JUDGMENT Sanjay Dhar, J.—The instant Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.07.2020, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.1045/2020 titled Mohammad Shafi Rather v. Union of India and another. 2) Before coming to the instant Letters Patent Appeal, let us give the brief background of the facts leading to the filing of this appeal. 3) On 08.06.2020, Police Station, Crime Branch, Kashmir, registered FIR bearing No.07/2020 for offences under Section 420, 409, 120-B IPC read with Section 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4) As per contents of the FIR, a complaint was received by Crime Branch, Kashmir, from Directorate of Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs, wherein it was alleged that inputs indicating misappropriation of food grains (rice) from the granaries of Hygam and Baramulla (Centre D) have been received. Upon receipt of this complaint, a Joint Surprise Check was conducted by the sleuths of Crime Branch, Kashmir, as a consequence whereof, it was revealed that seven trucks loaded with rice were shown to have been dispatched from Private Enterprise Godown (PEG), Baramulla, under the supervision of officers/officials of Food Corporation of India through Tehsil Supply Officer (TSO), PEG, Baramulla, FCS&CA. It was further revealed that these truck loads of rice were shown to have been received by TSO, Hygam Granary, Baramulla, by issuing separate challans in acknowledgement from various sale centres as mentioned in the FIR. It was also revealed that the receipt of the dispatched truck loads had been denied by the Sale Centres and even the relevant records of Accounts Section of Directorate of FCS & CA, Kashmir did not substantiate the receipt of these truck loads. Upon preliminary questioning of one of the truck drivers, it was revealed that these truck loads of food grains were never dispatched from PEG, Baramulla, and dispatches were shown only on papers without any physical transaction. The Joint Surprise Check also revealed that the fake challans were actually obtained by the appellant herein, who happened to be the Assistant Storekeeper, Palhallan Pattan, from one Siraj-ud-din Bhat, TSO, PEG, Baramulla. It is also alleged in the FIR that the appellant herein subsequently managed the challans in respect of trucks mentioned in the FIR from TSO, Hygam, Mohammad Hussain Bhat S/o Abdul Rahim Bhat R/o Kitchoo, Handwara. It is also alleged in the FIR that the appellant herein subsequently managed the challans in respect of trucks mentioned in the FIR from TSO, Hygam, Mohammad Hussain Bhat S/o Abdul Rahim Bhat R/o Kitchoo, Handwara. 5) Thus as per the FIR, the aforesaid officers/officials have after hatching a criminal conspiracy with each other and also with the employees of FCI, Baramulla, misappropriated 633.14 quintals of rice thereby causing pecuniary loss of Rs.9,49,710.00/ to the State exchequer. Accordingly, offences under Section 420/409/120-B IPC read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are stated to have been disclosed against the above named persons. 6) The aforesaid FIR was challenged by the appellant before the Writ Court by filing a writ petition bearing WP(C) No.1045/2020. The appellant further challenged the vires of second Proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 7) The learned Single Judge after hearing the counsel for the petitioner (appellant herein), dismissed the writ petition in limini by passing a detailed order dated 22.07.2020. It is this order which is under challenge before us in the instant Letters Patent Appeal. 8) The grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments are: (i) That the writ petition could not have been dismissed in limini, particularly when the appellant had challenged the vires of a provision of law i.e. second Proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It has been further contended that the impugned proviso gives unbridled powers to a non- designated police officer to conduct investigation to dilute the protection that is ensured by the main provision and thus the impugned proviso supersedes the main provision, which has led to absurdity and repugnancy; (ii) That the learned Single Judge has, while passing the impugned judgment, failed to properly interpret the provisions contained in Section 17-A of the Prevention of corruption Act; (iii) That the investigation of the case has been entrusted to a non-designated police officer, as such, the investigation is liable to be quashed. 9) We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the grounds of appeal and the impugned judgment. We have also gone through the record of the Writ Court. 9) We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the grounds of appeal and the impugned judgment. We have also gone through the record of the Writ Court. 10) The appellant has primarily challenged the impugned judgment on the ground that it was not open to the learned Single Judge to dismiss the writ petition in limini as the appellant had thrown challenge to the vires of second Proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned counsel has argued that the main provision of Section 17 empowers an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act with the prior order of a Magistrate of first class but the proviso to this Section, empowers even an Inspector of Police authorized by the Government to investigate such offences without an order of Magistrate of first class. According to the learned counsel, the officers of inferior rank are empowered to conduct the investigation without the order of a Magistrate of first class whereas the officers of higher rank have to seek prior order of the Magistrate before conducting the investigation. On this basis, it is urged that the proviso to Section 17 of the Act is repugnant to the main provision and hence liable to be struck down. 11) The learned counsel has relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 and State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 as also the judgment of this Court in Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman v. State of J&K and others, 2018 (2) SLJ 837, to canvass the point that the investigation relating to the offences under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act can be undertaken by a designated police officer only after an order of the Magistrate of first class. 12) In order to understand the import of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, we need to have a look at the language of the said provision. It reads as under: 17. 12) In order to understand the import of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, we need to have a look at the language of the said provision. It reads as under: 17. Persons authorized to investigate.— Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank,— (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police; (b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmadabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant Commissioner of Police; (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank, shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without a warrant: Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorized by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a warrant: Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. 