ORDER : T.R. Ravi, J. The revision petition has been preferred against the order dated 30.05.2015 of the KVAT Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam in R.P.No.8/2013 in T.A.(VAT)No.384/2012. The grievance of the petitioner is against the cancellation of the permission granted to him on 30.06.2008 by the Commercial Tax Officer, Thrissur to pay tax under the compounding scheme under Section 8(f) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act,2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The petitioner commenced business on 24.03.2008. An application was filed for permission to pay tax under Section 8(f) on which Annexure-II order dated 30.06.2008 was issued. The permission granted is for the assessment year 2008-09 and is stated to be valid till 31.03.2009. On 24.02.2009, the Deputy Commissioner, Department of Commercial Taxes, Thrissur as per Annexure-III order cancelled Annexure II order by invoking the powers vested in him under Section 56 of the Act. The order says that going by Section 8(f)(i), a dealer who has not transacted any business during any of the three consecutive years preceding is not eligible for compounding during the year 2008-09. Annexure III order was challenged in revision before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and by Annexure IV order dated 8.7.2009, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Authority for issuing fresh orders in accordance with law. Even though the matter has been remitted back, a reading of the order shows that the issue regarding the entitlement of the petitioner to opt under Section 8(f) was not considered at all. 3. Notice was issued to the petitioner, as directed in Annexure-IV order. The petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.942/2010 stating that no orders have been issued pursuant to Annexure-IV. On 12.01.2010, by Annexure-VI judgment, this Court disposed of W.P.(C)No.942/2010 directing the Commercial Tax Officer to consider and pass orders, in accordance with law, with regard to the law declared by the Division Bench of this Court in Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. Assistant commissioner reported in [2009 (17) KTR 613 (Ker)]. It appears that on 13.01.2010, the Commercial Tax Officer issued orders rejecting permission to pay tax under Section 8(f). It appears that on 13.01.2010, the Commercial Tax Officer issued orders rejecting permission to pay tax under Section 8(f). The order dated 13.1.2010 was challenged in W.P. (C)No.11777/2010 and by judgment dated 31.10.2011, this Court quashed the order of the assessment officer for the reason that the Officer had failed to consider the judgment reported in [2009 (17) KTR 613 (Ker)], in spite of being specifically directed to do so. On reading the judgment in W.P.(c) 11777/2010, it is seen that this Court did not offer any opinion as to the applicability of the above judgment to the facts of the petitioner’s case. 4. Thereafter by Annexure-VII order dated 09.02.2012, the Commercial Tax Officer ordered that the permission dated 30.06.2008 stands cancelled and the application filed by the petitioner for payment of tax under Section 8(f) for the year 2008-09 stands rejected under Section 8(f)(ii). The contentions of the petitioner that an order permitting compounding once issued cannot be cancelled, has been elaborately considered and relying on the Division Bench decision in M/s Joy Alukkas Traders (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala reported in [2010 (1) KLT S.N.87 (Case No.105)] and in M/s Bhima Jewellery v. State of Kerala reported in [2007 KHC 5166], the above contention has been rejected. 5. The petitioner filed a rectification application under Section 66 of the Act, against Annexure-VII order. The rectification application was dismissed by Annexure-IX order on 02.03.2012. The matter was taken up before the Appellate Tribunal and by Annexure-XI order, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The petitioner filed a review petition against Annexure-XI order which has been dismissed by Annexure-XIII order dated 30.05.2015. It is against the said order, the present revision petition is filed. 6. The petitioner has raised eight questions of law in the revision petition, most of which are overlapping. On a reading of the questions of law raised, we are of the opinion that once we decide on the question whether the petitioner is entitled to opt for paying tax under Section 8(f), none of the other questions will have to be answered. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader. The contentions of the petitioner are as follows : (i) Since the petitioner has made purchases during the year 2007-2008, going by Explanation 2 to Section 8(f)(i), he is entitled to pay tax at compounded rates. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader. The contentions of the petitioner are as follows : (i) Since the petitioner has made purchases during the year 2007-2008, going by Explanation 2 to Section 8(f)(i), he is entitled to pay tax at compounded rates. (ii) Since the petitioner has been permitted to pay tax at compounded rates during the years 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12, the authorities cannot subsequently cancel the permission under Section 8(f)(ii). (iii) Once the petitioner has accepted the option for compounding, there is a binding contract between the parties which cannot be revoked subsequently having regard to the decision in Johnson & Johnson Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner, reported in 2009 (17) KTR 613 and Zodiac Regency v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & anr. reported in 2012 (20) KTR 382. 8. The Senior Government Pleader appearing for the State contends that on a reading of Section 8(f)(i) it is clear that the option of compounding is available only to a person who has had genuine business during three consecutive years prior to the period for which the option is made and had “paid tax” or had “tax payable”. He further submits that the explanation to Section 8(f)(i) cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof. He relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.Sundram Pillai and others. v. V.R. Pattabiraman and others reported in [ (1985) 1 SCC 591 ]. Regarding the question of binding contract, the Senior Government Pleader submits that having regard to the decision in M/s. Joy Alukkas Traders (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala reported in [2010 (1) KLT S.N.87 (Case No.105)], it was well within the powers of the higher authority to correct a wrong order of compounding passed by the Assessing Officer and an order by the Assessing Officer does not achieve finality, since it is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner. It is submitted that the permission to pay compounded tax is provisional and subject to a proper assessment procedure. It is submitted that the permission to pay compounded tax is provisional and subject to a proper assessment procedure. It is pointed out by him that in the case on hand, the order which has been challenged in revision is the order of the KVAT Appellate Tribunal in R.P.No.8/2013 in TA (VAT) No.384/2012 and the order which was challenged before the Appellate Tribunal was the order dated 02.03.2012 in the rectification application filed by the petitioner against Annexure-VII order. It is pointed out that the dismissal of the rectification petition does not attract the principle of merger and since the original order has not been challenged, the petitioner is not entitled to prosecute the revision petition. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi reported in [2013 SCC OnLine SC 308]. He further points out that the application for payment of tax under Section 8(f) itself is dated 30.6.2008 as can be seen from Annexure II, and since it is filed beyond the stipulated period ie. 30.4.2008, it should not have been entertained by the Assessing officer. 9. The relevant portion of Section 8(f) as it stood during the assessment year in question (2008-09) reads thus; “8. Payment of tax at compounded rates:-Notwithstanding anything contained in section 6- (a) xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx (f) (i) any dealer in ornaments or wares or articles of gold, silver or platinum group metals may at his option, instead of paying tax in respect of such goods in accordance with the provisions of section 6, pay tax at one hundred and fifty per cent of the highest tax payable by him as conceded in the return or accounts, or tax paid by him under this Act, whichever is higher, for a year during any of the three consecutive years preceding that to which such option relates. Explanation 1.-Where a dealer had not transacted any business for the last three years consecutively, the highest tax paid or payable for the year during the year or years he transacted business shall be considered for the above purpose. Explanation 1.-Where a dealer had not transacted any business for the last three years consecutively, the highest tax paid or payable for the year during the year or years he transacted business shall be considered for the above purpose. Explanation 2.-Where during any such preceding year the dealer had not transacted business for any period in that financial year, the tax payable for the twelve months shall be calculated proportionately on the basis of the tax payable for the period during which such dealer had transacted business. xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx (ii) The assessing authority, for valid and sufficient reasons, such as shifting of place of business, holding of stock exceeding double the quantity held in the previous year, furnishing of false information, suppression or relevant information, failure to furnish such information demanded, may refuse permission to pay tax under this section and cancel the permission if any granted.” 10. A reading of Section 8(f)(i) along with the Explanation would show that only a dealer, who had a running business during the preceding consecutive three years to the year to which such option relates, and had “tax paid” or “tax payable” is entitled to opt for payment of tax under the above provision. The first Explanation enables even a dealer who had not transacted any business, in a year or two years in the immediately preceding three years also to opt for compounding if he had a registered dealership and had transacted business for atleast one whole year. The second Explanation provides for determination of the tax payable or paid in an year or years out of the preceding consecutive three years; when the business was transacted only piece-meal, ie: only in a certain period of that year. The computation then has to be made proportionately for the 12 month period to arrive at the year in which the highest tax was paid. Explanation 1 deals with a case where a dealer has not transacted any business consecutively for the last three years. Explanation 2 deals with a case where during any such preceding year the dealer had not transacted business for any period in that financial year. 11. Explanation 1 deals with a case where a dealer has not transacted any business consecutively for the last three years. Explanation 2 deals with a case where during any such preceding year the dealer had not transacted business for any period in that financial year. 11. Regarding the first contention of the petitioner, we have already observed that a reading of Section 8(f)(i) would clearly show that the option of compounding is available only to a dealer who had a registered dealership and had business transactions with tax paid or payable in the three consecutive years preceding the year for which the option for payment of tax under compounded rates is made. Since the petitioner admittedly has not transacted any business prior to 24.03.2008, he could not have submitted an application for compounding under Section 8(f)(i). Explanation 2 only deals with a case where a dealer who has not transacted any business for the last three years consecutively, and where during any such preceding year the dealer had not transacted business for any period in that financial year. In such cases, going by the Explanation, the tax payable for 12 months is to be calculated proportionately on the basis of the tax payable for the period during which such dealer had transacted business. Illustratively, if during a financial year the dealer had transacted business during six months and did not have any business during the remaining six months, the tax payable for the 12 months is to be calculated proportionately on the basis of the tax payable for the six months during which he transacted business. It is thus clear that Explanation 2 does not deal with the case of a dealer who begins his actual business during 2008-09 and has made some purchases during the last week of March, 2008. 