on. After a while, the doctor informed me that he died during the treatment. On looking at his body in the operation theater, I saw an injury on his head as well as a deep wound on the left side of the chest below the shoulder. There was also an injury caused with a sharp weapon on the small finger of the left hand as well as on the ankle and he was lying dead. The person who killed Dhirubhai was admitted in the Civil Hospital for treatment and I came to know his name as Anil Rameshbhai Pansuriya and was undergoing treatment. His place of residence is not known. Today, in the evening before quarter past seven, my aunt's son namely Dhirubhai Parshottambhai Bodariya was walking towards our office at the Shreeji Complex from our shop Patel Traders with a bag containing the accounts papers as well as a cash of Rs. 43,000. At that point of time, Anil Rameshbhai Pansuriya, who was caught by the people and who is undergoing treatment in the Civil Hospital, tried to grab the bag and in the grappling, he inflicted severe injuries with a knife on the head, chest and hand of the deceased and committed murder. Therefore, my complaint be registered against him. My witnesses are those who are mentioned in my complaint as well as those who comes out during the investigation.” 6. Upon registration of the FIR, the investigation had commenced. The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was drawn at Exh.17. The scene of the offence panchnama Exh.19 was drawn in presence of the two panch witnesses. The weapon used in the offence, i.e. the knife, was recovered vide the panchnama Exh.21. The clothes of the deceased were collected by drawing the panchnama Exh.23. The panchnama of the person of the accused at the time of his arrest was drawn vide Exh.25. One another co-accused was also arrested in connection with this offence. However, he has been acquitted by the trial court. His arrest panchnama was drawn vide Exh.27. The clothes of the deceased were collected by drawing the panchnama Exh.23. The panchnama of the person of the accused at the time of his arrest was drawn vide Exh.25. One another co-accused was also arrested in connection with this offence. However, he has been acquitted by the trial court. His arrest panchnama was drawn vide Exh.27. The clothes worn by the appellant accused at the time of the incident were collected by the Investigating Officer by drawing the panchnama Exh.29. The place where the acquitted accused was standing with a motorcycle to help the accused herein to make good his escape was discovered by way of the panchnama under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Exh.31. The motorcycle was recovered by drawing the panchnama Exh.35. The panchnama of the identification parade was carried out vide Exh.39. The dead body of the deceased was sent for the postmortem examination. The postmortem report is at Exh.47. 7. At the end of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet in the court of the JMFC, Surat. As the offences were exclusively triable by the court of sessions, the Magistrate committed the case of the court of sessions. Upon committal, the case came to be registered as the Sessions Case No. 65 of 2010. 8. The 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, vide order dated 1st February 2011, framed the charge (Exh.10), which reads thus: “CHARGE: I, Shri K.J. Upadhyay, 3rd Additional District and Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, hereby frame the following charge upon the accused persons (1) Anilbhai @ Natho Rameshbhai Pansuriya (Patel), (2) Jitendrabhai @ Jitu Raghavbhai Talaviya, both residing at 242, Prakukhchhaya Society, Punagam, Surat: That on 17.1.2009 at about 7:15 in the evening, the deceased Dhirubhai Parsottambhai Bodariya was going towards the office at the Shreeji Complex from Patel Traders shop with a handbag carrying the accounts papers and a cash of Rs. 43,000. At that time, both the accused persons, in collusion with each other, had come over there on a CBZ Motorcycle bearing No. GJ5-FA-8183 and tried to snatch away the bag from the hands of the deceased Dhirubhai. While the grappling was going on, the accused no. 1 took out a knife and inflicted several blows on the head, chest and hands of the deceased, causing severe injuries, which resulted into the death of the deceased. While the grappling was going on, the accused no. 1 took out a knife and inflicted several blows on the head, chest and hands of the deceased, causing severe injuries, which resulted into the death of the deceased. By doing this act, both the accused persons, in collusion with each other, have committed a grave offence punishable under Sections 302, 393, 188, 34 of the Indian Penal Code within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. At: Surat Dated: 1.2.2011 K.J. Upadhyay 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Surat.” 9. The appellant herein and the co-accused who ultimately came to be acquitted pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge and claimed to be tried. 10. The prosecution led the following oral evidence:- (i) Medical Evidence: PW-13 Exh.46 Dr. Dineshkumar Champaklal Modh Exh.47 Postmortem report of Dhirubhai Parsottambhai Bodariya PW-28 Exh.95 Dr. Hardikbhai Ashokbhai Astik Exh.96 Medical Certificate of Anil Rameshbhai Patel (ii) Eye Witnesses: PW-15 Exh.50 Jagdishbhai Parsottambhai Kakadia Owner of Shree Welcome Garden Restaurant PW-17 Exh.62 Rameshbhai Govindbhai Kheni (iii) Supporting Witnesses: PW-14 Exh.48 Dharmeshbhai Jivrajbhai Patel Exh.49 F.I.R. PW-16 Exh.57 Dineshbhai Jirvrajbhai Patel PW-20 Exh.66 Hareshbhai Chhanabhai Chauhan Seller of knife PW-22 Exh.72 Pradipbhai Popatbhai Accountant - Rajdhani Roadways Exh.73 Motor Transport Receipt PW-23 Exh.74 Rajesh Rameshchandra Parmar Executive Magistrate Exh.75 Yadi to record D/D Exh.76 D/D of Anil Rameshbhai Pansuriya PW-24 Exh.77 Bharatbhai Rajbhai Dholariya Hostile - Brother-in-law of Accused No. 2 Jitubhai (iv) Panch Witnesses: PW-1 Exh.16 Nemubhai Naranbhai Exh.17 Inquest Panchnama PW-2 Exh.18 Rakeshbhai Jagdishbhai Prajapati Exh.19 Panchnama of Scene of Offence PW-3 Exh.20 Kanaiyalal Nathulal Shah Exh.21 Panchnama - Production of knife by complainant Dharmeshbhai PW-4 Exh.22 Rameshbhai Chaturbhai Patel Exh.23 Panchnama - Production of Clothes of the deceased by Police Constable PW-5 Exh.24 Arunbhai Harising Gamit Exh.25 Panchnama - Personal condition of the accused PW-6 Exh.26 Niteshbhai Arjanbhai Dobaria Exh.27 Panchnama of personal condition and arrest of accused no. 2 Jitendra PW-7 Exh.28 Ashokbhai Bhavanbhai Patel Exh.29 Panchnama - Production of Articles recovered from the accused by Medical Officer. PW-8 Exh.30 Mukeshbhai Vitthalbhai Bhadani Exh.31 Panchnama - Discovery of motorcycle by accused no. 2 Jitendra PW-9 Exh.32 Jayeshbhai Mansukhbhai Rajodiya Exh.33 Panchnama - Discovery of weapon by accused Anil from his residence PW-10 Exh.34 Umeshbhai Raghavbhai Sojitra Exh.35 Panchnama - Seizure of motorcycle from Bharatbhai Rajabhai PW-11 Exh.36 Mansukhbhai Virjibhai Patel 2nd Panch PW-12 Exh.38 Dharmeshbhai Kanaiyalal Patel Executive Magistrate Exh.39 Panchnama of Test Identification Parade. 