JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 18.06.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2589 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has quashed the order dated 23.05.2016 issued by the General Manager (Sales and Marketing), Central Coalfields Limited, Ranchi – Respondent No.2 whereby the Fuel Supply Agreement dated 30.04.2008 of the writ petitioner has been terminated forfeiting the Bank Guarantee deposited by the writ petitioner with a liberty granted to the writ petitioner to participate in the auction process of relevant category under the new coal distribution policy, if any. The Bank Guarantee submitted by the writ petitioner shall also be released by the respondent –CCL forthwith, if there is no other legal impediment. 2. The brief facts which require to be enumerated herein for better appreciation of the lis read hereunder as :- The writ petitioner had entered into an agreement with the respondent – Central Coalfields Limited on 30.04.2008 under the New Coal Distribution Policy, 2007 for supply of coal which was to be remained in force for a period of five years from the date of agreement. The said agreement was renewed again on 25/29.04.2013 on the same terms and conditions. A raid was conducted by the district administration in the plant of the writ petitioner on 15.02.2016 and in consequence thereto, the entire documents lying in the said plant were seized and the said plant was also seized. The district administration instituted an F.I.R. being Barun P.S. Case No.27/2016 against the writ petitioner for commission of alleged offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 161 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code based upon the report submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Aurangabad dated 15.02.2016 wherein it was reported that at the time of inspection the Accountant of the company namely, Rajani Kant Verma, Purchase Clerk Prashant Kumar Sinha, Sales Clerk Saryu Singh and Production Manager Moti Lal Pal were found present. In course of such inspection conducted in their presence, it was found that the coal tar plant was not functional by which it became clear that the coal tar were not produced though every month its production and sale was shown and maintained in the register. In course of such inspection conducted in their presence, it was found that the coal tar plant was not functional by which it became clear that the coal tar were not produced though every month its production and sale was shown and maintained in the register. It was further alleged that in the register of purchase it was entered that on 15.02.2016, 94.650 MT coal loaded on five trucks were shown as arrival, out of which, two trucks of coal had gone to Dehri, however, the coal from three trucks were found to be unloaded to the tune of 59.15 MT. It was further found on verification of stock register that the opening stock as on 15.02.2016 was 265.54 MT and 94.65 MT coal was the arrival of the day on 15.02.2016, meaning thereby, the total stock ought to have been 360.174 MT in the premises of the unit of the writ petitioner but it transpired that out of the aforesaid 360.174 MT, only 70 MT coal was available in the premises. It was indicative of some scam. One labour present there informed that the trucks were sent for weighment to Dehri and thereafter it was not known. It also transpired that the unit was getting coal every month and for the said purpose it was getting certificate on verification with regard to SSF and coal tar from the General Manager, District Industry Centre on the basis of such letter and was being sold illegally in the market. The fact about registration of the said F.I.R. was communicated by the district administration to the appellants-respondents-Central Coalfields Limited and in pursuance thereto, the authorities of the appellants-respondents had suspended the agreement dated 30.04.2008 of the writ petitioner firm. A show cause notice was issued on 03.03.2016 to the writ petitioner as to why the Fuel Supply Agreement dated 30.04.2008 be not terminated in exercise of power conferred under Clause 15.1.5 of the said agreement and has further been show caused as to why the security deposit and other amounts furnished by the writ petitioner by way of Bank Guarantee should not be forfeited and as to why not the firm of the writ petitioner should not be blacklisted. The writ petitioner filed reply on 11.03.2016 before the respondent authorities showing his inability to file effective reply in as much as the entire documents which were lying in the plant of the writ petitioner’s firm were seized by the police authority. It is the case of the writ petitioner that investigation in connection with Barun P.S. Case No. 27/2016 is still pending but the appellants-respondents, without there being any cogent evidence and without making any separate preliminary enquiry and only on the basis of the F.I.R., has issued show cause notice dated 03.03.2016, which according to the writ petitioner, is absolutely illegal. The further case of the writ petitioner before the writ court was that against the sealing of the writ petitioner’s unit, the writ petition was filed before Hon’ble Patna High Court being C.W.J.C. No. 10250 of 2016 for resumption of supply of coal and the Hon’ble Patna High Court vide order dated 24.05.2016 had passed an order for unsealing of the petitioners’ unit and in pursuance thereto, the district administration recalled its own order of sealing vide order dated 29.07.2016. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner assisted by Mr. Raunak Sahay, has submitted by defending the order passed by the learned Single Judge that as per the terms and conditions of the Fuel Supply Agreement, before taking any adverse decision about closure of the premises and even before issuance of show cause notice, a preliminary enquiry was required to be made by the authority of the Central Coalfields Limited but here, no such preliminary enquiry was ever conducted of the premises of the writ petitioner’s unit, rather only on the basis of the allegation leveled in the F.I.R., the show cause notice was issued, basis upon which and without considering the reply furnished by the writ petitioner, the Fuel Supply Agreement has been cancelled which cannot be said to be a justified action of the authority. It has been contended that it is not in dispute that the authority of the appellants is having no power to rescind or cancel or recall the Fuel Supply Agreement if any of the terms and conditions of the Fuel Supply Agreement is being flouted but before proceeding to take such action it was the duty of the appellants to conduct a preliminary enquiry for reaching to their subjective satisfaction but herein, without conducting any preliminary enquiry, basing upon the F.I.R., which is still under investigation stage, adverse action has been taken and considering this aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has quashed the adverse decision taken against the writ petitioner which cannot be said to be an unjustified decision. Further, it has been contended that the very order of sealing of the writ petitioner’s plant has been said to be illegal by the order passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 10250 of 2016, basis upon which the district administration has also recalled the order of sealing, therefore, the very basis of cancellation of the Fuel Supply Agreement which was on the basis of the order of sealing of the writ petitioner’s premises at the behest of district administration, since is not in existence after the order having been passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 10250 of 2016, hence the very cancellation of Fuel Supply Agreement in absence of any subjective satisfaction having not been reached by conducting a preliminary enquiry by the appellants-respondents, cannot be said to be justified. 4. Per contra, the case of the appellants-respondents before the writ court was that the instant dispute pertains to a non-statutory contract and as such, the same is not amenable to be adjudicated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the appellants-respondents, the forum for adjudication of the dispute is only civil court of competent jurisdiction since several facts are in dispute herein. The fact about conducting of inspection was brought on record which led the appellants-respondents to issue show cause notice in contemplation of violation of the terms and conditions of the Fuel Supply Agreement. According to the appellants-respondents, the forum for adjudication of the dispute is only civil court of competent jurisdiction since several facts are in dispute herein. The fact about conducting of inspection was brought on record which led the appellants-respondents to issue show cause notice in contemplation of violation of the terms and conditions of the Fuel Supply Agreement. The learned Single Judge, after appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, has come to definite finding holding action of the appellants-respondents unjustified and illegal and thereby while allowing the writ petition has passed order of quashing of the order dated 23.05.2016 with liberty to the writ petitioner to participate in the auction process of relevant category under the New Coal Distribution Policy, if any. The Bank Guarantee submitted by the writ petitioner shall also be released by the appellants-respondents forthwith, if there is no legal impediment. 4. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-CCL has submitted that even accepting the reason of quashing of the impugned order dated 23.05.2016 to be justified but according to him, it is settled position of law that on technicalities, no one can be allowed to take advantage of an order if the same has been passed on any technical lapses, rather, according to him, the legal course before the learned Single Judge was to remit the matter before the concerned authority for taking a decision after providing an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. He further submits that even as on date the matter, if remitted before the authority concerned, the writ petitioner would be at liberty to file detailed reply and in that circumstances the appellants-respondents would be able to verify the veracity of the allegation leveled against the writ petitioner in the F.I.R. being Barun P.S. Case No. 27/2016 from the electricity bill or production register or the sales tax invoices or other payable taxes etc. 5. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating their arguments, deems it fit and proper first to discuss about the Fuel Supply Agreement which has been brought on record, as under Annexure-1 to the memorandum of appeal, entered in between the writ petitioner and the authorities of appellants-respondents. It is evident from the agreement which was for the period of five years subject to its renewal. It is evident from the agreement which was for the period of five years subject to its renewal. Further, it would be evident that at the time of entering into the agreement, security deposit of fixed amount was required to be made. It further appears from the agreement as under Clause 4.1 under the caption “Quantity, Source and End Use” which stipulates that the quantity of coal agreed to be supplied by the seller and undertaken to be purchased by the purchaser, shall be 45,000 tonnes per year from the seller’s mines of the CCL. As under Clause 4.4 it has been stipulated about the total quantity of coal supplied pursuant to the agreement will be for use at the SSF plant of the purchaser located at Industrial Estate, Barun, P.O. – Barun, District Aurangabad with the further stipulation made therein “the purchaser shall not sell/divert and/or transfer the coal for any purpose whatsoever and the same shall be treated as material breach