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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 445 (HP)

Ramesh Kumar Kataria v. CSK HPKV

2020-07-17

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2020
JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. - Facts of the case, as emerge from the petition are that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Professor (Agronomy) in the respondent University on 1.7.1988. On 1.7.1996, petitioner was promoted as an Associate Professor (Agronomy) and thereafter to the post of Professor/Principal Scientist on 27.7.2006. The next promotional post for the cadre of Professor/Principal Scientist is that of Dean/Director. At present, there are seven posts of Deans/Directors in the respondent-University. Careful perusal of the Seniority List (Annexure P-1) reveals that the petitioner is the senior-most Professor/Principal Scientist in the Department of Seed Science and Technology, as such, he was next in line to be promoted as Dean/Director in the respondent-University. However, in the year 2017, petitioner came to be served with a show cause notice dated 20.4.2017, for alleged insubordination. Precisely, the allegation against the petitioner is that he did not obey the orders of his superior i.e. Head of Department. Petitioner filed a detailed reply to the aforesaid show cause notice, specifically stating therein that at no point of time, he disobeyed the orders of his superior and denied all the allegations in toto. However, the fact remains that the reply of the petitioner was not accepted by the respondent-University. After expiry of three months, petitioner received a memorandum dated 3.8.2017 (Annexure P-2) contemplating an inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 (hereinafter, 'Rules'), containing therein following Article of Charge: "That Dr. R.K. Kataria, Principal Scientist (Agronomy), Department of Seed Science and Technology, COA, CSKHPKV Palampur did not perform the duties assigned to him by the Head, Department of Seed Science & Technology on one pretext or the other stating further that he was not asked by the Dean or Hon'ble Vice-Chancellor to submit the proposal. This act of omission and commission on the part of the said Dr. R.K. Kataria is highly unbecoming of an employee of the University and amounts to gross misconduct and flagrant violation of the provisions contained in Section 8.1(1) (a)(b)(c) and 8.1(2) and 8.1.(19) of the Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Visvavidyalaya Statutes, 1988 and with Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 2. Vide reply dated 17.8.2017(Annexure P-3), petitioner replied to the aforesaid memorandum. 2. Vide reply dated 17.8.2017(Annexure P-3), petitioner replied to the aforesaid memorandum. Whereafter, on 26.10.2017, petitioner was called for personal hearing by worthy Vice-Chancellor of the respondent-University, who after having heard the petitioner, assured him that no further action shall be taken against him. However, the fact remains that before an inquiry could be initiated against the petitioner, respondent vide order dated 17.8.2019 (Annexure P-4) entrusted responsibility of Associate Director Research (Agriculture) to one Shri Prem Nath Sharma (respondent No.2 herein), ignoring the petitioner, who at the relevant time was holding the post of Professor in the Department of Seed Science and Technology, which is at par with the post of Associate Director. In the month of November, 2019, petitioner came to know that Departmental proceedings initiated against him vide memorandum dated 3.8.2017 are still pending, as such, he submitted a representation dated 21.11.2019 (Annexure P-5) praying therein to disclose the status of memorandum served upon him. Since the respondent-University never responded to said communication, petitioner was compelled to file yet another representation dated 1.1.2020 (Annexure P-6), wherein petitioner, besides raising the issue of departmental inquiry pending against him, also highlighted the issue with regard to appointment of respondent No.2 as Associate Director. Petitioner claimed that since respondent No.2 is much junior to him, as per the seniority list of the Professors circulated by the competent Authority, he could not have been assigned duties of Associate Professor on seniority basis. Respondent-University, after having received aforesaid communication, issued an office order dated 8.1.2020 appointing one Shri Ashwani Kumar Basandrai, Dean, College of Agriculture, CSKSPKV as Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges levelled against the petitioner. Vide yet another order dated 8.1.2020 (Annexure P-7) one Shri Rajeev Rathour, Principal Scientist (Pl. Pathology), Department of Agriculture Biotechnology, COA, CSKHPKV, Palampur was appointed as a Presenting Officer. Being aggrieved with appointment of Inquiry Officer, petitioner filed fresh representation, stating therein that inquiry was kept pending for almost three years without knowledge of the petitioner and despite assurance given by worthy Vice-Chancellor to drop the proceedings, as such, it cannot be reopened at this stage. Petitioner also claimed before the competent Authority that as per law, inquiry, if any, should have been concluded within a period of six months from the date of framing of charge, as such order dated 8.1.2020 appointing Shri Ashwani Kumar Basandrai as Inquiry Officer, is not sustainable. 3. Petitioner also claimed before the competent Authority that as per law, inquiry, if any, should have been concluded within a period of six months from the date of framing of charge, as such order dated 8.1.2020 appointing Shri Ashwani Kumar Basandrai as Inquiry Officer, is not sustainable. 