2 Jitendra PW-9 Exh.32 Jayeshbhai Mansukhbhai Rajodiya Exh.33 Panchnama - Discovery of weapon by accused Anil from his residence PW-10 Exh.34 Umeshbhai Raghavbhai Sojitra Exh.35 Panchnama - Seizure of motorcycle from Bharatbhai Rajabhai PW-11 Exh.36 Mansukhbhai Virjibhai Patel 2nd Panch PW-12 Exh.38 Dharmeshbhai Kanaiyalal Patel Executive Magistrate Exh.39 Panchnama of Test Identification Parade. PW-13 Exh.63 Dineshbhai Lavjibhai Prepared Number Plate of Motorcycle at the instance of accused no. 2 Jitubhai PW-14 Exh.64 Dhaval Nitinbhai Danecha. Painter - working at A-One Painter of Dineshbhai Lavjibhai. (v) Police Witnesses: PW-21 Exh.67 Anil Rathunath Deshmukh Writer to the I.O. at Kapodara Police Station. PW-25 Exh.82 M.G. Sai - P.S.I. Exh.84 Complaint of Anil Rameshbhai Pansuriya Exh.85 Registration of FIR of Accused-1 Anil PW-26 Exh.87 Rajesh Rameshchandra Parmar Circle Officer Exh.88 Yadi to prepare Map Exh.89 Map PW-27 Exh.92 Laxmanbhai Hirabhai - A.S.I. Exh.93 Station Diary entry registering FIR Exh.94 Letter from PI to register FIR PW-29 Exh.98 Sanjay Kamlashanker Rai PSI - who had gone to Chotila to inquire about purchase of knife PW-30 Exh.99 Babubhai Mahadevbhai Desai PSI - I.O. Exh.100 Xerox of RC Book Exh.101 Report of Mobile FSL Exh.102 Forwarding letter to FSL Exh.103 Receipt of Muddamal from FSL Exh.104 Forwarding letter from FSL to P.I. Exh.105 Forwarding letter from Police Station to FSL Exh.106 Receipt from FSL Exh.107 Forwarding letter from FSL to P.I. Exh.108 Notification under Gujarat Police Act 11. The prosecution also led the documentary evidence. 12. On conclusion of the recording of the evidence, the statement of the accused herein as well as the statement of the acquitted accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused herein stated that he was innocent. He further stated that he had suffered grievous injuries and the police deliberately suppressed all such materials only with a view to see that the accused does not get the benefit of taking the plea of self-defence. The accused also stated that the police had done some interpolations in the record of the documentary evidence. 13. The trial court, upon appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, held the accused herein guilty of the offences enumerated above and sentenced him accordingly. The co-accused, however, came to be acquitted by the trial court as there was no sufficient evidence to connect him with the alleged crime. 14. 13. The trial court, upon appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, held the accused herein guilty of the offences enumerated above and sentenced him accordingly. The co-accused, however, came to be acquitted by the trial court as there was no sufficient evidence to connect him with the alleged crime. 14. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the convict is here before this Court with the present Appeal. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: 15. Mr. A.D. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the accused, submitted that he would not like to challenge the conviction on merits. Mr. Shah has only one argument to canvass. The argument of Mr. Shah is that the case is not one of murder but is one of culpable homicide as defined under Section 299 of the IPC. To put it in other words, the argument of Mr. Shah is that, having regard to the medical evidence on record and the genesis of the occurrence, it cannot be said that the act on the part of the accused was preplanned or premeditated. The argument is that the intention of the accused was not to kill the deceased. The accused was only interested in the bag containing money. The accused wanted to grab the bag from the hands of the deceased at any cost and run away. However, the accused was not successful in his attempt because the deceased caught hold of the accused and did not allow him to run away with the bag. According to Mr. Shah, while the grappling was going on between the two, all of a sudden, the accused took out a knife from his pocket and hit a blow on the chest of the deceased. According to Mr. Shah, the intention to kill is lacking in the present case. All that can be said is that the accused had the knowledge that he is likely, by such act, to cause death. The argument proceeds to the extent that the case on hand remains at the stage of Section 299 of the IPC, i.e. culpable homicide. It does not travel beyond culpable homicide so as to bring the same within the ambit of Section 300, i.e. murder. Mr. The argument proceeds to the extent that the case on hand remains at the stage of Section 299 of the IPC, i.e. culpable homicide. It does not travel beyond culpable homicide so as to bring the same within the ambit of Section 300, i.e. murder. Mr. Shah made himself very clear that having regard to the genesis of the occurrence and the evidence on record, it is not possible for him to invoke any of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC so as to bring the case within the ambit of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-I or 304 Part-II of the IPC. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Shah prays that the conviction may be altered from Section 302 to Section 299 of the IPC and the sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone. Mr. Shah in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of M.P. AIR 1956 SC 116 (2) Kapur Singh vs. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 654 (3) State of A.P. vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another, AIR 1977 SC 45 (4) Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh vs. Valerabhai Deganbhai Vagh, AIR 2017 SC 2827 (5) Masumsha Hasansha Musalman vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 1876 (6) Vaghari Kala Bhikha and Others vs. State, (1984) 1 GLR 188 (7) Tholan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE: 16. Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, the learned APP appearing for the State, has vehemently opposed this Appeal. Ms. Jhaveri would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the trial court in holding the accused guilty of the offence of murder. The learned APP would submit that the case on hand is one of murder attracting Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC. The learned APP would submit that there is no question of altering the conviction from murder to that of culpable homicide. The learned APP would submit that a plan was hatched by the accused herein along with the co-accused for the purpose of committing robbery. A close watch was kept while the deceased was walking past the street with a bag containing money. The learned APP would submit that a plan was hatched by the accused herein along with the co-accused for the purpose of committing robbery. A close watch was kept while the deceased was walking past the street with a bag containing money. The learned APP would submit that although the initial plan was to grab the bag from the hands of the deceased and run away, but as the accused himself got caught by the deceased, he ultimately went to the extent of drawing a knife out of his pocket and hit a severe blow straight into the chest causing extensive injuries to the heart. In such circumstances, according to the learned APP, there is no merit in the contention canvassed on behalf of the accused that the accused had no intention to kill the deceased but the case would rest only at the stage of knowledge that such an act would cause death. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned APP prays that there being no merit in this Appeal, the same be dismissed. ANALYSIS: 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is, whether the trial court committed any error in holding the accused guilty of the offence of murder? 