ORDER : 1. This is a petition preferred by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of detention dated 13.02.2020 bearing number DM/DTN/PASA/10/2020 passed by Respondent No.2 in its exercise of powers under sub Section (1)of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be referred to as the PASA Act), By the said order as alleged, the detenue has been detained in Jail and it is further alleged that the order impugned is passed without any Application of mind and in violation of the provisions of PASA Act. 2. With the prayers at paragraph No. 8 of the said petition, this Petitioner requests for quashing of the order as under: “8. In the premises aforesaid, the Applicant most humbly and respectfully prays to this Hon'ble Court that:- (A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to admit and allow the present petition; (B) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the Detention Order Dated 13/02/2020 bearing No.DM/DTN/PASA/10/2020 at Annexure-”A” to the petition placing the Petitioner under preventive detention in purported exercise of the powers under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities A, 1985 as being illegal, arbitrary, null and void and further be pleased to direct the respondents to release the Petitioner forthwith; (C) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present petition Your Lordships will be pleased to direct the respondents to release the petitioner from detention; (D) An ex-parte ad interim relief in terms of prayer (C) above may kindly be granted; (E) Such other and further relief as may be deemed just and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the present case may kindly be granted.” 3. According to the Petitioner, he is an innocent person and is a casual labourer and is earning his livelihood by doing Labour work, however, he has been made a scapegoat by the police and by a transfer warrant, he has been dragged falsely into undetected offenses and thereafter, a proposal came to be forwarded to detain him under the PASA Act. It is alleged in the grounds of detention that the petitioner is a dangerous person and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and has no base at all. It is alleged in the grounds of detention that the petitioner is a dangerous person and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and has no base at all. According to the petitioner, he has been allegedly involved in only two matters of ‘A’ Division police station, Junagadh being the CR.No.I-72 of 2019 dated 20.03.2019 for the offences punishable under sections 120B,143, 147,148,149, 307, 326 ,325 ,324 ,323 ,333 ,332, 186 ,427,504 of the Indian penal code and under section 135 of the Gujarat police act where trial is pending and he has been granted bail. 4. It is also his say that another offence is CR.No.I- 11203023200098 dated 21.01.2014 the offences under sections 294B ,143 ,147, 148 ,149 ,452 of the Indian penal code and under section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act, where again he has been granted bail and the trial is pending. Apart from these FIRs, the petitioner does have various other antecedents of the past, however, that cannot be held against him, since none of the offences is of such a nature that the same cannot be tackled by the ordinary law and none of his activities is prejudicial to the ‘public order’. Again, there is a marked distinction between violation of law and order and the person being dangerous to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, it is urged that the order of detention being violative of Articles 14 ,19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India and the detention order having been based on only two offences allegedly under the Indian Penal Code, the order of detention deserves to be quashed and set aside. Grievance is also made that the statements of witnesses, who have expressed the fear regarding maintenance of public order have not been revealed and along with the detention order, the same have not been supplied to the petitioner, therefore, also it is bad in law. 5. This Court on 18.05.2020, took up this matter and for verification of proceedings before the PASA board, adjourned the matter on the 19 May 2020. 6. On that day, learned advocate for the petitioner required some more time to prepare herself and accordingly, the same was posted on 20.05.2020 and both the sides were heard extensively. 7. 5. This Court on 18.05.2020, took up this matter and for verification of proceedings before the PASA board, adjourned the matter on the 19 May 2020. 6. On that day, learned advocate for the petitioner required some more time to prepare herself and accordingly, the same was posted on 20.05.2020 and both the sides were heard extensively. 7. It is submitted by learned advocate Ms.Pooja Baswal appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner cannot be termed as a dangerous person as none of his activities nor his actions also fall under the well defined criteria of, who could be termed as a dangerous person. Again, his actions in no manner are disturbing the public order. She has urged that number of decisions have been rendered by this court where relying on the Supreme Court‘s decisions, it has been held that breach of law and order situation would not amount to disrupting public order. She has relied on some of the decisions rendered by this Court and the apex court to substantiate her submissions. 1. Learned advocate for the petitioner, has relied on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 971 .she has also relied on the order passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6854 of 2012 to urge that the statements of secret witnesses, which are sought to be relied upon are not furnished to the Petitioner. According to her, serious doubt can be raised about the truthfulness of such statements. 