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2020 DIGILAW 476 (ALL)

Vinod Kumar Sharma v. Shiv Mohan Dwivedi

2020-02-12

BISWANATH SOMADDER, YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Let the rejoinder affidavit filed in Court today be taken on record. 2. This Special Appeal arises in respect of two orders dated 31st July, 2019 and 21st August, 2019, passed by a learned Single Judge in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 4283 of 2018, Shiv Mohan Dwivedi vs. Vinod Kumar Sharma. 3. The appellants before us are the incumbents holding the office of District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh and the Director of Education, Secondary, U.P. Lucknow, respectively. 4. For convenience, both the impugned orders are setout herein-below in their entirety: “Order dated 31st July, 2019: “........learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has apprised the Court of the fact that the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 20.11.2018 requested the Director of Education, Madhyamik for making available necessary budget to facilitate payment of arrears of salary of the applicant. The Director has forwarded the entire matter to the Secretary, Secondary Education, Lucknow being the competent authority for sanctioning the budget. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel seeks time so that in the meantime, the budget is sanctioned by the State Government. Accordingly, the matter is adjourned for three weeks. List on 21.8.2019, by which date, in case, the necessary budget is not sanctioned and payment is not made, the opposite party shall remain personally present before this Court to justify the delay in compliance of the order of this Court.” Order dated 21st August, 2019: “In the affidavit filed by the opposite party today before this Court, the stand taken is that despite specific request having been made by him to the Director of Education (Madhyamik) and the State Government to make available the required budget so as to ensure payment of arrears of salary to the applicant in terms of the order of the Writ Court, the amount has not been sanctioned so far. Alongwith the affidavit, a letter written by the State Government to Director of Education dated 8.7.2019 has been filed, whereunder the State Government has directed the Director of Education to submit his clear report and also identify the officers who were guilty of the delay in making payment. It is always open to the State Government to identify officers who are responsible for the delay in making payment to the applicant but that itself could not be an excuse for sitting tight over the matter and not sanctioning the required amount. It is always open to the State Government to identify officers who are responsible for the delay in making payment to the applicant but that itself could not be an excuse for sitting tight over the matter and not sanctioning the required amount. Leave is granted to learned counsel for the applicant to implead Principal Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Lucknow and Director of Secondary Education, U.P. Lucknow as respondents to the instant contempt petition by name. Learned standing counsel shall communicate this order to the newly impleaded respondents within three days. They shall file their affidavits showing cause as to why the necessary budget has not been sanctioned so far. This is without prejudice to their right to proceed against the officers guilty for delay in making payment of the arrears to the applicant. List on 23.9.2019.” 5. The genesis of the contempt application is a judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016, passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Appeal No. 23338 of 2013, Shiv Mohan Dwivedi vs. State of U.P. and Others. The operative portion of the said judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016 is required to be noticed and is setout herein-below: “The petitioner shall, within a period of two weeks from today, submit a detailed representation before the second respondent in regard to his claim for the release of salary which had been stopped in 2013. He shall alongwith his reply also furnish for the consideration of the second respondent a copy of the supplementary short counter affidavit filed in these proceedings on behalf of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi. In case a representation is so made by the petitioner within the time aforementioned, the respondent No. 2 shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law with due expedition and preferably within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.” 6. A bare perusal of the operative portion of the said judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016, clearly reveals that there was a mandatory direction upon the respondent no. 2 (being the appellant no. 1 before us) to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law in respect of a representation to be made by the respondent-writ petitioners within a certain time frame. 7. 2 (being the appellant no. 1 before us) to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law in respect of a representation to be made by the respondent-writ petitioners within a certain time frame. 7. It is admitted position that pursuant to the directions as contained in the judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016, two orders have been passed by the respondent no. 2 (being the appellant no. 1 before us) being orders dated 11th January, 2017 and 27th August, 2018. Both the aforesaid orders had been placed on record along with the compliance affidavit of the opposite party no. 1 (District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh) filed in the contempt case. 8. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the direction of the writ court was for consideration of the representation of the writ petitioner, and the said direction having been complied with in terms of the orders passed by the concerned respondent (appellant no. 1 herein), the contempt court could not have gone beyond the directions of the writ court and proceeded with the matter. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has tried to support the orders impugned by seeking to contend that the orders passed by the concerned authority stated to be in compliance of the directions of the writ court, have not been correctly passed. 