JUDGMENT Protik Prakash Banerjee, J. - This storm in the real-estate tea cup of Kolkata arises out of an appeal from an order dated March 8, 2018 by which the Learned Judge, 6th Bench in the City Civil Court at Calcutta rejected a petition for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in Title Suit No.1471 of 2017 inter alia for declaration and permanent injunction pending before it. There are three defendants in the suit - the defendant no. 1 who is the brother of the plaintiff/appellant and claims to be the erstwhile lessee of the property, the defendant no. 2, the original owner of the property, and the defendant no. 3, being the alleged transferee of the lease by the defendant no. 2 to it, on surrender of the original lease by the defendant no. 1. The plaintiff/appellant claims to have become the tenant of the defendant no. 2 by operation of law, on the surrender of the lease by the defendant no. 1, with the defendant no. 3 merely obtaining the rent receiving interest, since the deed of lease itself recorded the presence of existing occupants and the schedule indicated that the 40 year old two storied building thereon as transferred by the said lease was fully tenanted. Initially, the plaintiff/appellant obtained an ex parte ad interim order on the basis of the documents annexed to the petition and copies filed with the plaint, on November 17, 2017, which was extended from time to time. However, on contested hearing on objections in writing being filed by the defendants no.1 and 3 separately, the said petition for injunction was dismissed, primarily on a finding that no prima facie case had been made out in favour of the plaintiff/appellant before the said learned court, by the order dated March 8, 2018. The temporary injunction sought was in respect of the property situated at 6A, Dr. Harendra Coomar Mukherjee Sarani (previously 6, Pretoria Street) Police Station Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata-700071. Even though the defendant no.2/respondent appeared before the learned trial court, he has not appeared before us because no notice was served on him. On January 28, 2020 after recording the above facts, we also recorded the submission of Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior advocate who, on instructions, prayed for dispensation of service of notice on the defendant no.2/respondent. Even though the defendant no.2/respondent appeared before the learned trial court, he has not appeared before us because no notice was served on him. On January 28, 2020 after recording the above facts, we also recorded the submission of Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior advocate who, on instructions, prayed for dispensation of service of notice on the defendant no.2/respondent. We had granted the said prayer at the appellant's risk and peril. The defendant no.2/respondent having executed a long term lease in favour of the defendant no.3/respondent, has been party to a transfer and may not immediately be too concerned as to what transpires in respect of the leasehold prospects so long the lessee performs its part of the obligations under the lease with respect to the defendant no.2/respondent. 2. The heat generated by the learned counsel arguing the matter with great ability in January 2020, dissipated in the cooler confines of mature reflection and I have found that despite the seductive allure of the various arguments made before me, and the precedents cited, the dispute in this case, is in a short compass: whether on the face of the documents annexed to the plaint and the petition, to the extent objected to by the defendants/respondents, the plaintiff/appellant has made out a prima facie case that it was in possession, and whether there was any triable issue for which the matter would go to trial and till disposal whereof, an injunction protecting such possession, if any, ought to have been granted and/or continued? 3. The learned court below and the defendants/respondents have waxed lyrical on the mistake in the case number of the challans showing deposit of rents, though the same was plausibly explained by additional documents, which we had granted leave to adduce before us, and had for this purpose taken up CAN 6745 of 2019 and CAN 269 of 2019 at the time of hearing and now allow since we require the documents thus adduced to pronounce judgment. The learned court below has also dwelt at length on the rent receipt relied upon by the plaintiff/appellant without the agreement for tenancy not being "conclusive" proof at the stage of considering the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing of the suit, and that it did not show the extent of the tenancy and has found fault with there being no agreement of tenancy which alone would prima facie evince transfer of interest by the landlord to the tenant according to the learned court below. In addition, the learned court below parroted the submission of the defendants/respondents that a relief of injunction had been prayed for against the defendant no. 1, which had become a stranger after the surrender of the lease but no allegation was made against the defendant no. 2 who was the owner/landlord. In addition the learned court below found the failure of the plaintiff/appellant to put the defendant no. 2 on notice within the prescribed time of its sub-tenancy as something which breathed the spirit of doubt and suspicion about the claim of the plaintiff/appellant. 