JUDGMENT : 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment, dated 17.08.2006, passed by the learned Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in Calendar Case No.22 of 2000, wherein and whereby, the appellant was found guilty of the charges under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the appellant preferred the present appeal. 2. Vide the aforesaid judgment, the trial Court sentenced the Accused Officer to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two thousands only) for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The trial Court further sentenced the Accused Officer to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and six months and also to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two thousands only) for the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act punishable under Section 13(2) of the Act, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. The undergone period of the Accused Officer as under trial prisoner was given set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. However, the default sentences were ordered to run separately. 3. The factual matrix of the present appeal is as follows: According to the prosecution, the Accused Officer was Deputy Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, Karimnagar at the relevant point of time. The de facto complainant/P.W.1 is the resident of Karimnagar. The Accused Officer, being the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, Karimnagar, on 24.01.1998 at hotel Srinivasa of Karimnagar, as per his earlier demand, demanded and accepted Rs.20,000/- from the de facto complainant – K.Jagan Goud, Manager of Toddy Depot No.3 of Karimnagar Town as gratification other than the legal remuneration as a motive or reward for showing official favour i.e. for not sending any further report against the toddy depot No.3 owned by him. The Accused Officer thereby committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act. 4. The Accused Officer thereby committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act. 4. It is also the case of the prosecution that the Accused Officer being a public servant as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, Karimnagar, on 24.01.1998, obtained for himself pecuniary advantage to an extent of Rs.20,000/- from P.W.1 for showing official favour of not sending any further report against the toddy shop No.3 owned by him and thereby committed offence under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act punishable under Section 13 (2) of the Act. 5. The de facto complainant/P.W.1, being not interested to pay the said amount of Rs.20,000/- towards bribe, approached the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, Karimnagar by way of lodging Ex.P.1 complaint, who in turn registered a case and issued Ex.P.13 FIR. The ACB officials thereafter laid a trap against the appellant/Accused Officer and after completion of the investigation, they filed the charge sheet, which was taken on file vide C.C.No.22 of 2000 by the trial Court. 6. The trial Court framed charges under Section 7, 13 (1) (d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the Act. On examination, the Accused Officer denied the charges framed against him and claimed to be tried. Accordingly the trial Court proceeded with the trial. 7. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses i.e., PWs.1 to 10 and marked Exs.P1 to P14 and MOs.1 to 9 were exhibited. In support of the defence, the Accused Officer examined six witnesses i.e., DWs.1 to 6 and marked Exs.D-1 and D-2. Exs.X1 and X2 were also marked. After completion of the trial and on consideration of evidence available on record, both oral and documentary, the trial Court found the Accused Officer guilty of the aforesaid charges and accordingly convicted him vide impugned judgment and imposed the punishment in the manner stated supra. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, the Accused Officer preferred the present appeal. 8. Heard Sri Bodduluri Srinivasarao, learned counsel for the appellant - Accused Officer and Mr. T.L. Nayan Kumar, learned Additional Standing Counsel - cum - Special Public Prosecutor for ACB Cases for the State of Telangana appearing on behalf of the respondent. 9. Impugning the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that P.W.1 – the de facto complainant, who set the law into motion by lodging Ex.P.1 complaint, disowned his complaint, thereby he was declared hostile. 9. Impugning the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that P.W.1 – the de facto complainant, who set the law into motion by lodging Ex.P.1 complaint, disowned his complaint, thereby he was declared hostile. According to him, nothing was elicited from him during cross-examination by the prosecution. Therefore, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the very demand itself and therefore the question of acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer does not arise. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that P.W.2, the accompanying witness who accompanied P.W.1 on the date of trap also turned hostile. The prosecution failed to elicit anything from him during the cross-examination. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, since P.W.2 also turned hostile, heavy burden lies on the prosecution to prove the demand which is sine qua non to prove the guilt of the accused under Section 7 of the Act. The prosecution did not examine any independent witness to prove the demand and acceptance. He would further submit that P.W.5 accompanying witness did not accompany P.W.1 despite specific instructions from P.W.10, Dy.S.P, ACB, trap laying officer to accompany P.W.1. In fact, P.W.10 relied upon the deposition of P.W.5 to prove the demand. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the very demand itself and therefore the question of acceptance of bribe by the Accused Officer from P.W.1 does not arise. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the P.W.3 – Regional Intelligence Officer deposed that the Accused Officer being DSP, Intelligence, has to collect political information and submit the same to the higher authorities. Therefore, his evidence is not useful to prove the demand. He would further submit that P.W.4-Inspector of Police, Special Branch, deposed about receipt of Ex.P.7 Memorandum wherein the Superintendent of Police, Karimnagar was asked to take action against P.W.1 – K. Jagan Goud, who was described as bootlegger/smuggler and others i.e. Gampa Maruti, Sampath Rao, Kasula Surender and Ravinder Rao. PW.5 the accompanying witness did not accompany P.W.1 and did not speak about the demand at all. P.W.6- Dy.S.P. ACB spoke about laying of charge sheet and completion of investigation and on getting sanction proceedings. P.W.7- Receptionist of Srinivasa Hotel, Karimangar, deposed about allotment of rooms to P.W.1 and his presence on the day of trap. PW.5 the accompanying witness did not accompany P.W.1 and did not speak about the demand at all. P.W.6- Dy.S.P. ACB spoke about laying of charge sheet and completion of investigation and on getting sanction proceedings. P.W.7- Receptionist of Srinivasa Hotel, Karimangar, deposed about allotment of rooms to P.W.1 and his presence on the day of trap. PW.8-another Receptionist deposed about presence of P.W.1 and the said Gampa Maruti, Sampath Rao, Kasula Surender and Ravinder Rao. He also deposed that the Accused Officer raised his right hand and threw something, found currency notes in croton plants. P.W.9 deposed about sanction proceedings and P.W.10 Dy.S.P. ACB, trap laying officer deposed about trap proceedings. With regard to the alleged demand of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer from P.W.1, he has relied on the version of P.W.5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no official favour that was pending with the Accused Officer to do to P.W.1 and the Accused Officer never abused his official position as alleged by the prosecution. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that the prosecution failed to prove the pendency of official favour and the Accused Officer abusing his official position to do any favour to P.W.1. 12. By referring the said depositions, including the admissions of the prosecution witnesses, during cross examination, the learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that though heavy burden lies on the prosecution to prove the demand beyond reasonable doubt, since P.W.1, the de facto complainant turned hostile, the prosecution failed to discharge the said burden by examining any independent witness. The deposition of P.W.5 and P.W.10 are not at all useful to the prosecution to prove the said alleged demand. He would further submit that mere recovery of tainted currency notes from the possession of the Accused Officer is not sufficient. The prosecution has to prove the demand of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer beyond reasonable doubt with all probabilities like any other criminal case. 13. In the event, the prosecution fails to prove the very demand itself which is the basic and essential ingredient to record conviction of a public servant under Section 7 of the Act, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be drawn. 13. In the event, the prosecution fails to prove the very demand itself which is the basic and essential ingredient to record conviction of a public servant under Section 7 of the Act, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be drawn. He would further contend that the trial Court without appreciating the above said contentions of the Accused Officer recorded conviction against him. He would further submit that the defence of the Accused Officer that P.W.1 thrusted the currency notes into his pant pocket is consistent right from Ex.P.9 post trap proceedings and it is trust worthy. There is animosity between P.W.1 and the Accused Officer and due to the said animosity, P.W.1 implicated the Accused Officer in the present trap case. To prove the same, the Accused Officer has examined D.Ws.1 to 6 and also filed Exs.D.1 and D.2 documents which were not considered by the trial Court. Therefore, the impugned judgment is based only on surmises and conjectures without any preponderance of probabilities. 14. Supporting the impugned judgment, the learned Additional Standing Counsel - cum - Special Public Prosecutor for ACB Cases for the State of Telangana, would contend that the trap is proved, recovery of the tainted currency is proved, the chemical test turned positive and therefore the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He would further contend that though P.Ws.1 and 2 turned hostile, the portion of the deposition, which is relevant and benefit to the prosecution can be relied upon as held by the apex Court. He would further contend that the mediators to the trap and the trap laying officer have also categorically deposed about the demand and acceptance of the money and also the recovery of the tainted currency. 