8. Ms Nidhi Vyas Ld. Assistant government pleader appearing for the state has strongly objected to allowing of this petition. According to her, the present applicant has nearly 18 criminal antecedents at his discredit and he has made lives of common man miserable and his actions are terrifying ordinary citizen and hence, no interference is desirable. She has urged the court to go through the well laid down criterion in this regard. She also depended upon some of the judgments in support of her version. She has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Subramanian v. State of T.N. reported in 2012 4 SCC 699 . She has earnestly urged that no interference is desirable noticing the kind of offences the present applicant faces. 9. She also depended upon some of the judgments in support of her version. She has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Subramanian v. State of T.N. reported in 2012 4 SCC 699 . She has earnestly urged that no interference is desirable noticing the kind of offences the present applicant faces. 9. At the outset, firstly the law on the subject shall need to be regarded which is very well laid down by the apex court and the same has been followed time in again by various courts. 10. This Court in Special Civil Application No.6854 of 2012 in the case of Vijaybhai Raghavjibhai Sharma vs. State of Gujarat on 24.08.2012 had an occasion to deal with similar such case, where the detenue was involved in two cases registered under the Indian Penal Code with Gaekwad Haveli police station. He too was termed as “dangerous person” and an habitual offence. While considering his request for quashment, this Court referred to the decision of the Apex Court, which explained, who is the habitual offender and also applied the test as to whether the activities would concern disturbance to the public order and whether it is of such a nature that it would travel beyond the capacity of an ordinary law to handle him and prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large. 1. Apt would be to reproduce the relevant findings and observations in this case as under:- “Habitual Offender” is explained by the Apex Court in case of R.Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in 2006 (6) SCC 14 . It is held therein that habit gets proved from the totality of facts in the following words :- “The expression “habit” or “habitual” has not been defined under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985. The word “habitually” does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of a practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the complicity of a person in an isolated offence is neither evidence nor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is a “dangerous person” unless there is material suggesting his complicity in such cases, which lead to a reasonable conclusion that the person is a habitual criminal. The word “habitually” means “usually” and “generally”. The word “habitually” means “usually” and “generally”. Almost similar meaning is assigned to the word “habit” in Aiyar’s Judicial Dictionary, 10 Edn., at p.485. It does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts.(See : Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M. M. Mehta) The expression “habitually” is very significant. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be continuity in the commission of those offences.(See : Ayub v. S. N. Sinha) From one single transaction though consisting of several acts, a habit cannot be attributed to a person. ” Exercise of whether this applicant can be held to be habituated or not from the totality of facts, is not to be undertaken. And, sufficient to recall the real test as to whether the activities would concern disturbance to the public order and whether fall out are of such a nature that the same would travel beyond capacity of the ordinary law to handle him and prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large. Reply to the said test shall need to be negation. Ordinary laws; if implemented effectively are potent enough to clear the said test and deal with the offender for curbing his activities sufficiently. Well laid down principles on the subject would not allow to sustain the order of detaining authority.” 11. The detenue has approached this Court seeking quashment of the order passed in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(1) of the PASA Act. He has urged that the ground of registration of offence under the Indian Penal Code, cannot, by itself, bring the case of detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(c) of the PASA Act. 12. The detenue has approached this Court seeking quashment of the order passed in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(1) of the PASA Act. He has urged that the ground of registration of offence under the Indian Penal Code, cannot, by itself, bring the case of detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(c) of the PASA Act. 12. The Court, after careful consideration of the material needs to regard whether the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority can be said to be legal, valid and whether the offences alleged in the First Information Report can have any bearing on the public order, as required under the Act or other relevant panel laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and the allegations levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of detaining him within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. The ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal , AIR 1970 SC 850 , deserves reproduction, where the Court has made out a clear distinction between the law and order and public order. 