4. What the defendant no. 1 could not explain, and which the learned court below had failed to remark upon or appreciate, was that there was no denial of either the signature or the contents of a material letter disclosed as part of Annexure "D" to the petition for injunction before the learned court below and this was in fact not dealt with and admitted by non traverse by the defendant no. 1 even though this letter clearly showed an admission by the defendant no. 1/respondent of the tenancy/interest of the plaintiff/appellant in the suit property and his possession thereof.. 5. To appreciate how this is material, 5.1. let us go straight to Paragraph 12 of the petition. "The petitioner states that subsequently, by virtue of letter dated 05th February 1973, the defendant No.1 approached the petitioner to handover to him, possession of approximately 10 cottahs of the said property for the purpose of constructing a building. 5. To appreciate how this is material, 5.1. let us go straight to Paragraph 12 of the petition. "The petitioner states that subsequently, by virtue of letter dated 05th February 1973, the defendant No.1 approached the petitioner to handover to him, possession of approximately 10 cottahs of the said property for the purpose of constructing a building. After detailed discussion on the request, the petitioner acceded to the said demand and pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding dated 12.2.1973, handed over possession of 10 cottahs of the front portion (eastern side) of the said property to the defendant No.1 in the year 1973, and thereafter the defendant No.1 sub-leased a part of the said portion by the deed of sub lease dated 19.12.1973 to one M/s. Krebs and Cie India (P) Ltd., who constructed a five storied RCC building on about 8.5 kathas of land, along with a single storied RCC Building on the remaining about 1.5 kathas of land(out of the above mentioned 10 kathas of land) and thereafter, as per understanding of the petitioner with the defendant No.1,the possession of the said single storied building was handed over to the plaintiff. The petitioner craves leave to produce the copy of the said Deed of Sub-lease at the time of hearing of this plaint. The petitioner further craves leave to refer the said indenture for its true meaning and effect. Copy made from the said letters dated 5thFebruary 1973 and 12th February 1973 containing term of understanding between the Petitioner and the Defendant No.1 are annexed to this petition and collectively marked with letter 'D'." 5.2. Annexure "D" therefore, has two parts. One is the letter dated February 5, 1973. The other is the hotly disputed letter dated February 12, 1973. 5.3. The letter dated February 5, 1973, as annexed, reads as follows: - "Rajendra Kumar Phone:44-9528 6, Pretoria Street Calcutta-16,______5th Feb. 1973 Shri Laxmi Mineral Industries 6 Pretoria Street Calcutta-16 Dear Sirs: Re: - 6 Pretoria Street, Calcutta-16 __________________________________ I refer to my today's discussions with you when I requested you to release 10 cottahs of land from your tenancy for the purpose constructing a building. You very kindly agreed to consider my request and as the matter is urgent, I shall be pleased to know your consent to the release at the soonest. Yours Faithfully, Rajendra Kumar (Rajendra Kumar)" 5.4. You very kindly agreed to consider my request and as the matter is urgent, I shall be pleased to know your consent to the release at the soonest. Yours Faithfully, Rajendra Kumar (Rajendra Kumar)" 5.4. Since the plaintiff/appellant at paragraph 2 of the petition had made out a case that he was the sole proprietor of M/s Laxmi Mineral Industries, and further had alleged in the petition that it had taken a sub-tenancy from M/s S. Arakie and Aaron Arakie, the tenant of the entire premises under the Laws (Lahas) and that on their surrender of the tenancy, the petitioner continuing in possession of the said premises had approached the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant no. 2 to grant a tenancy jointly to him and the defendant no. 1 of the said property, it is clear therefore, that the said letter dated February 5, 1973, if undisputed would clearly show that the defendant no. 1 accepted the tenure of the petitioner and his possession of the entire property and that he was seeking release of only 10 cottahs in his favour for constructing a building. 5.5. Let us see what the defendant no. 1, the best person to deny the letter, his signature thereon or explain its contents, has said about the letter dated February 5, 1973, which, it must be remembered was referred to in paragraph 12 of the petition and made part of Annexure 'D' thereto. This has been dealt with at paragraphs 5(t), (u), (v) and (w) of the purported written objection of the defendant no. 1/respondent before the learned court below, and at paragraph 8 thereof. So that there is no misunderstanding, the relevant portions are quoted below: - Paragraph 5(t): "I say that the purported letter dated 12th February, 1973 allegedly issued by the plaintiff/petitioner, copy whereof forms of Annexure 'D' to the said application at page 39, is false and fabricated for the purpose of the instant suit. No such letter dated 12th February, 1973 was ever received by me from the plaintiff/petitioner. Without prejudice to my rights and contention in the matter, the plaintiff/petitioner is called upon the produce the proof of service of the said purported letter dated 12th February, 1973 on me. No such letter dated 12th February, 1973 was ever received by me from the plaintiff/petitioner. Without prejudice to my rights and contention in the matter, the plaintiff/petitioner is called upon the produce the proof of service of the said purported letter dated 12th February, 1973 on me. 