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2020 DIGILAW 466 (TS)

Md. Maruf v. State of Telangana

2020-06-11

B.VIJAYSEN REDDY, R.S.CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J. 1. This writ of habeas corpus is filed challenging the order of detention dated 19.11.2019 passed by the Commissioner of Police and Additional District Magistrate (Executive), Rachakonda Commissionerate and as approved by the Government vide G.O.Rt. No. 3139 dated 29.11.2019, whereunder the detenu, Aftab Alam S/o Mahmuddin, was detained under the provisions of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertilizer Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Amendment Act No. 13 of 2018) (for short ‘the Act’) holding that the criminal activities of the detenu fall within the ambit of Section 2(g) of the Act of 1986 to term him as Goonda and that the detenu is habitually indulging in criminal activities, which is a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of peace order and enforcement of ordinary penal laws could not prevent the detenu from indulging in such activities. 2. Ms. R. Sowmya Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that there is no proximity and nexus between the cases referred to in the detention order. For, the activities do not come within the definition of Section 2(g) of the Act. Hence, the detenu cannot be equated as Goonda. Furthermore, the cases shown in the grounds of detention do not come under public order. She further submits that the detention order is passed in a mechanical manner the same has been approved by the Government. Even the sponsoring authority has not placed the bail petitions and orders before the detaining authority. 3. On the other hand, Mr. S. Sharath Kumar, learned Special Government Pleader, submits the detention order was passed treating the detenu as Goonda, as he was engaged in committing burglary in jewellery shops/pan shops habitually within the Rachakonda Commissionerate. He, thus, created panic in the minds of general public and businessmen. Such activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Moreover, preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation, which may or may not relate to an offence and it does not overlap with prosecution. He, thus, created panic in the minds of general public and businessmen. Such activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Moreover, preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation, which may or may not relate to an offence and it does not overlap with prosecution. Since the detention order is based on sound reasoning, the adequacy of material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest, cannot be examined in a Court of law. Since the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it was essential to pass the detention order against the detenu. 4. The detaining authority has referred to three criminal cases as shown below: S. No. Crime No. Offence Name of Offence Data of arrest Bail Granted/ Dismissed 1. Cr. No. 409 of 2019 Under Sections 457 and 380 Attempt to commit theft 10.9.2019 Bail granted in Crl. MP No. 881 of 2019 on 16.9.2019 by XVII MM Malkajgiri 2. Cr. No. 593 of 2019 Under Sections 457 and 380 IPC Enticed into Pan shop and committed theft of Cigarette packets 10.9.2019 in Cr. No. 592 of 2019 and regularized through PT warrant on 30.9.2019 Bail granted in Crl. MP No. 1899 of 2019 on 23.10.2019 by XXIII MM, Malkajgiri 3. Cr. No. 592 of 2019 Under Section 457 and 380 IPC Theft of jewellery weighting 11 tolas and net cash Rs. 30,000/- 11.9.2019 1st Bail dismissed vide Crl. MP No. 1761 of 2019, dated 4.10.2019 2nd bail dismissed vide Crl. MP No. 1786 of 2019, 3rd bail dismissed vide Crl. MP No. 1928 of 2019 dated 29.10.2019, all on the file of XIX MM, Malkajgiri 5. It is stated in the impugned detention order that the detenu is involved in three burglary cases in the recent past which amply demonstrate his habitual natural of committing crimes, creating large scale fear in the minds of general public specially business community thereby restraining them from freely doing their jewellery shop business. Hence, these activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. The detenu was arrested in Cr. No. 592 of 2019 on the file of the Kushaiguda Police Station on 11.9.2019, and remanded to judicial custody and lodged in Central Prison, Cherlapally. Subsequently, he was arrested in Cr. No. 409 of 2019 on the file of the Keesara Police Station and in Cr. The detenu was arrested in Cr. No. 592 of 2019 on the file of the Kushaiguda Police Station on 11.9.2019, and remanded to judicial custody and lodged in Central Prison, Cherlapally. Subsequently, he was arrested in Cr. No. 409 of 2019 on the file of the Keesara Police Station and in Cr. No. 593 of 2019 on the file of the Jawaharnagar Police Station on 30.9.2019 under PT warrant. The detenu applied for bail in Cr. No. 592 of 2019 vide Crl. MP No. 1761 of 2019. But the same was dismissed by order dated 4.10.2019, by the XIX Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri. So also, the second bail application vide Crl. MP No. 1786 of 2019 was also dismissed on 21.10.2019; the third bail application, vide Crl. MP No. 1928 of 2019, was also dismissed on 29.10.2019 by XIX Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri. The detenu moved bail applications in Cr. No. 409 of 2019 and Cr. No. 593 of 2019 vide Crl. MP No. 881 of 2019 and Crl. MP No. 1899 of 2019 and the said applications were allowed on 16.10.2019 and 23.10.2019 respectively. 