3. In reply to aforesaid representation, respondent-University informed the petitioner vide communication dated 7.2.2020 (Annexure P-8) that since he stood charge sheeted, he was not appointed/assigned the post of Associate Director (Annexure P-9). In response to annexure P-8, petitioner vide communication dated 19.2.2020 (Annexure P-9) alleged that for the last three years, charge sheet was purposely kept pending by the respondent-University with specific motive to give appointment to respondent No.2 as Associate Director, which action cannot be said to be valid and legal by any stretch of imagination. Since the Inquiry Officer appointed vide order dated 8.1.2020, failed to proceed with the matter, respondent-University, vide office order dated 12.3.2020, appointed one Shri Madhumeet Singh, as Inquiry Officer (Annexure P-11) but again, till date, nothing has been done by the newly appointed Inquiry Officer, as such, in the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, with the following main reliefs: "(i) That a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or directions may kindly be issued and the Impugned Memo dated 03.08.2017 (Annexure P-2) and subsequent action, may kindly be quashed and set aside. (ii) That a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or directions may kindly be issued and the Impugned Order dated 30.05.2020 (Annexure P-13), and subsequent action, may kindly be quashed and set aside. (iii) That a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction may kindly be issued and the Respondents may kindly be directed to assign the Petitioner with the duties of Dean College of Agriculture an Dean College of basic Sciences CSK HPKV Palampur." 4. Careful perusal of the reply filed by the respondent-University, clearly reveals that the case of the petitioner was not considered for promotion to the post of Associate Director in Seed Science and Technology Department of respondent-University on account of pendency of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him in terms of memorandum dated 3.8.2017. Careful perusal of the reply filed by the respondent-University, clearly reveals that the case of the petitioner was not considered for promotion to the post of Associate Director in Seed Science and Technology Department of respondent-University on account of pendency of disciplinary proceedings initiated against him in terms of memorandum dated 3.8.2017. Similarly, it has been admitted that as per Clause 3.2(3) of the Statutes of the respondent-University, senior most Professor in the concerned College shall act as a Dean of the College in the absence of a regular Dean. Respondent-University has stated that respondent No.2 was not appointed as an Associate Professor in the Directorate of Research but was entrusted with the responsibility of Associate Director Research (Agriculture) in addition to his own duties till further orders, without any remuneration vide office order dated 17.8.2019 (Annexure P- 4). Respondent-University claimed that the petitioner was not considered for assigning aforesaid responsibility on account of pendency of charge sheet served upon him vide memorandum dated 3.8.2017. No plausible explanation worth acceptance has been rendered on record by the respondents for not appointing Inquiry Officer for more than three years after issuance of charge sheet vide memorandum dated 3.8.2017, save and except that the matter remained consideration before Board of Governors. 5. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner in the present petition is that since there is an inordinate delay of more than three years in appointing Inquiry Officer, inquiry proceedings initiated against him vide charge sheet dated 3.8.2017 are not sustainable. Though, perusal of Rule-14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, which prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties, nowhere provides specific time, if any, to be taken by the Disciplinary Authority in appointing Inquiry Officer. But Rule 14, if read in its entirety, clearly suggests that on receipt of Articles of Charge, delinquent official is required to be heard in person by the Disciplinary Authority within a period of fifteen days, which may be further extended for a period of not exceeding fifteen days at a time, for the reasons to be recorded in writing by the Disciplinary Authority or any other authority authorized by him in this behalf. Proviso to Rule 14(4)(b) provides that under no circumstances, the extension of time for filing written statement of defence shall exceed forty-five days from the date of receipt of Articles of Charge. Proviso to Rule 14(4)(b) provides that under no circumstances, the extension of time for filing written statement of defence shall exceed forty-five days from the date of receipt of Articles of Charge. Rule 14((5)(a) provides that on receipt of the written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the articles of charge, as are not admitted, or, if it considers it necessary to do so, appoint under sub-rule(2), an Inquiring Authority for the purpose, and where all the articles of charge have been admitted by the Government servant in his written statement of defence, the Disciplinary Authority shall record its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner laid down in Rule 15. Similarly, Rule 14(5)(b) provides that, if no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government servant, the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into the articles of charge, or may, if it considers it necessary to do so, appoint, under sub-rule(2), an Inquiring Authority for the purpose. If aforesaid provisions contained under Rule 14 of the Rules ibid are read in their entirety, they clearly suggest that the Disciplinary Authority immediately after having received written statement of defence, would either decide the matter itself or may appoint an Inquiry Officer under sub-rule (2). 