'the purported contents of the said fabricated letter appear to have been inspired the contents of my lease deed in favour of M/s Krebs & Cie (India) Pvt. Limited, wherein I had given M/s Krebs & Cie (India) Pvt. Ltd liberty to construct on the area of 8 cottahs, 8 chittacks and 24 Sq. Ft. reserving the right to construct for myself a single storied building using the boundary wall on the western side of the construction of M/s Krebs & Cie (India) Pvt. Ltd, at the cost of the said M/s Krebs & Cie (India) Pvt. Ltd. It is pertinent to mention that the sub-lease agreement between M/s Krebs & Cie (India) Pvt. Ltd and myself inter-alia provides that 'building such constructed will be outside the scope of the demised premises'. The contents of the documents annexed as Annexure 'D' of the said application are denied and disputed and the plaintiff/petitioner is called upon to prove the veracity or authenticity thereof. Without prejudice to my rights and contention in the matter, the plaintiff/petitioner is called upon to produce the original of the documents being Annexure 'D' at the time of hearing of the said application for just and proper adjudication of the matter." Interestingly, paragraph 5(t) is conspicuously silent about the letter dated February 5, 1973 disclosed as part of Annexure 'D' and whether the signature thereon of the defendant no. 1/respondent disputes the same or even the contents of the same. Again paragraph 5(u) waxes lyrical, saying "I say that the said false letter annexed as Annexure 'D' to the said application at page 39 absurdly records that the constructions of the two buildings mentioned therein will be treated as one block and separately renumbered as 6B, Pretoria Street, and remaining part of the original premises would be 6A, Pretoria Street, as if renumbering of a municipal premises is depending on the sweet will of the plaintiff/petitioner." Once again, this is in respect of the letter dated February 12, 1973 and has no whisper about the letter dated February 5, 1973 which the defendant no. 1/respondent has not dared to allege is false or the signature is false. Paragraph 5v: "I say that by purporting to manufacture the said purported letter dated 12th February 1973, the plaintiff/petitioner has sought to create false evidence about his alleged 'tenancy rights' as referred to in the said purported. Without prejudice to my rights and contention in the matter, I say tha thte plaintiff/petitioner to show any tenancy agreement in support of his alleged claim. However, even the said purported letter does not mention the extent of the alleged tenancy rights of the plaintiff/petitioner. This is of course wholly without prejudice to my firm contention that the said purported letter is false and fabricated. It is also without prejudice to my firm contention that there is serious doubt about the veracity of the contents of the documents annexed as Annexure 'D' to the said application." Except for the last sentence there is not even an echo of any allegation which can impeach the letter dated February 5, 1973. By merely referring to the documents in Annexure 'D' without expressly mentioning the letter dated February 5, 1973, when the letter dated February 12, 1973 has been dealt with by date and extensively, such a manner of dealing with a document does not inspire the confidence of the court. 5.w." I submit that this Learned Court would be pleased to direct the plaintiff/petitioner to forthwith produce the original of the Annexures "D" of the said application, particularly the said purported letter dated 12th February, 1973 at page 39, and to have the same verified by an appropriate expert to test the veracity and authenticity thereof. 8. With reference to the allegations and/or contention and/or submissions contained in paragraphs 9 to 14 of the said application, I deny and dispute the same save what would appear from the statements made in the preceding paragraphs of this affidavit and what would be specifically borne out by admitted records, as if each one has been set out hereunder and denied in seriatim. In particular, I deny that after taking the lease, the defendant/opposite party No.1 granted tenancy to the plaintiff/petitioner in respect of the entire premises as alleged in paragraph 10 under reply as alleged or at all. In particular, I deny that after taking the lease, the defendant/opposite party No.1 granted tenancy to the plaintiff/petitioner in respect of the entire premises as alleged in paragraph 10 under reply as alleged or at all. I categorically submit that no such tenancy in respect of the entire premises as falsely alluded to in paragraph 10 under reply had ever been granted