6. The detaining authority while referring to the criminal cases and subsequent grant of bail to the detenu merely, stated that the bail applications were allowed on account of detenu making persistent attempts moving bail applications one after another. Thus, the detaining authority strongly believes that there is imminent possibility of the detenu indulging in same offences, which are detrimental and prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and tranquility. 7. It is settled law that the provisions of the Preventive Detention law cannot be invoked when the detenu can be dealt with under ordinary criminal laws. The offences based on which detention order is passed are IPC offences. The order of detention can be passed only when the detaining, authority is satisfied that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public order. The activities in connection with the crimes referred to above relate to law and order and not public order. ‘Law and Order’ and ‘Public Order’ are two different concepts which have been discussed in several cases. The activities in connection with the crimes referred to above relate to law and order and not public order. ‘Law and Order’ and ‘Public Order’ are two different concepts which have been discussed in several cases. In Pushkar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 10 , the Supreme Court held as under: The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds (a), (b) and (e) served on Subhas Chandra Boss are grounds which are relevant to “the maintenance of public order.” All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order. In the present case we are concerned with detention under Section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act. The difference between the concepts of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ is similar to the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering the material elements of crime, the historic tests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen has distinguished ‘public’ and ‘private’ crimes in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. (See Dr. Allen's Legal Duties, P. 249). There is a broad distinction along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the application of any such test The learned author has pointed out that out of 331 indictable English offences 203 are public wrongs and 128 private wrongs. In Arun Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98 , the Supreme Court held as under: It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. 8. The detaining authority while passing detention order should ensure that there is strict compliance of law, more particularly, when fundamental rights of the detenu are involved under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The detention order should satisfy not only how public order is affected, but also what are the strong grounds based on which the detenu needs to be preventively detained. The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is one of the most cherished and precious rights available to the citizens of this country. A citizen has fundamental right to live freely, move from one place to another, live with dignity and decency etc. Apart from that right to life has got many other facets and unless due procedure under law is followed, the citizen's right to life and personal liberty cannot be deprived. A citizen has fundamental right to live freely, move from one place to another, live with dignity and decency etc. Apart from that right to life has got many other facets and unless due procedure under law is followed, the citizen's right to life and personal liberty cannot be deprived. In the light of above discussion, this Court holds that the offences whereunder the detenu was booked do not have the potential of disturbing public order. 9. It may be difficult to lay down a clear-cut method as to under what circumstances the detention order has to be passed, since every case varies on its facts and circumstances. In the instant case, there is no discussion in the detention order that the detenu has violated any bail conditions. An accused has got every right to apply for bail. The grant of bail depends upon several circumstances and the Court while granting bail takes into consideration several factors, like past crime history, the nature of the crime, stage of investigation etc. Opportunity is given to the prosecution (State) to oppose the bail application. As seen from the record, in all the three crimes referred to above, bail was granted with certain conditions. When certain conditions are imposed, while granting bail, there is some check on the conduct and movement of the detenu. In the event of violation