JUDGMENT : Vinod Chatterji Koul, J. 1. Plaintiff, who has lost the legal battle in both the courts below, has preferred this Civil Second Appeal against the concurrent judgment and decree dated 31st November 2016, passed by learned Principal District Judge, Kishtwar (for short "1st Appellate Court") as also judgment and decree dated 29th October 2015, passed by learned Munsiff, Kishtwar (for brevity "Trial Court"), dismissing the suit of plaintiff, and seeks setting-aside of the same on the grounds tailored therein. 2. A suit was filed by plaintiff before the Trial Court for grant of a decree of Permanent, Prohibitory Injunction, restraining defendant below-respondent here, from interfering in the land measuring 2 Marlas falling under Khasra no. 146 min and 6 Marlas comprised in Khasra no. 147 min, situate at Sargwar, Tehsil Kishtwar (for short "suit land"), owned and possessed by him, by flowing water through it or carving pathway on the said land. 3. Defendants, in their written statement, vehemently denied the assertions made in the plaint. 4. The Trial Court, in light of pleadings of the parties, framed following Issues for determination of Suit of plaintiff/appellant: 1. Whether the defendants have earlier filed a suit titled Ghulam Nabi vs. Ghulam & Ors. with respect to same subject matter and the proceedings of this suit to be stayed as previous suit is still pending in this Court.? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land mentioned in the plaint? OPP 3. If Issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the defendants are opening drainage towards the land of plaintiff and also defendants are forcibly taking pathway of the plaintiff and are causing interference with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit land? OPD 4. Relief. 5. Subsequently, however, plaintiff sought amendment of the suit to incorporate relief for possession on the ground that during pendency of the suit, he was dispossessed by defendants from the suit land. Considering this aspect of the matter, the Trial Court framed following two additional Issues: 3A. Whether during the pendency of the suit, plaintiff has been dispossessed by the defendants from the suit land? OPP 3B. If Issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative then whether plaintiff is owner of the suit land is entitled to the possession of the suit land? OPP. 6. Both parties produced the evidence in support of their respective stand. 7. Whether during the pendency of the suit, plaintiff has been dispossessed by the defendants from the suit land? OPP 3B. If Issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative then whether plaintiff is owner of the suit land is entitled to the possession of the suit land? OPP. 6. Both parties produced the evidence in support of their respective stand. 7. The Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence, decided afore-quoted Issues and dismissed the suit of plaintiff. Aggrieved, plaintiff filed an Appeal before 1st Appellate Court. The appeal also failed. It is how present Civil Second Appeal has come up before this Court. 8. Heard and considered. 9. Learned counsel for appellant, after ingeminating factual background aiming at cementing the case set up by plaintiff in Appeal on hand as also before courts below, has made reference to following questions, mentioned in paragraph 07 of the Appeal as well, that, according to him, are substantial questions of law and on the basis thereof instant Appeal is to be admitted: i. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in upholding the findings returned by the Learned Trial Court without properly evaluating the material on record evidence and documents and also the documentary evidence as required the bonafide requirement of the appellant. ii. Whether the Trial Court fallen in error while deciding the issue of possession against the appellant in contravention of the revenue record and the possession existing on spot. iii. Whether the Appellate Court has rightly exercised the Appellate jurisdiction while upholding the findings returned by the Trial Court by exercising its Appellate jurisdiction. iv. Whether the trial Court and Appellate Court have to decide the question of possession without appreciating the revenue record and the position existing on spot. v. Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court was justified in deciding the amended issues regarding the possession of 04 marlas of land in khasra No: 146 min without adopting the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and without adopting the due course of law. vi. Whether the Trial Court and Appellate Court was justified in deciding the additional issues framed under Order-6, Rule-7 in the same Khasra number belonging to the appellant in favour of the respondents without appreciating the provisions of law and also the facts and record. vii. vi. Whether the Trial Court and Appellate Court was justified in deciding the additional issues framed under Order-6, Rule-7 in the same Khasra number belonging to the appellant in favour of the respondents without appreciating the provisions of law and also the facts and record. vii. Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court were justified in deciding the issue of possession in favour of the defendants which is contrary to the Commissioner record and also contrary to the relief claimed in the plaint when admittedly during the pendency of the suit the defendants have also encroached upon 02 marlas of land in Khasra No: 146 min out of 04 Marlas of land. viii. Whether the Trial court and Appellate Court were justified in deciding the issue of possession against the appellant without appreciating the revenue record and also without appreciating the record of Parti Patwar and Parti Sarkar which establish the ownership; and possession of original plaintiff over the suit land. ix. Whether the Appellate Court and Trial Court without substantiating the statement of witnesses and revenue record can establish the question of possession without being proved from the revenue record. 