Research › Search › Judgment

Telangana High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 475 (TS)

Dusa Ramulu v. State Of AP Rep By Its PP Hyd.

2020-06-12

K.LAKSHMAN

body2020
JUDGMENT : Assailing the judgment dt.30-06-2006 in C.C.No.33 of 2001 passed by the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases-cum-IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the appellant filed the present Criminal Appeal. 2. Vide aforesaid judgment, the Trial Court convicted the appellant/accused officer for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) punishable under Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the Act, 1988’). The Trial Court directed that the appellant/accused officer is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year for the charge under Section 7 of the Act, 1988 punishable under Section 13 (2) of the Act, 1988 and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for one month. The Trial Court further sentenced the appellant/accused officer to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of one year for the charge under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act punishable under Section 13 (2) of the Act, 1988 and to pay a fine of Rs.200/-, in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for one month. It is further directed by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment that both the sentences of imprisonment of the appellant/accused officer shall run concurrently. 3. The factual matrix of the present case is as follows: The appellant/accused officer was Additional Assistant Engineer (Section Officer), A.P. Transco, Abids Section, Nampally, Hyderabad, at the relevant point of time. The defacto-complainant – Sri Azam Ali Khan, P.W.1, resident of Nampally, Hyderabad and running motor service works in the name and style of M/s.Bright Servicing Point at Mulgies bearing H.No.5-5-213/214, opposite Dargah Shah-Khamoosh, Nampally, Hyderabad. According to him, behind his shop, there is one room. He wanted electricity domestic service connection to the above said room. Therefore, 20 days back to Ex.P-1 complaint, he has submitted an application along with relevant copies of documents including lease agreement of the property etc. to the appellant/accused officer personally. The appellant/accused officer informed him that he will visit the site after some days. After one week back to Ex.P-1 complaint, the appellant/accused officer visited the site for verification and inspection. to the appellant/accused officer personally. The appellant/accused officer informed him that he will visit the site after some days. After one week back to Ex.P-1 complaint, the appellant/accused officer visited the site for verification and inspection. At that time, the appellant/accused officer asked P.W.1 to pay total sum of Rs.2,500/- in all for domestic connection i.e. Rs.1000/- for development charges, Rs.100/- for security deposit, Rs.25/- for application fee, in all, Rs.1125/- and balance Rs.1375/- towards bribe to him for getting sanction orders of the service connection immediately. The appellant/accused officer also informed P.W.1 that he himself will take demand draft for development charges etc. from the total amount of Rs.2500/-. Then P.W.1 was informed the appellant/accused officer that he is not in a position to pay the said large amount and then the appellant/accused officer requested P.W.1 to meet him after one week. On 07-04-1999, at about 11.45 am, when P.W.1 went to the office of the appellant/accused officer, he asked P.W.1 whether he brought the said amount of Rs.2,500/- as demanded by him. P.W.1 informed the appellant/accused officer that he does not have such huge amount with him and requested him to reduce the said amount, but the appellant/accused officer did not reduce the said amount and demanded P.W.1 to pay the said amount of Rs.2500/- to him in his office. On 07-04-1999, after noon, the appellant/accused officer also informed P.W.1 that he will see that domestic service connection will not be sanctioned if P.W.1 does not pay the total amount of Rs.2500/- as asked by him. P.W.1 was not interested to pay the said amount towards illegal gratification to the appellant/accused officer and therefore, he has approached the A.C.B. officials by way of lodging Ex.P-1 complaint dt.07-04-1999. On 08-04-1999, on receipt of the said complaint, P.W.6, D.S.P-Trap Laying Officer, A.C.B., registered a crime by way of issuing Ex.P-16 FIR. Thereafter, P.W.6, after following the procedure including the preparation of pre-trap and post-trap proceedings, laid trap on 08-04-1999 against the appellant/accused officer. 4. After completion of investigation, the A.C.B. officials laid a charge sheet against the appellant-accused officer and the same was taken on file vide C.C.No.33 of 2001 by the Trial Court for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act. 5. The Trial Court has framed the charges against the appellant/accused officer for the above said offences. 5. The Trial Court has framed the charges against the appellant/accused officer for the above said offences. The appellant/accused officer denied the said charges and prayed for trial. Accordingly, the Trial Court proceeded with the trial. 6. During the course of trial, the prosecution has examined as many as eight witnesses i.e. P.Ws.1 to 8 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-16 documents. M.Os.1 to 8 were exhibited. Exs.X-1 to X-6 were also marked. The appellant/accused officer has examined D.W.1 and he has not filed any documents. 