of agreement. In the event that the purchaser engages or plans to engage into any such resale or trade, the seller shall terminate this agreement forthwith without any liabilities or damages, whatsoever payable to the purchaser. It is expressly clarified that the seller shall reserve the right to verify including the right to inspect/call for any document from the purchaser and physically verify the end use of the coal and satisfy itself of its authenticity. The purchaser shall have the obligation to comply with the seller’s directions/extend full co-operation in carrying out such verification/inspection”. The aforesaid provision of clause 4.4. is being reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference :- “4.4 The total quantity of coal supplied pursuant to this Agreement is meant for use at the SSF Plant of the Purchaser located at Industrial Estate, Barun, P.O. – Barun, District Aurangabad as listed in Schedule-I. The Purchaser shall not sell/divert and/or transfer the Coal for any purpose whatsoever and the same shall be treated as material breach of Agreement. In the event that the Purchaser engages or plans to engage into any such resale or trade, the Seller shall terminate this Agreement forthwith without any liabilities or damages, whatsoever payable to the Purchaser. In the event that the Purchaser engages or plans to engage into any such resale or trade, the Seller shall terminate this Agreement forthwith without any liabilities or damages, whatsoever payable to the Purchaser. It is expressly clarified that the Seller shall reserve the right to verify including the right to inspect/call for any document from the Purchaser and physically verify the end use of the Coal and satisfy itself of its authenticity. The Purchaser shall have the obligation to comply with the seller’s directions/extend full co-operation in carrying out such verification/inspection.” It further contains a condition about settlement of dispute as under Clause 14 which reads hereunder as :- 14. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 14.1 In the event of any dispute, disagreement or difference arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its performance, existence, validity, termination and the rights and liabilities of the Parties to this Agreement (“Dispute”), the Parties shall in the first instance endeavor to amicably settle the same through negotiations carried out in good faith. 14.2 xxxx 14.3 xxxx” It is evident from the aforesaid provision that in case of any dispute, disagreement or difference arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its performance, existence, validity, termination and the rights and liabilities of the Parties to this Agreement, the Parties shall in the first instance endeavor to amicably settle the same through negotiations carried out in good faith. Clause 15 stipulates about the termination of agreement which is being reproduced hereunder :- “15. Clause 15 stipulates about the termination of agreement which is being reproduced hereunder :- “15. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT : 15.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 2, this Agreement may be terminated in the following event and in the manner specified hereunder: 15.1.1 In the even that either Party is rendered wholly or partially unable to perform its obligations under this Agreement (Affected Party) because of a Force Majeure Act, as described in Clause 16 below, and such inability to perform lasts for not less than a total of ninety (90) days in any continuous periods of one hundred eighty (180 ) days, and in the considered assessment of the other Party (Non-Affected Party) there is no reasonable likelihood of the Force Majeure Act coming to an end in the near future, such Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement, by giving at least ninety (90) days prior written notice to the Affected Party of the intention to so terminate this Agreement. In such event, the termination shall take effect on expiry of the notice period or ninety (90) days whichever is later, and the parties shall be absolved of all rights/obligations under this Agreement, save those that had already accrued as on the effective date of termination. 15.1.2 In the event that the Purchaser is prevented/disabled under law from using coal, for reasons beyond their control, owning to changes in applicable environmental and/or statutory norms, however brought into force, the purchaser shall have the right to terminate this Agreement, subject to a prior written notice to the seller of not less than thirty (30) days. 15.1.3 In the event of any material change in the coal distribution system of seller due to a Government directive/notification, at any time after the execution of this Agreement, the Seller may terminate this Agreement without any obligation/liability after providing the Purchaser with prior written notice to the Purchaser of not less than thirty (30) days. 15.1.4 In the event that the Level of Delivery (LD) falls below thirty percent (30%) or the Level of Lifting (LL) falls below thirty percent (30%), the Purchaser or the Seller as may be the case, shall have the right to terminate this Agreement, within sixty (60) days of the end of the relevant Year after providing the other Party with prior written notice of not less than thirty (3) days. 15.1.5 In the event that the Purchaser resells or diverts the Coal purchased pursuant to this Agreement, the Seller shall have the right to terminate this Agreement forthwith: 15.1.6 In the event of encashment of Security Deposit or the Financial Coverage or suspension of Coal supplies pursuant to Clause 13.1, the Seller shall have the right to terminate this Agreement by providing prior written notice of thirty (30) days provided the Purchaser has not replenished the Security Deposit/Financial Coverage within the aforesaid said notice period of thirty (30) days. 15.1.7 In the event that either party suffers insolvency, appointment of liquidator (provisional or final), appointment of receiver of any material assets, levy of any order of attachment of the material assets, or any order or injunction restraining the Party from dealing with or disposing of its assets and such order having been passed is not vacated within sixty (60) days, the other Party shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement. 