JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Navin Kumar, learned G.P.-IV appearing on behalf of the respondent-State and Mr. Shashank Shekhar, learned counsel for respondent nos. 7, 8 and 9. 2. As common facts are involved in both the matters, accordingly both the writ petitions were heard together. 3. The petitioners have preferred W.P.(C) No. 4997 of 2014 for quashing the order dated 01.04.2014 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand in Board's Revision Case No. 20 of 2012 contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition and have preferred W.P.(C) No. 5035 of 2014 for quashing the order dated 01.04.2014 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand in Board's Revision Case No. 19 of 2012 contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition, whereby, the Board of Revenue has dismissed the revision applications filed by the petitioner under Section 32 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation and Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, 1961). In both the writ petitions, the appellate orders passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi in pre-emption Appeal No. 13R 15 of 2011-12 (Annexure-6 to W.P.C. No. 4997 of 2014) and in pre-emption Appeal No. 12R 15 of 2011-12 (Annexure-6 to W.P.C. No. 5035 of 2014) are also under challenge in the writ petitions. 4. Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the mother of respondent no.10 namely Nirmala Devi along with Smt. Khileshwari Devi sold 0.21 acres of land appertaining to R.S. Plot No. 1434, 1.14 acres of land out of R.S. Plot No. 1436, 0.23 acres of land out of R.S. Plot No. 1428 and 0.26 acres out of R.S. Plot No. 1390 i.e. total area 1.84 acres of Khata No. 55 situated at Village Bare, P.S. Burmu to Smt. Laxmi Devi (respondent no.6) by virtue of registered deed of sale dated 29.12.1992 being deed no. 12397 of 2009. 12397 of 2009. He further submitted that the said Laxmi Devi also transferred the lands measuring 0.10½ acres of R.S. Plot No. 1434, 0.57 acres of R.S. Plot No. 1436, 0.11½ acres of R.S. Plot No. 1428 and 0.13 acres of R.S. Plot No. 1390 i.e. total area 0.92 acres out of Khata No. 55 of the Village Bare to Surendra Munda, Tulsi Munda and Vijay Munda by virtue of registered deed of sale dated 27.03.2006. He further submitted that the original petitioner being the co-sharer of the said Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi and also being the adjoining raiyat with respect to the vended lands filed applications under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 before the D.C.L.R., Sadar, Ranchi praying therein his right of pre-emption over the vended lands being pre-emption Case No. 06 of 2006-07 and pre-emption Case No. 05 of 2006-07 fulfilling all requirement as required under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 and the rules framed thereunder. He further submitted that by order dated 31.10.2011, the D.C.L.R., Sadar, Ranchi has allowed the pre-emption case in favour of the original petitioner. Aggrieved with this order, respondent nos. 6 to 10 preferred pre-emption Appeal No. 13R 15 of 2011-12 and pre-emption Appeal No. 12R 15 of 2011-12 before the Additional Collector, Ranchi, who allowed the appeals vide order dated 15.06.2012. The original petitioner aggrieved with the appellate order moved before the Board of Revenue in Revision Case No. 19 of 2011-12 and 20 of 2011-12, which were heard together and respondent no.3 has dismissed the revision applications in terms of the order dated 01.04.2014. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned orders on the ground that the original petitioner is an adjoining raiyat with respect to the vended lands and the pre-emption cases have been filed well within time. He further submitted that the claim of the original petitioner has been wrongly rejected without properly interpreting Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. He also submitted that after execution of the deed of sale by Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi in favour of Laxmi Devi, the original petitioner did not file preemption case against Laxmi Devi because the registration of sale deed was not completed which is the condition for filing application under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. He also submitted that after execution of the deed of sale by Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi in favour of Laxmi Devi, the original petitioner did not file preemption case against Laxmi Devi because the registration of sale deed was not completed which is the condition for filing application under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. He further submitted that the said deed was not copied till the transfer of half portion of the land i.e. 92 decimals by Laxmi Devi in favour of Surendra Munda and others and half portion of the land i.e. 92 decimals by Laxmi Devi in favour of Saroj Munda and others which was duly registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Ranchi on 08.10.2009 and in that view of the matter he submitted that the original petitioner could not file pre-emption petition against Laxmi Devi till the year 2006 because till that period it was premature