10. Before proceeding to advert to the rival contentions of the parties, it may be necessary to take up the question with regard to maintainability of the present intra court special appeal, filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules [Rules of the Court, 1952], against orders passed in contempt proceedings initiated by filing an application under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 11. In a case where the High Court, in a contempt proceeding, renders a decision on the merits of a dispute between the parties, either by an interlocutory order or final judgment, the question whether the same would be appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and if not, what would be the remedy of the person aggrieved, was considered in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. and Others vs. Chunilal Nanda and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 399 and it was held that any direction issued or decision made by the High Court, in contempt proceedings, on the merits of a dispute between the parties, unless the same is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, would not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and therefore, would not be appealable under Section 19 of the Act, 1971. Such an order, passed by the Contempt Court, was held, amenable to a challenge in an intra court appeal under the relevant rules of the High Court. The position with regard to filing of appeals against orders in contempt proceedings were summarized thus: “11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: (i) An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. (ii) Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. (iii) In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. (iv) Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. (v) If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intracourt appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).” 12. The question as to whether an intra court appeal would be available against an interlocutory order containing directions on merits of the dispute was answered by referring to the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 8 and it was held that interlocutory orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case or which finally decide a collateral issue or a question which is not the subject matter of the main case, are “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals under the relevant rules of the High Court. 13. 13. Taking note of the position that in a proceeding initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court could either punish or discharge the alleged contemnor and in doing so, it could pass all such ancillary orders which are necessary for exercise of such powers but it could not issue any directions or orders regarding the main dispute or controversy between the parties which had led to the filing of writ petition, this Court, in A.P. Verma and Others vs. U.P. Laboratory Technicians Association and Others, 1998 (3) AWC 2264 held that if any order or direction is made by the Court concerning the merit of the controversy or dispute between the parties, or for implementation of any judgment or order, the same would be de hors the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, and would be deemed to have been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, and such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court . The observations made in the judgment are as follows: “7....Thus there can be no doubt that in any proceeding initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court can either punish or discharge the alleged contemnor and in doing so it can pass all such ancillary orders which are necessary for exercise of such power but it cannot issue any directions or orders regarding the main dispute or controversy between the parties which has led to the filing of writ petition by either of the parties. However, if any order or direction is made by the Court concerning the merit of the controversy or dispute between the parties, or for implementation of any judgment or order, it will be de hors the provision of Contempt of Courts Act and they can only be deemed to have been issued in exercise of power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution. Such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court as they are not issued in exercise of any power conferred by the Act...” 14. Such direction would, therefore, be amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court as they are not issued in exercise of any power conferred by the Act...” 14. In the instant case, a bare reading of the two orders dated 31st July, 2019 and 21st August, 2019 passed in the contempt proceedings clearly show that orders touch the merits of the dispute between the parties and relate to the manner of implementation of the judgment passed by the writ court, as such, the said directions would be referable to the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and accordingly, the same would be amenable to an intra court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. 15. Coming to the merits of the present appeal, as we have already taken note of, the writ petition, being Writ Appeal No. 23338 of 2013, had been disposed of in terms of judgment dated 8th December, 2016 whereunder the writ petitioner was required to submit a detailed representation before the respondent no. 2 with regard to his claim for release of salary, and upon the representation being filed, the said respondent was to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 16. It is not in dispute that the aforementioned directions issued by the writ court in its judgment dated 8th December, 2016 had been complied with by the concerned respondent by passing orders dated 11th January 2017 and 27th August, 2018. 17. The question which thus arises is as to whether necessary orders having been passed by the authority concerned, stated to be in compliance of the directions issued by the writ court, was it open for the court exercising contempt jurisdiction to go beyond the directions contained in the judgment of the writ court and enter into the question of correctness, or otherwise, of the orders passed. 18. The broad contours governing the exercise of contempt jurisdiction are fairly laid out. The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction to punish for a breach or disobedience of its order, has to have due regard to the directions which had been issued and of which a breach is alleged. 