18. As the learned counsel appearing for the accused has confined his case only to the extent of altering the conviction, we need not discuss in details the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses examined in the course of the trial. However, we should look into the medical evidence on record. 19. The prosecution has examined Dr. Dineshkumar Champaklal Modh PW-13 (Exh.46). Dr. Modh proved the contents of the postmortem report (Exh.47). The postmortem report reveals the following injuries: (i) Scalp having incised wound of 5cm x 0.5cm muscle deep, red in colour with clean margin at mid line over parietal region 13cm far nasal bridge. (ii) Left side of chest having stab wound of 3 cm x 1 cm x 7 cm deep, red in colour with oblique with both angle acute with clean margin below left middle part of clavicle, 11 cm lateral to mid line blood comes out of the wound. (ii) Left side of chest having stab wound of 3 cm x 1 cm x 7 cm deep, red in colour with oblique with both angle acute with clean margin below left middle part of clavicle, 11 cm lateral to mid line blood comes out of the wound. (iv) Left (ILL) having incised wound of 6 cm x 1 cm muscle deep on lateral aspect 2 cm (ILL) 4th finger clefs clean margin and red in colour. (v) Left wrist on medial aspect having incised wound of 3 cm x 0.5 cm, red in colour. Muscle deep with clean margin, 8 cm (ILL) (thumb) 1st proximal phalangio metacarpal joint. (vi) Left (ILL) over on medial aspect having superficial incised wound of 4 cm x 0.25 cm, red in colour x clear margin 6 cm away (maximal) to the (4th) injury. The internal injuries revealed that there was corresponding contusion present at the mid line of 6 cm x 2 cm at the parietal region but no fracture of the skull. The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock as stab injury to the left sub-claviam vessels. The Medical Officer clearly admitted that the injuries nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 were superficial and simple injuries and not sufficient to cause death. The Medical Officer also admitted that the injury no. 2 had damaged the sub-clavicle artery which could have been repaired by surgery. However, no operation was performed to treat this injury at Ayush Hospital. Furthermore, this injury was having both ends sharp cut and the same is possible by a weapon having both sides sharp edges. The Medical Officer also admitted that the injuries nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 and the injury no. 2 are possible by different weapons.” 20. As the accused was severely thrashed by the mob at the place of the incident, he also suffered few injuries. He was subjected to medical examination. 21. The prosecution has examined Dr. Hardik Ashok Astik PW-28 (Exh.95) for the purpose of explaining the injuries suffered by the accused. It appears from the materials on record that the accused was admitted as an indoor patient between 17th January 2009 and 31st January 2009. The accused had suffered the following injuries: “(i) 1 x 0.25 x 0.25 cm incised wound over right eyebrow and right eye was blacken with swelling. Similarly, left eye was also having swelling. It appears from the materials on record that the accused was admitted as an indoor patient between 17th January 2009 and 31st January 2009. The accused had suffered the following injuries: “(i) 1 x 0.25 x 0.25 cm incised wound over right eyebrow and right eye was blacken with swelling. Similarly, left eye was also having swelling. (ii) Incised wound of 5 x 2 x 1 cm on right ear and multiple abrasions were noticed on the left shoulder, left chest region as well as right shoulder, right chest region and right hand. (iii) CLW of 2 x 1 x 3 cm over right eye. (iv) Sonography revealed hematoma of 4 x 2.5 cm on liver. (v) CT Scan revealed sub-arachnoid's hemorrhage.” 22. It also appears that while the accused was undergoing the treatment in the hospital, his dying declaration (Exh.76) came to be recorded, which reads thus:- Date: 18.1.2009 Time: 20/35 Place: New Civil Hospital 1 What is your name? Anil Rameshbhai Pansuriya. 2 How old are you? 20 years. 3 What do you do? Diamond Polishing. 4 Where do you stay? 242, Pramukh Chhaya, Behind Mahalaxmi Apartment, Kapodara Road, Puna Road, Surat. 5 What happened to you? I have been beaten. 6 Where are you at present? In the New Civil Hospital. 7 How did the incident happen? Day before yesterday in the evening at about 7 to 7:30. I went to snatch away a bag. In the grappling I hit a belt and a log blow. The bag was released from my hand and I ran towards the opposite side. However, the public caught hold of and thrashed me. In the mean time, the police arrived and they took me to the hospital. I have been beaten on the ear, head, stomach, back and all over the body. I don't know the person from whom I went to snatch away the bag. However, I can identify him. 8 Who were present at the time of the incident? People were present at the time of snatching away the bag. 9 Do you have any dispute with anyone? No. There is none. 10 Do you want to say anything further? No. Nothing further to say. 23. The materials on record further indicate that the accused had lodged an FIR (Exh.84) dated 17th January 2009. People were present at the time of snatching away the bag. 9 Do you have any dispute with anyone? No. There is none. 10 Do you want to say anything further? No. Nothing further to say. 23. The materials on record further indicate that the accused had lodged an FIR (Exh.84) dated 17th January 2009. The FIR lodged by the accused reads thus: “I, Anilbhai Rameshbhai Pansuriya, Aged 20, Occupation: Diamond Polishing work, at present residing with Jitubhai Talaviya at 242, Pramukh Chhaya Society, Punagam, Surat. Originally hails from village Maliyasan, Tahsil and District Rajkot. On being personally asked, I state the facts of my complaint as under: That I reside at the above mentioned address with my friend Jitubhai Talaviya and doing a labour work of diamond polishing at the Ghanshyam Nagar. I have been residing in Surat since last seven years. Prior to that, I was running a garage in the name and style of Bajrang Garage at the Adapedak Road, behind Masoom Mission, Rajkot. Today, in the evening at about half past seven, I was passing through the Heerabaug Circle. At that point of time, I saw a person carrying a bag with him. I was having no work for the last three days and was starving. Believing that the bag might contain money, I tried to grab the bag. However, there was resistance by that person. During the grappling, I took out a knife and inflicted a blow on the chest of that person. As there was a huge outcry, the people at the surrounding the area had gathered and they thrashed me. I got injured on the right eyebrow, forehead, right ear as well as on the eyes. As a result of thrashing, I also received injuries on my stomach as well as contused injuries on my body. As my right ear was cut, it was sutured. I don't know the name or recognize the persons who thrashed me. As I tried to grab a bag from an unknown person and as there was a grappling, I took out a knife and inflicted a blow on the chest of an unknown person. Some 50 to 100 people gathered at the place and they thrashed me. As a result, I received several injuries. Therefore, it is my complaint to take legal action against those persons who thrashed me. Some 50 to 100 people gathered at the place and they thrashed me. As a result, I received several injuries. Therefore, it is my complaint to take legal action against those persons who thrashed me. My witnesses are those who come out during the police investigation.” 