JUDGMENT : Anoop Chitkara, J. Challenging the judgment passed by Sessions Court, Una, dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition, filed by the petitioner and upholding the order passed by Judicial Magistrate, Una, who after holding an inquiry did not find sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner under Section 203 of CrPC, the complainant, who is a practicing Advocate, has now come up before this Court, seeking issuance of process for defamation. 2. The petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of Ld. Additional CJM, Una, HP, under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after now called CrPC, against Shri Bhoop Ram Thakur, who was father of his juvenile client, for defaming him in the reply filed by him in another litigation between petitioner Dinesh Chander Sharma and Bhoop Ram Thakur. 3. The petitioner in his complaint dated Jan 6, 2008, where apparently figure ‘2008’ is a writing error, and it is a complaint dated Jan 6, 2009, alleged that he is a practicing lawyer, and Shri Bhoop Ram Thakur (respondent herein), had engaged him as a counsel for his minor son, in a case pending before the Juvenile Court, Una. Reading of the complaint reveals that due to some financial transactions between the petitioner and the father of his juvenile client, a dispute arose between them, which led to filing of other cases. While replying to one such criminal complaint, which was barred by limitation, and the accused opposed the extension of time under Section 473 CrPC, by filing a written reply (Ext. C-1), it was alleged by the accused that he was harassed, and an amount of Rs. 24,000/- obtained from him, by putting pressure on him. In reply, the accused has further mentioned that the counsel had threatened him if he would not make the payment. The response specifies that a compromise had taken place between them, at the intervention of President of Bar Association, and around twelve Advocates. 4. The petitioner states in his complaint that this reply has leveled false allegations against him, intending, knowing, and having reasons to believe that the same would harm his reputation, socially, morally, and professionally, and thus committed an offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. 5. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 1, Una received the said complaint vide endorsement dated Jan 6, 2009. 5. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 1, Una received the said complaint vide endorsement dated Jan 6, 2009. It appears that the vide order dated Jan 8, 2009, the Court took cognizance of the complaint and posted the matter for preliminary evidence. 6. In the preliminary inquiry, the Court recorded the statement of the complainant under Section 200 CrPC, and took on its record the documentary evidence. 7. Vide order dated Mar 19, 2010, passed in Cr. Complaint No. 3-I of 2009, titled as Dinesh Chander Sharma vs. Bhoop Ram Thakur, the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 1 Una, held that since the inquiry does not conclude that the allegations leveled by the accused were with such intention to harm the reputation of the complainant, and accordingly the Judicial Magistrate did not find any ground to proceed against the accused of having committed an offence of criminal defamation, punishable under Section 500 IPC, and dismissed the complaint. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the complainant challenged the said order by filing a Criminal Revision Petition before the Sessions Judge, Una. Vide order dated Aug 23, 2011, passed in Criminal Revision No. 15 of 2010, titled Dinesh Chander Sharma vs. Bhoop Ram Thakur, the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, remanded the matter back to the Judicial Magistrate. 9. Vide order dated Aug 9, 2012, the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. 1, Una, after re-considering the matter, did not find any grounds to assume the complicity of the accused in the alleged offence and as such, dismissed the complaint. 10. The petitioner again challenged the said dismissal by filing a Criminal Revision Petition before the Sessions Judge, Una. Vide order dated Oct 27, 2016, passed in Criminal Revision No. 24 of 2012, titled Dinesh Chander Sharma vs. Bhoop Ram Thakur, the Additional Sessions Judge (I), Una, dismissed the Revision Petition. 11. Ld. Sessions Court dismissed the petition on two counts. Firstly, that the petitioner had filed his petition beyond the period of ninety days, and instead of submitting a separate application for condonation of delay, he had sought an extension of time within the main petition, which was not permissible. 11. Ld. Sessions Court dismissed the petition on two counts. Firstly, that the petitioner had filed his petition beyond the period of ninety days, and instead of submitting a separate application for condonation of delay, he had sought an extension of time within the main petition, which was not permissible. Secondly, the Sessions Court held that even if he presumed the matter to be within the period of limitation, then also he did not find any error or illegality in the order dated Aug 9, 2012, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, and upheld the same. 12. Challenging this order dated Oct 27, 2016, and a previous order dated Aug 9, 2012, the petitioner/complainant has now come up before this Court by filing the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with S. 482 of CrPC. 13. I have heard petitioner Sh. Dinesh Chander Sharma, who argued in person, and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. I have also waded through the entire record. ANALYSIS AND REASONING 14. The impugned order dated Oct 27, 2016, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Una, is on two counts. The Court initially arrived at a finding that there was no separate application for extension of time. As such, given the requirement of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a separate application was mandatory, and in the absence, thereof, the petition was barred by limitation. However, the second aspect of the matter is that the Court stated that even if for the sake of arguments, it presumed that the petition was within limitation, he did not find a prima facie case on its merits. 15. In my opinion, Ld. Sessions Court, if it believed that there was no application for extension of time and the petition, was not maintainable, he could have dismissed the petition, without even touching its merits. However, since the Sessions Court, addressed the matter on merits, therefore, it can safely be presumed that the Court had extended the delay in filing the petition, although the words expressed by the Court are couched in a manner that gives a reading that it did not condone the delay. Needless to say, once the Court had taken up the matter on merits, then it is imperative that such an act has been done after forming an opinion that it had jurisdiction to do so. Needless to say, once the Court had taken up the matter on merits, then it is imperative that such an act has been done after forming an opinion that it had jurisdiction to do so. Resultantly it may be presumed that the Ld. Sessions Court had condoned the delay, despite there being no separate application filed for the extension of time. 16. Now coming to the discussions on merits, the Sessions Court did not find any illegality in the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, and after discussing catena of case law upheld the order of dismissal passed by the Judicial Magistrate. 