Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 467 (KAR)

Kempaiah v. State Of Karnataka And Others

2020-02-17

H.T.NARENDRA PRASAD

body2020
JUDGMENT H.T. Narendra Prasad, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29.07.2019 passed by the second respondent vide Annexure-B whereby the Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal filed by the fourth respondent under Section 5-A of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short, the PTCL Act) and set aside the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. 2. The brief facts of the case is that the land bearing Sy. No. 89 measuring 4 acres situated at Juttanahalli Village, Kundana Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk was originally granted in favour of the petitioner under Darkhast Rules on 24.04.1962 with a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. The original grantee by violating the condition sold the land in favour of fourth respondent by a sale deed dated 02.03.1970. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. The original grantee filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2013. The Assistant Commissioner by order dated 26.04.2017 allowed the application and restored the land in favour of the original grantee. Being aggrieved by the same, the fourth respondent herein filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-A of the PTCL Act. The Deputy Commissioner, by order dated 29.07.2019 dismissed the appeal confirming the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Being aggrieved by the same, petitioner has filed this writ petition. 3. Sri Ananda, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the land was originally granted in favour of the petitioner under Darkhast Rules in the year 1962 with a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. The original grantee by violating the conditions of grant sold the land to the fourth respondent in the year 1970. The same is contrary to the provisions of Section 4(1) of the PTCL Act. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner had rightly allowed the application and resumed the land in favour of the petitioner. The Deputy Commissioner contrary to the provisions of the Act has passed the impugned order. Secondly, he contended that the fourth respondent herein was represented before the Assistant Commissioner. He has not taken any contention regarding delay in filing the application under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. For the first time he has taken the said contention before the Deputy Commissioner. Secondly, he contended that the fourth respondent herein was represented before the Assistant Commissioner. He has not taken any contention regarding delay in filing the application under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. For the first time he has taken the said contention before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner, without considering the contentions raised by the petitioner herein has allowed the appeal. The impugned order is contrary to the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act. Hence, he sought for allowing the writ petition. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent contended that the land was originally granted to the petitioner in the year 1962. He sold the land in favour of the fourth respondent in the year 1970. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. The petitioner filed an application for resumption of land under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act before the Assistant Commissioner in the year 2013, after a lapse of 34 years from the date the Act came into force. The application itself is not maintainable. In support of her contentions, she has relied on Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another . Secondly, she contended that the fourth respondent has filed objections before the Assistant Commissioner and specifically taken a contention that the application itself is not maintainable on the ground of delay. Hence, she sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Smt. Savitramma, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 contended that land was originally granted to the petitioner under Darkhast Rules in the year 1962 with a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. By violating the same, petitioner sold the land in favour of the fourth respondent herein in the year 1970. Since the original grantee violated the condition of grant and Section 4(1) of the PTCL Act the Assistant Commissioner has rightly allowed the application and resumed the land in favour of the original grantee. Since there is inordinate delay in filing the application under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act the Deputy Commissioner has rightly allowed the appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ papers. 7. Since there is inordinate delay in filing the application under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act the Deputy Commissioner has rightly allowed the appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ papers. 7. It is not in dispute that the land in question was originally granted in favour of the petitioner herein under Darkhast Rules in the year 1962 with a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years. The petitioner by violating the condition of grant sold the land in favour of the fourth respondent in the year 1970. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. The petitioner filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2013. There is an inordinate delay of 34 years in filing the application. The Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Ramalakshmi (supra) has held as hereinbelow: '8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523 , Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J. Sh. N. 4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly.' 8. In the above judgment the Honble Apex Court has opined that the application for resumption of the land under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act has to be filed within a reasonable time. In the case on hand, the application was filed after 34 years from the date the PTCL Act came into force and there is an unreasonable and inordinate delay in filing the application. In view of the law laid down by Honble Apex Court in the aforesaid case, the application itself is not maintainable. The Deputy Commissioner has rightly passed an order holding that there is an inordinate delay in filing the application. 9. The writ petition is devoid of merit. Accordingly, it is dismissed.