1. Apt would it be to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the said decision as under:- “You have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by commission of offences of riotous conduct, criminal intimidation and assault as detailed below :-- (a) That on 3-11-65 at about 17/30 hrs. you assaulted Shri Ashutosh Dutta son of Shri Pyari Mohan Dutta of 55, M.C. Ghosh Lane, P.W. Howrah at the crossing of Panchanan Tala Road and M.C. Ghosh Lane, with knife causing bleeding injuries on his hand. (b) That on 8-10-66 at about 16.00 hrs. while Shri Mahesh Prosad Bhagal son of Balgobinda Bhagal of 16, Belilious Road, P.S. Howrah was playing in an open field, you along with your associates demanded money from him and on his refusal you hurled cracker on him causing grievous injury on his right leg- (c) That on 8-6-67 at about 11.40 hrs. you accosted one Sushanta Kumar Ghosh son of Manmatha Ghosh of 2/1/1, Danesh Sk. you accosted one Sushanta Kumar Ghosh son of Manmatha Ghosh of 2/1/1, Danesh Sk. Lane inside a saloon at 255, Panchanantala Road on previous grudge and being intervened by Shri Shyamal Biswas son of Sandhya Biswas of 255, panchanantala Road, P.S. Howrah, you whipped out a dagger and assaulted Shri Biswas with the dagger causing injury on his hand. (d) That on 23-11-67 at about 22.45 hrs. you hurled cracker on A.S.I.B. Kundu of Bantra P.S. While he was coming to Howrah along panchanantala Road in a wireless van and caused injury to the A.S.I. And damage to the wireless van. (e) That on 7-1-68 at about 18.30 hrs. you threatened one Satya Narayan Prosad son of Late purusattam Prosad of 10, Debnath Banerjee Lane, P.S. Howtab with assault at the crossing of M.C. Ghosh Lane and Bellilious Road. 6. You are hereby informed that you may make a representation to the State Government within 30 days of the receipt of the detention order and that such representation should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Home Department, Special Section, Writers' Buildings, Calcutta and forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail in which you are detained. 7. You are also informed that under Section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) the Advisory Board shall if you desire to be heard you in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you should intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government. Sd/-D.C. Mookerjee District Magistrate Howrah.” 8. On March 19, 1968 the Advisory Board made a report under s. 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention of Sri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Ch. Bose. On March 30, 1968 the Governor of West Bengal confirmed the detention order under s. 11 (1) of the Act. 9. Section 3 of the Act provides: “3. On March 19, 1968 the Advisory Board made a report under s. 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention of Sri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Ch. Bose. On March 30, 1968 the Governor of West Bengal confirmed the detention order under s. 11 (1) of the Act. 9. Section 3 of the Act provides: “3. (1) The Central Government or the State Government may-- (a) If satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-- (I) the defence of India, the relation of India with foreign powers or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the maintenance or supplies and a services essential to the community, or (b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence-in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such persons be detained. (2) Any of the following officers, namely,-(a) District Magistrates, (b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, (c) the Commissioner of Police for Bombay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad, (d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad, may satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause (a) of sub-section (1 ) exercise powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such order made 'after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has 'been approved by State Government. (4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have bearing on the necessity for the order.” Section 7 is to the following effect: “7. '(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity if making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.” It will be noticed that before an order of detention can be validly made by the detaining authorities specified by s. 3(2) of the Act, the authority must be satisfied that the detention of the person is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any prejudicial manner as indicated in cls. (I) to (iii) of s. 3(1) (a). It is well-settled that the satisfaction of the detaining authority to which s. 3(1)(a) refers is a subjective satisfaction, and so is not justifiable. Therefore it would not be open to the detenu to ask the Court to consider the question as to whether the said satisfaction of the detaining authority can be justified by the application of objective tests. It would not be open, for instance, to the detenu to contend that the grounds supplied to him do not necessarily or reasonably lead to the conclusion that if he is not detained, he would indulge in prejudicial activities. The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law; the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot be examined in a Court of law. That is the effect of the true legal position in regard to the satisfaction contemplated by s. 3(1)(a) of the Act--(See the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(1). That is the effect of the true legal position in regard to the satisfaction contemplated by s. 3(1)(a) of the Act--(See the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(1). But there is no doubt that if any of the grounds furnished to the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application