JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant intra court appeal is against the order dated 18.07.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.1414 of 2018, whereby and where under the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority has been declined to be interfered with. 2. The brief facts of the case of the appellant/writ petitioner as per the pleading made in the instant appeal which is relevant for the purpose of appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge which is the subject matter of the present intra court appeal are as follows: The appellant/writ petitioner while working as peon in the Ranchi Judgeship posted in the office of the Munsif at Civil Court, Ranchi, was served with a charge as contained in Memo No.7169-72 dated 05.12.2007, alleging therein that on 30.11.2007 the appellant/writ petitioner was absent from duty after putting attendance in the attendance register and was taking duty through his son, Arun Rai, basis upon which departmental proceeding was initiated alleging gross negligence and dereliction from duty. Subsequent thereto, the additional copy of the additional charges as contained in Memo No.7208-11 dated 06.12.2007 had also been served levelling therein the following charges of misdeeds and misconduct: (i) Writ petitioner/appellant had not furnished correct income tax return (ii) Writ petitioner/appellant was working as land broker being a Government servant, purchased several piece of land in the name of his family without informing to the department (iii) Writ petitioner/appellant had made illegal construction in the Government quarters occupied by him, therefore, allotment was cancelled and he had to vacate the quarters (iv) Writ petitioner/appellant had not informed the department regarding several cases pending against him and (v) Writ petitioner/appellant had opened several Bank account without informing the department. The disciplinary authority after service of charges/additional charges appointed enquiry officer before whom the writ petitioner/appellant put his appearance and defended the charges, thereafter enquiry report was submitted on 15.03.2012 but none of the charges has been proved with the recommendation for his exoneration from the charges and the copy of the enquiry report has been sent to the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi for needful.The Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi being not satisfied with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer, decided to conduct further enquiry, for which Sri Manoj Prasad, Additional Judicial Commissioner-IV, Ranchi was appointed as enquiry officer. The second enquiry officer submitted enquiry report on 29.09.2014, who had found some charges proved against the petitioner and in consequence thereof, the disciplinary authority vide order No.01 dated 08.01.2015 passed the order of dismissal from service against the delinquent. The writ petitioner/appellant challenged the order of his dismissal before the appellate forum but the appellate forum had dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the order of dismissal was challenged before this Court by filing W.P.(S) No.1414 of 2018 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 18.07.2018 against which the present appeal has been preferred. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner has agitated the ground of procedural lapses to the effect of appointment of second enquiry officer after charges having not been proved by the first enquiry officer, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner is not permissible. Altogether six charges have been levelled against the appellant/writ petitioner but only three charges have been proved and the charges are not so serious, warranting passing the order of dismissal. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits by referring to the second enquiry report, wherein the charges which have been found to be proved pertains to the absence of the appellant/writ petitioner, the charge pertaining to illegal construction in the Government quarters and the charge pertaining to pendency of the several criminal cases while the charges pertaining to non-furnishing of correct income tax return, the charge pertaining to working as land broker and the charge of having several Bank accounts have not been proved, therefore, in view of the nature of charges having not been proved by the enquiry officer, the order of dismissal cannot be commensurate with the gravity of charges. It has further been submitted that the appellant/writ petitioner is to superannuate on attending the normal age of superannuation sometime in the year 2030 and he has already put his service of about 23 years without any complaint and as such while imposing the punishment of dismissal from service, the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority ought to have taken into consideration these aspects of the matter. It has further been submitted that even accepting the charge of absence from duty for a period of one day, for which, the order of dismissal cannot be said to be commensurate. It has further been submitted that even accepting the charge of absence from duty for a period of one day, for which, the order of dismissal cannot be said to be commensurate. So far as other charges which have been proved, pertains to making illegal construction of house, submission has been made that when the allotment order has already been cancelled, the same cannot be inserted as a charge since the adverse action has already been taken by cancelling the order of allotment, further non-disclosure of several criminal cases which pertains to commission of offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, but the same has been compounded by making payment of the amount against the cheque issued by him and hence even accepting the charge found to be proved, the order of dismissal cannot be said to be proportionate to the charge committed. 