15.1.8 In the event that any Party commits a breach of term or condition of this Agreement (Defaulting Party) not otherwise specified under this clause 15.1, the other Party (Non –Defaulting Party), shall have the right to terminate this Agreement after providing the Defaulting Party thirty(30)days prior notice and the breach has not been cured or rectified to the satisfaction of the Non-Defaulting Party within the said period of thirty (30) days. 15.2 Accrued rights to survive termination Termination of this Agreement shall be without prejudice to the accrued rights and obligations of either Party as at immediately prior to the termination.” The condition as referred above about termination of agreement contains one condition that in case the purchaser resells or diverts the coal purchases pursuant to the agreement, the seller shall have the right to terminate the agreement forthwith. 6. It requires to refer herein the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India(P) Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India and Others reported in (2007) 2 SCC 640 wherein the issue fell for consideration pertaining to control black marketing and misutilization of coal. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with such situation, has laid down a proposition as under para 189 thereof that the inspection should be carried out by the officers appointed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company concerned within whose jurisdiction the unit is situated. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with such situation, has laid down a proposition as under para 189 thereof that the inspection should be carried out by the officers appointed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company concerned within whose jurisdiction the unit is situated. 7. It also requires to refer herein the other judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Coal India Limited and Others Vs. Alok Fuels Private Limited reported in (2010) 10 SCC 157 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court after considering the judgment rendered in the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India(P) Ltd. (Supra) and other judgments rendered in the case of Sterling Computers Ltd. Vs. M/s. M & N Publications Ltd. reported in (1993) 1 SCC 445 and in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi Vs. State of U.P. reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 , after considering the fact about the transfer of resale or diversion of coal, in paragraph 27 has laid down that the BCCL will also have the right to suspend supplies of coal to the respondents where it has doubts that the respondents may misutilise the allotted coal and divert or sell the same in the open market because, as would be clear from Clause 4.4 of FSA and the new Coal Distribution Policy decision dated 18.10.2007, the very object of FSA as well as the policy of the Government is to allot coal to the respondents for utilization in their plants and not for any other purpose. Therefore, if the FIR lodged by CBI, which is a premier investigation agency of the Central Government, created serious doubts that the allotted coal may be diverted or sold in the open market instead of being utilized in the plants of the respondents, BCCL would be within its rights to suspend the supplies of coal to the respondents till the doubts are cleared in appropriate proceedings. 8. The undisputed facts herein are that in pursuance to the Fuel Supply Agreement, the writ petitioner was being supplied coal but in course of inspection having been conducted by the district administration it was found about diversion or resale of coal which led the district administration to institute an F.I.R. The further admitted fact is that still the investigation in the said police case is going on. It is further admitted that the district administration sealed the premises against which writ petition being C.W.J.C. 10250 of 2016 was filed before the Hon’ble Patna High Court whereby the order of sealing has been quashed and in consequence thereto, the plant has been unsealed. The fact about alleged diversion of coal was reported to the appellant-CCL, basis upon which show cause notice was issued, the petitioner expressed its inability to furnish proper reply in absence of the documents on account of seizure of the same. The authorities of the appellants-CCL has cancelled the Fuel Supply Agreement as also forfeited the Bank Guarantee which was in support of the security deposit and in terms of Fuel Supply Agreement. 9. This Court deems it fit and proper first to deal with the first objection of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants about maintainability of the writ petition as because, according to the learned counsel, in pursuance to the condition as contained under Clause 14 to the Fuel Supply Agreement, there is provision of dispute redressal mechanism. It is not in dispute that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the basic structure and as such, it cannot be said that writ court has got no power to exercise under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, there is self-imposed restriction upon the High Court in exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of availability of alternative remedy or dispute redressal mechanism in the contractual matters. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court time and again. One of the leading judgment in this regard is the judgment rendered in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has carved out exception in entertaining the writ petition if in a case order has been challenged having been passed by an authority having no jurisdiction or the order is in violation of any statutory provision or the order is infringing any fundamental or legal vested right of the citizen. It is also equally settled that where alternative remedy for dispute redressal mechanism is available, the writ court should be loath in exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. It is also equally settled that where alternative remedy for dispute redressal mechanism is available, the writ court should be loath in exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. This Court has examined the argument advanced in this regard by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants by going through the conditions stipulated in the Fuel Supply Agreement under Clause 14 which contains provision about settlement of dispute, as referred above. It would be evident from the provision of the said Clause that in case of any dispute, disagreement or difference arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its performance, existence, validity, termination and the rights and liabilities of the Parties to this Agreement, the Parties shall in the first instance endeavor to amicably settle the same through negotiations carried out in good faith. This condition goes to suggest that it is incumbent upon the authorities to first try to amicably settle the dispute through negotiations carried out in good faith, meaning thereby, either the appellants-respondents or the writ petitioner being party to the bilateral contract, it is incumbent upon them to first resort to the dispute redressal mechanism as per the provision as contemplated under Clause 14 to the Fuel Supply Agreement. Here, admitted case is that the appellants-respondents had not endeavoured to go for settlement of dispute as per the dispute redressal mechanism as provided under Clause 14, being one of the signatory of the agreement, rather the appellants-respondents have terminated the agreement and once the agreement has been terminated, now it cannot be argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the order of termination ought to have been questioned by the writ petitioner by taking aid of Clause 14 of the Fuel Supply Agreement. 11. The other reason which requires to be demonstrated herein is that admittedly as per the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court it was incumbent upon the appellants-respondents, before taking any penal action by cancelling the agreement, the inspection ought to have been conducted by the officers appointed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company within whose jurisdiction the unit is located, as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India(P) Ltd. (Supra) under paragraph 189, as quoted above. The admitted fact herein is that no such inspection has ever been conducted by the appellants-respondents. 12. The question is that when the fact is going to the question of jurisdiction, certainly if the writ petition would be filed on that ground, the writ petition will be held maintainable as under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (Supra). It also requires to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Karnataka State Forest Industries Corporation Vs. Indian Rocks reported in (2009) 1 SCC 150 wherein at paragraph 38 it has been held which reads hereunder as :- “38. Although ordinarily a superior court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction would not enforce the terms of a contract qua contract, it is trite that when an action of the State is arbitrary or discriminatory and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, a writ petition would be maintainable.” 13. It cannot be disputed that the very issuance of show cause notice is based upon the inspection report of the district administration and, therefore, the jurisdictional issue is required to be seen by this Court. When a show cause notice has not been issued on the basis of inspection conducted by the appellants-respondents, it cannot be said to be well within the jurisdiction of the concerned authority, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. (Supra), and it is only then a show cause notice would be said to be within jurisdiction but since herein the show cause notice is based upon the inspection conducted and report submitted by the district administration, therefore, the show cause notice itself would be said to be not in accordance with law and if a show cause notice is not in accordance with law, certainly the same shall be said to be non-sustainable in the eye of law. 14. 14. It is equally settled that the writ court should not show any interference with the show cause but when the very genesis of show cause is under question, the writ court can well exercise its power by interfering with the show cause by holding it without jurisdiction, as has been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vrs. Kunisetty Satyanarayan reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court by taking reference of the judgment rendered in the case of Executive Engineer Bihar Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh, reported in (1996) 1 SCC 327 , Special Director vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ulagappa vs. Divisional Commr., Mysore reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 and Ulagappa Vs. Divisional Commr. Mysore reported in (2001)10 SCC 639 , State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma reported in (1987) 2 SCC 179 has been pleased to hold that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show cause notice. 15. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against mere show cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceeding and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show cause or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed that the said party can be said to have any grievance. In paragraph 15 it has been held that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such a discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show cause notice or charge-sheet. 16. In paragraph 15 it has been held that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such a discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show cause notice or charge-sheet. 16. It is thus evident that a writ Court should not ordinarily interfere in the show cause notice at that stage rather it will be said to be premature case and allegations, if levelled against one or the other in the show cause notice, do not give rise to the cause of action because it does not amount to adverse order, which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. 17. This Court, on the basis of these facts, is of the view that argument which has been advanced by learned counsel appearing for the appellants about non-maintainability of the writ petition is not acceptable to this Court, reason for such finding is that the show cause is not based upon inspection/enquiry conducted by the authorities of the appellants-CCL. 18. So far as the legality and propriety of the decision of the authority in cancelling the Fuel Supply Agreement is concerned, the learned Single Judge has shown interference by quashing it which cannot be said to suffer from infirmity due to the following reasons :- (i) Since we have already concluded by giving a finding about the question of jurisdiction on show cause since was based not upon the inspection/enquiry conducted by the respondent-CCL but was based upon the inspection of the district administration and as such the very basis of the show cause notice is itself lacking the jurisdiction, and it is settled that if the genesis is bad, the subsequent decision or its off suit will be nullity in the eye of law. Here, in the instant case also, applying the same principle, the very basis of show cause itself in the lack of jurisdiction in absence of any inspection having been conducted by the appellants-respondents-CCL and when it lacks jurisdiction, any decision based upon such show cause will also be nullity in the eye of law. Here, in the instant case also, applying the same principle, the very basis of show cause itself in the lack of jurisdiction in absence of any inspection having been conducted by the appellants-respondents-CCL and when it lacks jurisdiction, any decision based upon such show cause will also be nullity in the eye of law. (ii) Still the investigation in the said police case is going on, meaning thereby, as yet even accepting that the inspection of district administration is not conclusive, even by taking this, learned Single Judge has quashed the impugned order which cannot be said to be unjustified. (iii) As would appear from the impugned order that the force of the Fuel Supply Agreement has already expired and as such, the learned Single Judge, by taking this into consideration, has issued no direction for renewal of the same. In view of implementation of New Coal Distribution Policy, if such consideration has been made by the learned Single Judge, even the impugned order dated 23.05.2016 would be allowed to be restored, no purpose would be served since the period of agreement itself has expired in the meanwhile. 19. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge, while passing the order, which has been impugned in this memo of appeal, has not committed any error. 20. So far as the contention of Mr. A.K.Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellants that on technicalities no positive relief can be granted to anyone, according to him, merely on account of the fact that inspection could not have been conducted by the district administration, basis upon which the impugned order has been quashed, that cannot be said to be proper course since according to him still there is scope of inspection by going through the different documents i.e., electricity bill, the different invoices in lieu of payment of taxes etc. and if the liberty would be granted to the appellants, fresh show cause notice would be issued and the fact about the resale or diversion of the coal can be ascertained by examining about the fact as to whether the plant was in operation or not. and if the liberty would be granted to the appellants, fresh show cause notice would be issued and the fact about the resale or diversion of the coal can be ascertained by examining about the fact as to whether the plant was in operation or not. He further submits that if the plant would be found to be operative, whatever allegation is available in the inspection report of the district administration, would stand vanished and the operation of plant would only be ascertained from the electricity bill since according to him, if the plant would be in operation, electricity would be consumed and in lieu thereof the electricity bill would be paid and likewise, register pertaining to labour payment or other documents under the Factory Acts will be the justified documents to assess these facts. 21. While on the other hand, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner has submitted that even accepting what has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants to be true, even then no purpose would be served since in the meanwhile the Fuel Supply Agreement has already lost its force and New Distribution Policy has come into being. According to him, even accepting that such opportunity would be granted to the appellants-CCL, then also no fruitful purpose would be served since after introduction of New Distribution Policy the case of the writ petitioner would be considered on the basis of the new policy. 