24. In view of the aforesaid, we now proceed to address ourselves on the only argument canvassed on behalf of the accused that the conviction deserves to be altered to Section 304 of the IPC. 25. The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock on account of the stab injury to the left sub-clavicle vessel. The postmortem report reveals that there was a stab-wound on the left side of the chest 3 cm x 1 cm x 7 cm deep. From the above description, it can be seen that the blow was aimed at the chest and the injury was inflicted with great force by a deadly weapon on the vital part. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Shah that as the accused and the deceased had grappled with each other it cannot definitely be said that the accused aimed the blow at a particular part of the body and, therefore, intended to cause that particular injury which was objectively found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is no doubt true that there may be a scope to contend that there was no premeditation and, therefore, clause firstly of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, that the accused intended to cause death, is not attracted. But, the important question is, whether Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC is attracted? INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE: 26. As the only argument canvassed before us is that the case does not travel beyond culpable homicide as the accused could only be said to have knowledge that he is likely by his act to cause death and not the intention to kill the deceased, we must explain the fine distinction between the terms intent and knowledge. 27. In the case of Smt. Mathri vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 , at page 990, His Lordship Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant vs. Kadari, ILR 25 Bombay 202. 27. In the case of Smt. Mathri vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 , at page 990, His Lordship Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant vs. Kadari, ILR 25 Bombay 202. They are as under: “The word intent by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies "aim" and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but further connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which the action would not have been taken.” 28. In the case of Basdev vs. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 , at page 490, the following observations have been made by His Lordship Chadrasekhara Aiyar J. “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less an intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.” 29. In para-9 of the judgment, at page-490, the observation made by Coleridge J. in Reg. vs. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating: “The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off, without intending to kill him but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?” 30. Bearing in mind the test suggested in this decision and bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies intent and knowledge and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that intent and knowledge cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that intent and knowledge are the same, knowledge will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. In the case In Re: Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 A.P. 141 also the distinction between knowledge and ‘intention’ is aptly explained. It is as under: “Knowledge and intention must not be confused. A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. It is as under: “Knowledge and intention must not be confused. A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of guilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention. Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is, therefore, necessary in order to arrive at a decision as to an offender's intention to inquire what the natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them can be presumed to have intended those natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C. Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge that the bodily Injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under sec. 300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more than merely likely to cause death but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of guilt is presumed.” 31. It has been further observed therein as under: “Where the evidence did not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable.” 32. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable.” 32. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the Code laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the Code designedly used the two words 'intention and knowledge, and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he "must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition Volume 1 Page 40). 33. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edition at Page 31 has observed: “To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed.........Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it.” 34. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition Vol. 1st page 41 has observed: “In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word "intention" is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims............Differing from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word "recklessness." In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds - (a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur.” 35. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds - (a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur.” 35. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 of the Code leaves no manner of doubt that under these sections when it is said that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299 it is said "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death" it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to bring about the particular consequences, that is, causing of death. Similarly, when it is said that "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death" it must be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. 36. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to intention may be satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result in death. CULPABLE HOMICIDE AND MURDER: 37. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder? 38. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of culpable homicide and murder, respectively. CULPABLE HOMICIDE AND MURDER: 37. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder? 38. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of culpable homicide and murder, respectively. In terms of Section 299, culpable homicide is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression 'intention' while the latter upon knowledge. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in culpable homicide, that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would be culpable homicide. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with murder, although there is no clear definition of murder in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, culpable homicide is the genus and murder is its species and all murders are culpable homicides but all culpable homicides are not murders. Rampal Singh vs. State of U.P. (2012) 8 SCC 289 . 39. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 , the Supreme Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under: “12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, culpable homicide is genus and murder is species. All murder is culpable homicide but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, culpable homicide not amounting to murder. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as murder. The second may be termed as culpable homicide of the second degree. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. The first is, what may be called culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as murder. The second may be termed as culpable homicide of the second degree. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is culpable homicide of the third degree. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.” 40. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. culpable homicide may or may not amount to murder, in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a culpable homicide is murder, the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of the Supreme Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail. 41. The principles state in the Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. The Supreme Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. culpable homicide and murder respectively. In Phulia Tudu vs. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588 , the Supreme Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections. The Supreme Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections. 42. The Supreme Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections. 42. The Supreme Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused if courts, losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:- Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done--- Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done--- INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing death. (1) with the intention of causing death. (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 43. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. 43. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300 of the IPC. 44. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result; of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC, instead of the words likely to cause death occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC and clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium of the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury.....sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 45. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and Another vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 , is an apt illustration of this point. 46. The scope of Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC has been the subject matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court. The decision in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 , has throughout been followed in a number of cases by all the High Courts as well as the Supreme Court. In all these cases the approach has been to find out whether the ingredient namely the intention to cause the particular injury was present or not? If such an intention to cause that particular injury is made out and if the injury is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC is attracted. Analysing Clause thirdly and as to what the prosecution must prove, it was held in Virsa Singh (supra) as under: “First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Analysing Clause thirdly and as to what the prosecution must prove, it was held in Virsa Singh (supra) as under: “First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.” 47. It was further observed as under: “If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.” 48. Thus, it is clear that the ingredient of Clause thirdly is not the intention to cause death but on the other hand the ingredient to be proved is the intention to cause the particular injury that was present. It is fallacious to contend that wherever there is a single injury only a case of culpable homicide is made out irrespective of other circumstances. In Emperor vs. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan, 18 Bom LR 793, it was observed as under: “Where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended.” 49. Commenting upon the aforesaid observation of the Bombay High Court, Justice Bose, in Virsa Singh (supra), held thus: “With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap.” 50. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap.” 50. As to how the intention is to be inferred even in a case of single injury, Justice Bose further held as under: “The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but one of fact.” 51. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but one of fact.” 51. This question was again considered in Jagrup Singh vs. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 , by a Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice D.A. Desai and Justice A.P. Sen and following the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh (supra) it was held as under: “There is no justification for the assertion that the giving of a solitary blow on a vital part of the body resulting the death must always necessarily reduce the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Code. If a man deliberately strikes another on the head with a heavy log of wood or an iron rod or even a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he must in (1981) 3 SCC 616 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 768 the absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption, be deemed to have intended to cause the death of the victim or such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The whole thing depends upon the intention to cause death, and the case may be covered by either clause 1stly or clause 3rdly. The nature of intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant upon the death.” 52. Therefore, there is no legal basis whatsoever to hold that since the respondent-accused gave only one blow and that too during the grappling, though found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause thirdly of Section 300 is not attracted. 53. In Jai Prakash vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1992) 2 SCC 32, the Supreme Court, after an exhaustive review of various decisions, more particularly, the principles laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra), concluded as under: “In all these cases, injury by a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. The Supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as mentioned above only t o assess the state of mind namely whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury i.e. to say that he desired expressly that such injury only should be the result. It is held in all these cases that there was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances, the accused could have been barely aware i.e. only had knowledge of the consequences. These circumstances under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at least a doubt arose that all his mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular result. We may point out that we are not concerned with the intention to cause death in which case it will be a murder simplicitor unless exception is attracted. We are concerned under clause 3rdly with the intention to cause that particular injury which is a subjective inquiry and when once such intention is established and if the intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, clause 3rdly is attracted and it would be murder, unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is attracted. If on the other hand this ingredient of 'intention' is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in this regard then only it would be reasonable to infer that clause 3rdly is not attracted and that the accused must be attributed knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause death in which case it will be culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.” 