15. It is his further contention that the Accused Officer failed to prove or establish the thrust theory. It is only on seeing the ACB officials, the Accused Officer had taken out the tainted currency from his pocket and threw it away. According to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the said fact itself is enough to establish that the Accused Officer has received the above said bribe amount of Rs.20,000/- from P.W.1. It is only on seeing the ACB officials, the Accused Officer had taken out the tainted currency from his pocket and threw it away. According to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the said fact itself is enough to establish that the Accused Officer has received the above said bribe amount of Rs.20,000/- from P.W.1. He further contends that the Accused Officer being Deputy Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, won over P.W.1 – the de facto complainant and therefore P.W.1 deposed contrary to his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C and 164 Cr.P.C only to help the Accused Officer. 16. The learned Special Public Prosecutor would further contend that on the critical analysis of the entire evidence both oral and documentary, the trial Court gave a specific finding on pendency of official favour, demand and acceptance and presumption under Section 20 of the Act and also on the thrust theory, the defence taken by the Accused Officer. According to him, there is no circumstance or reason warranting interference of this Court in the present appeal and with the said submissions, the learned Special Public Prosecutor would pray to dismiss the Criminal Appeal. 17. In view of the above said rival submissions, the points that arise for consideration by this Court in this appeal are: i. Whether the prosecution proved pendency of official favour, demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer from the de facto complainant? ii. Whether impugned judgment is sustainable both on facts and law? POINTS 1 & 2: 18. On perusal of the entire evidence, it is not in dispute that P.W.1- the de facto complainant, who set the law into motion by way of lodging Ex.P.1 complaint, turned hostile and disowned his own complaint. P.W.2 – Member of Toddy Tapers Cooperative Society, Karimnagar Shop No.2 also declared hostile. P.W.5, the accompanying witness did not accompany P.W.1 despite specific instructions from P.W.10 – trap laying officer on the day of trap. P.W-10 did not depose about demand and to prove demand, he has relied on the version of P.W.5, the accompanying witness. Therefore, heavy burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the Accused Officer demanded an amount of Rs.20,000/- towards illegal gratification to do official favour to P.W.1. It is relevant to note that though P.Ws.1 and 2 were declared hostile, nothing useful was elicited by the prosecution from them. 19. Therefore, heavy burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the Accused Officer demanded an amount of Rs.20,000/- towards illegal gratification to do official favour to P.W.1. It is relevant to note that though P.Ws.1 and 2 were declared hostile, nothing useful was elicited by the prosecution from them. 19. P.W.3 deposed about the duties of the Accused Officer, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, Karimnagar at the relevant point of time. P.W.4 deposed about receiving of Ex.P.7 Memorandum addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Karimnagar from the Intelligence department asking him to take action against P.W.1 – K. Jagan Goud and others i.e. Gampa Maruti, Sampath Rao, Kasula Surender and Ravinder Rao. In Ex.P.7 Memorandum, it is mentioned that P.W.1 is a bootlegger/smuggler. P.W.5 – Joint Director, Agriculture, acted as another mediator to the trap. He deposed about the trap proceedings, vantage positions in Srinivasa Lodge. He further deposed about P.W.2 informing him and the trap party about demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer from P.W.1. He also deposed that he and other mediator and the ACB officials observed the Accused Officer raising his hand and throwing something. They have moved forward and came near to them and found the currency notes in crotons at a distance of two yards. Thus, he has not accompanied P.W.1 to the place of trap despite specific instructions from P.W.10 the trap laying officer. He has not deposed that the Accused Officer has demanded and accepted an amount of Rs.20,000/- from P.W.1. Therefore, the deposition of P.W.5 is not at all helpful to the prosecution to prove the very demand of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer from P.W.1. 20. P.W.6 – Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, Karimnagar at the relevant point of time, deposed about filing of the charge sheet. P.Ws.7 and 8, receptionists of Srinivasa Hotel, Karimnagar deposed about the activities of the lodge, stay of the Accused Officer and other politicians in the said hotel. They have also deposed about the presence of Accused Officer and other people like Satyanarayana (P.W.2), Maruthi and Sampath Rao etc., on the day of trap. P.Ws.7 and 8, receptionists of Srinivasa Hotel, Karimnagar deposed about the activities of the lodge, stay of the Accused Officer and other politicians in the said hotel. They have also deposed about the presence of Accused Officer and other people like Satyanarayana (P.W.2), Maruthi and Sampath Rao etc., on the day of trap. It is relevant to note that P.W.8 who is also receptionist of the hotel categorically admitted during crossexamination that “I saw P.W.1 Jagan Goud keeping in the right side pocket of the Accused Officer from behind and then the accused took out the amount and threw it, after that ACB people came and caught. P.W.1 Jagan, Satyanarayana, Sampath Rao, Gampa Maruthi waited for 10 minutes at the reception after that incident and left the lodge.” 