of cls. (I) to (iii) of s. 3(1)(a) and in that sense arc foreign to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge 'and the detention order liable to be quashed. Similarly, if some of the grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detenu of his statutory right of making a representation, that again may make the order of detention invalid. If, however, the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under s. 3 (1) (a) of the Act, it would not be open to the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not reasonably based on any of the said grounds. It is also necessary to emphasise in this connection that though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by s. 3 (1) (a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said' authority, cases may 'arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides. The detenu may say that the passing of the order of detention was an abuse of the statutory power and was for a collateral purpose. In support of the plea of mala fides the detenu may urge that along with other facts which show mala fides, the grounds served on him cannot rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining authority. It is only in this incidental manner that this question can become justifiable; otherwise the reasonableness or propriety of the said satisfaction contemplated by s. 3(1)(a) cannot be questioned before the Courts. The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds (a), (b) and (e) served on Subhas Chandra Bose are grounds which are relevant to “the maintenance of public order”. The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds (a), (b) and (e) served on Subhas Chandra Bose are grounds which are relevant to “the maintenance of public order”. All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order. In the present case we are concerned with detention under s. 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Does the expression “public (1) [1951] S.C.R. 167. order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act. A District Magistrate is therefore entitled to take action under s. 3 (1) of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. In Dr. A District Magistrate is therefore entitled to take action under s. 3 (1) of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar(1), it was held by the majority decision of this Court that the expression “public order” was different and does not mean the same thing as “law and order”. The question at issue in that case was whether the order of the District Magistrate, Patna under Rule 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 against the petitioner was valid. Rule 30(1)(b) provided that a State Government might, if it was satisfied with respect to a person that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to 'public safety and maintenance of public order' it is necessary to do so, order him to be detained. The order of the District Magistrate stated that he was satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 'public safety and the maintenance of law and order,' it was necessary to detain him. Prior to the making of the order the District Magistrate had, however, recorded a note stating that having read the report of the Police Superintendent that the petitioner's being at large was prejudicial to 'public safety' and 'maintenance of public order', he was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained under the rule. The petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus directing his release from detention, contending that though an order of detention to prevent acts prejudicial to public order may be justifiable ,an order to prevent acts prejudicial to law and order would not be justified by the rule. It was held by the majority judgment that what was (1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709, meant by maintenance of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, whereas, the expression 'maintenance of law and order' meant prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance. It was held by the majority judgment that what was (1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709, meant by maintenance of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, whereas, the expression 'maintenance of law and order' meant prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance. At page 746 of the Report, Hidayatullah, J. as he then was, observed as follows in the course of his judgment: “It will thus appear that just as 'public order' in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting 'security of State', 'law and order' also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting 'public order'. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an 'act may affect public order but not security of the State. By using the expression 'maintenance of law and order' the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules.”” 13. Yet another decision sought to be relied upon is rendered in the case of Sanjay @ Sunny @ Kekdo Maheshbhai Thakor vs State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 2565 of 2015, where again, the challenge was to the order of detention made under subsection (1) of section 3 of the PASA Act. The petitioner had been detained as a bootlegger and dangerous person and the grounds of detention mentioned six cases registered with Bavla police station under the Gujarat Prohibition Act as two First Information Reports for the offences punishable under sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 307,332, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. There also , the Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors (supra) and held that the detaining authority failed to substantiate that the alleged anti-social activities of the petitioner detenue adversely affect or were likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. The Court categorically held that because six cases have been registered, the Prohibition Act by itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance on public order. The Court categorically held that because six cases have been registered, the Prohibition Act by itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance on public order. The petitioner was being tried under ordinary law and can be also punished, if offences are held to be proved against him, but the acts constituting offence cannot be said to have affected even tempo of the life of community much less public health. The Court, accordingly, had allowed this petition. 