7. The Trial Court, on consideration of both the oral and documentary evidence, convicted the appellant/accused officer and imposed the sentence in the manner stated above. Hence, the Criminal Appeal. 8. Heard Sri H.Prahlada Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant/accused officer and Sri T.L.Nayan Kumar, learned Additional Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor, A.C.B., Telangana, Hyderabad. 9. Impugning the judgment, learned counsel for the appellant would contend that there was no official favour that was pending with the appellant/accused officer at the relevant point of time. The appellant/accused officer is not concerned with receipt of any cash or sanction of any connection as alleged by the prosecution. According to him, the appellant/accused officer was Additional Assistant Engineer (Section Officer) and his role is very limited in the entire process. He is not having any documents even to show that he has applied for the domestic connection in respect of the premises. 10. He would further contend that P.W.1 sought domestic connection illegally and the appellant/accused officer did not accept the said illegal request of P.W.1 and therefore, P.W.1 bore grudge against the appellant/accused officer and implicated the appellant/accused officer in a false case with the help of A.C.B. officials. 11. He would further contend that P.W.6, without following due procedure laid down under the law, more particularly, A.C.B. manual, and without conducting discrete enquiries, laid the trap. The prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are sine qua non and twin requirements to record conviction under the Act. The Trial Court without appreciating the contention of the appellant/accused officer that the appellant/accused officer has received the said amount of Rs.2,500/- from P.W.1 towards cost of connection including payment of development charges, connection fees and application fees etc. and it is not towards illegal gratification. 12. The Trial Court without appreciating the contention of the appellant/accused officer that the appellant/accused officer has received the said amount of Rs.2,500/- from P.W.1 towards cost of connection including payment of development charges, connection fees and application fees etc. and it is not towards illegal gratification. 12. According to him, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the appellant/accused officer that P.W.1 is not a bona fide witness and having recorded the said finding, the Trial Court convicted the appellant/accused officer and imposed the sentence in the manner stated above. He would further contend that there is no direct witness examined by the prosecution and in the absence of the same, recording of conviction against the appellant/accused officer is not sustainable. According to him, the Trial Court failed to consider that there are contradictions which are serious in nature and P.Ws.2 and 3 turned hostile and without considering the same, the Trial court erroneously recorded the conviction. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer would further contend that the accused officer was implicated in a false case by P.W.1 due to the animosity and accused officer at present is aged 74 years, suffering with various old age ailments. With the said contentions, he prayed to set aside the impugned judgment and acquit the appellant/accused officer. 13. On the other hand, the learned Additional Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for A.C.B. would contend that the prosecution has proved the trap, tainted currency notes which are recovered from the possession of the appellant/accused officer. The Trial Court on the analysis of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved the demand and guilt of the appellant/accused officer beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Court, having held that the prosecution has proved the demand beyond reasonable doubt, rightly drawn presumption under Section 20 of the Act, 1988. 14. He would further contend that the Trial Court has convicted the appellant/accused officer by giving specific reasons with regard to the pendency of official favour with the appellant/accused officer, trap, recovery of tainted currency notes. Accordingly imposed the sentence in the manner stated above. According to him, there is no error in the impugned judgment that warrants interference by this Court in the Criminal Appeal. With the said submissions, he prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Appeal. 15. Accordingly imposed the sentence in the manner stated above. According to him, there is no error in the impugned judgment that warrants interference by this Court in the Criminal Appeal. With the said submissions, he prayed for dismissal of the Criminal Appeal. 15. In view of the above said rival submissions, the points for consideration in the present appeal are; (a) Whether the prosecution could prove the guilt of the accused-officer for the offences under Sections 7, and 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1998? (b) Whether the impugned judgment is sustainable both under law and on facts? POINTS 1 AND 2:- 16. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer would contend that there was no official favour that was pending with the appellant-accused officer at the relevant point of time and P.W.1 due to animosity implicated him in a false case. In support of is contention, learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer referred depositions of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.5, P.W.6 and D.W.1 and also referred Exs.P-1, P-2, P-3, P-7, P-9 and Exs.X-1 to X-8. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the appellant-accused officer was in a position to do official favour to P.W.1 and to do the said official favour only, appellant-accused officer demanded and accepted the said amount of Rs.2,500/- from P.W.1. 17. As per Ex.P-1, complaint, P.W.1 was running motor servicing centre in the name and style of Bright Servicing point at house bearing No.5-5-213/214, Nampally, Hyderabad, since three years. Behind the said shops, there is one room and P.W.1 wanted electricity domestic service connection for the said room. According to P.W.1, he has approached the appellant-accused officer who demanded an amount of Rs.2,500/- in all for domestic connection i.e. Rs.1,000/- for development charges, Rs.100/- towards security deposit, Rs.25/- towards application fee and in all Rs.1125/-. The balance amount of Rs.1375/- was towards bribe. In Ex.P-1, complaint, P.W.1 further stated that the appellant-accused officer will pay the development charges etc. through demand drafts etc. Appellant-accused officer requested P.W.1 to come after one week. Accordingly, on 07-04- 1999, P.W.1 met appellant-accused officer at his office who in-turn, enquired about the bribe amount with P.W.1. On such enquiry, P.W.1 requested the appellant-accused officer to reduce the said amount for which the appellant-accused officer declined to reduce the said amount. through demand drafts etc. Appellant-accused officer requested P.W.1 to come after one week. Accordingly, on 07-04- 1999, P.W.1 met appellant-accused officer at his office who in-turn, enquired about the bribe amount with P.W.1. On such enquiry, P.W.1 requested the appellant-accused officer to reduce the said amount for which the appellant-accused officer declined to reduce the said amount. On the other hand, the appellant-accused officer requested P.W.1 to pay the said amount on the next day i.e. 08-04-1999. 18. From the contents of Ex.P-1, complaint, it is clear that P.W.1 approached the appellant-accused officer for providing domestic connection for the room behind the mulgis/shops in which, P.W.1 was running service centre. For obtaining the said connection, P.W.1 has to pay an amount of Rs.1125/- through demand drafts/challans. Appellant-accused officer demanded an amount of Rs.2,500/- i.e. Rs.1375/- more than the above said amount of Rs.1125/-. It is relevant to note that P.W.1 has agreed to pay the said amount of Rs.1125/- to the appellant-accused officer and requested him to reduce from the balance amount of Rs.1375/-. There was no resistance from P.W.1 to take the above said amount of Rs.1125/- in cash to the appellant-accused officer towards payment of development charges, security deposit and application fee etc. through demand drafts/challans. It is also relevant to note that P.W.1 deposed almost in terms of Ex.P-1 complaint. P.W.1 deposed that the appellant-accused officer took him to the premises on his scooter and after inspection of premises only, the appellant-accused officer has demanded the said amount of Rs.2,500/- from P.W.1 towards providing electricity connection including development charges, security deposit, application fee etc. 19. Ex.P-2 is the application submitted by P.W.1 for the purpose of obtaining domestic electricity connection of the said room. It is also not in dispute that P.W.1 has to submit that some documents to show that he is in occupation of the said premises to which he is seeking electricity connection. In the present case, P.W.1 claimed possessory rights under Ex.P-7, agreement (lease agreement). As per Ex.P-7, lease agreement, two mulgis were shown as leased premises with premises bearing No.5-5-213 & 5-5-214 (compromising of two shops) It is also specifically mentioned in Ex.P-7 that the said two shops have been agreed to let out the said two shops on a monthly rent of Rs.800/- each. Thus, there is no mention of room behind the said shops mentioned in Ex.P-7, lease deed. Thus, there is no mention of room behind the said shops mentioned in Ex.P-7, lease deed. P.W.1 did not produce any document other than Ex.P-7 to show that he has obtained the said room behind the said two shops/mulgis on lease. But however, in Ex.P-1, complaint, he has mentioned that he wanted domestic electricity connection to the room behind his shop and therefore, approached the appellant-accused officer. 20. P.W.1 in his deposition deposed that there was a room adjoining to the above said two shops and there is a different entrance for the said room. It is relevant to note that P.W.1 did not mention about the said facts in Ex.P-1 complaint. During cross examination, P.W.1 categorically admitted that the rear room which he intended to take domestic service connection was already in occupation of some other tenant and it had supplied from his shop and therefore P.W.1 thought of getting a domestic connection to it. He has further admitted that there was already power supply to his service point situated in two mulgis. He has further admitted that he has not mentioned about the said tenant in Ex.P-1 complaint, he was not intending to take the rear room on rent, he had necessity to obtain domestic connection for the rear room service since he has to pay consumption charges on commercial basis as there was no separate connection for the said rear room. He has further admitted that he has no right over the rear room even as per Ex.P-7, lease deed, and that