13) The afore-quoted provision starts with a non-obstinate clause meaning thereby that it is a departure from the normal procedure of investigation of the offences provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The provision authorizes only the police officers of a certain rank to investigate the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The purpose for incorporating such a provision is to ensure that the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which are normally of serious and sensitive nature, are investigated by senior and experienced police officers. The provision authorizes only the police officers of a certain rank to investigate the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The purpose for incorporating such a provision is to ensure that the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which are normally of serious and sensitive nature, are investigated by senior and experienced police officers. The provision further provides a safeguard to the public servants from undue harassment by requiring that the investigation is to be conducted normally by a police officer of a designated higher rank so as to enable the honest public servants to discharge their duties free from false, frivolous and malicious accusations. 14) It is a well settled cannon of construction that a provision has to be read as it is and not to be rewritten to suit a particular conclusion. It is impermissible to read a provision in such a manner as to render it to some extent otiose. A plain reading of Section 17 conveys that a police officer, of the rank of Inspector in the case of Delhi Police establishment, an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmadabad or in any other metropolitan area and a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank, is authorized to investigate the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. Corollary is that an officer below the rank of aforesaid designated officers may also investigate the offences with the prior order of or permission of a Magistrate of first class or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be. No other construction of the main provision of S. 17 is permissible or possible. 15) The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that even for designated police officers, it is necessary to obtain permission of the Metropolitan Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate before undertaking the investigation of the cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, is misconceived and incorrect interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. 15) The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that even for designated police officers, it is necessary to obtain permission of the Metropolitan Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate before undertaking the investigation of the cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, is misconceived and incorrect interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. The provision mentions that the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act can be investigated only by the designated police officers and it further postulates that even the officers of lower rank may investigate such cases if there is a general or special order issued by the Government, without the order of a Magistrate, which is clear from the language of the main provision and first proviso to the said provision. 16) The second proviso to S. 17 of the Act lays down additional stipulation of a previous order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police for undertaking investigation of an offence under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thus for undertaking investigation of an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act, the investigating officer, besides being a police officer of the designated rank, has to be armed with an order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police and if the investigating officer is of a rank inferior to that of the designated police officer, in that case permission/authorization of the Magistrate will also be required. 17) The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention are of no assistance to the case set up by him. In Ch. Bhajan Lal’s case ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ), the Supreme Court held that the provisions contained in Section 5A of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is in paramateria with Section 17 of 1988 Act, are mandatory in nature and its strict compliance is absolutely necessary. This Court in Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman’s case reiterated this legal position while interpreting the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act, which is in paramateria with Section 17 of the 1988 Act. This Court in Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman’s case reiterated this legal position while interpreting the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act, which is in paramateria with Section 17 of the 1988 Act. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay ( AIR 1984 SC 684 ), is also not of any help to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. In fact, the observations made by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case and in the case of R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, go against what is being argued by the learned counsel. 18) In Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra), the Supreme Court while holding that the granting of permission under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, authorizing an officer of lower rank to conduct the investigation is not to be treated by Magistrate as a mere matter of routine, but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion and the order giving the permission should, on the face of it, disclose the reasons for granting such permission, observed as under: “….It is, therefore, clear in the light of the above principle of law that the Superintendent of Police or any police officer of above rank while granting permission to a non-designated police officer in exercise of his power under the second proviso to Section 5-A (1), should satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons to entrust the investigation with such police officer of a lower rank and record his reasons for doing so; because the very object of the legislature in enacting Section 5-A is to see that the investigation of offences punishable under Section 161, 165 or 165 A of the Indian Penal Code as well as those under Section 5 of the Act should be done ordinarily by the officers designated in clause (a) to (d) of Sec. 5A (1). The exception should be for adequate reasons which should be disclosed on the face of the order. The exception should be for adequate reasons which should be disclosed on the face of the order. In this connection, it is worthy to note that the strict compliance with Section 5A(1) becomes absolutely necessary, because Section 5A(1) expressly prohibits police officers, below certain ranks, from investigating into offences under Section 161, 165 and 165A, IPC and under Section 5 of the Act without orders of Magistrates specified therein or without authorization of the State Government in this behalf and from effecting arrests for those offences without a warrant..” 19) From the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court it becomes crystal clear that designated police officers do not require permission of Magistrate to investigate offences under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act. The permission of Magistrate is needed only when the investigation is undertaken by a non-designated police officer. 20) In R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, the Supreme Court while referring to its earlier decisions observed that an investigation contemplated by Section 5A must ordinarily be undertaken by a police officer of the designated rank and except with the permission of a Magistrate, the investigation of the police officers of lower rank is barred. From this, one can easily infer that it is only for a non-designated police officer that requirement of prior permission from a Magistrate is a necessity. 