JUDGMENT : 1. This is a petition preferred under Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner, who has been detained by an order of respondent No.1 dated 27.11.2019 under the provisions of Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1984 (“the PASA Act” for short). 2. The brief facts leading to the present petition are as follows:- 1. The grounds of detention are mentioned of two cases under the Indian Penal Code against the present petitioner. It is averred by the petitioner that both the cases are simple incidents of theft. In none of the First Information Reports, the name of the petitioner is reflected. It is not a case of any public peace and order that has been disturbed, the grievance is further made that the detention order passed by the authority is without any application of mind and hence, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 2.2 It is further the say of the petitioner that the activities mentioned in the ground of detention related to disturbance of law and order situation and the same has nothing to do with the breach of any public peace and order and there is a marked distinction between the two. Two secret witnesses, as averred in the petition have given their statements on 16.11.2019, which have been verified by the Ahmedabad Municipal Commissioner on 27.11.2019. The statements are stereotype and highly questionable and thus, it appears that without verifying any material, the detention order has been passed. It is further averred that looking to the material supplied to the petitioner, it is nowhere established that the petitioner is a “dangerous person”. A simple case of theft will not make the petitioner a “dangerous person”. It is also further averred that the material presented against the petitioner does not anywhere show that the petitioner is involved anywhere in any violent activities, which has disturbed public peace. 2.3 It is further the say of the petitioner that he had moved the application for regular bail. The opponents have not opposed the application for regular bail and the authority could have moved for cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) or section 437(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Without doing any of these, the Detaining Authority has chosen to act illegally and detained the person. 4. The opponents have not opposed the application for regular bail and the authority could have moved for cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) or section 437(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Without doing any of these, the Detaining Authority has chosen to act illegally and detained the person. 4. It is, therefore, urged to quash and set aside the impugned order of detention on 27.11.2019 by seeking following prayers :- “In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioner prays to this Hon'ble Court as under:- (A) Your Lordships be pleased to kindly admit and allow this petition. (B) Your Lordships be pleased to issue the writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order quashing and setting aside the impugned order of detention dated 27.11.2019 passed by respondent No.1 (at Annexure- A) herein, and further Your Lordship be pleased to issue a writ of Habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ directing the respondent authority to release the petitioner detenue forthwith from the detention. (C) Pending hearing and final disposal of the petition, Your Lordships be pleased to release the petitioner on parole. (D) Your Lordships be pleased to dispense with the filing of the petitioner's affidavit, as he is in jail.” 3. On 18.05.2029, learned advocate Mr.Sanjay Prajapati for the petitioner needed to know the outcome of the PASA Board and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor Ms. Nidhi Vyas for the State also needed to confirm from the State Government. Accordingly, the matter was posted on 21.05.2020 and it was conveyed to the Court that the Board under the PASA Act has also confirmed the impugned order. They both have been heard extensively by this Court. 4. Firstly, taking the submissions of Mr. Prajapati, learned advocate for the petitioner, along the line of the memo of petition, he has argued before this Court that this certainly is not the matter, which can be specially said to be falling under the provisions of PASA Act. He has urged that, ordinarily, rigor of such Act requires to be exercised only against those persons, who commit serious offences and their violent activities and anti-social stance would disturb public order. He has further submitted that there is specific distinction between the breach of law and order and disturbance of public order. He has urged that, ordinarily, rigor of such Act requires to be exercised only against those persons, who commit serious offences and their violent activities and anti-social stance would disturb public order. He has further submitted that there is specific distinction between the breach of law and order and disturbance of public order. The petitioner is involved in two cases of theft and in such eventuality, he cannot be termed as “dangerous person” nor can that give any authority to the respondent authorities to detain him under the PASA Act. He has further submitted that the order of detention is dated 27.11.2019 and he is in the prison at Surat jail since then. Learned advocate Mr. Prajapati for the petitioner, has relied on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 971 . He has also relied on the order passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6854 of 2012 to urge that the statements of secret witnesses, which are sought to be relied upon are not signed by the P.I and the order challenged here is also passed on the very day on which such statements have been recorded. According to him, serious doubt can be raised on the truthfulness of such statements. It is these two First Information Reports, which has led to his detention also. 5. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor Ms. Vyas for the respondent State has submitted that there are two First Information Reports and his breaching the conditions while, he was enlarged on bail had led the authority to also believe that he is an habitual offender. According to her, there are two secret witnesses, whose names cannot be revealed, as otherwise, it would endanger their lives. However, the Court needs to consider that the detaining authority has authority to decide the grounds. It is not for this Court to replace those grounds and order. He has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Subramanian v. State of T.N. reported in 2012 4 SCC 699 . She has earnestly urged that no interference is desirable noticing the kind of offences the present applicant faces. 6. It is not for this Court to replace those grounds and order. He has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Subramanian v. State of T.N. reported in 2012 4 SCC 699 . She has earnestly urged that no interference is desirable noticing the kind of offences the present applicant faces. 