it is mentioned about residential portion of both mulgis and the room situated on the rear side, though it is struck off, he did not agree for striking it out. 21. It is relevant to note that as discussed supra, as per Ex.P-7, lease deed, P.W.1 has obtained only two mulgis/shops on lease and agreed to pay an amount of Rs.800/- for mulgi towards rent. Thus, admittedly P.W.1 is not having right over the rear room. Prosecution failed to file any other document and did not examine the owner of the premises to show that P.W.1 was tenant of the said room. Therefore, the very contents of Ex.P-1, complaint, and deposition of P.W.1 would disclose that P.W.1 is not having any possessory rights over the said room either by way of lease or any other means. Prosecution failed to file any other document and did not examine the owner of the premises to show that P.W.1 was tenant of the said room. Therefore, the very contents of Ex.P-1, complaint, and deposition of P.W.1 would disclose that P.W.1 is not having any possessory rights over the said room either by way of lease or any other means. It is also relevant to note that P.W.1 has agreed to pay the cash to the appellant-accused officer for providing electricity connection and there was no résistance from P.W.1. The dispute is only with regard to the balance amount of Rs.1375/-. 22. P.W.1 has admitted during cross examination that there is commercial connection to shop/mulgi No.5-5-214 with connection No.K2-3288. He has further admitted that in Ex.P-1, complaint, he has not mentioned that there is a separate entrance to the rear side room of the said mulgis and he was intending to take domestic service connection to the rear side room on his name. He had no intention of perfecting any right or title over the right side room by getting the domestic connection in his name. It is also relevant to note that though Ex.P-7 is claimed as lease agreement, it is titled as agreement dt.01-11-1995 and it is also mentioned in Ex.P-7 about obtaining of Rs.70,000/- as hand loan by the owner of the said premises i.e. Mohd. Nawaz Moosa and he has agreed about obtaining of the said hand loan and keeping original document of said premises with P.W.1 and also agreed that he shall not take the monthly rent from 2nd party. It is also mentioned in Ex.P-7 that P.W.1 shall pay the rent on the said owner returning the said hand loan of Rs.70,000/- to P.W.1. Thus, the very Ex.P-7 agreement itself is not in accordance with law. 23. P.W.1 further admitted during cross examination under Ex.P-1 application, he sought connection to premises bearing No.5-5-213 & 214 and he did not show the rear side room in Ex.P-2 application for providing domestic connection. Thus, from the above said depositions and contents of Ex.P-1, it can be safely concluded that P.W.1 is not having any right or title over the said room said to have been attached to the above said two mulgis/shops obtained by P.W.1 on lease. In fact, the very existence of room including its location etc. Thus, from the above said depositions and contents of Ex.P-1, it can be safely concluded that P.W.1 is not having any right or title over the said room said to have been attached to the above said two mulgis/shops obtained by P.W.1 on lease. In fact, the very existence of room including its location etc. are also doubtful since there are serious contradictions in the deposition of P.W.1 and contents of Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-7. In Ex.P-1, P.W.1 claims that the said room is behind his shops/mulgis and in the deposition, P.W.1 deposed that the said room is adjoining the shops/mulgis and there is a separate entrance. The said contradictions are serious in nature. There is no room mentioned in Ex.P-7, agreement, at all. Admittedly, there are service connection to the said two mulgis/shops. Therefore, the question of P.W.1 approaching the appellant-accused officer for providing service connection to the said room by way of submission of Ex.P-1 application does not arise. Therefore, P.W.1 is not a trust-worthy witness and his evidence is not reliable. It is relevant to note that it is the prosecutor’s duty to prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence to prove its innocence, which itself is a circumstance which cannot be termed to be suspicious in nature as held by Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh, AIR 2002 S.C. 620 . P.W.1 himself set the law into motion. It is the defence of the appellant-accused officer that P.W.1 insisted him to provide domestic connection to the said shop bearing 5-5-213 so as to avoid payment of electricity at commercial rates by P.W.1 for which appellant-accused officer refused to do so and therefore P.W.1 bore grudge against the appellant-accused officer. The above stated facts would reveal that there are strained relation between the P.W.1 and appellant-accused officer. 