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2020 DIGILAW 48 (GUJ)

Yashpal Mahendrasinh Jadeja v. State of Gujarat

2020-01-10

A.C.RAO

body2020
JUDGMENT : A.C. RAO, J. 1. The present petitions have been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing and setting aside the FIR dated 13.04.2015 lodged by the respondent No. 2-original complainant being I-C.R. No. 80 of 2015 registered before Panch “B” Division Police Station, Jamnagar for the offences punishable under Sections 386 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. Since all the three captioned petitions arise out of the common FIR, the same are heard and decided analogously by common judgment. 2. The brief facts leading to the present petitions are as under: 2.1 The respondent No. 2-Mahendrabhai Samatbhai Gorsani is the original complainant and filed the complaint on 13.04.2015 inter alia alleging that the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 87, admeasuring 9 Acres, 11 Gunthas situated at village Kansumra, Ta. Dist. Jamnagar, is of the joint ownership of the complainant and his family members. 2.2 It is further alleged that since the complainant wanted to sell out the said land he approached estate broker of his village namely Osmanbhai Hasambhai Khira and in turn contacted one another broker namely Rameshbhai Arjanbhai Chavda who knew Pradeepsinh Nikulsinh Sarvaiya (petitioner in Cr. MA No. 13277 of 2015). It is further alleged that an agreement for sale was executed in favour of the said Pradeepsinh through the land brokers and it was agreed to sell the land to him at the rate of 2,02,11,000/- per bigha and in all price was fixed for total Rs. 32,33,76,000/- for 23.03 bighas. It is further alleged that the talk was taken place to sell only 16 bighas of the land. Thereafter, on 13.06.2014 an Agreement to Sale was executed. The agreed terms were contained in the said agreement to sale and that the payments were also made according to the recital of the said agreement to sale. 2.3 It is further alleged that the complainant later came to realize that the registered agreement to sale was qua the entire land in question when it was specifically agreed that only 16 bighas were to be sold. However, as there were differences of opinion as regards the price of the land, both the sides had filed caveat applications as well as civil suits in the civil courts being Special Civil Suit No. 116 of 2014. However, as there were differences of opinion as regards the price of the land, both the sides had filed caveat applications as well as civil suits in the civil courts being Special Civil Suit No. 116 of 2014. 2.4 It is further alleged by the complainant that on 30.01.2015 at about 9.45 p.m. when he was at his residence he received a phone call from his nephew and was informed that some persons came on their land to take possession and therefore, the complainant proceeded to his land alongwith his two nephews. When they reached their field at about 10.15 p.m. they found that one Yashpalsinh Mahendrasinh Jadeja (petitioner in Cr. MA No. 7385 of 2015), Pradip Bhagwanji Makwana, Firdozkhan Osmankhan Pathan and other unknown persons were present there and were threatening to the persons working in the field and were asking to vacate the premises. It is further alleged that the complainant informed them that he is the owner of the said land and then Yashpalsinh told to the complainant that he has purchased his land from Pradeepsinh and he is the owner of the land now. The petitioner alongwith other accused threatened the complainant with dire consequences and driven out the complainant from the land by issuing threat. As such the petitioners tried to dis-possess him from the property in question. 3. It is contended by the learned advocate Mr. Viral K. Shah appearing for the petitioner that the civil suit referred to above, is compromised and decree is also passed in the said suit. The petitioner has also produced the compromise purshis as well as the order of the lower court alongwith the decree. It is contended that there is a compromise between the parties and the dispute is of the civil nature. Under the circumstances, no substantive purpose would survive if the litigation is continued but, it would be a wastage of time. 4. The learned advocate appearing for the heirs of the respondent No. 2 in Special Criminal Application No. 2535 of 2015 has stated that he has no objection if the complaint is quashed as the dispute is already settled between the parties. He has further stated that in other matters he has not filed his appearance but, he has no objection if the other matters are also disposed of. 5. While opposing these petitions, the learned APP Ms. He has further stated that in other matters he has not filed his appearance but, he has no objection if the other matters are also disposed of. 5. While opposing these petitions, the learned APP Ms. C.M. Shah appearing for the State has contended that this is a very serious matter and number of cases are registered against all the petitioners. Therefore, it would not be desirable to dispose of all the matters though there is a compromise between the parties. The learned APP has also placed on record a report against one of the petitioners in support of her submissions. It is submitted that the other petitioners have similar history. 6. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the materials on record. 6.1 The above undisputed facts based on record, clearly indicate that the dispute inter-se the accused and the complainant is of a civil nature. The cross complaints were filed through report dated 22.08.2018. The accused no. 1 also filed a civil suit, bearing Special Civil Sit No. 116 of 2014, against the complainant of specific Performance of a registered agreement to sale, which was also settled. It is post the filing of the aforesaid suit, that again the complainant approached the police machinery with the same dispute, but only this time, surprisingly though, the impugned FIR came to be registered. As on date, the complainant has expired, the suit No. 116 of 2014 is settled and the land in question is also sold. There seems no cause then for the continuance of the Prosecution of the impugned FIR in light of such subsequent events. Be that as it may. The events proceeding the registering of the impugned FIR are also sufficient to conclude that the impugned FIR was nothing but an attempt to abuse the court process to circumvent a civil dispute, adjudication of which was at large before a civil court. The State, however, notwithstanding the above aspects, would resist the grant of prayers of the petitioner by contending that the petitioner has antecedents in the form of not less than 12 cases. The vehemence of the State Government even if it were to be well received would not merit acceptance for the reason that what falls for the consideration of this Court is whether the impugned FIR tantamount to an abuse of court process. The vehemence of the State Government even if it were to be well received would not merit acceptance for the reason that what falls for the consideration of this Court is whether the impugned FIR tantamount to an abuse of court process. However, I find substance in the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the petitioners qua accused are in the business of purchasing and selling of land and there is a tendency to file criminal complaint and settle the dispute by applying pressurized practice in civil cases. The petitioners are not convicted in any of the offences. The scope of adjudication cannot thus rest on the fact that there are 12 other cases against the petitioner, but whether the one case against the petitioner, assailed by the same before this Court, be at the threshold interfered with as prayed for, to meet the ends of justice. 6.2 At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to some of the judgments of the Apex Court, which are as under. 6.3 In the case of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , in paragraph 61, the Supreme Court has observed and held as under: “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim s family and the offender have settled the dispute. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc. cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 6.4 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 29, the Supreme Court summed up as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 6.5 In the case of Shiji @ Pappu vs. Radhika, AIR 2012 SC 499 , the Supreme Court has observed and held as under: “7. This Court has, in several decisions, declared that offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. which are not compoundable with or without the permission of the Court cannot be allowed to be compounded. 