and, therefore, the findings of the court below otherwise in this regard are wholly perverse and the same is against the mandate of law. He further submitted that the registration process was not completed in the year 1992 and so far as deed of sale executed by Nirmala Devi is concerned, there was no occasion to file an application under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 claiming pre-emption and the findings of the courts below otherwise in this regard are wholly erroneous and the same is against the mandate of law. He further submitted that so far as the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 59 of 2009 is concerned, the same is not binding upon the original petitioner as he was not party to the said suit and, therefore, the findings of the courts below otherwise in this regard are also perverse and the same is against the mandate of law. To buttress his arguments, he relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Prasad Singh v. Dulhin Phulkumari Devi and Others , reported in (2010) 6 SCC 441 . 5. Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “19. The appellant being a co-sharer of the transferor in the land transferred to Respondent 1 had a statutory right of preemption under Section 16(3) of the Act. 5. Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “19. The appellant being a co-sharer of the transferor in the land transferred to Respondent 1 had a statutory right of preemption under Section 16(3) of the Act. As the language of Section 16(3)(i) shows, any co-sharer “shall be entitled” within three months of the date of registration of the document of the transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the transfer deed. It is not disputed that the appellant in fact made such an application within three months of the date of registration of the sale deed executed by the transferors in favour of Respondent 1 and also deposited the purchase money together with a sum equal to 10% thereof in the prescribed manner within the period of three months as provided in the proviso of Section 16(3)(i). The Deputy Collector, therefore, had no discretion but to allow the application considering the mandatory nature of the right of pre-emption conferred by Section 16(3) of the Act. 20. The learned Single Judge deciding the writ petition and the Division Bench of the High Court deciding the LPA appear to have taken a view that the right of pre-emption is a weak right, presumably because the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sudama Devi v. Rajendra Singh8 and the learned Single Judge in Ram Pravesh Singh v. Board of Revenue2 have taken this view. Whatever may have been the views of the Patna High Court and this Court in the earlier decisions cited by the learned counsel for Respondent 1, a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar has now held that where a right of pre-emption is recognised by statute, it has to be treated as mandatory and not discretionary. The relevant passage from the judgment in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar is quoted here in below: “17. … The right of pre-emption of a co-sharer is an incident of property attached to the land itself. It is some sort of encumbrance carrying with the land which can be enforced by or against the co-owner of the land. The relevant passage from the judgment in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar is quoted here in below: “17. … The right of pre-emption of a co-sharer is an incident of property attached to the land itself. It is some sort of encumbrance carrying with the land which can be enforced by or against the co-owner of the land. The main object behind the right of pre-emption, either based on custom or statutory law, is to prevent intrusion of a stranger into the family holding or property. A co-sharer under the law of pre-emption has right to substitute himself in place of a stranger in respect of a portion of the property purchased by him, meaning thereby that where a co-sharer transfers his share in holding, the other co-sharer has right to veto such transfer and thereby prevent the stranger from acquiring the holding in an area where the law of pre-emption prevails. Such a right at present may be characterised as archaic, feudal and outmoded but this was law for nearly two centuries, either based on custom or statutory law. It is in this background the right of preemption under statutory law has been held to be mandatory and not mere discretionary.” Thus, even if there has been a long lapse of 19 years, the High Court could not have rejected the claim of the appellant for preemption when the claim was recognised by the statute, had been lodged in accordance with the statute and within the time prescribed by the statute and in the manner provided by the statute. 