14. Apt would it be to refer to some of the relevant findings and observations of the Court from this decision, at this stage, it would be expedient to quote the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court as under:- “At this stage, it would be expedient to quote the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ramesh Vandha Modhwadiya through brother, Laxmanbhai Vandha v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2009(3) GLH 296 , wherein in paragraph 11, the Division Bench has observed as under:- “11. PASA Act has been enacted with a clear object to prevent the crime and to protect the society from anti-social elements and dangerous characters against perpetration of crime by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrents for them. Law is well settled that the power under the Act should be exercised with restraint and great caution. Law is well settled that the power under the Act should be exercised with restraint and great caution. In order to pass an order of detention under the Act against any person, the detaining authority must be satisfied that he is a `dangerous person' within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PASA Act, who habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act as according to sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act it is such `dangerous person' who for the purpose of Section 3 shall be deemed to be a person “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” against whom an order of detention may lawfully be made. Further, subsection (1) of Section 3 confers power on the State Government and a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police under the direction of the State Government to detain a person on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of `public order'. The explanation attached to sub-section (4) of Section 3 reproduced above in the foregoing para contemplates that `public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-section (4) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 also provides that for the purpose of Section 3, a person shall be deemed to be `acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' when such person is a `dangerous person' and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a `dangerous person' his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression `public order'. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a `dangerous person' his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression `public order'. A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order.” In paragraphs 15 and 16, the Division Bench has, after considering the factual position on the record, observed as under:- “15. We find that even going by the F.I.R. On the date of incident, it is alleged that the dentenu's father had a pistol with him. There is nothing to show that he had fired with the pistol or caused any harm to anybody. Possession of pistol by detenu's father without license may be an offence so far as father is concerned and not the son, the detenu. Further, it is also to be noted that though they had disturbed the programme, later, the programme continued without any disturbance. Further, they had not caused any harm or bodily injury to anybody present there. Even in the F.I.R. It is stated that they had not caused any serious harm or injury to anybody. At the most, in our view, the incident occurred on that day might have raised problems of law and order, but we find it impossible to see that they impinged public order. No motive was also attributed against the detenu for creating such an incident. In order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order to fall out and extend and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature the ordinary law cannot deal with it or prevent the subversive activities affecting the society. In our view, those incidents are not sufficient to take action against the detenu under the provisions of the PASA Act. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the incident in question occurred on 10.02.2008 would be sufficient to disturb the tempo of life of the community so as to disturb the public tranquility and public order. 