6. In the event of appointment of Inquiring Authority, in terms of sub-rule (2), Disciplinary Authority is obliged to make available copy of articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; a copy of the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Government servant; a copy of the statements of witnesses, if any, referred to in sub-rule (3), evidence proving the delivery of the documents referred to in sub-rule (3) to the Government servant; and a copy of the order appointing the "Presenting Officer". 7. Rule 14(7) of the Rules ibid, provides that the Government servant shall appear in person before the inquiring authority on such day and at such time within ten working days from the date of receipt by the inquiring authority of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, as the inquiring authority may, by notice in writing, specify, in this behalf, or within such further time, not exceeding ten days, as the inquiring authority may allow. Similarly, Rule 14(24)(a) provides that, the Inquiring Authority should conclude the inquiry and submit his report within a period of six months from the date of receipt of order of his appointment as Inquiring Authority. However, aforesaid time can be further enhanced, where it is not possible for the Inquiring Authority to adhere to the time limit specified in clause (a) but while doing so, Inquiry Officer is under obligation to record reasons and seek extension of time from the Disciplinary Authority in writing, who may allow additional time not exceeding six months for completion of inquiry, at a time. 8. Careful perusal of Rule 14 of the Rules ibid clearly reveals that inquiry, if any, initiated against a delinquent official is required to be completed expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of appointment of Inquiry Officer, but, interestingly, in the case at hand, petitioner was served with charge sheet on 3.8.2017, which was suitably replied by the petitioner vide reply dated 17.8.2017 (Annexure P-5). Surprisingly, the Disciplinary Authority, after having received aforesaid reply, neither appointed Inquiry Officer nor proceeded to close the inquiry proceedings against the petitioner for more than three years. It is not in dispute that the Disciplinary Authority after having received reply to the show cause notice to the charge sheet, filed by the petitioner, afforded an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner on 26.9.2017, as has been fairly admitted by the respondent-University in its reply. Though the respondent-University has claimed that the issue with regard to appointment of Inquiry Officer remained under active consideration of the Board of Governors, but the pleadings adduced on record by the parties clearly suggest that no action, if any, was taken by the Disciplinary Authority for appointment of Inquiry Officer till the time, petitioner filed representation dated 21.11.2019 (Annexure P-5), questioning therein appointment of respondent No.2 as an Associate Director, ignoring the seniority of the petitioner, as circulated by the competent Authority. Vide order dated 8.1.2020, Disciplinary Authority appointed one Ashwani Kumar Basandrai, as Inquiry Officer to enquire into the allegations levelled against the petitioner vide memo dated 3.8.2017. Similarly, Disciplinary Authority for good three years, failed to appoint Presenting Officer because Presenting Officer was also appointed vide order dated 8.1.2020 (Annexure P-7). Vide order dated 8.1.2020, Disciplinary Authority appointed one Ashwani Kumar Basandrai, as Inquiry Officer to enquire into the allegations levelled against the petitioner vide memo dated 3.8.2017. Similarly, Disciplinary Authority for good three years, failed to appoint Presenting Officer because Presenting Officer was also appointed vide order dated 8.1.2020 (Annexure P-7). Since the Inquiry Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority failed to take steps to conclude the inquiry proceedings, Disciplinary Authority vide office order dated 12.3.2020, appointed another Inquiry Officer namely Shri Madhumeet Singh but, he also failed to conclude the inquiry proceedings for three months, because, as per own reply of the respondent-University, Inquiring Authority started proceedings on 6.6.2020. Provisions contained under Rule 14 of the Rules ibid, if are read in their entirety, same clearly suggest that it is expected of every employer to conclude the departmental proceedings within a reasonable time by giving priority to such proceedings. As has been provided under Rule 14(24)(a), inquiry proceedings should be concluded within six months, being outer limit. But, in the case at hand, what to talk of completion of inquiry proceedings, respondent-University, for no reasons, failed to appoint Inquiry Officer, for good three years, compelling the petitioner to approach this Court in the instant proceedings. 