21. It is also relevant to note that P.W.8 is the prosecution witness and he himself categorically admitted about the thrusting of amount into the pant pocket of the Accused Officer. In fact, the deposition of P.W.8 is useful to the Accused Officer. P.W.9 deposed about sanction of prosecution and P.W.10 who is the trap laying officer deposed about what all happened on the relevant date of trap. 22. As discussed above, the prosecution did not examine any independent witness and failed to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer from any witness. It is relevant to note that P.W.1 the de facto complainant disowned his own complaint-Ex.P.1 and in view of the same heavy burden lies on the prosecution to prove the demand and acceptance with cogent reasons and by examining relevant witnesses. It is also settled principle of law that the prosecution has to prove the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, like any other criminal case beyond reasonable doubt as held by the Hon’ble apex Court in A. Subair v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 587 . In the present case, as discussed supra, the prosecution failed to prove the same from P.Ws.1 and 2 and P.W.5, the accompanying witness. 23. It is relevant to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudip Kumar Sen alias Biltu v. State of West Bengal, (2016) 3 SCC 26 held that the Court may act on the testimony of single witness though uncorroborated, provided that the testimony of single witness is found reliable. 23. It is relevant to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudip Kumar Sen alias Biltu v. State of West Bengal, (2016) 3 SCC 26 held that the Court may act on the testimony of single witness though uncorroborated, provided that the testimony of single witness is found reliable. Whereas, in the present case, as discussed supra, the trap laying officer relied upon P.W.5, the accompanying witness and he did not depose about demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer. Therefore, the deposition of P.W.10, the trap laying officer is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the Accused Officer had demanded and accepted illegal gratification to do official favour to P.W.1 and record conviction. 24. It is also settled preposition that even the prosecution can prove the demand and acceptance by way of circumstantial evidence where there is no direct evidence more particularly when the de facto complainant declared hostile by disowning his own complaint. In view of the same, this Court has to examine whether the prosecution could prove the said demand and acceptance of bribe from the evidence of the trap laying officer i.e. P.W.10. 25. P.W.10 deposed about the receipt of Ex.P.1 complaint from P.W.1 and conducted discrete enquiry into the genuineness of the allegations made by P.W.1 in Ex.P.1 complaint. Though P.W.10 deposed that there is an endorsement on Ex.P.13 FIR, with regard to conducting discrete enquiry, there is no evidence with regard to the same. As per the ACB manual where there is complaint relating to inter se seniority, promotions, intra departmental activities, it is the duty of the ACB officials to conduct discrete enquires. In the present case also, as discussed supra, there are disputes between the local police, intelligence department and excise officials. Exs.X.1 and X.2 would establish the said fact. Apart from the same, as per Ex.P.7 Memorandum dated 23.10.1997, there are smuggling and selling of non-duty paid liquor activities in Karimnagar district. In the said Memorandum, it is also specifically mentioned about certain persons including P.W.1 as bootlegger/smuggler. The names of Gampa Maruti, Sampath Rao, Kasula Surender and Ravinder Rao were also specifically mentioned in Ex.P.7. The details of P.W.1 were specifically mentioned. Vide Ex.P.7, the intelligence department requested the Superintendent of Police Karimangar to take action against P.W.1 and the above said persons as deposed by P.W.4. The names of Gampa Maruti, Sampath Rao, Kasula Surender and Ravinder Rao were also specifically mentioned in Ex.P.7. The details of P.W.1 were specifically mentioned. Vide Ex.P.7, the intelligence department requested the Superintendent of Police Karimangar to take action against P.W.1 and the above said persons as deposed by P.W.4. Though the prosecution tried to convince the trial Court and also this Court during the course of arguments that P.W.10 conducted discrete enquiries, except endorsement on Ex.P.13 FIR, there is no other evidence in proof of the same. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove that P.W.10 trap laying officer conducted discrete enquiry into the allegations made by P.W.1 in Ex.P.1 complaint. 26. P.W.10 trap laying officer deposed about the trap proceedings and recording of pre trap and post trap proceedings. He has instructed the complainant to go over to room No.119 of Srinivasa lodge along with the accompanying witness PW.5 with specific instructions to handover the tainted amount only on the demand of the Accused Officer but not otherwise. P.W.10 further instructed him not to shake hands of the Accused Officer before and after handing over the tainted amount. The accompanying witness was instructed to follow P.W.1 to the above room number and watch the transaction between the complainant and the Accused Officer and if the Accused Officer demands and accepts the bribe he has to come out of the room No.106. P.W.10 further deposed that at 10-45 PM the accompanying witness came to their room and informed that the Accused Officer accepted the bribe amount and leaving the hotel. The Accused Officer took out the currency bundles from his right side wearing pant pocket and threw behind hedge the croton plants alongside the wall of hotel. Thus the deposition of P.W.10 would also show that the Accused Officer took out the currency notes and threw it on the crotons. 