6. On thus hearing both the sides, at the outset, it is needed to be recorded that by way of this writ petition, what is sought to be quashed and set aside is the order of detention dated 27.11.2019 in exercise of powers of his powers under subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act. The detenue has challenged the order at post execution stage. He has been branded as a dangerous person on account of his involvement in two offences and this, according to the Police Commissioner, also has disturbed the public order. There are two cases registered against the present petitioner registered with CR.No.I- 180 of 2019 on 14.11.2019 at Gomtipur police station of the offences punishable under section 379 and section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and CR.No.I- 181 of 2019 again at Gomtipur police station for the offence punishable under sections 392 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act. Section 2(c) of the PASA Act defines “dangerous person”, which means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter 16 or XXVII of the Indian Penal Code or under Chapter V of the Arm Act. 7. This Court in Special Civil Application No.6854 of 2012 in the case of Vijaybhai Raghavjibhai Sharma vs. State of Gujarat on 24.08.2012 had an occasion to deal with similar such case, where the detenue was involved in two cases registered under the Indian Penal Code with Gaekwad Haveli police station. He too was terms as “dangerous person” and an habitual offence. He too was terms as “dangerous person” and an habitual offence. While considering his request for quashment, this Court referred to the decision of the Apex Court, which explained, who is the habitual offence and also exercised the test as to whether the activities would concern disturbance to the public order and whether it is of such a nature that it would travel beyond the capacity of an ordinary law to handle him and prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large. 8. Apt would be to reproduce the relevant findings and observations in this case as under:- “Habitual Offender” is explained by the Apex Court in case of R.Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in 2006 (6) SCC 14 . It is held therein that habit gets proved from the totality of facts in the following words :- “The expression “habit” or “habitual” has not been defined under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985. The word “habitually” does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of a practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the complicity of a person in an isolated offence is neither evidence nor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is a “dangerous person” unless there is material suggesting his complicity in such cases, which lead to a reasonable conclusion that the person is a habitual criminal. The word “habitually” means “usually” and “generally”. Almost similar meaning is assigned to the word “habit” in Aiyar’s Judicial Dictionary, 10 Edn., at p.485. It does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. (See : Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M. M. Mehta) The expression “habitually” is very significant. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be continuity in the commission of those offences. (See : Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M. M. Mehta) The expression “habitually” is very significant. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be continuity in the commission of those offences. (See : Ayub v. S. N. Sinha) From one single transaction though consisting of several acts, a habit cannot be attributed to a person.” Exercise of whether this applicant can be held to be habituated or not from the totality of facts, is not to be undertaken. And, sufficient to recall the real test as to whether the activities would concern disturbance to the public order and whether fall out are of such a nature that the same would travel beyond capacity of the ordinary law to handle him and prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large. Reply to the said test shall need to be negation. Ordinary laws; if implemented effectively are potent enough to clear the said test and deal with the offender for curbing his activities sufficiently. Well laid down principles on the subject would not allow to sustain the order of detaining authority.” 9. In Special Civil Application No. 9542 of 2019, the detenue approached this Court seeking quashment of the order passed in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the PASA Act. The ground of registration of offence under the Indian Penal Code, cannot, by itself, bring the case of detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(c) of the PASA Act. It was submitted to the Court that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of detenue with respect to criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal routine life of people at large. On the basis of the criminal case, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for the whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order. 10. On the basis of the criminal case, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for the whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order. 10. The Court, after careful consideration of the material on record, held that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the First Information Report cannot have any bearing on the public order, as required under the Act and other relevant panel laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and the allegations levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of detenue within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. While so holding, the Court relied on decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 850 , where the Court has made out a clear distinction between the law and order and public order. 11. Apt would it be to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the said decision as under:- “You have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by commission of offences of riotous conduct, criminal intimidation and assault as detailed below :- (a) That on 3-11-65 at about 17/30 hrs. you assaulted Shri Ashutosh Dutta son of Shri Pyari Mohan Dutta of 55, M.C. Ghosh Lane, P.W. Howrah at the crossing of Panchanan Tala Road and M.C. Ghosh Lane, with knife causing bleeding injuries on his hand. (b) That on 8-10-66 at about 16.00 hrs. while Shri Mahesh Prosad Bhagal son of Balgobinda Bhagal of 16, Belilious Road, P.S. Howrah was playing in an open field, you along with your associates demanded money from him and on his refusal you hurled cracker on him causing grievous injury on his right leg- (c) That on 8-6-67 at about 11.40 hrs. you accosted one Sushanta Kumar Ghosh son of Manmatha Ghosh of 2/1/1, Danesh Sk. Lane inside a saloon at 255, Panchanantala Road on previous grudge and being intervened by Shri Shyamal Biswas son of Sandhya Biswas of 255, panchanantala Road, P.S. Howrah, you whipped out a dagger and assaulted Shri Biswas with the dagger causing injury on his hand. you accosted one Sushanta Kumar Ghosh son of Manmatha Ghosh of 2/1/1, Danesh Sk. Lane inside a saloon at 255, Panchanantala Road on previous grudge and being intervened by Shri Shyamal Biswas son of Sandhya Biswas of 255, panchanantala Road, P.S. Howrah, you whipped out a dagger and assaulted Shri Biswas with the dagger causing injury on his hand. (d) That on 23-11-67 at about 22.45 hrs. you hurled cracker on A.S.I.B. Kundu of Bantra P.S. While he was coming to Howrah along panchanantala Road in a wireless van and caused injury to the A.S.I. And damage to the wireless van. (e) That on 7-1-68 at about 18.30 hrs. you threatened one Satya Narayan Prosad son of Late purusattam Prosad of 10, Debnath Banerjee Lane, P.S. Howtab with assault at the crossing of M.C. Ghosh Lane and Bellilious Road. 6. You are hereby informed that you may make a representation to the State Government within 30 days of the receipt of the detention order and that such representation should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Home Department, Special Section, Writers' Buildings, Calcutta and forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail in which you are detained. 