54. In the case of Rajwant Singh vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 , after referring to the relevant clauses of Section 300 of the India Penal Code, the following observations have been made: “The mental attitude is thus made of two elements (a) causing an intentional injury and (b) which injury the offender has the foresight to know would cause death. For the application of clause three it must first be established that the injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. For the application of clause three it must first be established that the injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death, one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very Injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is established.” 55. In the case of Anda vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 , the two relevant Sections 299 and 300 are beautifully analysed and the relevant observations are made at page 151 in para-7. Before we refer to those observations, we would refer to certain observations made earlier. They are as under: “The offence of culpable homicide involves the doing of an act (which term includes illegal omissions) (a) with the intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. If the death is caused in any of these three circumstances, the offence of culpable homicide is said to be committed.......Intention and knowledge in the ingredients of the section postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude and this mental condition is the special mens rea necessary for the offence. The guilty intention in the first two conditions contemplates the intended death of the person harmed or the intentional causing of an injury likely to cause his death. The knowledge in the third condition contemplates knowledge of the death of the person. Sec. 300 tells us when the offence is murder and when it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Sec. 300 begins by setting out the circumstances when culpable homicide turns out into murder which is punishable under sec. 302 and the exceptions in the same section tell us when offence is not murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under sec. 304. Murder is an aggravated form of culpable homicide. The existence of one of four conditions turns culpable homicide into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder again to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” 56. 304. Murder is an aggravated form of culpable homicide. The existence of one of four conditions turns culpable homicide into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder again to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” 56. We will now refer to the relevant observations made in para at page 151. They are as under: “The third clause views the matter from a general stand-point. It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The emphasis here is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary way of nature and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is intended the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused, and sometimes both are relevant. The determinant factor is the intentional injury which must be sufficient to cause death, that is to say, the probability of death is not so high, the offence does not fall within murder but within culpable homicide not amounting to murder or something less. The illustration appended to the clause 3rdly reads: “(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death. The sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary way of nature is the gist of the clause irrespective of an intention to cause death. Here again, the exceptions may bring down the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” 57. The Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan vs. State of U.P. (2007) 14 SCC 660 , noticed that the academic distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder had vividly been brought out by the Supreme Court in State of A.P. vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 , where it was observed as under: “...that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of Sections 299 and 300 of the Code is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of sections 299 and 300 of the Code and the drawing support from the decisions of the court in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri. L.J. 818 and Rajwant Singh vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri. L.J. 1509, speaking for the court, Justice R.S. Sarkaria, neatly brought out the points of distinction between the two offences, which have been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the court said that wherever the Court is confronted with the question whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, on the facts of a case, it would be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be that the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Two, if such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to culpable homicide as defined in section 299. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the First or Second part of Section 304, depending respectively, on whether this second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the cases come within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the first part of Section 304 of the Code. It was, however, clarified that these were only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of the court and not cast-iron imperative.” 58. Mr. Shah, the learned counsel placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tholan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 . 59. In Tholan (supra), the accused stood in front of the house of the deceased and used filthy language against some persons (who were unconnected with the deceased). The deceased came out of his house and told the accused that he should not use vulgar and filthy language in front of ladies and asked him to go away. 59. In Tholan (supra), the accused stood in front of the house of the deceased and used filthy language against some persons (who were unconnected with the deceased). The deceased came out of his house and told the accused that he should not use vulgar and filthy language in front of ladies and asked him to go away. The accused questioned the authority of the deceased to ask him to leave the place. In the ensuing altercation, the accused gave one blow with a knife which landed on the (right) chest of the deceased which proved to be fatal. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the accused could not be convicted under Section 302, but was guilty under Section 304 Part II. The circumstances which weighed with the Supreme Court were: (i) there was no connection between the accused and the deceased and the presence of the deceased at the time of the incident, was wholly accidental; (ii) altercation with the deceased was on the spur of the moment and the accused gave a single blow being enraged by the deceased asking him to leave the place; (iii) the requisite intention could not be attributed to the accused as there was nothing to indicate that the accused intended the blow to land on the right side of the chest which proved to be fatal. 60. Mr. A.D. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the accused, invited our attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Vaghari Kala Bhikha and others v. State, reported in (1984)1 GLR 188 . In the said case, the facts were that thousands of pilgrims had gathered near a place called “Ahmedabadi Kua” near Jenababa Medi. The accused no. 6 before the High Court was a wanted accused as he was to be arrested in connection with one offence. The Police Constables on duty noticed the presence of the wanted accused amongst the pilgrims. A constable by name Lila caught hold of the wanted accused. The other accused persons wanted to see that the accused no. 6 (absconding) is released by the police and, therefore, they started pelting stones. At that time, the accused no. 6 took out a knife and hit a blow on the body of the Police Constable, namely Lila. A constable by name Lila caught hold of the wanted accused. The other accused persons wanted to see that the accused no. 6 (absconding) is released by the police and, therefore, they started pelting stones. At that time, the accused no. 6 took out a knife and hit a blow on the body of the Police Constable, namely Lila. In the said factual background, the Sessions Judge held all the accused persons guilty of the offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC. In appeal by the accused no. 6, it was argued on his behalf that at the most the accused no. 6 could have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC as the injury suffered by the Police Constable, namely Lila, was a simple injury. A Division Bench of this High Court addressed itself to the question as to what offence the accused no. 6 could be said to have committed when he used the knife. The Hon'ble Judges of the Bench considered the fact that the accused no. 6 took out a knife and hit a blow on the Police Constable. The Court observed that it could be inferred that the accused no. 6 voluntarily caused hurt with the knife to the Police Constable. The Court posed a question, whether it could infer that the accused no. 6 had intended to inflict that very injury which was caused to the Police Constable Lila. In such circumstances referred to above, this Court observed as under: “Under these circumstances is it possible to infer that he intended to inflict a blow on the chest or he intended to give a blow with knife which fell on the chest this is important because of the definition of Section 307. Sec. 307 reads as under: “307. Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.” Now, therefore, what can be attributed to accused No. 6? He wielded a knife. He wielded a knife. Therefore, he intended or had the knowledge that he would use that knife. Further attribution could be made to him that use of a knife might cause injury to the person against whom the knife is used. The important question is whether, if death had been caused would he have been guilty for murder. For convicting a person. Under Section 302 I.P.C what is required to be satisfied is clause 3rdly of Section 300 of the IPC & 300 of the I.P.C runs as under: “300. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death: 2ndly.............. 3rdly - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 4thly - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.” Now, what is required to be considered is clause thirdly. For that purpose what is required to be established is as under: 1. The prosecution must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. 2. The nature of injury must be proved - These are purely objective investigations. 3. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was not intended. 4. It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Out of the four ingredients which are required to be proved in the case, we have to see, whether in this particular case there was an intention to inflict this particular injury on Lila, in the sense that some other kind of injury was not intended To our mind the only intention could be to cause a bodily injury with a knife. Attributing it any thing further and to say that he intended to cause this particular injury at this particular place and he never intended to inflict some other kind of injury by the knife, would be stretching the case too far and the resultant effect would be that if Lila had died, the accused would not have been guilty for murder but would have been guilty for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. This view is taken in the case of Harjinder Singh vs. Delhi Administration. There the scope and applicability of Section 300 Thirdly and Section 304 were considered Intention of accused to inflict the particular injury on the particular place was not proved It was held that Section 300 Thirdly could not apply. It was further held on facts that it was quite legitimate to hold that the accused struck the deceased with the knife with the intention to cause an injury likely to cause death and that, therefore, the offence fell Under Section 304 Part I. Now, if the police constable Lila had died the accused could have been convicted Under Section 304 Part I or Under Section 304 Part II depending upon the injury. In these circumstances this act would not be an offence Under Section 307 I.P.C. Further, here the injury was neither sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death nor it was likely to cause death The police constable did not die. He even did not receive a grievous injury. Normally a man is presumed to know the result of the act that he does and he is required to be punished accordingly. Here the injury found is a simple injury and, therefore, the accused would be only liable for the injury which he causes.” 61. Thus, this Court took the view that if the Police Constable Lila would have died, the accused no. 6 would have been convicted under Section 304 Part-I or under Section 304 Part-II depending upon the injury. In such circumstances, the act of the accused no. 6 would not be an offence under Section 307 of the IPC. 62. Extending the same analogy as noted above, it is sought to be argued by Mr. 6 would have been convicted under Section 304 Part-I or under Section 304 Part-II depending upon the injury. In such circumstances, the act of the accused no. 6 would not be an offence under Section 307 of the IPC. 62. Extending the same analogy as noted above, it is sought to be argued by Mr. Shah that the case on hand is not one of murder as the accused, although had a knife and hit a blow on the chest of the deceased, yet the intention of the accused could not be said to be to cause a particular injury, and that too, on a particular part of the body. 63. The learned APP invited our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harendra Nath Mandal vs. State of Bihar, 1993 Cri. L.J. 2830. The Supreme Court in the said decision, has observed as under: “Section 304 of the IPC does not create an offence but provides the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In view of Section 299 of the IPC, whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely, by such act, to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide. In