27. With regard to the demand he has relied upon the accompanying witness i.e. P.W.5. As discussed supra, in fact, the said accompanying witness deposed about demand. He ahs not even accompanied P.W.1 as instructed by P.W.10. Therefore, even from the evidence of P.W.10-the trap laying officer, the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance. None of the prosecution witnesses deposed about the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer. 28. As discussed supra, in fact, the said accompanying witness deposed about demand. He ahs not even accompanied P.W.1 as instructed by P.W.10. Therefore, even from the evidence of P.W.10-the trap laying officer, the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance. None of the prosecution witnesses deposed about the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer. 28. With regard to circumstantial evidence, it is relevant to not that the Apex Court in Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 2002 SC 3164 had an occasion to deal with the circumstantial evidence and held that (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 29. It was also held that the circumstances from which conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistence only with the hypothesis of the accused. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probably, the act must have been done by the accused. Minor contradictions did not endanger to the prosecution case and the same can be ignored, provided that both the foundation and super structure of the prosecution case can withstand the critical analysis of the judicial scrutiny. 30. Minor contradictions did not endanger to the prosecution case and the same can be ignored, provided that both the foundation and super structure of the prosecution case can withstand the critical analysis of the judicial scrutiny. 30. In view of the said principle, coming to the case on hand, P.W.1, the de facto complainant turned hostile by disowning his own complaint, P.W.2 declared as hostile, P.W.5- accompanying witness did not depose about the demand and acceptance and P.W.10 also did not depose about the demand. He has relied upon the deposition of P.W.5 to prove the demand and in fact, P.W.5 did not accompany P.W.1 during the trap. Thus, P.W.5 did not depose about the demand. In the present case, there is no chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused by way of circumstantial evidence or a single witness i.e. P.W.10. 31. In view of the above said discussion, the contention of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that since the tainted currency was recovered from the Accused Officer the trap is proved, and therefore the trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution proved demand and acceptance by drawing presumption under Section 20 of the Act is misconceived and contrary to record. It is settled principle of law by the Hon’ble apex Court in catena of decisions that mere recovery of tainted currency notes is not sufficient and the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt like in any other criminal case. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand and hence the question of acceptance does not arise. 32. On the other hand, the defence has proved the thrust theory. It is the consistent explanation of the Accused Officer right from the post trap proceedings that P.W.1 thrusted the money into the pant pocket. To prove the same he has examined D.Ws.1 to 6 apart from proving the same during cross examination of PWs.1, 5, 7 and 8. Therefore, the defence of thrust theory of the Accused Officer is consistent, believable and trustworthy. Thus the Accused Officer has proved that P.W.1 thrusted the said amount. 33. To prove the same he has examined D.Ws.1 to 6 apart from proving the same during cross examination of PWs.1, 5, 7 and 8. Therefore, the defence of thrust theory of the Accused Officer is consistent, believable and trustworthy. Thus the Accused Officer has proved that P.W.1 thrusted the said amount. 33. It is also relevant to note that as per Ex.P.7, P.W.1 is involved in illicit liquor business and there is a case registered against him. As deposed by P.W.4, Superintendent of Police was requested to take action against P.W.1 – bootlegger/smuggler and also Gampa Maruti, Sampathrao, Ravinder Rao and Kasula Surender. There names were mentioned in Ex.P.7. They were present in Srinivasa Lodge at the time of trap as deposed by P.Ws.8 and 10. Thus the conduct of P.W.1 is not bona fide and trustworthy. As per Exs.X.1 and X.2, there are allegations of corrupt practices against the Karimnagar local police. Admittedly, the Accused Officer was Deputy Superintendent of Police, Intelligence Department at the relevant point of time and his duty as deposed by his colleague officer is that he has to report the said corrupt practice, political activities etc., to higher officials. When he was on the said duty, he used to stay in Srinivasa lodge, Karimnagar since all such activities are being run from the said lodge. Therefore, he has opted the said lodge. The above said facts would clearly reveal that there are strained relations between the Accused Officer and P.W.1 including the said Gampa Maruti, Sampath Rao, Ravinder Rao and Kasula Surender. The Accused Officer has proved the said animosity between P.W.1 and himself and that P.W.1 with the help of the local police and ACB officials implicated the Accused Officer in the present case. In the said course of action, PW.1 thrusted the said amount into the pant pocket of the Accused Officer. 34. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment reported in V.Venkata Subbarao vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P, (2006) 13SCC 305 wherein the Hon’ble apex Court had an occasion to deal with presumption under Section 20 of the Act. It held that the said presumption cannot be raised when demand by the accused is not proved. In the present case also, as discussed supra, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the very demand itself. It held that the said presumption cannot be raised when demand by the accused is not proved. In the present case also, as discussed supra, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the very demand itself. Therefore, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be drawn. The finding of the trial Court with regard to drawing of the said presumption is without considering the fact that the prosecution failed to prove the demand itself and hence the said finding is erroneous and unsustainable in view of the principle laid down by the apex Court that where the prosecution failed to prove the very demand and therefore presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be drawn. 35. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the principle laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court in State of Punjab vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma, AIR 2013 SC 3368 wherein the Hon’ble apex Court had an occasion to deal with a case of illegal gratification i.e. trap case and more particularly with regard to demand and acceptance of a sum by the Accused Officer therein as part payment of the illegal gratification for not re-opening assessment. In the said case the complainant himself went to DCP for having a trap and therefore question of Executive Magistrate receiving a direction from DCP on earlier date could not arise. The facts of the said case are altogether different to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the principle held therein is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 36. The learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble apex Court in Selvaraj vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230 wherein the Hon’ble apex Court by referring its earlier judgment reported in State of Kerala vs. C.P.Rao, (2011) 6 SCC 450 held that mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused. There has to be corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding the payment of bribe and when the complainant is not available for examination during the trial, Court has to be cautious while sifting the evidence of other witnesses. Charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There has to be corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding the payment of bribe and when the complainant is not available for examination during the trial, Court has to be cautious while sifting the evidence of other witnesses. Charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, though the prosecution examined the de facto complainant as PW.1, he has disowned his complaint and nothing was elicited from him during the course of cross examination by the learned Public Prosecutor. The prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself from PW.1. 37. The learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Hon’ble apex Court in Mukhtiar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 136 wherein it was held that mere bald allegation of complainant regarding demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by accused which remains uncorroborated, is not sufficient. Prosecution has to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Hon’ble apex Court further held that where the shadow witness/accompanying witness turned hostile, heavy burden lies on the prosecution to prove the said charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused by examining relevant/independent witness. Whereas, in the present case, P.W.5 being the accompanying/shadow witness, did not accompany P.W.1 and did not depose about the demand. He did not support the case of the prosecution and on the other hand he himself deposed about throwing of the tainted currency by the Accused Officer. The prosecution failed to examine any independent witness to establish the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the Accused Officer. Moreover, in the above case, the Hon’ble apex Court held that trap operation is wholly inadequate to comply with the prerequisites to constitute the ingredients of the offence with which the original accused had been charged. Not only the date or time of first demand/payment is not forthcoming and the allegation to that effect is rather omnibus, vague and sweeping. Therefore, the prosecution has to prove both demand and acceptance which are the twin requirements to record conviction under Section 7 or 13 of the Act by persuasive evidence. But in the present case the same are lacking and the prosecution failed to prove the demand itself. 38. Therefore, the prosecution has to prove both demand and acceptance which are the twin requirements to record conviction under Section 7 or 13 of the Act by persuasive evidence. But in the present case the same are lacking and the prosecution failed to prove the demand itself. 38. In Dashrath Singh Chauhan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2018 (2) ALD (Crl.) 952 (SC), the Apex Court held that in order to attract the rigors of Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) of the Act, the prosecution was under a legal obligation to prove the twin requirements of “demand and acceptance of bribe money by the accused”, proving of one alone but not the other was not sufficient. As discussed supra, in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself. 39. It is the case of the prosecution that the Accused Officer demand an amount of Rs.20,000/- from P.W.1 to do an official favour i.e. not sending any further report against the toddy depot owned by him. As discussed above, to prove the official favour, the prosecution has examined P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.10. P.Ws.1 and 2 turned hostile and nothing contra was elicited from them during cross examination by the prosecution to do the said official favour. Nothing is useful from the depositions of P.Ws.1 and 2 to prove the pendency of the official favour with the Accused Officer. The prosecution also failed to prove the pendency of the said official favour at the relevant point of time with the Accused Officer. 