4. Mr. Sudarshan Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent-High Court, has raised the question of scope of judicial review by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the scope is very limited and the same cannot be exercised when the finding has been arrived on the basis of the fact presented before the enquiry officer, having been accepted by the disciplinary authority by passing order of dismissal which has also been confirmed by the appellate forum and if this Court will exercise the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by showing any interference with the impugned decision, it will nothing but re-appreciation of the evidence and if that would be done, this Court will become the court of appeal. It has been submitted on merit, that the allegation of absence for one day cannot be read out in isolation but by asking his son to perform his duty in his place is serious one, therefore, contention which has been raised with respect to the quantum of punishment, is not fit to be accepted. So far as issue pertaining to pendency of criminal case, submission has been made that the criminal case although has been instituted under the Negotiable Instrument Act but after compounding of the said offence, it will be treated to be acceptance of the charges and, therefore, when the enquiry officer has found the charges proved on this head, it cannot be said to be minor one. So far as the charges levelled against the appellant/writ petitioner with respect to making alteration in the Government quarters and taking water supply line, the same is also serious one for the reason that when the appellant/writ petitioner is the public servant, he cannot be allowed to make alteration in the quarter and even get illegal water connection and as such the said charge has rightly been levelled against the appellant/writ petitioner and after having the said charge proved, in the cumulative effect punishment of dismissal has been imposed upon the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions it has been submitted by Mr. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in not interfering with the order of dismissal. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions, deem it fit and proper to discuss about the scope of judicial review in the matter of decision taken by the disciplinary authority. It is not in dispute that the scope of judicial review is very least to be exercised by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the scope of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has considered the same in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13 thereof, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. reported in (2017) 4 SCC 75 , it has been laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, wherein the following guidelines have been laid down, showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the same extract of para 8 thereof, is referred here-in-below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (LandS) 80: (1996) 32 ATC 44] : ( AIR 1996 SC 484 ) ; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [ (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (LandS) 1806] : ( AIR 1997 SC 3387 ) ; Bank of India v. Degala Suryanar-ayana [ (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (LandS) 1036] : ( AIR 1999 SC 2407 ) and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil. ( AIR 2000 SC 22 )". In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 : ( AIR 2015 SC 545 , Para 13), this Court held as follows: "13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; 13.(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 6. This Court has proceeded with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer vis a vis the order of punishment along with the nature of allegation. As has been reflected hereinabove that altogether two memo of charges have been served, one dated 05.12.2007, the content of the same reads here under as: “Whereas you Sachidanand Rai while attached as orderly, Peon of the Court of Munsif, Ranchi was absent from duty after putting your signature in the attendance Register on 30.11.2007 and you were taking duty in-performance of your duty through your son Arun Rai. Thus your act shows gross negligence and also dereliction from your duty. You are, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why you should not be punished accordingly. Cause to be shown before the enquiry officer”. Subsequent thereto, additional charges were served on 06.12.2007 which read hereunder as: “Whereas you Sachidanand Rai while attached as Orderly Peon of the Court of Munsif, Ranchi, hav not furnished correct income tax return. Whereas you Sachidanand Rai is working as land broker being a government servant, purchased several piece land without giving any information to the department, in the name of your dependent family members. Whereas you Sachidanand Rai, have been occupying government quarter at Lakra Godown, Line Tank Road, Ranchi, whereupon you illegally constructed a house and took water connection as a result the allotment was cancelled and you have been directed to vacate the said quarter. Whereas you Sachidanand Rai, has not informed the department about several cases pending against you. Whereas you Sachidanand Rai, opened several bank account in several banks without giving any information to the department. Thus your act shows misdeeds, misconduct while in the government service. Whereas you Sachidanand Rai, has not informed the department about several cases pending against you. Whereas you Sachidanand Rai, opened several bank account in several banks without giving any information to the department. Thus your act shows misdeeds, misconduct while in the government service. You are, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why suitable punishment should not be awarded for the above misdeeds, misconduct committed by you. Cause to be shown before the enquiry officer”. The admitted position herein is that the disciplinary authority has appointed enquiry officer to conduct enquiry. The appellant/writ petitioner put his appearance before the enquiry officer where he had defended him by denying the allegation. The said enquiry officer had recorded the evidence of the witnesses which had been cross examined by the appellant/writ petitioner and thereafter the report was submitted on 15.03.2012 holding the petitioner fit to be