24. P.W.3, Assistant Divisional Engineer, Distribution, explained about the procedure to be following for providing electricity service connection to a consumer. According to him, the person seeking connection has to provide some documents either ownership or rental agreement, challan for payment of fee, tax payment receipt etc. along with the application itself. Whereas in the present case, though P.W.1 is claiming that he has applied for domestic service connection to the said room and he has not filed any document to show that he is having right either ownership or leasehold on the said room. 25. along with the application itself. Whereas in the present case, though P.W.1 is claiming that he has applied for domestic service connection to the said room and he has not filed any document to show that he is having right either ownership or leasehold on the said room. 25. P.W.3, further admitted that once there exists a commercial connection in a particular premises, no domestic connection would be given, by the date of Ex.P-2 - application i.e., 26-03-1999, there was already a commercial connection to the door No.5-5-214. If the door numbers are separate, new commercial connection can be given to the other door number. In Ex.P2 - application, P.W.1 mentioned door number as 5-5-213/214 but he did not specifically mention door numbers to which domestic service connection is required. He has further admitted that during 1999, there was oral instructions by the superior officers in view of the Government policy for drive to collect electricity consumption charges so as to increase the revenue. At the relevant point of time and at the time of lodging of Ex.P-1, complaint, the said drive was in vogue. 26. D.W.1, Additional Assistant Engineer, also deposed about the procedure for providing commercial and residential connections and payment of fee etc. According to him, Rs.2,000/- has to be paid towards development charges for providing commercial single phase connection, Rs.200/- towards deposit and Rs.500/- towards application fee. He has admitted that the said amount has to be paid to the ERO office not to the staff. Even then, P.W.1 has agreed to pay the amount in cash. As deposed by P.W.5, there was practice of receipt of cash from the consumers during a special drive for the purpose of collection of revenue and increase of the same. Thus, the role of the appellant-accused officer in the entire process of providing service connection to any consumer is very limited. He was Additional Assistant Engineer at the relevant point of time. 27. The Trial Court on the critical analysis of entire evidence gave a finding that by taking domestic service connection, P.W.1 intended to use it for commercial purpose and thus he is not a bonafide applicant. The Trial Court further held that as per Exs.P-2 to P-7 seized from the appellant-accused officer, no application for commercial connection was given by P.W.1 to the appellant-accused officer. The Trial Court further held that as per Exs.P-2 to P-7 seized from the appellant-accused officer, no application for commercial connection was given by P.W.1 to the appellant-accused officer. The evidence of D.W.1 and Exs.X-1 to X-8 disclose that there was certain service connections in the premises bearing No.5-5-213/214. However, though there is no other witness examined by prosecution to show that official favour was pending with the appellant-accused officer and that he has abused his official position to do the said favour to P.W.1, demanded and accepted the bribe, the Trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant-accused officer. Therefore, according to this Court, the said finding of the Trial Court is contrary to the evidence both oral and documentary. As discussed supra, admittedly, P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant and there were strained relations between P.W.1 and the appellant-accused officer with regard to providing of electricity connection i.e. commercial/domestic. 28. It is relevant to note that P.W.2, Junior Assistant, Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, was declared hostile and P.W.3, Divisional Engineer, Distribution, who spoke about procedure and rules relating to competency of appellant-accused officer in receiving the application, sanction orders, declared hostile. Nothing was elicited from them during cross examination. In view of the same, this Court is of the view that the role of the appellant-accused officer in the entire process was limited and there were strained relation between him and P.W.1 and also that P.W.1 is not having any title or right over the said room to which according to P.W.1 sought electricity connection. It is relevant to note that the trial Court on the analysis of entire evidence gave a finding that P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant. 29. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer would contend that the prosecution failed to prove the very demand which is sine qua non to record conviction under Section 7 of the Act. He would further submit that the trial Court having held that P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant, recorded conviction against appellant-accused officer without appreciating the contention of the appellant-accused officer that there is no other witness much less independent witness to depose about the alleged demand. Therefore, according to him, the question of acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant-accused officer from P.W.1 does not arise. Therefore, according to him, the question of acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant-accused officer from P.W.1 does not arise. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the appellant-accused officer has demanded an amount of Rs.2,500/- which includes an amount of Rs.1375/- towards bribe excluding an amount of Rs.1125/- towards development charges, application fee etc. He would further submit that the prosecution has proved pendency of official favour with the appellant-accused officer at the relevant point of time, demand and acceptance, recovery of tainted currency and chemical tests turned positive. Therefore, according to him, the Trial Court rightly convicted the appellant-accused officer. 