10. Prior to adverting to above questions, put forward by appellant as to whether those, or any of them, are substantial questions of law or not, it would be apt at this vantage point to have bird's eye view of factual background of the case. 11. Plaintiff preferred a Suit before the Trial Court for grant of a decree of Permanent, Prohibitory Injunction, restraining defendants from interfering in the land measuring 2 Marlas falling under Khasra no. 146 min and 6 Marlas under Khasra no. 147 min, situate at Sargwar, Tehsil Kishtwar (for short "suit land") owned and possessed by him, by flowing water through it or carving pathway on the said land. It was claimed by him that he was an exclusive owner in possession of suit land and defendants, without any right, title or interest and with an intention to encroach upon suit land, were interfering in his peaceful possession and trying to keep flow of waste water through suit land and were also bent upon to carve out pathway over the suit land. In nutshell, his contention before the Trial Court was that defendants were interfering in his possession over the suit land. In nutshell, his contention before the Trial Court was that defendants were interfering in his possession over the suit land. Defendants denied averments of the suit, insisting that plaintiff was not in possession of suit property and, therefore, there was no occasion for them to cause any interference therein. Defendants also contended that they had already filed a suit against plaintiff, prior to plaintiffs suit, concerning Khasra no. 146, which was pending and that plaintiff was not in possession of the property and there was no question of interference on their part. 12. The Trial Court, in light of pleadings of the parties, framed necessary Issues, as quoted in paragraphs 4&5 (supra). Plaintiff, to bolster his case, besides recording his evidence, adduced Mohd. Sharief, Mohd. Yousaf, and Ahemdu Rather as witnesses. In rebuttal, defendants, besides recording their own statement, produced Assa Ram as their witness. 13. The evidence produced by plaintiff in respect of Issues framed by Trial Court, was that plaintiff was owner in possession of 4 Marlas falling under Khasra no. 146 and 6 Marlas comprised in Khasra no. 147; out of which plaintiff was dispossessed of 2 Marlas of land falling under Khasra no. 146, whereas defendant's evidence was that out of the land measuring 4 Marlas under Khasra no. 146, plaintiff was in possession of 2 Marlas of land and 4 Marlas under Khasra no. 147 was in his possession and rest in possession of plaintiff. Worth to be seen is that before Trial Court, plaintiff did not produce any revenue official, particularly, Patwari, as an evidence to support this case so as to prove revenue entries. 14. The Trial, Court after appreciating the evidence, produced by the parties, returned the finding on all the issues. On the basis of the evidence produced, the fact as about who was in possession of the suit property, the Trial Court came to the finding that it is the plaintiff, who was in possession of the suit land. This finding was recorded on the issue which was framed before the suit was amended and at that time, as per the plaint, the plaintiff has claimed to be owner in possession of 2 marlas and 6 marlas in khasra Nos. 146 & 147 respectively and while deciding Issue no. This finding was recorded on the issue which was framed before the suit was amended and at that time, as per the plaint, the plaintiff has claimed to be owner in possession of 2 marlas and 6 marlas in khasra Nos. 146 & 147 respectively and while deciding Issue no. 2 which was regarding the fact as to whether defendant was opening drainage towards the land of the plaintiff and forcibly taking pathway and, thus, causing interference with his peaceful possession, the Trial Court while appreciating the evidence came to the conclusion that plaintiff has failed to prove that defendant was interfering in the suit land and, thus, decided this issue against plaintiff and in favour of defendants. 15. Insofar as additional issue framed on the basis of amendment of the suit is concerned, which was whether plaintiff had been dispossessed by defendant from suit land, the Trial Court, on appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that plaintiff had not been able to prove the factum of dispossession. The judgment rendered by the Trial Court is inclusive and luculent. Thus, it need not be interfered with. This is the reason that the 1st Appellate Court has upheld the Trial Court judgment and dismissed the Appeal. 16. Qua present Civil Second Appeal, it should come within the prism of provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). What Section 100 CPC provides, is imperative to be reproduced herein after and discussed as well given the contents of appeal and submissions made by learned senior counsel for appellant. "100. Second appeal: (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under the section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, nor formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." 