16. The incident referred to in the F.I.R. Had occurred on 10.02.2008 and criminal case was registered against the detenu and others and are being tried for the offences punishable under Sections 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and Section 25(1B)A.B.) of the Arms Act. 16. The incident referred to in the F.I.R. Had occurred on 10.02.2008 and criminal case was registered against the detenu and others and are being tried for the offences punishable under Sections 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and Section 25(1B)A.B.) of the Arms Act. Registration of cases and trial undertaken would be sufficient enough to contain those situations, but not sufficient to detain a person, and to characterise him as a `dangerous person' curtailing his life and liberty. There is nothing to show that the detenu is a habitual offender, apart from the solitary incident occurred on 10.02.2008. May be, a solitary act has the propensity of affecting the tempo of life and public tranquility, but the incident occurred on 10.02.2008 will not fall under that category. The detaining authority could not point out any other incident in which he was involved or a criminal case registered against him. Even the three witnesses have also not filed any complaints against the detenu. The solitary incident pointed out in the F.I.R. And the reach and potentiality of that incident cannot be said to be so grave to disturb even the tempo or normal life of the community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. The mere fact that the order narrates the detenu as a `dangerous person' without any materials, a conclusion cannot be drawn that the detenu is a `dangerous person', unless the incident has reach and potentiality, and a single incident pointed out as such would not indicate that the detenu is a habitual offender. Power under the Act to detain a person in jail has to be exercised with restraint and great caution.” In the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the matter of Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v/s. State of Manipur and others, reported in (2010)9 SCC 618 , the Supreme Court has considered all aspects pertaining to individual liberty and has also held that in a criminal case, if it is initiated against the detenu, the prosecution would not be in a position to procure evidence to sustain conviction cannot be a ground to pass an order of preventive detention under the National Security Act. In the result, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. In the result, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order of detention dated 30 December, 2014 passed by the respondent authority is hereby ordered to be quashed and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute.” 15. If one looks at the order impugned dated 13.02.2020, it clearly and emphatically specifies that the applicant is habituated of making and committing offences under Chapter 16 and 17 of the Indian penal code. He not only has disrupted the public order, but also has terrified ordinary people and disrupted the administration. For the larger good as also for maintaining law and order and also the public order, it is utmost necessary to stop his activities on urgent basis. 16. Referring to the FIR No.72 of 19 dated 20.03.2019 and the offence of 21.01.2020 where the description of FIR makes out clearly his role as a dangerous person and his unlawful and illegal activities committed along with his accomplice take the toll of innocent citizens. This court had an occasion to go through various statements of the witnesses who have complained against this man and the question that needs to be addressed by this Court is whether his actions are such which can be handled by the ordinary penal law and whether there was any requirement for invocation of provisions of PASA and the answer to this is that he creates a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality and at every place he spreads his tentacles. It is not a solitary act nor are the numbers of offences solely the consideration for concluding that he is a dangerous person. Overall scrutiny and consideration lead to the unerring conclusion that he not only breaches law and order but he impudently disturbs the public order and make peaceful living of people extremely difficult. 17. It is necessary to make a specific reference of the FIR being the 1st CR no. 72 of 2019 which reveals his nefarious actions and extent of his life threatening actions in presence of Police personnel who had gone to protect the complainant and his family members. 17. It is necessary to make a specific reference of the FIR being the 1st CR no. 72 of 2019 which reveals his nefarious actions and extent of his life threatening actions in presence of Police personnel who had gone to protect the complainant and his family members. The Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that those decisions which are sought to be relied upon by the Petitioner are either cases of solitary offences on the basis of which the authority had detained the detenue under the PASA Act and in one of those matters there were six offences, but, they were under the Bombay Prohibition act and in other matters, solitary incidents under the Indian penal code were registered. 18. Again, from entire gamut of facts and version of witnesses and other details, it can be held that his repeated indulgence in such Criminal activities, even though registered under the IPC, he is unstoppable by such dealing of his actions under the ordinary criminal law machinery and hence, resorting to the provision of PASA act is not found unsustainable. His criminal acts do affect the tempo of life and disturbs the tranquility in the society. Here if one looks at his antecedents , it emerges that he repeats his criminal activities and as many as 16 to 18 offences are registered against him. The nature of allegations made in each one would make it difficult for the ordinary legal system to handle him and hence, to prevent him from indulging in subversive activities often, his detention is found justifiable. He is a habitual offender who by force often indulges in illegality and illegal and cruel actions, terrifying ordinary law abiding citizens, having lost sense of fear of Criminal Justice system and on having become emboldened by the easy process of being set free so also having mastered the loopholes of overreaching the process of law. He can be called the outlaw, dangerous and antisocial who needs to be disabled so as not to spread his dangerous criminal activities which is the object of PASA Act. 19. Resultantly, for the reasons above, this Petition fails and is dismissed.