30. As discussed supra, P.W.1 is not having any right or title over the said room to which he sought electricity connection. There were strained relations between P.W.1 and the appellant-accused officer with regard to providing domestic/commercial connection. P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant. 31. P.W.3 deposed about the procedure to be followed by a consumer, P.W.1 herein to obtain power connection. The consumer has to pay the amount with the ERO office and not to the staff of the department. He has further admitted that sometimes Government will give instructions to collect the revenue by conducting a special drive and according to him, the said drive was in vogue at the relevant point of time and there were oral instructions from the superior officials to collect the arrears and to increase the revenue. In the said course of action, the staff will receive cash from the consumers for the purpose of payment of challans/demand drafts towards development charges, registration fee and application fee etc. The said fact is not in dispute. The amount defers from the nature of connection i.e. single phase, double phase or triple phase and commercial/residential. P.W.1 himself is not sure of Ex.P-2, application, submitted by him for obtaining connection to the said room. In Ex.P-1, complaint, P.W.1 stated that he has applied for domestic connection for the room and in fact, there is no premises number to the said room. He was not a lessee of the said room. He has not mentioned about separate entrance to the said room in Ex.P-1 complaint and there are serious contradictions with regard to the very location of the said room. He was not a lessee of the said room. He has not mentioned about separate entrance to the said room in Ex.P-1 complaint and there are serious contradictions with regard to the very location of the said room. In Ex.P-1, he has stated that the said room is behind the shop and in his deposition, he has stated that the said room is adjoining to the premises. Even according to P.W.1, he has submitted Ex.P-1 application for providing connection to premises bearing No.5-5-213 & 214 and there is commercial connection with No.K2-3288 to his shop bearing No.5-5-214. P.W.1 during cross examination has admitted that he was intending to take domestic service connection for the rear side room on his name. When P.W.1 is not having any right much less possessory right over the said room, the question of he applying for domestic connection by P.W.1 to the said room does not arise. On the analysis of the entire evidence, the trial Court gave a finding that P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant. 32. According to Ex.P-1 complaint, the appellant-accused officer has demanded an amount of Rs.2,500/- in all including Rs.1000/- for developmental charges, Rs.100/- towards security deposit and Rs.25/- towards application fee and in all Rs.1125/- and the balance of Rs.1375/- towards bribe. P.W.1 gave his deposition almost in terms of Ex.P-1 with regard to the alleged demand of bribe. Whereas a charge has been framed by the Trial Court that the appellant-accused officer has demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.1400/- out of total amount of Rs.2,500/- from P.W.1 and also accepted the said amount of Rs.1400/- towards illegal gratification. Thus, there is contradiction in the alleged bribe amount which is major contradiction. 33. P.W.2, Mediator, turned hostile. Nothing elicited from him during cross examination. P.W.2 deposed that the appellant-accused officer, in his spot explanation, explained that he has received the amount from P.W.1 for providing electricity connection and the same was recorded in Ex.P-9, post trap proceedings. 34. P.W.3, Assistant Divisional Engineer at the relevant point of time, deposed about procedure and rules relating to the competency of the appellant-accused officer in receiving the application, sanction orders etc. According to him, if it is three phase connection, an amount of Rs.3,000/- would be the developmental charges and for a single phase, commercial connection, Rs.2,000/- is the developmental charges. P.W.3, Assistant Divisional Engineer at the relevant point of time, deposed about procedure and rules relating to the competency of the appellant-accused officer in receiving the application, sanction orders etc. According to him, if it is three phase connection, an amount of Rs.3,000/- would be the developmental charges and for a single phase, commercial connection, Rs.2,000/- is the developmental charges. Ex.P-2 is the application filed by P.W.1 seeking domestic service connection single phase for a period of three years. According to him, the consumer has to distinctly mention the door number to which service connection is required. Once the commercial connection is in existence in a particular premises, no domestic connection is given to it. By the date of submission of Ex.P-2 application by P.W.1, there was already a commercial connection to the premises bearing No.5-5-214. If the door numbers are separate, new commercial connection can be given to the other door number. In Ex.P-2, P.W.1 mentioned the door number as 5-5-213/214 and he did not specifically mention which of those door numbers were requiring domestic service connection. The owner of premises bearing number 5-5-213 has applied for commercial connection of single phase on 24-05-1999 and the same was released in the very same month. 