JUDGMENT Shameem Akther, J. - This Second Appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is filed by the appellant/defendant, challenging the decree and judgment, dated 13.11.2019, passed in A.S.No.10 of 2018 by the I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, whereby, the decree and judgment, dated 05.12.2017, passed in O.S.No.382 of 2015 by the I Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, was confirmed. 2. Heard the submissions of Sri Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant, Sri G.S.Prakash Rao, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs and perused the record. 3. The original suit in O.S.No.382 of 2015 was filed by the respondents herein/plaintiffs for eviction of the appellant/defendant from the suit schedule property and for mesne profits. On merits, the trial Court decreed the said suit directing the appellant/defendant to vacate the suit schedule property within two months from the date of the said judgment and further directed to file a separate application for ascertainment the mesne profits. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant/defendant preferred the subject First Appeal in A.S.No.10 of 2018 before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court, after re-appreciating the entire evidence on record, dismissed the appeal by confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant/defendant filed this second appeal. 4. Having argued for some time, the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that nine months time may be granted to the appellant/defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondents/plaintiffs. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would submit that six (06) months time may be granted to the appellant/defendant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondents/plaintiffs. 5. This second appeal is sought to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the relief claimed and issue involved in the earlier case, i.e., RC No.129/2012 on the file of Additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad, filed by the plaintiffs for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises are same and identical with the relief claimed in the present suit? And principle of Res-Judicata operates against the plaintiffs? 2. Whether the suit is barred by res-judicata? 3. Whether the lease is subsisting, as the plaintiffs are receiving the rents regularly even after issuing quit notice? 4. And principle of Res-Judicata operates against the plaintiffs? 2. Whether the suit is barred by res-judicata? 3. Whether the lease is subsisting, as the plaintiffs are receiving the rents regularly even after issuing quit notice? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim more rent @ Rs. 18,000/- per month as against the fair rent fixed by the learned Rent Controller in RC No.148/2012 and thereby terminate the lease? 5. Whether the notice dated 25.05.2015, i.e, Ex.A.1 issued on behalf of the plaintiffs under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act is valid and in accordance with law? 6. Whether the suit premises is required for personal use of the plaintiffs and in the absence of any evidence in that regard, the plaintiffs are entitled to seek eviction of the defendant from the suit premises? 7. Whether the lower appellate Court appreciated the evidence on record in correct perspective and justified in confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court? 6. There cannot be any dispute that, under the amended Section 100 of C.P.C., a party aggrieved by the decree passed by the first appellate Court has no absolute right of appeal. He can neither challenge the decree on a question of fact or on a question of law. The second appeal lies only where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The word substantial as qualifying question of law , means and conveys of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important, considerable, fairly arguable. A substantial question of law should directly and substantially affect the rights of the parties. A question of law can be said to be substantial between the parties, if the decision in appeal turns one way or the other on the particular view of law. But, if the question does not affect the decision, it cannot be said to be substantial question between the parties. Recording a finding without any evidence on record; disregard or non-consideration of relevant or admissible evidence; taking into consideration irrelevant or inadmissible evidence; perverse finding - are some of the questions, which involve substantial questions of law. 7. But, if the question does not affect the decision, it cannot be said to be substantial question between the parties. Recording a finding without any evidence on record; disregard or non-consideration of relevant or admissible evidence; taking into consideration irrelevant or inadmissible evidence; perverse finding - are some of the questions, which involve substantial questions of law. 7. A plain reading of the questions sought to be raised in this appeal as substantial questions of law are pure questions of fact, which cannot be dealt with in this appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. Where the lower appellate court had exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error, either of law or of procedure, requiring interference in a Second Appeal. The findings of the lower appellate Court are not perverse. There is nothing to take a different view. The lower appellate Court has neither overlooked the admissible evidence nor acted upon inadmissible evidence. After careful examination of the pleadings, evidence and the contentions, this Court finds that no question of law, much less substantial question of law, is involved in this Second Appeal. The appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 8. At this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submits that the appellant/defendant undertakes to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondents/plaintiffs by 31.07.2020. Under these circumstances, the appellant/defendant is directed to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondents/plaintiffs by 31.07.2020. Further, the appellant/defendant is directed to file an undertaking affidavit before the trial Court undertaking to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondents/plaintiffs by 31.07.2020 within a week from today, failing which, the benefit of extension of time now granted shall automatically stands cancelled. If the appellant/defendant fails to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondents/plaintiffs by 31.07.2020 even after filing undertaking affidavit as indicated above, the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to seek vacant possession of the suit schedule property, in accordance with law. 9. Subject to the above directions, this second appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Second Appeal, shall stand closed.