17. I have gone through both the impugned judgments, and for the following reasons, the same is correct, legal, and well within its propriety. 18. The entire matter revolves around the reading of the reply allegedly containing defamation allegations against the complainant. This reply, running in two pages, is well detailed, and the accused in the said reply, has given the history of the trauma undergone by him. The allegations regarding extracting money precede details leading to such circumstances. 19. It was well within the rights of the accused to set up his defence. While taking stand, undoubtedly the accused was not entitled to breach the Lakshman Rekha, which, in my opinion, in the present case, he did not infringe. In a criminal case, if the accused is not permitted even to plead his innocence, then it would leave to a situation that if he denies allegations made in the complaint, then he faces prosecution for defamation, and if he does not deny it, then there would be the risk of conviction in the said case. In such a situation, for the accused, it would be a choice between the devil and the deep sea, which is a trap, and it is the bounden duty of the Courts to deactivate all such booby traps. 20. In the facts in the present case, even if we see the allegations as a whole, then the complainant may find a remedy by claiming damages by filing appropriate proceedings in a Civil Court, that too if within limitation, but not by filing a criminal complaint about prosecuting under Sections 499 and 500 CrPC. 21. After taking the cognizance, Ld. Judicial Magistrate, recorded the statement of the complainant under Section 200 CrPC and conducted an inquiry. 21. After taking the cognizance, Ld. Judicial Magistrate, recorded the statement of the complainant under Section 200 CrPC and conducted an inquiry. After reading the complaint and the evidence in the opinion of the Magistrate, there was no material to proceed further, and no sufficient ground existed to move under Section 204 CrPC. He dismissed the complaint under Section 203 CrPC. There is no illegality in this order. 22. A reference to the following judicial precedents clinches the issue: (a) In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430 , a four-member bench of Supreme Court, holds, “8. …For determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. A number of decisions were cited at the bar in which the question of the scope of the enquiry under Section 202 has been considered. Amongst those decisions are: Paranand Brahmachari v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Patna 30; Radha Kishan Sao v. S. K. Misra, AIR 1949 Patna 36; Ramkisto Sahu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Patna 125; Emperor v. J.A. Pinan, AIR 1931 Bombay 524 and Baidya Nath Singh v. Musppatt, ILR 14 Calcutta 141. In all these cases, it has been held that the object of the provisions of Section 202 is enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued or not and to remove from his mind any hesitation that he may have felt upon the mere perusal of the complaint and the consideration of the complainant's evidence on oath. The courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the Magistrate has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations of the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned -Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Section 202 is no to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. The learned -Judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under Section 202 is no to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-section (1) of Section 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complaint and the statements made before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant.” (b) In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 , Supreme Court holds, “15. In case of a complaint under Section 200 Criminal Procedure Code or Indian Penal Code a Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence made out and then has to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any, to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused to issue process so that the issue of process is prevented on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass. Such examination is provided in order to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding. The words "sufficient ground" used under Section 203 have to be construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the accused and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. (c) In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal and another, 1973(3) SCC 753 , referring to scheme of Sections 200-203 of CrPC, Supreme Court holds, 22. the section does not say that a regular trial of adjudging truth or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage, for, such a person can be called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has been issued and he is on trial. Section 203 consists of two parts. The first part lays down the materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. Section 203 consists of two parts. The first part lays down the materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, 1964(1) SCR 639 , where dismissal of a complaint by the Magistrate at the stage of Section 202 inquiry was set aside, this Court laid down that the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction, and observed (p. 653) that where there was prima facie evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of a process could not be refused. Unless, therefore, the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before him is self-contradictory, or intrinsically untrustworthy, process cannot be refused if that evidence makes out a prima facie case." (d). In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others, 1976(3) SCC 736 , Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of inquiry under Section 202, holds, 4. …it is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint (a) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court; (b) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; (c) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. It is also indicated by way of illustration in which cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process can be quashed on such case being "Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused." (e) In Punjab National Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, (1993) Supp. (1) SCC 499, Supreme Court cautions, 6. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needles harassment. (1) SCC 499, Supreme Court cautions, 6. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needles harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case of harass them for vendetta. 23. A survey of the judicial precedents on the process leads to an irrefutable conclusion that issuance of process under S. 204 CrPC is not automatic but must follow, provided there exists a prima facie case. If the Judicial magistrate, in her enquiry conducted under S. 200 CrPC, does not find material justifying to summon the accused to face the trauma of criminal trial, it would be better for her to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 CrPC. 24. Given the above, there is no merit in the present petition, and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand closed. Registry to return the records.