by me. I submit that the purported rent control challans, copies whereof have been annexed as Annexure 'C' to the said application, are fabricated for the purpose of instant suit. I submit that despite searches being made, the mother file, if any, pertaining to the rent control proceeding in alleged connection with which such purported deposits are being made has not been found. I say that upon enquiry, it has been revealed that the distinctive number appended to the said challans actually pertains to the application for deposit of rent made by some other persons to the credit of yet another person, none of whom are parties to the instant suit and about a property which is totally different from the present property in the present suit. Without prejudice to my rights and contention, I submit that the plaintiff/petitioner has failed to show any documents with regard to payment or deposit of rent in respect of his alleged claim of tenancy for the period prior to 1994 and also for the period from 1994 and 2017. The contents of the document annexed at page 33 of the said allocation (part of Annexure 'C') are denied and disputed and the plaintiff/petitioner is called upon to prove the veracity of the said document. In any event, I say that the plaintiff/petitioner has miserably failed to produce any substantive document supporting his alleged claim of tenancy of the entire premises as made in paragraph 10 under reply. The purported rent control challans do not and cannot prove either possession or tenancy. In any event, the purported description of tenancy given in the said rent control challans annexed to the said application contradicts the extent of tenancy allegedly claimed by the plaintiff/petitioner in the body of the said application. In the event the plaintiff/petitioner fails to furnish the documents as hereby called upon, the Learned Court would be pleased to draw adverse inference against the plaintiff/petitioner and forthwith dismiss the said application. In the event the plaintiff/petitioner fails to furnish the documents as hereby called upon, the Learned Court would be pleased to draw adverse inference against the plaintiff/petitioner and forthwith dismiss the said application. I state that no letter dated 12th February, 1973 (at page 39 of the said application) had been issued by the plaintiff in favour of me. I submit that the purported letter dated 12th February, 1973 being part of Annexure 'D' to the said application is false and fabricated and has been manufactured by the plaintiff/petitioner for the purpose of the instant suit. I, accordingly deny and dispute the existence, validity and authenticity of the said purported letter dated 12th February, 1973. In any event, neither the letter dated 12th February, 1973 issued by me being the defendant/opposite party No.1 nor the said purported letter dated 12th February, 1973 issued by the proprietor of Shri Laxmi Mineral Industries shows tenancy right in respect of the entire premises as allegedly claimed by the plaintiff/petitioner in the suit. I say that the portion of land of about 8 Cottahs 4 Chittacks and 24 Sq. Ft. on the eastern part of the mother Premises No. 6, Dr. Harendra Coomer Mukherjee Sarani was subleased in favour of M/s. Krebs & Cie (India) Pvt. Limited and the said portion of land with the structures standing thereon is known and numbered as 6B, Dr. Harendra Coomer Mukherjee Sarani. I say that the single storied office block adjoining the building is standing on the Premises No. 6B, Dr. Harendra Coomer Mukherjee Sarani. I say that at the time of execution of the Indenture of Lease dated 25th September, 2017, the plaintiff/petitioner was not in possession or occupation of any part or portion of Premises No. 6A, Dr. Harendra Coomer Mukherjee Sarani, save and except the aforesaid 150 sq. ft. (approx) of office space on the easter fringes thereof by way of gratuitous license. I say that the defendant/opposite party No.3 was accordingly put in possession of the entire portion or Premises No. 6A, Dr. Harendra Coomer Mukherjee Sarani save and except the aforesaid 150 sq. ft. (approx) of office space. I say that the said registered lease in favour of the defendant/opposite party No.1 was duly surrendered by me and fresh lease in favour of the defendant/opposite party No.3 was executed by the defendant/opposite party No.2. Harendra Coomer Mukherjee Sarani save and except the aforesaid 150 sq. ft. (approx) of office space. I say that the said registered lease in favour of the defendant/opposite party No.1 was duly surrendered by me and fresh lease in favour of the defendant/opposite party No.3 was executed by the defendant/opposite party No.2. I crave leave to deal with the instruments of lease and extension of lease in favour of the defendant/opposite party No.1 and the instrument of lease in favour of the defendant/opposite party No.3 and to make appropriate submissions thereon at the time of hearing, if necessary. I also reserve my right to file Supplementary Affidavit in support of my contention, if necessary." 