of such bail conditions, the prosecution has full opportunity to apply for cancellation of bail. Inspite of having such remedy under the provisions of Cr.P.C., the detention order can be passed only as a last resort and not in a routine manner. The detaining authority has to satisfy itself that all other legal avenues have been exhausted either of arrest, prosecution etc., under ordinary law and inspite of the same, if it has become difficult for the authority to control the criminal activities of the detenu, only in such case, the detention order needs to be passed. In a recent decision of this Court in Rapolu Mahalakshmi vs. State of Telangana, 2019 (2) ALD (Crl.) 950 (TS), it was held as under: 12. Every violation of criminal law does cause a rippled in the society. But the ripples can be calmed down by use of normal Criminal Justice System. In a recent decision of this Court in Rapolu Mahalakshmi vs. State of Telangana, 2019 (2) ALD (Crl.) 950 (TS), it was held as under: 12. Every violation of criminal law does cause a rippled in the society. But the ripples can be calmed down by use of normal Criminal Justice System. It is only when an offence strikes the society, like a tsunami, that as a weapon of the last resort, the detaining authority is justified in invoking the powers under preventive detention laws. 13. Therefore, while invoking the magical formula of preventive detention, the detaining authority is required to firstly consider whether the offences, allegedly committed by the detenu, can be dealt with within the normal course of Criminal Justice System or not? The detaining authority should also examine whether the release of the detenu can be prevented by opposing his bail applications or not? If bail were granted, whether an application for cancellation of bail can be filed or not? Whether his detention under judicial custody can be ensured or not? It is only after assessing these circumstances, and after being satisfied that the answer of all these issues is in the negative, that the detaining authority may be justified in passing the detention order. 14. It has repeatedly come to the notice of this Court that the investigating agencies, especially the police, instead of furnishing complete details about the offender to the Public Prosecutor, fail to do so. Therefore, the public prosecution is not armed with the complete criminal record of the offender. Hence, the Public Prosecutor is not in a position to vehemently oppose the bail application. Resultantly, many a times, the alleged offender is granted bail by the Courts. Even thereafter, the State does not move a petition for cancellation of bail. Instead, it lets the offender go scot free. Therefore, the State fails to perform its duty within the arena of Criminal Justice System. 15. In such a scenario, faced with a raising crime rate, the State turns to the use of preventive detention laws to tackle the menace of crime in the society. Therefore, even for petty cases, the offenders are being preventively detained by the State. Needless to say, such a use of preventive powers amounts to colourable exercise of power, which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 16. Therefore, even for petty cases, the offenders are being preventively detained by the State. Needless to say, such a use of preventive powers amounts to colourable exercise of power, which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 16. The entire political structure, which deals with democracy, the Constitution, and the rule of law, is based on the bedrock foundation of the faith of the people in the systems created by the law. It is, thus, faith of the people which needs to be strengthened by the State. Too frequent misuse of preventive laws would naturally undermine the faith of the people in the administrative system of the State. Instead of seeing the State as a protector, the State would be seen as a persecutor by the people. When personal liberty is invaded at the drop of a hat, the State ceases to be a democratic one. Rather, it transforms itself into a fascist regime. In such a scenario, misuse of preventive detention leads to oppression of the people. However, the constitutional mandate does not permit the State, that too a welfare State, to change its colour and transform itself into a Frankstein Monster. Therefore, even in the Constitutional Scheme, although Article 22 of the Constitution of India permits preventive detention, even then it requires that the power should be used as sparingly as possible and strictly in accordance with law. 10. In view of the foregoing reasons, the detention order is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 11. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order dated 19.11.2019 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the consequential confirmation order dated 29.11.2019 are, hereby, set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely Aftab Alam S/o Mahmuddin, at liberty forthwith, in case he is no longer detained in the criminal cases, which have been registered so far against him. 12. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.