21. Respondent 1, however, claims to be a boundary raiyat saying that she had purchased under an earlier sale deed dated 11-1-1980 a plot of land adjoining to the land in respect of which the appellant has applied for pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. The learned counsel for Respondent 1 has relied on the decision of the Patna High Court in Ram Pravesh Singh v. Board of Revenue for the proposition that the claim of pre-emption was not maintainable against a person who holds an adjacent plot of land. This view of the Patna High Court is based upon its earlier judgment in Ramachabila Singh v. Ramsagar Singh that if the transferee happens to be an adjacent raiyat in respect of some other plots, a co-sharer cannot claim any right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. This view of the Patna High Court is based upon its earlier judgment in Ramachabila Singh v. Ramsagar Singh that if the transferee happens to be an adjacent raiyat in respect of some other plots, a co-sharer cannot claim any right of pre-emption under Section 16(3) of the Act. As a matter of fact, Section 16(3) confers the right of pre-emption not only on the co-sharer but also on the raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred. We are, however, of the considered opinion that a complete stranger who was not originally a raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred cannot be allowed to defeat the right of preemption of a co-sharer by first purchasing an adjoining plot of land and thereafter claiming to be a raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred. The decisions of the Patna High Court are cases of original boundary raiyats resisting the claim of pre-emption by a co-sharer of the transferred land. The object of Section 16(3) of the Act is to recognise the right of pre-emption of the co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining to the land transferred and this object would be frustrated if strangers are allowed to first buy one plot of land and then resist the claim of right of pre-emption of a co-sharer or a boundary raiyat on the basis of such first purchase of a plot of land.” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheoji Mahto and Others v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue and Others, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 733 . 7. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: “3. A reading of Section 16(3)(i) clearly indicates that when any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act, to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled within three months of the date of registration of the document of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal below held the appellants to be raiyats holding land adjoining to the land sold to the respondents by registered sale deed. An application was also filed within three months from the date of the registration of the document. Under these circumstances, the two conditions having been satisfied by operation of Section 16(3)(i), the appellants are entitled to pre-emption of the said land. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in refusing to entertain the writ petition dismissed in limine. The Collector was also wrong in allowing the appeal.” 8. By way of relying the aforesaid two judgments, Mr. Sinha learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the case of the petitioners is fully covered and the order passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand as well as the appellate order are fit to be quashed. 9. Per contra, Mr. Shashank Shekhar, learned counsel for respondent nos. 7, 8 and 9 submitted that after demise of Bharat Singh, son of Deo Nath Singh, his wife Kunta Devi transferred lands of Khewat No.2/2, Khata No.55, Village- Bare vide registered deed of sale bearing deed no. 5305 dated 06.05.1991 in favour of her daughter namely Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi. He further submitted that after purchasing the aforesaid land Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi jointly mutated their name in the Burmu Circle Office, Ranchi vide Mutation Appeal No. 13-R-15 of 1990-91 dated 09.09.1992 and paid rent to the then State of Bihar. He further submitted that Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi in her turn jointly transferred entire lands of Khata No. 55, Village- Bare in favour of Laxmi Devi, wife of Ram Narayan Yadav vide registered deed of sale bearing deed no. 12397 dated 29.12.1992 appertaining to Plot No. 1434, 1436, 1428, 1390 having area measuring 0.21 acres, 1.14 acres, 0.23 acres and 0.26 acres respectively, i.e. total area of 1.84 acres and executed the deed which was registered on 29.12.1992. Subsequently, Laxmi Devi sold part of lands of Khata No.55, Plot No. 1434, 1436, 1428, 1390 having area measuring 0.10½ acres, 0.57 acres, 0.11½ acres, 0.13 acres respectively, i.e. total area of 0.92 acres in favour of Surendra Munda, Tulsi Munda and Vijay Munda vide registered deed of sale bearing No. 4392 dated 27.03.2006. Subsequently, Laxmi Devi sold part of lands of Khata No.55, Plot No. 1434, 1436, 1428, 1390 having area measuring 0.10½ acres, 0.57 acres, 0.11½ acres, 0.13 acres respectively, i.e. total area of 0.92 acres in favour of Surendra Munda, Tulsi Munda and Vijay Munda vide registered deed of sale bearing No. 4392 dated 27.03.2006. Laxmi Devi sold another part of lands of Khata No.55, Plot No. 1434, 1436, 1428, 1390 having area measuring 0.10½ acres, 0.57 acres, 0.11½ acres, 0.13 acres respectively, i.e. total area of 0.92 acres in favour of Surendra Munda, Tulsi Munda and Vijay Munda vide registered deed of sale bearing No. 4392 dated 27.03.2006. He