5.6. We have now therefore reached a stage where we can answer the basic question - what is the effect of the conspicuous absence of any denial of the signature, contents and even sending of the letter by the defendant no. 1/respondent. The effect, most obviously must be the admission that the plaintiff/appellant is in possession of the entire premises and at best was asked to part with 10 cottahs from the same. It is also indicative of some sort of tenancy right of the plaintiff/appellant though naturally this is to be proved by evidence at the trial as to what is the nature of the tenure and under whom it is established, if at all. But that is not for now. He does not have to prove it today. When there is a case of oath versus oath and the question is to be decided on affidavits, if a party having all opportunity chooses not to deny the effect, genuineness or contents of an admission like the letter dated 5th February, 1973 or even explain such admission, it remains an unqualified admission until the matter reaches the stage of evidence in the suit. 5.7. Therefore, we must hold, that prima facie the plaintiff/appellant has made out a triable case of being in possession and some sort of tenancy right on the said premises which only trial in the suit can prove or disprove. 5.8. A substantial question of law has been made out by the plaintiff/appellant being whether after an unqualified admission of the possession and interest of a person in the suit property by the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant no. 3 before passing of the property to the defendant no. 5.8. A substantial question of law has been made out by the plaintiff/appellant being whether after an unqualified admission of the possession and interest of a person in the suit property by the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant no. 3 before passing of the property to the defendant no. 3, it is possible for the defendant no. 3 to deny the said possession and interest of the plaintiff/appellant without also alleging a nouvelle disseisin. 6. Therefore, it is clear that a triable case has been made out even after considering the objections in writing filed by the defendants/respondents to the application for the plaintiff/appellant in the court below, and a substantial question of law is to be determined. In such view of the matter, the decision in Krishna Chandra Saha Sardar and others-v- Hem Chandra Rai Chowdhury,1915 SCCOnline(Cal) 339 equivalent to AIR 1916 Cal 782, being a Bench decision of this Court, cited on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant seems apposite. I cannot resist the temptation to quote selected extracts from it, since Sir Ashutosh Mukerji was a part of the Bench and the lucid brevity of the language of the Bench still mesmerizes me: - "It is not necessary that the Court should find a case which would entitle the plaintiff to relief at all events; it is quite sufficient if the Court finds a case which shows that there is a substantial question to be investigated and that matters should be preserved in status quo until the final disposal of the question." 7. What is the status is clear from the letter dated February 5, 1973 before the lease on September 25, 2017 was entered into in favour of the defendant no. 3/respondent who therefore cannot make any comment as to facts except on the basis of what it has learnt from the defendant no. 1. This status is subject to what the parties agreed to that a five storied building has been erected on the said land, the original undivided 6, Pretoria Street. The defendants No.1 and 3 voluntarily admit that a licence was granted to the plaintiff/appellant in respect of 150 sq. ft, in a single storied building at what is now 6A, Pretoria Street. In addition, there is a report commissioned by us when the appeal was admitted, and it shows exactly how many buildings are there in the suit property. 8. ft, in a single storied building at what is now 6A, Pretoria Street. In addition, there is a report commissioned by us when the appeal was admitted, and it shows exactly how many buildings are there in the suit property. 8. However, though admittedly the defendant no. 3 did not come into the picture until 2017, matters which occurred in 1973 and before September 25, 2017 have been affirmed as true to the knowledge of the deponent on behalf of the defendant no. 3, being a partner of the limited liability partnership. No credence can be placed upon such an affidavit, in view of the dictum laid down by a Bench decision of this Court in Padmavati Dasi-v-Rasik Lal Dhar, (1910) 37 ILR(Cal) 259 and we therefore hold that the learned court below erred in both fact and law, in relying upon such written objection (called affidavit-in-opposition) to the petition, and furthermore, the learned court below erred grievously in law and in fact in not giving proper weightage to the conspicuous failure of the defendant no. 1 to dispute the signature, contents or even existence of the letter dated February 5, 1973, which operates as an admission against him. 9. So far as the submissions of facts advanced by the defendants No.1 and 3 are concerned, the manner in which the defendant no. 3 has alleged that it has come to be the lessee of the property under the defendant no. 2, is itself suspicious and absurd on its face. Admittedly, the deed of lease was executed on September 25, 2017 by the defendant no. 2 alone, and not his co-sharers. However, the deed of gift under which the defendant no. 2 is purported to have obtained absolute ownership of