17. Plain reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 100, CPC, enjoins that every decree of court subordinate to the High Court, is appealable before the High Court, but such should involve substantial question of law to the satisfaction of the High Court. When an appeal is preferred it should preciously state substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question. Thus restrictive scheme of Section 100 couched in mandatory terms firstly casts a duty on the Court not to admit the appeals, which do not involve substantial questions of law, for, such an appeal is not provided for and secondly, it requires the admission order to speak about and spell out such substantial question and thirdly on that question the notice has to be issued to respondents, who are enable to show that such a question is neither a substantial question of law, nor arises in a given appeal, but further at that stage with leave of the Court, appellant is further enable to rely on any other substantial question of law which can form the part of debate at the final hearing stage. The scope of second appeal is very much circumscribed and the High Court is not entitled to go behind the findings of facts recorded by the courts below, unless and until illegality or manifest perversity or misconstruction of misreading is, successfully, pointed out, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of facts of the courts below. 18. The scope of second appeal is very much circumscribed and the High Court is not entitled to go behind the findings of facts recorded by the courts below, unless and until illegality or manifest perversity or misconstruction of misreading is, successfully, pointed out, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of facts of the courts below. 18. The legislature has not defined the term "substantial question of law", though the expression has been used in the Constitution as well as in other statutes. The phrase, however, cannot be confined to a straight jacket and no rule of universal application can be formulated as to when it can be said that a substantial question of law has arisen. High Court can entertain a second appeal provided that it is satisfied that the case, involves a substantial question of law. The term "involves" suggests that such a question must arise in the case and it is necessary to decide it. The mere fact that the question is raised by the appellant in the appeal, is not enough and the High Court is not justified in entertaining the appeal. The term "involves" implies a considerable element of necessity. 19. The expression "substantial question of law", sans any statutory definition, has become jurisprudentially vital with the afflux of time after it was contemplated by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India in Chuni Lal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. Vs. Century SPG. and MFG. Co Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314 ). Reference to this expression is found in various provisions of law including Article 133 of the Constitution of India. But, in relation to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this expression is sine qua non as Section 100 mandates the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law before allowing the 2nd Civil Appeal.[Ashok Rangnath Magar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar (2015) 16 SCC 763 ]. 20. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing, AIR 1962 SC 1314 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down the test to determine whether the question is substantial question of law or not. 20. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing, AIR 1962 SC 1314 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down the test to determine whether the question is substantial question of law or not. The test laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is as under: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 21. In SBI v. SN. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92 , the Supreme Court laid down the procedure relating to second appeals as evident from Section 100 read with Order 42 Rules 1 and 2 CPC: "Procedure relating to second appeals 14. We may next refer to the procedure relating to second appeals as evident from Section 100 read with Order 42 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure: (a) The appellant should set out in the memorandum of appeal the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal. (b) The High Court should entertain the second appeal only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (c) While admitting or entertaining the second appeal, the High Court should formulate the substantial questions of law involved in the case. (d) The second appeal shall be heard on the question(s) of law so formulated and the respondent can submit at the hearing that the second appeal does not in fact involve any such questions of law. The appellant cannot urge any other ground other than the substantial question of law without the leave of the Court. (d) The second appeal shall be heard on the question(s) of law so formulated and the respondent can submit at the hearing that the second appeal does not in fact involve any such questions of law. The appellant cannot urge any other ground other than the substantial question of law without the leave of the Court. (e) The High Court is at liberty to reformulate the substantial questions of law or frame other substantial question of law, for reasons to be recorded and hear the parties on such reformulated or additional substantial questions of law. 15. It is a matter of concern that the scope of second appeals and as also the procedural aspects of second appeals are often ignored by the High Courts. Some of the oft-repeated errors are: (a) Admitting a second appeal when it does not give rise to a substantial question of law. (b) Admitting second appeals without formulating substantial question of law. (c) Admitting second appeals by formulating a standard or mechanical question such as "whether on the facts and circumstances the judgment of the first appellate court calls for interference" as the substantial question of law. (d) Failing to consider and formulate relevant and appropriate substantial question(s) of law involved in the second appeal. (e) Rejecting second appeals on the ground that the case does not involve any substantial question of law, when the case in fact involves substantial questions of law. (f) Reformulating the substantial question of law after the conclusion of the hearing, while preparing the judgment, thereby denying an opportunity to the parties to make submissions on the reformulated substantial question of law. (g) Deciding second appeals by reappreciating evidence and interfering with findings of fact, ignoring the questions of law. These lapses or technical errors lead to injustice and also give rise to avoidable further appeals to this Court and remands by this Court, thereby prolonging the period of litigation. Care should be taken to ensure that the cases not involving substantial questions of law are not entertained, and at the same time ensure that cases involving substantial questions of law are not rejected as not involving substantial questions of law." 22. In Umerkhan v. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684 , it has been observed by the Supreme Court that: "11. In Umerkhan v. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684 , it has been observed by the Supreme Court that: "11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a second appeal is founded on the formulation of a substantial question of law. The judgment of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard and judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without formulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin to the appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code; it is restricted to such substantial question or questions of law that may arise from the judgment and decree appealed against. As a matter of law, a second appeal is entertainable by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated. It is, however, open to the High Court to reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the judgment and decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code is impermissible without formulating substantial question of law and a decision on such question." 23. In Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh, AIR 2008 SC 1749 , the Supreme Court has held that: "11. The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. Mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey 1976 (1) SCC 803 ) held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference.[See: Kondiba Dogadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Others 1999(3) SCC 722 )]." 24. In Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708 , the Supreme Court has reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. 25. In Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. v. Lehna Singh (D) by LRs., (2019) 7 SCC 641 , the Supreme Court has held that in a Second Appeal under Section 100, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the Court were erroneous being: (1) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; or (2) contrary to the law as pronounced by this Court; or (3) based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. 26. Recently, in Illoth Valappil Ambunhi (D) by Lrs. v. Kunhambu Karanavan, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the High Court does not, in Second Appeal, embark upon re-analysis of evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. It is well settled that the condition precedent for interference under Section 100 of the CPC is the existence of a substantial question of law. 27. v. Kunhambu Karanavan, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the High Court does not, in Second Appeal, embark upon re-analysis of evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. It is well settled that the condition precedent for interference under Section 100 of the CPC is the existence of a substantial question of law. 27. A second appellate court is not supposed to interfere with the concurrent findings given by the trial court and the first appellate court. [Vide: Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ; Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 6 SCC 683 ; Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 ]. However, it is only on the premise of perversity which is an exceptional case of grave injustice or imprudence so as to shock the conscience of the court that concurrent findings can be interfered with. If there is no perversity in concurrent findings of fact, interference by the High Court in Second Appeal is not permissible. [Vide Dalip Singh v. Bhupinder Kaur, (2018) 3 SCC 677 ; P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan, (2007) 5 SCC 669 ; Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414 ] 28. As the Second Appellate Court is not supposed to interfere with concurrent findings given by the trial court and the 1st Appellate Court. However, it is only on the premise of perversity, which is an exceptional case of grave injustice or imprudence so as to shock the conscience of the court that concurrent findings can be interfered with. It is also settled that the 1st Appellate Court, under Section 96 CPC, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse. In exercise of power under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of the fact recorded by the 1st Appellate Court which is the final court of fact, unless same is found to be perverse. Even if the finding of the fact is wrong that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based on only on conjectures and surmises. [See: Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi & Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 78 ] 29. Even if the finding of the fact is wrong that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based on only on conjectures and surmises. [See: Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi & Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 78 ] 29. In Ashok Rangnath Magar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar (2015) 16 SCC 763 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that: "20. In the light of the provision contained in Section 100 CPC and