21) In a case relating to investigation of an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act, a similar issue came up for discussion before the Supreme Court in State by Central Bureau of Investigation v. S. Bagarappa, (2001) 1 SCC 369 . The Court, after interpreting the provisions contained in Section17 of the Act, upheld the validity of the order of the Superintendent of Police, CBI, whereby Inspector of Police (CBI) was authorized to investigate the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. 22) From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that there is no requirement of prior permission of Metropolitan/Judicial Magistrate in case the investigation is being undertaken by a designated officer. The requirement of prior permission of Magistrate is only needed in a case where investigation is entrusted to an officer of a lower rank. That being so, the very basis of challenge to the vires of the proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act gets knocked down. The requirement of prior permission of Magistrate is only needed in a case where investigation is entrusted to an officer of a lower rank. That being so, the very basis of challenge to the vires of the proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act gets knocked down. 23) The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that there is repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity in the main provision i.e. Section 17 of the Act and the provisos to it, is without any basis and appears to be a result of misreading of the provision by the learned counsel for the appellant. We are absolutely clear that there is no inconsistency or repugnancy between main provision of S. 17 and the impugned proviso. 24) It has been next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that while passing the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has not properly interpreted the provisions contained in Section 17-A of the Act. According to the learned counsel, in the instant case, the investigating agency could not have undertaken investigation against the appellant without the previous approval as contemplated in Section 17-A of the Act. 25) In order to understand the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, let us have a look at the provisions contained in Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 25) In order to understand the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, let us have a look at the provisions contained in Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It reads as under: 17-A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties.—(1) No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties, without the previous approval— (a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed: Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person: Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month. 26) The afore-quoted provision provides that no police officer is permitted to conduct enquiry or inquiry or conduct investigation into any offence done by a public servant where the offence alleged is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his public functions or duties without the previous approval, inter alia, of the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. Thus unless there is previous approval, there could be neither enquiry or inquiry nor investigation. Thus unless there is previous approval, there could be neither enquiry or inquiry nor investigation. 27) The provision is very clear and unambiguous as to in which circumstances the previous approval of the competent authority is needed for undertaking investigation etc. against a public servant. It uses the expression “offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties”. This expression is very significant and it connotes that it is only in such cases where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by a public servant that previous approval for undertaking the investigation is needed. It is not in all cases where a public servant is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act that previous approval, as contemplated in Section 17-A of the Act, is required. 28) Coming to the facts of the instant case. The allegations against the appellant are that he was involved in preparation/manipulation of bogus challans of delivery of food grains and had conspired in managing fictitious dispatch of food grains. These allegations do not involve any element of decision making or recommendation on the part of the appellant in discharge of his official functions. Thus, he cannot seek protection of umbrella provided to the public servants in terms of Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Single Judge has rightly rejected this contention of the appellant while passing the impugned judgment. 29) The judgment of the Supreme Court in D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain (Criminal Appeal No.458 of 2020 arising out of SLP (CRL.) No.1882 of 2018), relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, in the above context, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case because in the said case, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of S. 197 of Cr. P. C and S. 170 of Karnataka Police Act which are not akin to S. 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Both these provisions do not contain expression like “recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant”. 30) Lastly, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the investigation in the instant case has been entrusted to a non-designated police officer. Both these provisions do not contain expression like “recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant”. 30) Lastly, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the investigation in the instant case has been entrusted to a non-designated police officer. He has further contended that the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act are mandatory in nature and, as such, the investigation could not have been entrusted to an Inspector of Police who is a non-designated officer. On this ground, it is urged that the investigation is liable to be quashed. 31) It is true that the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act are mandatory in nature and the procedure laid down by the said provision for investigation of the offences punishable under the Act has to be strictly followed but in the instant case, though it is written in the FIR that investigation has been handed over to Inspector Mubarak Shah who is a non-designated officer yet Annexure-III to the writ petition shows that the investigation has been entrusted to Shri Imtiyaz Ahmad, Dy. SP, who is a designated officer in terms of Section 17 of the Act. As already noted, for a designated police officer, there is no requirement of previous permission from a Magistrate to undertake the investigation of offences punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, as such; the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is without any merit. The finding of the learned Single Judge in this regard is well reasoned and in accordance with the law. 32) No other ground has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments. 33) For the foregoing discussion, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. The appeal, being without any merit, is dismissed along with connected CM. 34) No order as to costs.