the original premises No.6, Pretoria Street, is alleged to be an unregistered deed of December 8, 2000 which was allegedly registered only on September 25, 2017 itself. A bare perusal of the Registration Act would show that no deed can be registered beyond a maximum limit of 8 months from its execution and if so required a fresh deed of gift is to be executed. Despite the aforesaid, the deed of lease contains a recital that a deed of gift executed on December 8, 2000 was registered in 2017. How it was done, in the teeth of a statutory bar is not disclosed. Despite the aforesaid, the deed of lease contains a recital that a deed of gift executed on December 8, 2000 was registered in 2017. How it was done, in the teeth of a statutory bar is not disclosed. So far as the third defence is concerned, that the defendant no.1 is disturbing the possession of the plaintiff/appellant without title, the fact that he has divested himself of all right, title and interest in the suit property is more reason to pass the temporary injunction. 10. Apart from a bald denial of the case of the plaintiff/appellant and narrating a slightly different story the true defence of the defendants No.1 and 3 are three-fold - first, there is a dispute as to the tenure under which the plaintiff/appellant holds, and second, there is an allegation that except for 150 square feet in a single storied office building, the plaintiff/appellant does not have any possession; the third defence is that the defendant no. 1 having divested himself of any right, title, interest in the suit property, it could not be said that any injunction could be passed against him at all, and he is not disturbing the plaintiff/appellant. What is the nature of the tenure under which the plaintiff/appellant holds, is a mixed question of law and facts which we cannot adjudicate in an appeal from a refusal to pass a temporary injunction. It requires evidence to be led, and proof of facts on the basis of which a conclusion is to be drawn as to the nature of the tenure under which the plaintiff/appellant holds, if at all. The second point raised, on the face of the admission dated February 5, 1973 made by the defendant no. 1, undisputed till date and unqualified as it is, cannot be raised until a witness action, when alone can the same be explained, though not disputed. The defendant no. 3 cannot have a better right than the defendant no. 1 being its successor-in-interest. So this point cannot be decided in favour of the defendants at this stage and in this too, the learned court below erred grievously in law. 11. The defendant no. 3 cannot have a better right than the defendant no. 1 being its successor-in-interest. So this point cannot be decided in favour of the defendants at this stage and in this too, the learned court below erred grievously in law. 11. The other disputes, in the nature of nitpicking the documents produced in support of the plaintiff/appellant's claim, cannot, rightly speaking, be decided or adjudicated upon at the interim stage and we must wait until the trial to see whether the same are authentic or not. 12. This leaves us with the veritable flood of decisions cited by the defendant no. 3 and the two decisions cited by the defendant no. 1. Since the right of the defendant no. 3 is derived from the defendant no. 1, let us deal with the authorities relied upon by the defendant no. 1 first. THE AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY THE DEFENDANTS. 13. The defendant no. 1 has relied upon: - 13.1. [ Dorab Cowasji Warden-v-Coomi Sorab Warden and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 117 ] , was a case where the transfer of a dwelling house was at issue, and what was to be decided was what was an undivided property and whether without a prayer for ejectment, a stranger purchaser could be thrown out by way of a mandatory injunction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the law, inter alia, about the principles which must inform the court while granting a mandatory injunction and that irreparable injury and balance of convenience was to be considered for grant of such equitable relief is concerned. We respectfully agree with the said proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court but since in the instant case were are concerned with temporary and prohibitory injunction and not mandatory injunction and hence, in terms of paragraph 16a of the judgment the standard is not higher than that of a prima facie case. Therefore, in the facts of the case, though instructive, it does not apply. 13.2. Therefore, in the facts of the case, though instructive, it does not apply. 