exonerated since the charges were established, the same would be evident from the enquiry report as has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the paper book, the part of the enquiry report is being referred hereunder as: “From the order no.04/07 it is crystal clear that Sachidanand Rai was ordered to perform duty in the office of the court of Munsif and that was shown to him by taking his signature in the order itself. Therefore, the allegations that Sachidanand Rai was orderly peon and he was found absent from the Izlas could not be established by the Administration by credible evidence whereas the delinquent has been able to prove it that he was deputed in the office of Munsif, Civil Court, Ranchi. So far other charges are concerned, the Civil Court Administration has not adduced an iota of evidence either oral or documentary against the delinquent despite of the fact that sufficient opportunities were provided by this court. On consideration of entire facts and circumstances of the case, I have come to a definite opinion that the Administratin has failed to establish the charges leveled against the delinquent Sachidanand Rai. Therefore, delinquent Sachidanand Rai is fit to be exonerated from the charges leveled against him. Accordingly, this enquiry is concluded. Let the order of enquiry along with entire record be sent to the Hon’ble Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi for needful”. Therefore, delinquent Sachidanand Rai is fit to be exonerated from the charges leveled against him. Accordingly, this enquiry is concluded. Let the order of enquiry along with entire record be sent to the Hon’ble Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi for needful”. The said enquiry report was submitted before the disciplinary authority who examined it in detail but not being satisfied with the finding and as such, by taking aid of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of K.R. Deb vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong reported in AIR 1971 SC 1447 came to conclusive finding for further enquiry for which one Sri Manoj Prasad, Additional Judicial Commissioner-IV, Ranchi had been appointed as enquiry officer. The second enquiry officer conducted the enquiry wherein the appellant/writ petitioner has filed additional show cause taking the plea of exoneration by the first enquiry officer, the evidence recorded by the first enquiry officer was again been appreciated by the second enquiry officer, who had found three charges proved while the other charges were not found to be proved, the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi being the disciplinary authority has passed an order of dismissal from service. The appellant/writ petitioner assailed the same before the appellate forum i.e. this Court in the administrative side. The matter was placed before the standing committee wherein no interference had been shown with respect to the order of punishment for dismissal from services. 7. This Court is conscious about the scope of judicial review. So far as the issue on merit is concerned, it is a case wherein the petitioner has been provided with opportunity of hearing, he has been provided with an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses, basis upon which in the first enquiry report the charges having not been found to be proved but in the second enquiry report three charges have been found to be proved. This Court is of the view that since the fact finding has been recorded by the second enquiry officer, basis upon which the order of punishment of dismissal from services has been passed which has been affirmed by the appellate forum, but, the appellant/writ petitioner has failed to point out any infirmity in the decision making process, warranting this Court to interfere with the charges or the finding recorded by the enquiry officer and therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same in exercise of power of judicial review by appreciating the evidence otherwise, this Court will be said to be a Court of appeal as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court hereinabove. This Court, therefore, is of the view that so far as the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge with respect to the issue on merit, no error has been committed. 8. This Court has further proceeded to scrutinize the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge pertaining to decision on quantum of punishment, by appreciating the argument advanced in this regard by the learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner. It is settled that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may interfere on quantum of punishment as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dev Singh vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Anr. reported in (2003) 8 SCC 9 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to considered the issue on quantum of punishment, taken into consideration the unblemished service of the appellant therein who had served the establishment for nearly 20 years and the charge upon which the punishment was imposed was of misplacement of a file and no motive was attached for such misplacement of file and as such it has been laid down therein that imposing maximum punishment, is disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and the same certainly shocks the judicial conscience of the Court. Further in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. Further in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. (Supra) the learned Single Judge in the impugned order has recorded the finding with respect to the quantum by referring therein that the decision of quantum of punishment rest exclusively with the departmental authority and the Court can interfere in the matter only when it is found that punishment imposed upon the delinquent is so disproportionate to the charges framed and found proved that it shocks the conscience of the Court, on a consideration of the aforesaid facts and the materials on record, learned Single Judge has found no infirmity in the order of dismissal from services. This Court has proceeded to examine the case of the appellant/writ petitioner in the light