35. P.W.5, another mediator, turned hostile and nothing was elicited from him during cross examination by the prosecution. P.W.6 is the Trap Laying Officer who deposed about the trap proceedings. Even according to P.W.6, he has not probed into the aspect that whether the premises is own premises or leased premises of P.W.1. It is relevant to note that P.W.6 has deposed that he has gone through Ex.P-7 agreement on 07-04-1999 itself. He did not depose about the demand of bribe from P.W.1 by the appellant-accused officer. 36. D.W.1, Additional Assistant Engineer, deposed that as per Ex.X-1, load register, Abdul Rehman Moosa, was the owner of premises No.5-5-214, Patelnagar with service connection No.K2-3287 which is domestic connection and K2-3288 for the same premises which is commercial service and both the services were released on 02-01-1981. During cross examination he has admitted that under Ex.X-3, load register of E-1 Circle, commercial service connection was given on 31-05-1999. Under Ex.X-8, P.W.1 requested for conversion from commercial service to industrial service and the said file was received in his office on 01-04-2002. The conversion has not taken place pursuant to Ex.X-8. 37. During cross examination he has admitted that under Ex.X-3, load register of E-1 Circle, commercial service connection was given on 31-05-1999. Under Ex.X-8, P.W.1 requested for conversion from commercial service to industrial service and the said file was received in his office on 01-04-2002. The conversion has not taken place pursuant to Ex.X-8. 37. The above stated depositions and contents of various documents referred supra, the prosecution failed to examine any witness much less independent witness to prove the alleged demand of bribe from P.W.1 by the appellant-accused officer. There are serious contradictions in the versions of P.W.1 and P.W.1 is not a reliable witness and his evidence is not trust-worthy. He is not a bonafide applicant. He has agreed to pay amount in cash to the appellant accused officer for providing service connection and according to him, the alleged amount of Rs.1375/- is on higher side and therefore, he has not agreed to pay the said amount towards bribe to the appellant-accused officer. The Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, AIR 2000 S.C. 1735 , held that no witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as prosecution witness or even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as those different categories of witnesses. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand by examining any witness much less any independent witness and on judicial scrutiny, the evidence of P.W.1 is not reliable and trustworthy. 38. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself and therefore, the question of drawing of presumption under Section 20 of the Act does not arise. The prosecution has to prove the demand of illegal gratification by way of producing relevant witnesses beyond reasonable doubt like any other offence. Mere possession and recovery of tainted notes is not sufficient to record conviction and the prosecution has to prove the demand of bribe beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself. Mere possession and recovery of tainted notes is not sufficient to record conviction and the prosecution has to prove the demand of bribe beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that the defence of the appellant-accused officer that P.W.1 was not in actual possession of rear portion of mulgis and that the said portion was already having electricity connection in premises No.5-5-213/214, it would not tilt the case of the prosecution. The said finding of the Trial Court is contrary to its finding that P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant and even then recorded conviction without giving any specific reasons. As stated above, when the prosecution failed to prove the very demand, the Trial Court cannot draw presumption under Section 20 of the Act. The Trial Court having held that P.W.1 is not a bonafide applicant, gave a finding that there is no evidence on record that P.W.1 has animus with the appellant-accused officer. Thus the Trial Court failed to consider the strained relation between P.W.1 and the appellant-accused officer with regard to providing service connection. 39. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer relied upon the principle held by the Apex Court in Reena Hazarika v. State of Asasm, 2019 CRL.L.J 388, wherein it was held that Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be simply as a part of audi alteram partem, it confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right as a constitution right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, even if it is not to be considered as a piece of substantive evidence, not being on oath under Section 313 (2) Cr.P.C. If there has been no consideration at all of the defence taken under 313 Cr.P.C., in the given facts of a case, the conviction may well stand vitiated. A solemn duty is cast on the courts in dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of the accused taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and to either accept or reject the same for the reasons specified in title. 