13.2. [ Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao-v- Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy (dead) by Legal Representatives and Others, (2017) 7 SCC 694 ] is a judgment which is an authority for the proposition as to what are the things to be looked into when a final decree in a suit for permanent injunction is given, the standard of appreciation of facts and how far the appellate court and the second appellate court can interfere with these findings of facts by the trial court. We are not at that stage yet in this case before us. We are still at the stage of deciding whether or not to grant the temporary injunction pending disposal of the suit and therefore, the said judgment is not an authority applicable to the present case. The defendant no. 3 has relied upon: - 13.3. [ Wander Limited and Another-v- Antox India Private Limited, (1990) Supp1 SCC 727] is a case on Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 but incidentally it laid down the conditions when an appellate court would interfere with an order refusing or granting an interlocutory order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, being a discretionary order. One of the factors laid down is when the order is arbitrary or perverse - as in this case where the learned court below failed to appreciate the effect of the unqualified admission made by the defendant no. 1 by his letter dated February 5, 1973 which vitiated the representations said to be made to the defendant no. 3 and on which the question of possession clearly depends. Therefore, while respectfully agreeing with this decision we apply it to the present case to find that there are such grievous errors of fact and law as require us to interfere with the said order. 13.4. [ N.V. Srinivasa Murthy and Others-v- Maniyamma (Dead) by proposed LRs and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 548 ] paragraphs 10, 11 and 15, which has confounded us as to why it was cited. This judgment is an authority for what must be prayed in order to make a suit for declaration maintainable when the actual relief is for seeking that a transaction is loan transaction and for specific performance of a contract for reconveyance; it is an authority for what constitutes cause of action and when the plaint ought to be rejected. This judgment is an authority for what must be prayed in order to make a suit for declaration maintainable when the actual relief is for seeking that a transaction is loan transaction and for specific performance of a contract for reconveyance; it is an authority for what constitutes cause of action and when the plaint ought to be rejected. It is not an authority for when the appellate court can or cannot interfere with an order refusing a contested interlocutory injunction particularly when the learned court below failed to appreciate the effect of the unqualified admission made by the defendant no. 1 by his letter dated February 5, 1973. It is therefore not applicable to the present case and is thus distinguished. 13.5. [ Union of India and Others-v-Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Others, (2014) 2 SCC 269 ] paragraphs 15 to 19, which lay down as follows: - "In a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out an establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. Even if the title set up by the defendants is found against them, in the absence of establishment of the plaintiff's own title, the plaintiff must be non-suited." On its face, this judgment applies and operates when a final judgment is to be given in a suit for declaration of title, after adjudication of the entire case on the basis of the evidence adduced. We have, as we are at some anguish to point out to save judicial time and space of paper, not at that stage and therefore, reliance of this judgment is not only misplaced, but flirts dangerously with an attempt to swamp the Court with precedents, regardless of their applicability. We have, as we are at some anguish to point out to save judicial time and space of paper, not at that stage and therefore, reliance of this judgment is not only misplaced, but flirts dangerously with an attempt to swamp the Court with precedents, regardless of their applicability. The judgment is thus not an authority for the factors on which the appellate court interferes with a refusal to pass an interlocutory order on contest, and can be distinguished on facts and is so distinguished. 13.6. [ Biswanath Poddar-v-Archana Poddar and Another, (2001) 8 SCC 187 ] 13.7. [ Shantilal Rampuria and Others-v-M/s Vega Trading Corporation and Others, (1989) 3 SCC 552 ] 13.8. [ Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd-v-Rajiv Trust and Another, (1998) 3 SCC 723 ] are authorities for the proposition that when there is a valid sub-tenancy and whether without statutory notice by the sub-tenant and tenant it can be said to exist and protection of the putative sub-tenant against eviction by the landlord without impleading him, if necessary by executing a decree passed in a proceeding where is not a party; the last is also on the question of executing such a decree against third parties including such putative sub-tenants without such notice having been served on the landlord; none of them is an authority for the proposition that where a person is admittedly in possession his possession can be interfered without process at an interlocutory stage and if a trial court refused to protect him pending trial of his suit, when the learned court below failed to appreciate the effect of the unqualified admission made by the defendant no. 1 by his letter dated February 5, 1973, the appellate court will not interfere. We are not at the stage of executing a decree of the suit. Therefore, they are clearly distinguishable and are so distinguished. This judgment has also been cited by the firm representing the defendant no.3 to multiply irrelevant precedents and swamp the court with irrelevancies which is a species of abuse of process complete in itself, rather like a filibuster in a foreign legislature. 