of the aforesaid aspect of the matter, for which relevant rule has been examined which is rule in the name of Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1935. The Rule 2 thereof, provides the lists of punishments: “2.The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed upon any member of a Subordinate Service, viz; (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments or promotion, including stoppage at an efficiency bar; (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time scale; (iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to government by the negligence or breach of order; [(iv-a) Compulsory retirement; (v) Fine; (vi) Suspension. (vii) Removal from the Civil Service of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment; (viii)Dismissal from the Civil Services of the Crown which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment; Provided that the penalty of fine shall be imposed only on menials and inferior servant;” It is evident from the lists of punishment that apart from dismissal from the civil services under the head of major punishment, the other punishments are also there i.e. reduction to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale, compulsory retirement, removal from the Civil Services of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment. The appellant/writ petitioner has taken the stand that he was appointed on 03.08.1992 as is evident from para 21 (page-14) of the supplementary affidavit dated 27.03.2019 filed on behalf of the appellant and since he has already completed 23 years of service as on the date of dismissal (approximately), therefore, the other punishment available under the list of punishments can also be imposed entitling the appellant at least for the pensionary benefits but according to him by order of dismissal, the past services rendered by him has stand forfeited and therefore, the disciplinary authority ought to have taken into consideration this aspect of the matter. This Court has examined the aforesaid factual aspect and considering the fact that the whole object of issuance of memorandum of charge on the basis of the allegations is to get rid of the establishment from the services of the appellant/writ petitioner, equally herein the appellant/writ petitioner has already discharged about 23 years of services and when the lists of punishment also contains the punishment of compulsory retirement, the disciplinary authority ought to have considered this aspect of the matter. 9. This Court has also scrutinized the nature of the proved charges, although charges levelled against the petitioner for absence of one day cannot be said to be so serious, warranting the disciplinary authority to inflict against him the order of dismissal but the said allegation is coupled with allegation of allowing the son of the writ petitioner to discharge his duty, therefore, the allegation of one day absence from duty coupled with asking the son to discharge duty although is serious in nature but warranting the order of dismissal from services ignoring the past services rendered by the appellant/writ petitioner disentitling him from at least pensionary benefits requires considerations. The other charges which pertains to making illegal construction along with illegal water connection, admitted position herein is that the allegation of making illegal construction over the Government quarter, the writ petitioner/appellant has already been penalised by cancellation of order of allegation and further the allegation which pertains to pendency of the criminal case, on examination of this allegation it has been found by this Court that the pendency of the criminal case pertains to commission of offence under Negotiable Instruments Act and when the case has been instituted against the appellant/writ petitioner for dishonour of cheque, the appellant has made payment in course of pendency of criminal case and offence in view of the provision of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is compoundable, therefore, the same cannot be said to be compared with the offence pertaining to the moral turpitude or pertaining to Prevention of Corruption Act. Moreover, the Negotiable Instruments Act itself is compoundable for the reason that the dispute pertaining to Negotiable Instruments Act is civil in nature and opportunity is always with the signatory of the cheque to make payment in favour of the person to whom the cheque has been delivered, and in such exigency the case would be compoundable, therefore, this Court is of the view that if the offence committed by the appellant/writ petitioner under the Negotiable Instrument Act has been compounded on making payment equal to the amount involved in cheque, which is one of the reason of passing the order of dismissal which also requires considerations by the disciplinary authority. 10. In view of the aforesaid factual aspect, this Court is of the view that when the other punishments are provided in the list of punishments, this aspects of the matter ought to have been considered by the learned Single Judge before reaching to such conclusion and therefore, the finding pertaining to quantum of punishment as recorded by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be proper. 11. In view thereof, this Court is not interfering with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer but interfering with the quantum of punishment of dismissal from services by quashing and setting it aside. In consequence thereof, the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are quashed to the extent of quantum of punishment. 12. 11. In view thereof, this Court is not interfering with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer but interfering with the quantum of punishment of dismissal from services by quashing and setting it aside. In consequence thereof, the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are quashed to the extent of quantum of punishment. 12. In the result, the matter is remitted before the disciplinary authority to take fresh decision on the quantum of punishment within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 13. Accordingly, the present appeal is disposed of.