JUDGMENT : 1. This Civil Misc. Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 27.2.2019 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Beawar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), whereby a sum of Rs. 8,93,032/- has been decreed in favour of the claimant and against the non claimants respondents. 2. Facts of the case are that the claimants filed a claim petition before the Tribunal with regard to the death of Ghanshyam Sain in a road accident which took place on 26.10.2017 at 8.30-9.00 PM with a motor cycle no. RJ 30 SN 5313 when he was returning from village Bhaisapa to village Durgawas on his motor cycle no. RJ 36/SC 5109. 3. With regard to the said accident, a complaint was lodged by the brother of the deceased on 27.10.2017 at 10.30 AM, whereupon an FIR bearing No. 319/2017 was registered on 27.10.2017 at Police Station, Jawaja for the offences under Section 279, 304A IPC and investigation was commenced. After investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the driver of the offending vehicle. 4. A claim petition was filed by the claimants, claiming Rs. 80,30,000/- as compensation. None appeared for the respondents no. 1 and 2 despite service of summons and therefore, ex-parte proceedings were carried out against them on 8.2.2018. 5. Evidence was led and after hearing both the parties, the Tribunal vide its judgment dated 27.2.2019 awarded a sum of Rs. 8,93,032/- as compensation in favour of the claimants. Aggrieved therefrom, the present Civil Misc. Appeal has been filed by the Insurance Co. 6. Learned counsel for the Appellant Insurance Co. submitted that the Insurance Co. produced the investigator NAW-1 Lalta Prasad and exhibited A/2 and A/3 i.e. Rojnamcha Report. NAW-1 Lalta Prasad stated before the Tribunal that as per his investigation, no accident had taken place with the insured motor cycle no. RJ-30 SN 5313. In-fact the accident had taken place between two motor cycles i.e. RJ 36-SF-9248 Hero Deluxe and RJ-36-SC 5109. He further submitted that from Ex. –A/2 Rojnamcha Report, it is clear that upon receiving the information, police reached the spot and two motor cycles no. RJ-36-SF-9248 Hero Deluxe and RJ-36-SC-5109 Deluxe were lying on the side of the road and both motor cycles were brought to the police station on 27.10.2017. In such circumstances, the police could have or ought to have seized the motor cycle bearing no. RJ-36-SF-9248 Hero Deluxe and RJ-36-SC-5109 Deluxe were lying on the side of the road and both motor cycles were brought to the police station on 27.10.2017. In such circumstances, the police could have or ought to have seized the motor cycle bearing no. RJ 36-SF-9248 on the same day i.e. 27.10.2017. The seizure of the insured motor cycle after 6 days of alleged accident clearly shows that the insured motor cycle bearing No. RJ 30 SN 5313 was falsely involved in the alleged accident. The Tribunal has utterly failed to consider this aspect of the matter. On this count, the impugned judgment and award needs to be quashed and set-aside. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the following judgment: Cholamandalam General Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus Smt. Badami & Ors. – S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1148/2018. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned judgment and award and stated the same to be just and proper. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) Mangla Ram Versus The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. – Civil Appeal Nos. 2499-2500 of 2018, arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 28141-42 of 2017 (ii) Sunita and others Versus Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another – 2019 (1) TAC 710 (SC) 8. Heard. Considered. 9. In the instant case, first information report was submitted on 27.10.2017 at 10.30 AM, wherein the numbers of both the motor cycle were mentioned as RJ 36 SC 5109 and RJ 30 SN 5313. 10. If the contents of Roznamcha are taken into consideration, it is revealed that Roznamcha was prepared on 27.10.2017 at 6.58 AM, and the first information was submitted on 27.10.2017 at 10.30 AM. Although Roznamcha (Ex.A/2 and A/3) was prepared prior to the submission of first information report (Ex.-2), yet to prove the Roznamcha (Ex.A/2 and A/3), its scribe has not been examined by the appellant-Insurance Co. Thus, the claimants had no opportunity to cross-examine him. In this view of the matter, Roznamcha (Ex.-A/2 & A/3) has not been proved. 11. Dev Karan (AW-2) is the independent eye witness in this case. He categorically testified that on 26.10.2017 accident took place at about 8.30 PM between motor cycle no. RJ 36 SC 5109 and Motor Cycle No. RJ 30 SN 5313. His testimony has not been shuttered in the cross-examination. 11. Dev Karan (AW-2) is the independent eye witness in this case. He categorically testified that on 26.10.2017 accident took place at about 8.30 PM between motor cycle no. RJ 36 SC 5109 and Motor Cycle No. RJ 30 SN 5313. His testimony has not been shuttered in the cross-examination. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of AW-2 Dev Karan, more so when there is documentary evidence to this effect viz. FIR (Ex.-2), challan (Ex.-3), site plan (Ex.-4) and various other documents. 12. Albeit Lalta Prasad was examined as NAW-1, but in his cross examination he stated that no enquiry was done by him either from the owner of vehicle No. RJ 30 SN 5313 or from the owner of motor cycle No. RJ 36 SF 9248. 13. Further, it was not the case of the insurance co. and neither was it proved that vehicle No. RJ 36 SC 5109 was uninsured and thus, motor cycle Number RJ 30 SN 5313 was falsely involved in this case. 14. So far as the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Cholamandalam General Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus Smt. Badami & Ors. (supra) and relied upon by the counsel for the Insurance Co. is concerned, it does not apply in the instant case for the reason that the said case was not related to false involvement of the vehicle. 15. So far as the judgment passed in the case of Mangla Ram Versus The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and relied upon by the counsel for the claimant is concerned, in the said case Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. 16. Relevant paras 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mangla Ram (supra) are reproduced as under: “17. The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi’s case (supra), this Court in Parmeswari (supra) noted that when filing of the complaint was not disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High Court on the ground that nobody came from the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paragraphs 12 & 13 and observed thus: “12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor’s chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim. 13. The other so-called reason in the High Court’s order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is “a device to grab money from the insurance company”. This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted…….” 18. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors., wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors., wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under the IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in paragraph 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient 16 (1980) 3 SCC 457 disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 19. In Dulcina Fernandes (supra), this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant’s eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi (supra). In paragraphs 8 & 9, of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shila Datta, has been adverted to as under: “8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10) ‘10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. * * * (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. … (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.’ 9. … (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.’ 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519) ‘10. … We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.’ ” In paragraph 10 of the reported decision [Dulcina Fernandes and Ors. (supra)], the Court opined that non-examination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability.” 17. In the case of Sunita and others Versus Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another(supra) it was held by Hon’ble Apex in para 31 that:- “The approach in examining the evidence in accident claim cases is not to find fault with non examination of some “best” eye witness in the case but to analyse the evidence already on record to ascertain whether that is sufficient to answer the matters in issue on the touchstone of preponderance of probability.” 18. In this view of the matter, learned Tribunal is found not to have committed any error while passing the impugned judgment and award and I am in agreement with the findings arrived at by the Tribunal. 19. For the aforesaid reason, the appeal filed by the Insurance Co. fails and the same is hereby dismissed.