9. Hon'ble Apex Court, in a catena of cases, have reiterated that every employer, whether State or private, must make sincere endeavour to conclude the departmental proceedings, once initiated against delinquent official within reasonable time. Employee cannot be allowed to suffer indefinitely on account of pendency of departmental proceedings. After reply to memorandum containing articles of charge, it is Disciplinary Authority, which is to take further action. Once, there is a specific time limit stipulated under Rule 14 of the Rules, for filing reply to the charge sheet by the delinquent official, it cannot be said that there is no time limit for the Disciplinary Authority to either close the proceedings or appoint the Inquiry Officer, who otherwise has been mandated to conclude the inquiry proceedings, within a period of six months. No doubt, aforesaid period can be enlarged but for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. In this regard reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Prem Nath Bali v. High Court of Delhi, (2015) 16 SCC 415 , wherein it has been held as under: "25. No doubt, aforesaid period can be enlarged but for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. In this regard reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Prem Nath Bali v. High Court of Delhi, (2015) 16 SCC 415 , wherein it has been held as under: "25. We are constrained to observe as to why the departmental proceeding, which involved only one charge and that too uncomplicated, have taken more than 9 years to conclude the departmental inquiry. No justification was forthcoming from the respondents' side to explain the undue delay in completion of the departmental inquiry except to throw blame on the appellant's conduct which we feel, was not fully justified. 26. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that it is the duty of the employer to ensure that the departmental inquiry initiated against the delinquent employee is concluded within the shortest possible time by taking priority measures. In cases where the delinquent is placed under suspension during the pendency of such inquiry then it becomes all the more imperative for the employer to ensure that the inquiry is concluded in the shortest possible time to avoid any inconvenience, loss and prejudice to the rights of the delinquent employee. 27. As a matter of experience, we often notice that after completion of the inquiry, the issue involved therein does not come to an end because if the findings of the inquiry proceedings have gone against the delinquent employee, he invariably pursues the issue in Court to ventilate his grievance, which again consumes time for its final conclusion. 28. Keeping these factors in mind, we are of the considered opinion that every employer (whether State or private) must make sincere endeavor to conclude the departmental inquiry proceedings once initiated against the delinquent employee within a reasonable time by giving priority to such proceedings and as far as possible it should be concluded within six months as an outer limit. Where it is not possible for the employer to conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the time frame then efforts should be made to conclude within reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year." 10. Where it is not possible for the employer to conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the time frame then efforts should be made to conclude within reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year." 10. In support of the claim of the petitioner, learned senior counsel has relied upon judgment reported in case titled State of Punjab and others versus Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 , wherein, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that inquiry should be completed within a reasonable period as prescribed under the law. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below:- "9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the fact-, of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the inquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing. Now, let us see what are the factors in favour of the respondent. They are: (a) That he was transferred from the post of Superintendent of Nabha Jail and had given charge of the post about six days prior to the incident. While the incident took place on the night intervening 1st/ 2nd of January, 1987, the respondent had relinquished the charge of the said office. on December 26, 1986. They are: (a) That he was transferred from the post of Superintendent of Nabha Jail and had given charge of the post about six days prior to the incident. While the incident took place on the night intervening 1st/ 2nd of January, 1987, the respondent had relinquished the charge of the said office. on December 26, 1986. He was not there-. at the time of incident. (b) The explanation offered by the government for the delay in serving the charges is unacceptable. There was no reason for the government to wait for the Sub-divisional Magistrate's report when it had with it the report of the Inspector General of Prisons which report was not only earlier in point of time but was made by the highest official of the prison administration, Head of the Department, itself The Inspector General of Prisons was the superior of the respondent and was directly concerned with the prison administration whereas the Sub- divisional Magistrate was not so connected. In the circumstances, the explanation that the government was waiting for the report of the Sub-divisional Magistrate is unacceptable. Even otherwise they waited for two more years after obtaining a copy of the said report. Since no action was taken within a reasonable time after the incident, he was entitled to and he must have presumed that no action would be taken against him. After a lapse of five and a half years, he was being asked to face an inquiry. (c) If not in 1992, his case for promotion was bound to come up for consideration in 1993 or at any rate in 1994. The pendency of a disciplinary inquiry was bound to cause him prejudice in that matter apart from subjecting him to the worry and inconvenience involved in facing such an inquiry." 11. On the same principle, learned counsel representing the petitioner, has also relied upon case law reported in case titled State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 , wherein, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. the essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he s not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. if the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse consideration. 