40. In the present case, according to the learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer, the defence taken by him that he has received the said amount towards development charges, registration fee and application fee etc. 40. In the present case, according to the learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer, the defence taken by him that he has received the said amount towards development charges, registration fee and application fee etc. for providing service connection is consistent. The appellant-accused officer has proved the said defence as can be seen from Ex.P-13, post trap proceedings and examination statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 41. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused officer by referring the principle held in Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2005) 5 S.C.C. 258 would contend that P.W.3 is the official witness and he was not declared as hostile and his evidence can be believed. He would further submit that by relying on the principle held by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, For the State of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, reported in Gundappa v. State (High Court), 2016 (1) ALD (Crl) 969 Would contend that the defence of the appellant-accused officer has to be decided on the touch stone of preponderance of probability and it need not establish its stand by proving beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, as discussed supra, the defence of the appellant-accused officer that he has received money for providing service connection by paying all necessary charges is consistent and he has proved the same. 42. Learned Public Prosecutor by relying on principle held by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in P.Satyanarayana v. State, 2013 (1) ALD (Crl) 346 AP, and S.Kumara Swamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 (1) ALD (Crl) 434 AP, would submit that trap is proved, recovery of tainted currency is proved, chemical test proved positive and therefore the Trial Court rightly convicted the appellant-accused officer. But in the present case, as discussed supra, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself and therefore the principle held in the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 43. Learned Public Prosecutor by relying on the principle held by the Apex Court in Umesh Manan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Through Special Police Establishment Lokayukta Office, (2017) 3 S.C.C. 608 , would contend that the prosecution has proved both demand and acceptance on the basis of clinching evidence produced by it regarding trap and recoveries. 43. Learned Public Prosecutor by relying on the principle held by the Apex Court in Umesh Manan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Through Special Police Establishment Lokayukta Office, (2017) 3 S.C.C. 608 , would contend that the prosecution has proved both demand and acceptance on the basis of clinching evidence produced by it regarding trap and recoveries. But in view of the discussion supra that the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself, the principle held by the Apex Court in the said judgment is of no use to the prosecution. He would further rely on the principle held in Phula Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2014 S.C. 1256 and contend that the appellant-accused officer kept mum, did not lead any evidence in defence, no spot explanation and therefore the Trial Court rightly convicted the accused by drawing presumption under Section 20 of the Act. But whereas in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the pendency of official favour with the appellant-accused officer and the very demand itself and therefore drawing of presumption under Section 20 of the Act is not sustainable. There is consistent defence taken by the appellant-accused officer right from post trap proceedings and he is not mum. He has also examined Additional Assistant Engineer as D.W.1 in his support. Therefore, the said principle has no application to the facts of the present case. He would further rely on the principle of the Apex Court in S.Dinesh Kumar v. State Th. Inspector and another, 2015 (2) ALD (Crl) 606, wherein the Apex Court on consideration of the entire material held that recovery of tainted amount from the possession of the accused was firmly established and no two views are possible in the matter since aspects of demand and acceptance established and therefore confirmed the conviction recorded by the High Court. But, whereas in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself and therefore the said principle is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 44. In view of the above said, discussion, the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance, the twin requirements to record conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Since the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself, recording of conviction by drawing presumption under Section 20 of the Act by the Trial Court is not sustainable. 45. Since the prosecution failed to prove the very demand itself, recording of conviction by drawing presumption under Section 20 of the Act by the Trial Court is not sustainable. 45. Viewed from any angle, the impugned judgment is not sustainable both on facts and on law. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 46. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dt.30-06-2006 in C.C.No.33 of 2001 passed by the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases-cum-IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, is hereby set aside. The appellant-accused officer is acquitted. He is on bail and therefore his bail bonds are discharged. 47. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any in this Criminal Appeal, shall stand closed.