JUDGMENT : Manish Mathur,J. 1. Heard Sri D.K. Tripathi, learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties. 2. Petition has been filed against order dated 06.12.2004 issued by the State Government cancelling petitioner's appointment on the post of Assistant Accountant as well as consequential orders dated 07.12.2004 and 09.12.2004. Vide interim order dated 22.12.2004, operation of impugned orders had been stayed and it has been stated by learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner thereafter is continuing in service in pursuance of interim directions of this Court. 3. As per averments made in the petition, petitioner was initially appointed on 02.07.1991 on the post of Assistant Accountant by direct recruitment through a Selection Committee. Appointment letter is said to have been issued by the appointing authority. In pursuance to appointment, petitioner joined on the post on 04.07.1991 in the office of District Veterinary Officer, District Mau and was continuing on the aforesaid post as a regularly selected candidate. It has been stated that thereafter impugned orders have been passed after more than 13 years of satisfactory service. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that impugned orders are vitiated due to nonobservance of principles of natural justice inasmuch as services of petitioner could not have been dispensed with after more than 13 years' of satisfactory service in such a cursory manner and in fact such order amounts to dismissal of services for which opposite parties were not only required to follow the due procedure prescribed in Service Rules but to have also afforded opportunity of hearing. Learned Counsel has relied upon the decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr.(Miss) Binapanni Dei and others reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 as well as Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India & others reported in AIR 1994 SC 2480 in order to buttress his submissions. 5. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties on the basis of counter affidavit has submitted that there is no separate Accounts cadre in the department nor are there any separate Service Rules or Regulations provided for such separate independent Accounts cadre. 5. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties on the basis of counter affidavit has submitted that there is no separate Accounts cadre in the department nor are there any separate Service Rules or Regulations provided for such separate independent Accounts cadre. It has been submitted that impugned orders have been passed pursuant to complaints which were received in the office of Principal Secretary, Animal Husbandry, which were investigated with regard to one Rajendra Prasad Gupta and it was revealed that record pertaining to aforesaid selections particularly with regard to appointments of petitioner and Rejendra Prasad Gupta was unavailable in the Department for which first information reports were also filed. It has been submitted that since there is no separate cadre of Accounts created in the Department of Animal Husbandry, hence appointments made were in contravention to Rules which required to be cancelled. 6. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of records, it is undisputed that petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Accountant vide order dated 02.07.1991 in pursuance of which he joined on the said post in the year 1991 itself and the impugned orders have been passed after more than 13 years of service rendered by petitioner on the said post. A perusal of impugned orders clearly indicates the fact that prior to passing of such orders, neither any opportunity of hearing nor even any show cause notice has been issued to petitioner. Even otherwise, the orders are completely non-speaking in nature since they do not record any reason for cancellation of appointment of petitioner. 7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr.(Miss) Binapanni Dei(supra)has held as follows :- "It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken; the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting aside the order of the State." Similarly in Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India & others(supra) Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as follows : "fair play in action warrants that no such order which has the effect of an employee suffering civil consequences should be passed without putting the concerned to notice and giving him a hearing in the matter." 8. The pleadings made in counter affidavit make it evident that at the time of passing of impugned orders, the concerned authority did not have the entire records pertaining to selection since in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit, opposite parties themselves admit that records pertaining to said selection are unavailable. In such circumstance, it is not understandable as to how the concerned authority reached to a conclusion with regard to invalidity of petitioner's appointment. Counter affidavit also states that there was no separate Accounts cadre available in the department and, therefore, there were no separate service rules notified for the same. In the same breath, however, it has been stated that petitioner's appointment was dehors the rules. Said averments are also contradictory. If there was no separate rules for the Accounts cadre in the Department, naturally, petitioner's service would be governed by the General Service Rules applicable in the department but it could not be said that his appointment was dehors any Rules which have not yet been framed. Neither the impugned order nor counter affidavit indicates the Rules as per which petitioner's appointment is said to be dehors. 9. Upon applicability of judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it is evident that the same are squarely applicable in the present case particularly in view of fact that after rendering 13 years of service by petitioner, the same could not have been cancelled in such a cursory manner without affording any opportunity of hearing to him. 10. Ordinarily, in matters pertaining to quashing of orders passed in violation of principles of natural justice, such a dispute is required to be remitted for a decision afresh to the authority concerned but the same has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court to be inapplicable in cases where such remand would not only be harsh but ineffective. 10. Ordinarily, in matters pertaining to quashing of orders passed in violation of principles of natural justice, such a dispute is required to be remitted for a decision afresh to the authority concerned but the same has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court to be inapplicable in cases where such remand would not only be harsh but ineffective. In the present case, since opposite parties themselves have taken a ground that records pertaining to petitioner's selection are unavailable, any such remand to authorities concerned would be quite ineffective and harsh in view of the fact that petitioner has now been continuing in service for close to 30 years and would soon be attaining the age of superannuation. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank and others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in 2017 (2) SCC 308 has held as follows: “8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time-lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand.” 11. Consequently, a writ in the nature of Certiorari is issued quashing the orders dated 06.12.2004, 07.12.2004 and 09.12.2004 with all consequential benefits. 12. Writ Petition stands allowed.