20. In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without particularizing the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and Director General, Anti Corruption bureau had pointed out that no witnesses ad been examined before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had been appointed on after the other, had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the state as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the state to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. the Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos." 12. In case titled P.V. Mahadevan versus MD. T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 , Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary inquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the inquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the inquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." 13. In case titled Ajay Kumar Choudhary versus Union of India through its Secretary and another, (2015) 7 SCC 291 , Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental inquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 , underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973; that it encompasses all stages, viz., investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it. Keeping these factors in mind the CAT had in the case in hand directed that the Appellant's suspension would not be extended beyond 90 days from 19.3.2013. The High Court had set aside this direction, viewing it as a substitution of a judicial determination to the authority possessing that power, i.e., the Government." 14. Careful perusal of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court (supra) clearly reveals that protracted disciplinary proceedings against Government employee should be avoided not only in the interest of the Government employee but also in the public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of Government employees. Careful perusal of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court (supra) clearly reveals that protracted disciplinary proceedings against Government employee should be avoided not only in the interest of the Government employee but also in the public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of Government employees. In the case at hand, respondent-University without there being any justification has successfully stalled the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for more than three years, solely with a view to stall his promotion, because, reply filed by the respondent-University, itself suggests that though the petitioner was eligible for promotion the post of Associate Professor, but his case was not considered on account of pendency of disciplinary proceedings, which were initiated on 3.8.2017. No action, either to close the proceedings or appoint an Inquiry Officer, ever came to be taken by the respondent-University till the time, petitioner raked up the issue of promotion of his junior to the post of Associate Director, which was admittedly issued on 17.8.2019 i.e. after two years of initiation of departmental proceedings against the petitioner. There is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that delay in appointing Inquiry Officer was attributable to the petitioner, rather, record reveals that the petitioner immediately replied to the articles of charge but thereafter the respondent-University kept mum and suddenly woke from its deep slumber when petitioner highlighted illegality committed by the respondent-University by promoting/assigning duties of the post of Dean/Director to junior of the petitioner, against which petitioner, being senior most, was eligible. Hence action of the respondents in appointing Inquiry Officer after three years and promoting respondent No. 2 as Dean/Director, cannot be said to be justifiable, rather, same appears to be actuated with malice. 15. Otherwise also, essence of providing time limit in Rule 14 of the Rules is to conclude the entire disciplinary proceedings in a time bound manner, so that neither the official concerned suffers nor the Government machinery is unnecessarily engaged in conducting inquiry proceedings for an indefinitely long time. In the present case, inordinate delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings has vitiated the said proceedings. 16. Also, this Court finds that the allegations against the petitioner are trivial in nature and same could have been decided/disposed of by the worthy Vice-Chancellor himself, after having received reply from the petitioner. In the present case, inordinate delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings has vitiated the said proceedings. 16. Also, this Court finds that the allegations against the petitioner are trivial in nature and same could have been decided/disposed of by the worthy Vice-Chancellor himself, after having received reply from the petitioner. Since petitioner has already suffered for a long period, for no fault of his, on account of protracted proceedings against him, no fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the disciplinary proceedings against him. 17. Consequently, in view of above, present petition is allowed with costs of Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the respondent-University to the petitioner, within four weeks from today. Annexures dated 3.8.2017 (Annexure P-2) and 30.5.2020 (Annexure P-13) are quashed and set aside. Respondent-University is directed to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment/assigning of duties of the post of Dean/Director of the College in question forthwith. All pending applications also stand disposed of.