18. The broad contours governing the exercise of contempt jurisdiction are fairly laid out. The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction to punish for a breach or disobedience of its order, has to have due regard to the directions which had been issued and of which a breach is alleged. It has been consistently held that in dealing with a contempt petition, the High Court cannot go behind the order of which a breach is complained or, to take upon itself to decide issues which were not touched in the original order. The orders which seek to supplement the directions issued in terms of the original order, of which a breach is complained, cannot be passed in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction. In doing so, the Court would be expanding the scope of contempt jurisdiction, which would not be permissible. 19. The scope of contempt jurisdiction, in a case where an order had already been passed on the basis of the directions issued by the court, came up for consideration in J. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar and Others, (1996) 6 SCC 291 and it was held that the authority concerned having passed an order, may be right or may be wrong, the contempt court could not proceed to consider the matter on merits. A fresh cause of action having arisen, it would be open to the party concerned to seek redressal before an appropriate forum. The observations made in the judgment are as follows: “6...The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out, whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the willful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the willful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings...” 20. In a somewhat similar set of facts, as in the present case, in Lalith Mathur vs. Maheswara Rao, (2000) 10 SCC 285 the question of maintainability of a contempt petition came up for consideration in a case when the court's direction was to consider the employees' representation, which was duly complied with, though the representation was rejected on merits. It was held that the direction issued by the contempt court, that the employee be absorbed on a suitable post, was without jurisdiction and should not have been passed. The relevant extract of the judgment is as follows: “4. The High Court in the writ petition had issued a direction for the consideration of the respondent's representation by the State Government. This direction was carried out by the State Government which had considered and thereafter rejected the representation on merits. Instead of challenging that order in a fresh writ petition under Article 226, the respondent took recourse to contempt proceedings which did not lie as the order had already been complied with by the State Government which had considered the representation and rejected it on merits.” 21. The basic parameters governing the exercise of contempt jurisdiction were examined in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 352 and it was held that the court cannot, in the guise of exercising contempt jurisdiction, grant substantive relief not covered by the order which is subject matter of the proceedings and that a substantive relief not covered by the initial order could not be considered in contempt proceedings. In this case also, the contempt court had proceeded on the basis of the allegation that the respondent authorities had not complied with the initial order, “effectively” and “in appropriate manner.” In the aforesaid background, the observations made in the judgment are as follows: “11. In this case also, the contempt court had proceeded on the basis of the allegation that the respondent authorities had not complied with the initial order, “effectively” and “in appropriate manner.” In the aforesaid background, the observations made in the judgment are as follows: “11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of court is a special power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction “that it has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute” in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts. 12. Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles noted above, we find that the directions issued by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment in effect granted substantive reliefs not covered by the judgment/order passed in the original proceeding. In the judgment, no direction was issued by the High Court that the writ petitioners will be admitted to the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants in the Directorate. As noted earlier, they have all along been holding the posts of Clerk-cum-Cash Collector which are ex cadre posts. Entry of such persons into the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants has to be considered taking into account various aspects of the matter. It is one thing to say that the benefits under the government order may be extended to the writ petitioners also and extending benefits of the government order to the writ petitioners is one thing and directing their entry into the existing cadre of Office Assistants is a different thing. It is one thing to say that the benefits under the government order may be extended to the writ petitioners also and extending benefits of the government order to the writ petitioners is one thing and directing their entry into the existing cadre of Office Assistants is a different thing. Such a dispute can only be determined on consideration of all relevant aspects of the matter and cannot be and should not be ordered in the summary proceeding for taking action for contempt of court. If the High Court felt that the grievance of the writ petitioners relating to the question of their entry into the cadre of Upper Division Clerks/Assistants has not been dealt with by the Court and specific direction has not been issued while disposing of the writ petitions/appeals then the appropriate course was to leave it to the parties (writ petitioners) to agitate the matter before the competent forum. Further the question of entry of holders of ex cadre posts, like the writ petitioners, into an existing cadre is a matter of policy which the Government has to decide. Be it noted here that on consideration of the matter the High Court held that no action for contempt of court need be taken against the respondents in the writ petition for deliberate disobedience of the judgment or order passed by the High Court. Thereafter it was not open to the court to pass any order granting substantive relief to the applicants (writ petitioners) on the plea that the question raised was also a part of their grievance in the writ petition. 13. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are constrained to hold that the judgment/ order passed by the High Court was without jurisdiction. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The judgment/order under challenge is set aside. The petition filed by the writ petitioners for taking action for contempt of court against the respondents is dismissed.” 22. Taking a similar view in Director of Education, Uttaranchal and Others vs. Ved Prakash Joshi and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 98 it was held that review of decision, contempt in respect of which is in question, in contempt proceedings was not permissible. Taking a similar view in Director of Education, Uttaranchal and Others vs. Ved Prakash Joshi and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 98 it was held that review of decision, contempt in respect of which is in question, in contempt proceedings was not permissible. It was reiterated that all that the contempt court is concerned with is whether the decision in question has been complied with or not and it cannot test the correctness or otherwise of the order, traverse beyond it or give additional directions. The observations made in the judgment are being extracted below: “7. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari vs. Union of India, (2001) 10 SCC 496 . The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher court. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, noncompliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside.” 23. The question as to whether a Court exercising contempt jurisdiction could pass supplemental order to the main order passed in the writ petition was taken up in the case of Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and Others vs. M. George Ravishekaran and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 373 and it was held that the directions issued by the contempt judge which virtually amounted to supplementing the directions contained in the original order was beyond jurisdiction and could not be countenanced. The observations made in the judgment are as follows: “19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely: Jhareswar Prasad Paul vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352 , V.M. Manohar Prasad vs. N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610 , Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. vs. Gautam Goswami, (2008) 5 SCC 339 and Union of India vs. Subedar Devassy P.V. (2006) 1 SCC 613 . 20. Applying the above settled principles to the case before us, it is clear that the direction of the High Court for creation of supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator cannot be countenanced. Not only the courts must act with utmost restraint before compelling the executive to create additional posts, the impugned direction virtually amounts to supplementing the directions contained in the order of the High Court dated 2.8.2006, the direction to create supernumerary posts at the stage of exercise of the contempt jurisdiction has to be understood to be an addition to the initial order passed in the writ petition. The argument that such a direction is implicit in the order dated 2.8.2006 M. George Ravishekeran vs. ONGC Ltd. W.P. No. 21518 of 2000, order dated 2.8.2006 (Mad)] is self-defeating. Neither is such a course of action open to balance the equities i.e. not to foreclose the promotional avenues of the petitioners, as vehemently urged by Shri Rao. The issue is one of jurisdiction and not of justification. Whether the direction issued would be justified by way of review or in exercise of any other jurisdiction is an aspect that does not concern us in the present case. The issue is one of jurisdiction and not of justification. Whether the direction issued would be justified by way of review or in exercise of any other jurisdiction is an aspect that does not concern us in the present case. Of relevance is the fact that an alternative direction had been issued by the High Court by its order dated 2.8.2006 M. George Ravishekeran vs. ONGC Ltd. W.P. No. 21518 of 2000, order dated 2.8.2006 (Mad) and the appellants, as officers of the Corporation, have complied with the same. They cannot be, therefore, understood to have acted in wilful disobedience of the said order of the Court. All that was required in terms of the second direction having been complied with by the appellants, we are of the view that the order dated 2.8.2006 passed in M. George Ravishekeran vs. ONGC Ltd. W.P. No. 21518 of 2000, order dated 2.8.2006 (Mad) stands duly implemented. Consequently, we set aside the order dated 19.1.2012 passed in Contempt Petition No. 161 of 2010, as well as the impugned order dated 11.7.2012 passed in Sudhir Vasudeva vs. M. George Ravi Shekeran Contempt Appeal No. 2 of 2012, decided on 11.7.2012 (Mad) and allow the present appeal.” 24. The scope of contempt jurisdiction is to see whether the order of the Court has been complied with - in substance - or deliberately flouted leading to an inference of a “wilful, deliberate and contumacious” violation of the order of which noncompliance is alleged. In a case, such as the present one, where there is no direction to dispose of the applications/ representation of the petitioner in a particular manner, the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the respondent authority, in compliance of the directions under the order of the writ Court, in our opinion, cannot be gone into in contempt proceedings, since its scope, even otherwise is extremely limited and narrow. The correctness or otherwise of the orders which have been passed by the respondent, if required, may be tested in appropriate proceedings but not in contempt jurisdiction. 25. Once the directions as contained in the judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016 had been complied with, the necessity of passing of the two orders could possibly not have arisen in contempt jurisdiction. 25. Once the directions as contained in the judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016 had been complied with, the necessity of passing of the two orders could possibly not have arisen in contempt jurisdiction. The reason is that the two orders expand the scope of contempt jurisdiction and go behind the directions as contained in the judgment and order dated 8th December, 2016, passed by the writ Court. In the event, the writ petitioners were not satisfied, their remedies would lie elsewhere but certainly not by invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 26. We, therefore, have no hesitation to set aside the two orders dated 31st July, 2019 and 21st August, 2019, passed by the learned Single Judge in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 4283 of 2018, Shiv Mohan Dwivedi vs. Vinod Kumar Sharma and the same are accordingly set aside. 27. The Special Appeal is, thus, allowed.