40. On the other hand, the Accused Officer has proved the animosity between him, P.W.1 and others. As per Ex.P.7, P.W.1 is a smuggler/bootlegger and as per the deposition of P.W.4, Superintendent of Police was asked to take action against P.W.1 and others who have involved in illicit liquor business. The said facts were also mentioned in Exs.X.1 and X.2. As deposed by P.W.3, the Accused Officer has to collect political information and send it to his higher officials. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove pendency of official favour with the Accused Officer at the relevant point of time to do the same to P.W.1. 41. The said facts were also mentioned in Exs.X.1 and X.2. As deposed by P.W.3, the Accused Officer has to collect political information and send it to his higher officials. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove pendency of official favour with the Accused Officer at the relevant point of time to do the same to P.W.1. 41. The learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment of the Hon’ble apex Court in Om Prakash vs. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250 wherein the Hon’ble apex Court held that where there are discrepancies in the depositions of prosecution witnesses and consistency in the defence story set up by the Accused Officer cannot be said to be wholly improper. In the present case also there are serious discrepancies in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. 42. It is relevant to note that to prove the Thrust Theory, the defence taken by the Accused Officer, he has examined D.W.1 who deposed about thrusting of the said amount into the right side pant pocket of the Accused Officer who immediately took out the same, threw it away on the floor. D.W.2 childhood friend of the Accused Officer deposed about his stay in Srinivasa lodge on the day of trap, meeting the Accused Officer and thrusting of the currency notes by P.W.1. D.W.3, Bus operator deposed that he knows P.W.1, P.W.2, Gampa Maruti, Kasula Surender. He was in Srinivasa Lodge on the day of trap to attend a meeting. He specifically deposed about thrusting of money by P.W.1 into the pant pocket of the Accused Officer. D.W.4 also deposed in the same manner. D.W.6 deposed about Exs.X.1 and X.2. The prosecution failed to elicit anything from the above said defence witnesses during cross examination. Thus, the Accused Officer has proved the thrusting of currency notes by P.W.1 into his pant pocket. There is consistency in the defence taken by the Accused Officer right from the post trap proceedings i.e. “Thrust Theory” and the Accused Officer has proved the said theory which is probable and believable. 43. The finding of the trial Court that the accused has used his official position to extract illegal gratification for not sending further report against P.W.1, and therefore the requirement of law is satisfied, is contrary to the record. 43. The finding of the trial Court that the accused has used his official position to extract illegal gratification for not sending further report against P.W.1, and therefore the requirement of law is satisfied, is contrary to the record. As discussed supra, there was no official favour that was pending with the Accused Officer at the relevant point to time to do to P.W.1 and the Accused Officer never abused his official position. In view of the said discussion, the finding of the trial Court is not sustainable. 44. The further finding of the trial Court that it is difficult to connect P.W.1 with Ex.X1 report is also contrary to the evidence both oral and documentary. It is specifically mentioned in Ex.P.7 supported by Exs.X.1 and X.2 that illicit liquor business is going on in Karimnagar district, P.W.1 is bootlegger/smuggler and request was made to take action against P.W.1 and others. The same was supported by the depositions of P.Ws.4 and 10. In view of the same, the finding of the trial Court that the Accused Officer failed to prove the animosity between him and P.W.1 is not sustainable. The further finding of the trial Court that the Accused Officer failed to disprove the pendency of official favour with him at the relevant point of time is also not sustainable in view of the reasons stated above. With regard to the Thrust Theory, the finding of the trial Court that the Accused Officer failed to prove the Thrust Theory is also not sustainable since the said finding is without consideration of the depositions of prosecution witnesses and their admissions during cross examination in the manner stated above and also the depositions of the defence witnesses. Thus viewed from any angle, the impugned judgment is not sustainable both on law and on facts. 45. Thus, in view of the above said findings, the prosecution failed to prove the offence under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The findings of the trial Court are not based on the evidence both oral and documentary available on record. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 46. The findings of the trial Court are not based on the evidence both oral and documentary available on record. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 46. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in Calendar Case No.22 of 2000 is accordingly set aside. The Accused Officer is acquitted of the offence under Section 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 47. Since the Accused Officer is on bail, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.