further submitted that the original petitioner instituted a preemption case under Section 16(3)(i) of the Act, 1961. He also submitted that after purchasing the aforesaid lands vide registered deed of sale dated 27.03.2006, the purchasers of the respective deeds mutated their name in the Burmu Circle, Ranchi vide Mutation Case No. 224-R-27 of 2006-07 and Mutation Case No. 223-R-27 of 2006-07 on 18.09.2006 and paid rent to the State thereof. He further submitted that the D.C.L.R., Ranchi allowed the aforesaid pre-emption case vide order dated 31.10.2011. Respondent nos. 7 to 9 have challenged the said order by preferring pre-emption Appeal No. 13R 15 of 2011-12 and 12R 15 of 2011-12, which were allowed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi vide order dated 15.06.2012, which were challenged by the original petitioner by preferring Board's Revision Case Nos. 20 of 2012 and 19 of 2012, which were dismissed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand vide order dated 01.04.2014. Being aggrieved with the said order, the original petitioner has preferred the present writ petitions. He further submitted that the document as contained in Annexure-1 is a manipulated and forged document having an endorsement therein as 08.10.2009, presuming it to be the date of registration of the deed of sale in the books under Section 61 of the Registration Act, 1908. He further submitted that they have obtained the certified copy of deed of sale bearing no. 12397 dated 29.12.1992 which does not mention any like date as mentioned in Annexure-1 being 08.10.2009, presuming it to be the date of registration of the deed, as such, the preemption application filed by the pre-emptor is an abuse of process of Court by manipulating and forging the document. 12397 dated 29.12.1992 which does not mention any like date as mentioned in Annexure-1 being 08.10.2009, presuming it to be the date of registration of the deed, as such, the preemption application filed by the pre-emptor is an abuse of process of Court by manipulating and forging the document. He further submitted that the preemptor is not the co-sharer of the Laxmi Devi as the land has been purchased from Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi in the year 1992. Laxmi Devi was the first purchaser in the year 1992 from Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi and thereafter respondent nos. 7 to 9 were the second purchasers and, therefore, the pre-emptor has failed to make his claim at the time of execution of first deed in the year 1992. He also submitted that the pre-emption application dated 26.06.2006 is barred by law of limitation as contained under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. Moreover Laxmi Devi is the stranger to the family of the petitioner. To buttress his arguments, he relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Shashi Shekhar Mahto v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2020 (1) JBCJ 240 (HC). 10. Paragraphs 13, 14 and 16 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: “13. The issue which has been agitated in this writ petition has well been considered by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Jawahar Lal Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue & Others reported in 1974 PLJR 360 wherein it has been held – “3. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Hiralal Aggarwal v. Ram-padarath Singh ( AIR 1969 SC 244 ) that the right of reconveyance under Section 16 of the Act accrues only when the registration of a sale deed is complete, as required by Sections 60 and 6l of the Registration Act and not before. In other words the right of reconveyance does not accrue before the sale deed is copied out in the books maintained for the purpose by the registering authority, following the above decision, the same view has been reiterated by a Bench of this Court, in Kauleshwar Singh v. Parmanand ( AIR 1972 Pat 407 ). In other words the right of reconveyance does not accrue before the sale deed is copied out in the books maintained for the purpose by the registering authority, following the above decision, the same view has been reiterated by a Bench of this Court, in Kauleshwar Singh v. Parmanand ( AIR 1972 Pat 407 ). It may be stated that the same view had been taken in three earlier unreported Bench decisions of this Court, which have been referred to in Kauleshwar Singh's case. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the application of respondent No. 4 filed before respondent No.3 was not maintainable and that respondent No. 3 could not have entertained that application, and, consequently, the orders passed by him on the 1st of May, 1969 issuing notices to the petitioners and respondent No.5 and the final order as contained in Annexure "3" allowing the said application were without jurisdiction.” In another judgment rendered in the case of Ram Paras Choudhary & Others Vs. The State of Bihar & Others reported in 1993(2) PLJR 260 the Division Bench of Hon’ble Patna High Court has held – “5. The aforementioned, two cases, namely, Ram Saran Lal’s and Radhakishan L. Toshniwal’s case (supra) have been noticed by the Supreme Court in Hiralal Agarwal’s case (Supra). The Supreme Court in the facts of the