22. In reply, Mr. A.K.Das submits that the aforesaid contention is not fit to be accepted because if the writ petitioner has been found to be indulged in the resale or diversion of coal, which is the paramount consideration of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary and Others reported in (2014) 9 SCC 516 which pertains to illegal settlement of coal blocks and its diversion and if it would be allowed to be found by the appellants-CCL about the conduct of the writ petitioner and if it is found that writ petitioner was involved in such misdeed, certainly he cannot be allowed to participate in the New Distribution Policy. 23. Having heard the parties and considering the aforesaid arguments, this Court, after taking into paramount consideration of the judgment rendered in the case of Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. 23. Having heard the parties and considering the aforesaid arguments, this Court, after taking into paramount consideration of the judgment rendered in the case of Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary and Others (Supra) wherein the issue fell for consideration about the illegal settlement of coal blocks and its diversion and on the basis of the factual aspect as has been gathered by us as reflected hereinabove, the allegation levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner is about the diversion of the coal blocks and as such the argument which has been advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that on technicalities no positive relief can be granted to anyone since according to him merely on account of the fact that inspection could not have been conducted by the district administration, basis upon which the impugned order has been passed, that cannot be said to be proper course since according to him still there is scope of inspection by going through the different documents, documents i.e., electricity bill, the different invoices in lieu of payment of taxes etc. and as such, submission has been made that if the liberty would be granted to the appellants, fresh show cause notice would be issued and the truth can be surfaced about the resale or diversion of the coal by examining about the fact as to whether the plant was in operation or not. His further contention is that if the plant would be found to be operative, whatever allegation is available in the inspection report of the district administration, would stand vanished and the operation of plant would only be ascertained from the electricity bill since according to him, if the plant would be in operation, electricity would be consumed and in lieu thereof the electricity bill would be paid and likewise, register pertaining to labour payment or other documents under the Factory Acts will be the justified documents to assess these facts. The aforesaid contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants to the effect that on technicalities no one can be allowed to take advantage, the same issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. The aforesaid contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants to the effect that on technicalities no one can be allowed to take advantage, the same issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 wherein while discussing the aforesaid issue as to whether on technicalities anyone can be allowed to take advantage, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down that if the decision of the administrative authority is being quashed on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice, the proper course is to remit the matter before the authority concerned for taking decision afresh, but in this particular case, i.e., the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra (Supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the factual aspect involved in the said case, as would be evident from Para-21 thereof, since the matter pertains to payment of retiral dues and since the litigation has already continued for a period of 21 years, therefore, considering the delay of 21 years the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased not to remit the matter before the authority. 24. We have scrutinized the factual aspect of this case on the basis of the facts involved in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra (Supra) wherefrom it is evident that the F.I.R. has been instituted in the year 2016 about diversion of the coal blocks and as such, according to our considered view, there is no considerable lapse of the period in comparison to the period available in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra (Supra), more particularly, keeping the fact into consideration about the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary and Others (Supra) as also considering the fact that large scale coal blocks have been diverted, therefore, this Court is not unhesitant in accepting the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants to provide an opportunity to take a decision afresh after following the principle of natural justice. 25. In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the matter is required to be remitted before the competent authority. 26. 25. In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the matter is required to be remitted before the competent authority. 26. Accordingly, the matter is remitted before the competent authority to take a fresh decision after issuing show cause containing therein the content of allegation to be issued to the respondent/writ petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The respondent/writ petitioner, in turn, is directed to furnish due reply within a further period of three months. The appellants/respondents are directed to take decision by passing an speaking order within a further period of eight weeks. 27. With these observations and directions, the instant appeal is disposed of. 28. Consequently, I.A. No. 11318 of 2018 filed for stay of the operation/implementation/execution of the impugned order dated 18.06.2018 stands disposed of. Ravi Ranjan, J. - I agree.