12. The manner in which an Explanation to a Section should be interpreted has been laid down in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. V.R.Pattabiraman and others reported in [ 1985 1 SCC 591 ] The Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions in the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act regarding the meaning of the word 'wilful default'. The court was concerned with an Explanation added to a proviso to a Section in the said Act. The court was concerned with an Explanation added to a proviso to a Section in the said Act. After citing several authorities on the interpretation of statutes and the principles laid down in some earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Court concluded in paragraph 53 as follows; “53. Thus, from a conspectus of the authorities referred to above, it is manifest that the object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is (a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself, (b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve, (c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful, (d) an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and (e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same.” 13. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that Explanation 2 cannot have an independent existence sans the main provision Section 8(f)(i) and the contention of the petitioner that he should be allowed to opt for payment of tax under the compounded rates on the basis of the purchase tax paid by him for the nominal purchases made during the last week of March, 2008 is without any legal basis. 14. The contentions of the petitioner noted as (ii) and (iii) above are dealt with together. The assessment under the compounding scheme is no doubt a contract, between the department and the assessee. 14. The contentions of the petitioner noted as (ii) and (iii) above are dealt with together. The assessment under the compounding scheme is no doubt a contract, between the department and the assessee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in the decision in Koothattukulam Liquors v. Deputy commissioner of Sales Tax reported in [(2015) 12 SCC 794] held that an option for payment of tax under the compounded scheme once exercised and accepted becomes a statutory contract and the same came can be set at naught only under the provisions of the Contract Act. However, the acceptance of the option of the assessee by the Assessment Officer alone is not sufficient to constitute a completed contract. Under the scheme of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner has power to interfere with orders issued by the Assessing Officer and correct the same subject of course to the time limit prescribed under the Act. In the case on hand, the permission that is granted on 30.06.2008 was interfered with by the Deputy Commissioner on 24.02.2009 itself. The proceedings thereafter continued and the Assessing Officer by Annexure-VII order dated 09.02.2012, rejected the request of the petitioner for payment of tax under the compounding rate. As held by this Court in the decision in M/s Joy Alukkas Traders (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala reported in [2010 (1) KLT S.N.87 (Case No.105)], the compounding scheme for payment of tax opted by the assessee and accepted by the Assessing Officer does not achieve finality, since it is subject to supervisory jurisdiction by the Deputy Commissioner and if the scheme approved by the Assessing Officer is in violation of the charging provisions, it can never be held that such an approval would create a concluded contract between the parties. The decision in Joy Alukkas (supra) was considered by another Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Commercial Taxes Officer v. Hotel Breezeland Ltd. [ 2019 (2) KLT 432 ] and it was held that the precedential force of the judgment in Joy Alukkas Traders still continues. 15. The reliance placed on the judgment in Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner has no basis in our opinion. In Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, the appellant therein had been remitting tax at the compounded rates, even though no application for compounding had been filed. 15. The reliance placed on the judgment in Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner has no basis in our opinion. In Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, the appellant therein had been remitting tax at the compounded rates, even though no application for compounding had been filed. When assessment was made, the Assessing Officer applied the same rate of tax with regard to medicines sold in other divisions of the Company. The appellant contended that they have paid compounded rates only for the pharma division and that as far as other divisions are concerned, the compounded rates should not be applied. In the above circumstances this Court found, that all that the Commissioner has stated is that once the appellant has started billing in accordance with compounding scheme, then the same itself would amount to opting to pay tax under the compounding scheme and the appellant cannot thereafter back out of the option. The above judgment does not in any manner support the contention that the petitioner herein is entitled to pay tax under Section 8(f)(i) even though he is not entitled under the Scheme of the Act, merely on the basis of a wrong order passed by the Assessing Officer on 30.06.2008. 16. We find that none of the contentions of the petitioner are legally sustainable. Apart from the fact that the petitioner is not entitled to apply for compounding under Section 8(f)(i) since he does not satisfy the requirements under the provision, we also find force in the contention of the learned Senior Government Pleader that the application for compounding having been submitted much beyond the period prescribed under the Statute, ought not to have been entertained. The contention of the Senior Government Pleader that the main order has not been challenged also finds favour with us. As already noted, the first order of the Assessing Officer (Annexure-II) had been interfered with by the Deputy Commissioner as per Annexure-III order invoking his supervisory jurisdiction. The order Annexure-IV remitting the matter back to the Assessing Authority is a open remand and Assessing Authority had to consider the application for payment of tax under the compounded rate afresh. It is in exercise of such power that Annexure-VII order has been issued by the Assessing Authority whereby the Annexure-II order issued earlier was cancelled and the application itself was rejected. It is in exercise of such power that Annexure-VII order has been issued by the Assessing Authority whereby the Annexure-II order issued earlier was cancelled and the application itself was rejected. In the above circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere with Annexure-VII order issued by the Assessing Authority, confirmed in appeal by Annexure-XI order of the Appellate Tribunal. None of the grounds raised against the orders of the statutory authorities are sustainable and the Revision Petition is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.