view of Section 300 of the IPC, except in cases covered by the five exceptions mentioned therein, culpable homicide is murder. It is well known that if a death is caused and the case is covered by any one of the five exceptions of Section 300, then such culpable homicide shall not amount to murder. Section 304 provides punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder and draws a distinction in the penalty to be inflicted in cases covered by one of the five exceptions, where an intention to kill is present and where there is only knowledge that death will be a likely result, but intention to cause death or such bodily injury which is likely to cause death is absent. To put it otherwise, if the act of the accused falls within any of the clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 300 but is covered by any of the five exceptions it will be punishable under the first part of Section 304. To put it otherwise, if the act of the accused falls within any of the clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 300 but is covered by any of the five exceptions it will be punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, the act comes under clause (4) of Section 300, i.e. the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death but without any intention to cause death and is covered by any of the exceptions, it will be punishable under the second part. The first part of Section 304 applies where there is guilty intention whereas, the second part applies where there is guilty knowledge. But, before an accused is held guilty and punished under first part or second part of Section 304, a death must have been caused by him under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to Section 300, which includes death caused while deprived of power of self-control under grave and sudden provocation, while exercising in good faith, the right of private defence of person or property and in a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation.” 64. The aforesaid decision has been relied upon by the learned APP to contend that even for the purpose of bringing the case within the ambit of the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, a death must have been caused by the accused under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. We are afraid, we are not in a position to accept such a contention. 65. The decision of the Supreme Court, to the extent it makes a statement of law that before an accused is held guilty and punished under first part or second part of Section 304 of the IPC a death must have been caused by him under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, is partially incorrect. 66. The difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that, under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is given the benefit of the exceptions under Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is not established at all. 66. The difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that, under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is given the benefit of the exceptions under Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is not established at all. The right approach to cases of culpable homicide, as noted above, is first to find out if the offence falls under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. If it is so found, the trial Judge is then to see if the case is covered by one of the exceptions to this Section. The offence if proved to fall under one of the exceptions would be punishable under Section 304, Part I, of the IPC. Otherwise, it would be murder, the punishment for which is provided by Section 302 of the IPC. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of the opinion that the requirements of Section 300 of the IPC are not fulfilled and the offence does not fall under any one of its four clauses, he should proceed to see, whether it was committed with one of the intentions mentioned in Part-I or only with the knowledge prescribed in Part-II of Section 304 of the IPC. Thus, for the purpose of bringing the case within Section 304, Part-II, of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. 67. Once again adverting to the contention of a single blow without any intention, we may only say that there is no principle that in all cases of single blow Section 302 of the IPC is not attracted. Of course, in the case on hand, the argument of Mr. Shah is two-fold. One, with respect to the single blow, and another, with respect to the fact that the case is one of grappling between the accused and the deceased. Single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 of the IPC, in some cases, under Section 304 of the IPC and in som other cases, under Section 326 of the IPC. The question with regard to the nature of the offence has to be determined on the facts of each case. Single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302 of the IPC, in some cases, under Section 304 of the IPC and in som other cases, under Section 326 of the IPC. The question with regard to the nature of the offence has to be determined on the facts of each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention and the knowledge of the offender of the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the accused wanted to get himself released from the clutches of the deceased at any cost because he realized that it was too late for him to run away with the bag and if he would get caught by the mob, then he would be butchered or rather thrashed severely and this is exactly what happened in the present case. In such circumstances, the accused, who was armed with a knife, took it out from his pocket and straightway hit a blow on the chest of the deceased. 68. We find it extremely difficult to take the view that the case on hand is one not travelling beyond knowledge, i.e. Section 299 of the IPC. In other words, not beyond culpable homicide. 69. It is important to once again note at this stage that Mr. Shah very fairly submitted that he is not in a position to bring his case within any of the four exceptions enumerated. Mr. Shah confines his case only upto Section 299 of the IPC. 70. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate 'A' is bound hand and foot. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A' shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A' and 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (4) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury “likely to cause death” and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. (5) The word “likely” means probably and it is distinguished from more “possibly.” When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will “probably happen.” In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (6) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (7) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (8) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (9) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (10) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (11) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 71. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion that the trial court rightly held the accused guilty of the offence of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. No case, in our opinion, could be said to have been made out for altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 of the IPC. 72. In the result, this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.