said case held that the question whether right of reconveyance had accrued to the appellant of that case or not was academic for the purpose of that case as in that case the facts were that the application for pre-emption though filed on 26th November, 1964 but was placed for the first time before the Collector on 30th November, 1964 when the registration was completed and the transfer had also become complete. The Collector for the first time took cognizance of the aforementioned application for preemption on November, 30, 1964, on which date it was placed before him and on being satisfied that the conditions of section 16 of the Act were satisfied he passed order under sub-section 16(3) (ii) of the Act for handing over possession from the transferee to the appellant. The fact of the said case was that the Collector had not even seen the application for pre-emption before November 30, 1964, and, therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Collector had rightly exercised the jurisdiction in entertaining the said application as the prescription to annex a copy of the registered deed is only directory and is laid down to furnish necessary information to the Collector to enable him to proceed with it. While considering the object of rule 19 of the Rules and Form L. C. 13 it was held that the same are directory instructions and if there is sufficient compliance thereof the application can be validly entertained by the Collector. The Supreme Court has further held that annexing a certified copy of the sale deed where a copy of the registered deed is not yet available on account of the process of registration not having been completed would be sufficient compliance of the directory prescription long, as it furnished information necessary to proceed with the application and the fact that a copy of the registered deed was not furnished along with the application was not fatal to the application nor did such omission deprive the Collector of his jurisdiction to entertain it nor did it vitiate the proceedings before him or the order thereon made by him.” Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Ram Roop Yadav Vs. The Additional Member, Board of Revenue & Others reported in 1984 BBCJ 390 by the Hon’ble Patna High Court. 14. In the fact of the present case, the application under Section 16(3) has been filed on 21.01.1998 i.e. on the basis of letter of sale which was of 25.11.1995 and the admitted position is that the registration of the said land under the Indian Registration Act is dated 29.08.2008. The very perusal of the date as referred in the preceding paragraph it would be evident that prior to the transfer of land by virtue of registration which is in the present case is dated 29.08.2008 while the application has been filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 on 21.01.1998 i.e. on the basis of letter of sale dated 25.11.1995. The authorities have passed the order emitting the fact that power conferred under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 cannot be set at motion on the basis of letter of sale and that is the reason the reflection has been made in the impugned orders that with the consent of the parties the matter has been kept pending waiting for registration and when the registration has been done on 29.08.2008 then only the final order has been passed by the original authority. xxxx xxxx xxxx 16. The question herein is that when the statute provides something to be done in the manner as provided, can the authority deviate from it. The settled position of law is that the authority or the court of law is not supposed to deviate from the statute and its onus duty in discharge thereof to proceed strictly in accordance with law. On the principle of cardinal rule of interpretation that where the statute provides that a particular thing should be done it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way., reference in this regard be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633 in which their Lordships have held – “27. … it is to be seen that the Act requires the Board to exercise the power under Section 119 in a particular manner i.e. by way of issuance of orders, instructions and directions. These orders, instructions and directions are meant to be issued to other income-tax authorities for proper administration of the Act, the Commission while exercising its quasi-judicial power of arriving at a settlement under Section 245D cannot have the administrative power of issuing directions to other income-tax authorities. It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. If that be so since the Commission cannot exercise the power of relaxation found in Section 119(2)(a) in the manner provided therein it cannot invoke that power under Section 119(2)(a) to exercise the same in its judicial proceedings by following a procedure contrary to that provided in sub-section (2) of Section 119.” In yet another judgment rendered in the case of Captain Sube Singh & Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others reported in (2004) 6 SCC 440 the Hon’ble Apex court has held :- “29. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala a Constitution Bench of this Court reaffirmed the general rule that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. (See also in this connection Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka) The statute in question requires the authority to act in accordance with the rules for variation of the conditions attached to the permit. In our view, it is not permissible to the State Government to purport to alter these conditions by issuing a notification under Section 67(1)(d) read with sub-clause (i) thereof.” In the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Direction ESIC Hyderabad & Ors. (in Civil Appeal No.5138-40/2007) reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690 it has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court at para 14 which reads hereunder as :- “14. As per the scheme of the Act, appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Ambay Cements and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 368 , it was held that : “26. … It is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way”.” In another judgment rendered in the case of Babu Verghese and Ors. … It is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way”.” In another judgment rendered in the case of Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422 , the Hon’ble Apex Court at para 31 has held as under :- “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor vs. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch.D 426] which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor [ AIR 1936 PC 253 ] who stated as under : "Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the rule is to be followed as provided under the statute.” 11. By way of relying the aforesaid judgment, Mr. Shekhar, learned counsel for respondent nos. 7, 8 and 9 submitted that the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 12. Mr. Navin Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent-State has accepted the argument made by learned counsel for respondent nos. 7, 8 and 9 as mutatis mutandis. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, for better appreciation of Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961, it is quoted herein below: “16(3)(i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed: Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision: Provided that where the application is rejected, the cosharer or the raiyat, as the case may be, shall be evicted from the land and possession there of shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten per cent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed.” The petitioners have filed supplementary affidavit, wherein, genealogy of ex-landlord is described, which is as under: From this genealogy, it transpires that Laxmi Devi is not the co-sharer of Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi. Laxmi Devi was the first purchaser in the year 1992 from Nirmala Devi and Khileshwari Devi and thereafter respondent nos. 7 to 9 were the second purchasers from Laxmi Devi. The pre-emption application was filed in the year 2006, and the petitioner had failed to make his claim at the time of execution of first deed in the year 1992. The petitioner failed to file a case in the year 1992 and, accordingly, he lost his right to claim the execution of the deed as pre-emption case was filed much later than the year 1992. As per Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961, pre-emptor must be cosharer or any raiyat of the adjoining land and an application needs to be made within three months from the date of registration of the document and 10% of the purchase money to be deposited within the prescribed period. The petitioner has failed to file the pre-emption case within time. The petitioner is also not the co-sharer of Laxmi Devi. Respondent nos. 7 to 9 are the second purchasers. The condition precedent about maintainability of application would be the date of registration. The petitioner has failed to file the pre-emption case within time. The petitioner is also not the co-sharer of Laxmi Devi. Respondent nos. 7 to 9 are the second purchasers. The condition precedent about maintainability of application would be the date of registration. The authority or court of law is not supposed to deviate from statute and onus is upon the petitioner to prove that he has acted in terms of the statute. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the condition precedent under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. It is well settled proposition of law that interpretation of any statute needs to be done in view of the provisions made therein and where statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in manner prescribed and not in any other way. The appellate court and revisional court have rightly considered Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. The petitioner has not filed pre-emption case within the time and he is not the co-sharer of Laxmi Devi, which transpires from the genealogy provided by the petitioner by way of filing supplementary affidavit. This Court finds that there is no illegality in the impugned orders passed by the appellate court as well as the revisional court and, accordingly, the same do not require any interference by this Court. 14. Accordingly, these writ petitions stand dismissed.