13.9. Therefore, they are clearly distinguishable and are so distinguished. This judgment has also been cited by the firm representing the defendant no.3 to multiply irrelevant precedents and swamp the court with irrelevancies which is a species of abuse of process complete in itself, rather like a filibuster in a foreign legislature. 13.9. [ Cotton Corporation of India Limited-v- United Industrial Bank Limited and Others, (1983) 4 SCC 625 ] is an authority for the proposition where a temporary injunction under Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can be granted, especially if it cannot be granted as a final relief. While discussing the law on this point, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down that where no permanent injunction could be passed to restrain the institution of such proceedings, neither could any temporary injunction be passed. However, paragraph 10 of the said judgment is canvassed by the defendant no. 3/respondent to be a bar against our passing any order of temporary injunction since it says, very clearly that "if the final relief cannot be granted in terms as prayed for, temporary relief in the same terms can hardly, if ever be granted.". To our mind, this paragraph cannot be read in isolation and bereft of its context of Section 41(b) of the said Act of 1963. It can only serve to amplify the principle behind refusing a temporary injunction where Section 41(b) is seen to be violated as a final relief. It cannot therefore, operate generally on the grant or refusal of an interim order, since as appears from even the judgments in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden (supra) and Agnigundala (supra) relied upon by the defendant no. 1, an interim order can be granted if a substantial question of law which must be tried has been made out, regardless of whether the final relief can be granted or not. I therefore repel the attempt of the defendant no. 3/respondent to give a general operation to a specific provision in a particular case. The present case does not deal with any injunction being sought in violation of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or seeking any order of restraint from instituting proceedings. Therefore, on facts the cases are clearly distinguishable and are so distinguished. 14. 3/respondent to give a general operation to a specific provision in a particular case. The present case does not deal with any injunction being sought in violation of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or seeking any order of restraint from instituting proceedings. Therefore, on facts the cases are clearly distinguishable and are so distinguished. 14. Since therefore, each of the points raised by the defendants/ respondents fails, and I have already indicated my findings that the learned court below erred in fact and in law and did not properly apply its judicial mind to all the relevant materials on record, including those referred to in paragraphs 5 and its sub-paragraphs and paragraph 8 above of this judgment, for the reasons mentioned above, and on the finding that the preponderance of balance of convenience is in favour of passing the temporary injunction and because an irreparable injury will occur if those in admitted possession as aforesaid are allowed to be dispossessed, I therefore have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order dated March 8, 2018 and restore the order dated November 17, 2017, and restrain the defendants, their men, agents, servants and those claiming thereunder by an order of temporary injunction from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff/appellant of and in the suit property till the disposal of the suit. It is needless to mention that all the findings arrived here are tentative and for the purposes of deciding the question of grant of temporary injunction and shall not bind the learned Trial Court while deciding the main suit which it shall do uninfluenced by the observations and findings recorded hereinabove. The hearing of the suit is expedited. All interim orders passed merge with the final order passed hereon, in this appeal from the refusal of the interim order. The applications for adducing additional evidence, being CAN 6745 of 2019 and CAN 269 of 2019 are allowed and disposed of. The appeal and the application for injunction being CAN 2740 of 2019 are allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs. DIPANKAR DATTA, J:- 1. The applications for adducing additional evidence, being CAN 6745 of 2019 and CAN 269 of 2019 are allowed and disposed of. The appeal and the application for injunction being CAN 2740 of 2019 are allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs. DIPANKAR DATTA, J:- 1. I quite agree with brother Banerjee, J., that the plaintiff / appellant has raised contentions which require investigation upon framing of issues and thus, made out a case for the suit to proceed to trial; and that having regard to the factors that a court seized of an application for temporary injunction ought to bear in mind, the status of the suit property must be preserved till such suit is decided. 2. I do also agree with the directions given by brother Banerjee J., to maintain such status.