6.5 In the case of Shiji @ Pappu vs. Radhika, AIR 2012 SC 499 , the Supreme Court has observed and held as under: “7. This Court has, in several decisions, declared that offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. which are not compoundable with or without the permission of the Court cannot be allowed to be compounded. In Ram Lal and Another vs. State of J&K, (1999) 2 SCC 213 , this Court referred to Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C. to declare that such offences as are made compoundable under Section 320 can alone be compounded and none else. This Court declared two earlier decisions rendered in Y. Suresh Babu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, JT (1987) 2 SC 361 and Mahesh Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Supp. SCC 681, to be per incuriam in as much as the same permitted composition of offences not otherwise compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. What is important, however, is that in Ram Lal's case (supra) the parties had settled the dispute among themselves after the appellants stood convicted under Section 326 IPC. The mutual settlement was then sought to be made a basis for compounding of the offence in appeal arising out of the order of conviction and sentence imposed upon the accused. This Court observed that since the offence was non- compoundable, the court could not permit the same to be compounded, in the teeth of Section 320. Even so, the compromise was taken as an extenuating circumstance which the court took into consideration to reduce the punishment awarded to the appellant to the period already undergone. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ishwar Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 667 , where this Court said: “14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate to order compounding of an offence not compoundable under the Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves consideration that while imposing substantive sentence, the factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance which the Court may keep in mind.” 8. In our judgment, however, limited submission of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves consideration that while imposing substantive sentence, the factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance which the Court may keep in mind.” 8. There is another line of decisions in which this Court has taken note of the compromise arrived at between the parties and quashed the prosecution in exercise of powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 this Court held that the High Court was entitled to quash the proceedings if it came to the conclusion that the ends of justice so required. This Court observed: “.....Section 482 of the new Code, which corresponds to Section 561-A o the Code of 1898, provides that: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit, or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 9. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , this Court held that the High Court should take into account any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue or quash the prosecution where in its opinion the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak. This Court observed: “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the un-controverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 10. In B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , the question that fell for consideration before this Court was whether the inherent powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised to quash non-compoundable offences. In B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , the question that fell for consideration before this Court was whether the inherent powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised to quash non-compoundable offences. The High Court had, in that case relying upon the decision of this Court in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SC 551, held that since offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC were not compoundable, it was not permissible in law to quash the FIR on the ground that there has been a settlement between the parties. This Court declared that the decisions in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) had been misread and misapplied by the High Court and that the judgment of this Court in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) clearly supported the view that nothing contained in Section 320(2) can limit or affect the exercise of inherent power of the High Court if interference by the High Court was considered necessary for the parties to secure the ends of justice. This Court observed: “8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case (1977) 4 SC 551 does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 11. That brings to the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Abbot' case (supra) whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. That brings to the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Abbot' case (supra) whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under Section 406 was not compoundable the settlement between the parties could not be recognized nor the pending proceedings quashed. This Court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words: “6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law. 7. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs. 250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the later case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed.” 12. The outer limit of Rs. 250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the later case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed.” 12. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI, 2008 (9) SCC 677 where relying upon the decision in B.S. Joshi (supra), this Court took note of the settlement arrived at between the parties and quashed the criminal proceedings for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of IPC and held that since the criminal proceedings had the overtone of a civil dispute which had been amicably settled between the parties it was a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings since the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise. We may also at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in Manoj Sharma vs. State and Others, (2008) 16 SCC 1 . This court observed: “8. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The first information report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the first information report was the basis of the investigation by the police authorities, but the dispute between the parties remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 9. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility.....” 13. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 9. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility.....” 13. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked. 14. Coming to the case at hand we are of the view that the incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to the access to the two plots which are adjacent to each other. It was not a case of broad day light robbery for gain. It was a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them. That being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations which are now described by her as arising out of some “misunderstanding and misconception” will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose. It is noteworthy that the two alleged eye witnesses, who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer supportive of the prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482 Cr.P.C. could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the Courts below.” 6.6 Thus in above referred cases, the Apex Court held that criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purpose of quashing, particularly offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimonial relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In these category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings, if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of a conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court may consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrong-doer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question is in affirmative the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings. 6.7 In such circumstances, this is a fit case in which the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked to quash the FIR, in view of the above re-offered judgments of the Apex Court. 7. After considering the rival submissions and considering the judgments of the Apex Court, I am of the view that when the matter is compromised between the parties and there was a civil litigation between the parties prior to the complaint and there is an amicable settlement between the parties, I do not find any substantive purpose would be served if the litigation is dragged further into the Court. 7.1 Accordingly, the present petitions are required to be allowed and are hereby allowed and FIR being I-C.R. No. 80 of 2015 dated 13.04.2015, under Sections 386 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code registered at Panch “B” Division Police Station, Jamnagar and the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed against the petitioners. Rule is made absolute accordingly.