the ratio decided by this Court, we come to the following conclusion: (i) On the day when the second appeal is listed for hearing on admission if the High Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law is involved, it shall dismiss the second appeal without even formulating the substantial question of law; (ii) In cases where the High Court after hearing the appellate is satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved, it shall formulate that question and then the appeal shall be heard on those substantial question of law, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the respondent; (iii) In no circumstances the High Court can reverse the judgment of the trial court and the first appellate court without formulating the substantial question of law and complying with the mandatory requirements of Section 100 CPC." 30. Now in view of discussion in preceding paragraphs, it is to be seen as to whether any substantial question of law arises in Appeal on hand, as is required under section 100 of the CPC or not. 31. In paragraph 7 of the Appeal, questions proposed, according to learned senior counsel for appellant, are substantial questions of law to be decided by this Court. In my opinion, the questions proposed by are not substantial questions of law. Substantial question of law is sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 CPC. Proposed questions pertain to appreciation of the evidence by the Trial and Appellate Courts. The issue of possession is a question of fact; the determination whereof depends upon oral/documentary evidence produced by the parties. 32. Perusal of the record on the file would make it clear that at the time of filing of the suit, dispute was with regard to 2 marlas of land falling under Khasra no. The issue of possession is a question of fact; the determination whereof depends upon oral/documentary evidence produced by the parties. 32. Perusal of the record on the file would make it clear that at the time of filing of the suit, dispute was with regard to 2 marlas of land falling under Khasra no. 146 min, in respect of which plaintiff alleged that the defendant was interfering. The plaintiff was specific in pleading that he was in possession of 2 marlas of land in Khasra no. 146 min and 6 Marlas in khasra no. 147 min (hereinafter referred to as suit land). Issue with regard to this fact was framed and evidence was recorded. Subsequently, the plaintiff amended the suit claiming that he had been dispossessed from 2 marlas of land out of 4 marlas in his possession in Khasra no. 146 min. The trial Court on appreciating the evidence produced decided and held the plaintiff in possession of the suit land, i.e. 2 marlas of land in Khasra no. 146 and 6 marlas in khasra no. 147, but the plaintiff failed to establish alleged interference by the defendant. The evidence produced regarding rest of the 2 marlas was regarding the possession of the defendant. The claim of the plaintiff made after amendment of the suit was improvement to his earlier claim which was restricted to only 2 marlas in Khasra no. 146 min. The issues involved in this case were all issues with regard to the determination of the issues of fact which were decided by the trial Court and Appellate Court on the basis of the appreciation of the evidence produced by the parties. 33. The case of the appellant that Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have not properly evaluated/appreciated the evidence is not a substantial question of law. The High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of second appeal and second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial question of law (Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, AIR 1999 SC 864 ). 34. 34. In Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal AIR 2001 SC 2920 , it has been held that merely because on appreciation of evidence another view is also possible, would not clothe High Court to assume jurisdiction on issue of fact framed by Trial Court by turning question as substantial question of law. 35. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, AIR 1999 SC 864 , it has been held-Whether a finding of fact reached by the Courts below is against the weight of evidence or not is a question which will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and does not project any question of law, much less, any substantial question of law, which can enable the High Court in second appeal to upset such findings of fact. 36. The questions which have been proposed by the appellant to be substantial questions of law, in view of the law laid down and discussions made hereinabove, are not substantial questions of law, but questions of facts requiring the appreciation of evidence which is not permissible. 37. After considering the arguments put forth by learned senior counsel for appellant and after going through the record of the Trial Court as well as 1st Appellate Court and keeping in view the discussion made hereinabove, I am of the considered opinion and view that in this case no substantial question of law is involved for determination. The questions, proposed by appellant as substantial questions of law, are not substantial questions of law arising for determination by this Court. The case of the appellant set out in the Appeal is that the evidence produced has not been properly appreciated by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court in determining the dispute. 38. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, it is held that the questions proposed by the appellant are not substantial questions of law arising in this Appeal nor does any other substantial question of law arise in this case, as such, this Appeal is dismissed. 39. Decree sheet be drawn, accordingly. 40. Registry to send down the record, if any, called for and/or received from the courts below, along with a copy of this judgment.