Sattar Khan v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority
2020-03-19
VIVEK RUSIA
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The petitioner has filed the present petition being aggrieved by order dated 3.3.2020 whereby respondent No.2 has been granted temporary permit for the route from Mandsaur to Nagda. 2. According to the petitioner, he is a regular SCP operator since last so many years for the route from Mandsaur to Nagda one trip daily. He is having SCP No.56/P/17/9470 which is valid up to 31.5.2022. On 24.2.2020, respondent No.2 filed an application seeking temporary permit over vehicle bearing Registration No. MP-14-PA-0480 for the route from Mandsaur to Nagda one return trip daily. Petitioner, respondent No.3 and others filed objections before respondent No.1 along with affidavit to the effect that the route in question is not formulated u/s.68(3)(ca) of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, the temporary permit in question cannot be granted. According to the petitioner, without giving any opportunity of hearing him and other objectors, respondent No.1 vide order dated 3.3.2020 has Sattar Khan. V/s. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority & others. allowed the application of respondent No.2 by granting temporary permit, hence the present petition before this Court. 3. Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that as on today, the post of President of STAT is vacant, therefore, the petitioner has no remedy except to file the present petition. He submits that respondent No.1 has committed an error of law by not granting opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and other objectors. Petitioner and others had submitted their objections in respect of proposed timing of respondent No.2 which is ahead to their timing but the same has not been considered by respondent No.1 which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Tansukhlal Talati V/s. STAT : ILR [2012] MP 1872. He further submits that the RTA cannot grant the permit without formulation of the route u/s. 68(3)(ca) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the impugned action of respondent No.1 is contrary to the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashis Kumar Jain V/s. MPSTAT : 2010 (3) MPLJ 60 . Respondent No.1 has also failed to examine the need for grant of temporary permit. The petitioner and other operators are already operating on the same route and there is no need at present for additional permit by way of temporary permit, hence the impugned order be set aside. 4.
Respondent No.1 has also failed to examine the need for grant of temporary permit. The petitioner and other operators are already operating on the same route and there is no need at present for additional permit by way of temporary permit, hence the impugned order be set aside. 4. Respondent No.2 was already having temporary permit for bus bearing Registration No.MP-14-PA-0480 36+2 DLX valid up to 29.2.2020. He submitted an application for extension of the said permit from 1.3.2020 to 30.4.2020 vide application dated 24.2.2020. Against the said application, present petitioner and respondent No.3 filed their objections only to the effect that there is no formulation of the route and about difference of timing. U/s. 68(3)(ca) there is a provision of formulation of route for plying stage carriages. In the present case, the route had already been formulated while granting the earlier temporary permit to respondent No.2. The petitioner and other objectors are also plying their buses on the same route, therefore, the route from Mandsaur to Nagda had already been formulated. The formulation of route is required only at the time of grant of fresh permit for new route. Therefore, there was no need for formulation of the route in the present case. 5. So far as opportunity of hearing to the objectors is concerned, In the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no provision for giving opportunity of hearing to the objectors while granting temporary permit. Section 72 of Motor Vehicles Act provides for grant of Stage Carriage Permit by the RTA subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The detailed procedure is prescribed in Section 71 of the Act for consideration of applications received for grant of Stage Carriage Permit. In entire Section 71, there is no provision for calling or inviting objections from the existing transporters. Therefore, under the Motor Vehicle Act, there is no statutory right available to the existing operators to submit an objection for grant of temporary permit.
In entire Section 71, there is no provision for calling or inviting objections from the existing transporters. Therefore, under the Motor Vehicle Act, there is no statutory right available to the existing operators to submit an objection for grant of temporary permit. In the case of Mithilesh Garg V/s. Union of India : (1992) 1 SCC 168 and judgments passed by this Court in the case of Chenram Jain V/s. STAT (M.P. No.730/1993); Madan Lal Chhabra V/s. STAT (M.P. No.969/1993); MPSRTC V/s. STAT : 1994 (1) MPWN Note 16; and MPSRTC V/s. RTA : 1973 MPLJ 969 , it has been held that under the Motor Vehicle Acct, number of permits can be granted by the RTA and it is not violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the right of the existing operators is not prejudiced by the temporary permit to be granted by the RTA. Thus, this petition is not tenable. 6. So far as need for grant of temporary permit to respondent No.2 is concerned, respondent No.1 has specifically mentioned in the impugned order that temporary permit is needed due to upcoming festival of Holi, Dhulendi, Bhai Duj, Gudi Padwa, Navratri, etc. The need to issue temporary permit is substantive satisfaction of the RTA and this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot examine the same as an appellate authority. 7. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ali Ahmed V/s. Regional Transport Authority Bilaspur : 1985 MPLJ 199 has held that the benefit of discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be extended in favour of the person who is not prejudiced at all but merely vindicating his prejudices on technical grounds. Para 15 of the aforesaid judgment of Division Bench is reproduced below : “15. Before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner must demonstrate how he is prejudiced with the order. The benefit of discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be extended in favour of the person who is not prejudiced at all but is merely vindicating his prejudices on technical grounds. Section 62 emphasises the exercise of emergent powers to grant temporary permit in the interest of travelling public which is the dominant consideration.
The benefit of discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be extended in favour of the person who is not prejudiced at all but is merely vindicating his prejudices on technical grounds. Section 62 emphasises the exercise of emergent powers to grant temporary permit in the interest of travelling public which is the dominant consideration. Therefore, no order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be passed against the travelling public whose interest is likely to be affected adversely.” 8. So far as clash of timing is concerned, respondent No.2 is already having temporary permit for the said route for the same timing and by the impugned order, same has been extended up to 30.4.2020. In the impugned order itself, it is specifically mentioned as under : ^^vkosnd }kjk iqu% mi;qZDr of.kZr ekxZ ,ao le;pdzksa ij fnuakd 01-03-2020 ls 30-04-2020 rd iwokZuqlkj le;pdz ij vLFkkbZ ijfeV Lohd`r fd;s tkus gsrq vkosnu i= fnukad 24-02-2020 dks izLrqr fd;k gSA 9. In view of the above, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.