7. You are also informed that under Section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) the Advisory Board shall if you desire to be heard you in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you should intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government. Sd/- D.C. Mookerjee District Magistrate Howrah.” 8. On March 19, 1968 the Advisory Board made a report under s. 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention of Sri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Ch. Bose. On March 30, 1968 the Governor of West Bengal confirmed the detention order under s. 11 (1) of the Act. 9. Section 3 of the Act provides: “3. On March 19, 1968 the Advisory Board made a report under s. 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention of Sri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Ch. Bose. On March 30, 1968 the Governor of West Bengal confirmed the detention order under s. 11 (1) of the Act. 9. Section 3 of the Act provides: “3. (1) The Central Government or the State Government may-- (a) If satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-- (i) the defence of India, the relation of India with foreign powers or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the maintenance or supplies and a services essential to the community, or (b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence-in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such persons be detained. (2) Any of the following officers, namely,-(a) District Magistrates, (b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, (c) the Commissioner of Police for Bombay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad, (d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad, may satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause (a) of sub-section (1 ) exercise powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such order made 'after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has 'been approved by State Government. (4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have bearing on the necessity for the order.” Section 7 is to the following effect: “7. '(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity if making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.” 12. Yet another decision sought to be relied upon is rendered in the case of Sanjay @ Sunny @ Kekdo Maheshbhai Thakor vs State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 2565 of 2015, where again, the challenge was to the order of detention made under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the PASA Act. The petitioner had been detained as a bootlegger and dangerous person and the grounds of detention mentioned six cases registered with Bavla police station under the Gujarat Prohibition Act as two First Information Reports for the offences punishable under sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 307,332, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. There also, the Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors (supra) and held that the detaining authority failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner detenue adversely affect or were likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. The Court categorically held that because six cases have been registered, the Prohibition Act by itself would not have any bearing on the maintenance on public order. The petitioner was being tried under ordinary law and can be also punished, if offences are held to be proved against him, but the acts constituting offence cannot be said to have affected even tempo of the life of community much less public health. The Court, accordingly, had allowed this petition. 13. The petitioner was being tried under ordinary law and can be also punished, if offences are held to be proved against him, but the acts constituting offence cannot be said to have affected even tempo of the life of community much less public health. The Court, accordingly, had allowed this petition. 13. Apt would it be to refer to some of the relevant findings and observations of the Court from this decision, at this stage, it would be expedient to quote the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court as under :- “At this stage, it would be expedient to quote the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ramesh Vandha Modhwadiya through brother, Laxmanbhai Vandha v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2009(3) GLH 296 , wherein in paragraph 11, the Division Bench has observed as under:- “11. PASA Act has been enacted with a clear object to prevent the crime and to protect the society from antisocial elements and dangerous characters against perpetration of crime by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrents for them. Law is well settled that the power under the Act should be exercised with restraint and great caution. In order to pass an order of detention under the Act against any person, the detaining authority must be satisfied that he is a ‘dangerous person' within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the PASA Act, who habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act as according to sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act it is such ‘dangerous person' who for the purpose of Section 3 shall be deemed to be a person “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” against whom an order of detention may lawfully be made. Further, subsection (1) of Section 3 confers power on the State Government and a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police under the direction of the State Government to detain a person on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order'. The explanation attached to sub-section (4) of Section 3 reproduced above in the foregoing para contemplates that ‘public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-section (4) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 also provides that for the purpose of Section 3, a person shall be deemed to be ‘acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' when such person is a ‘dangerous person' and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a ‘dangerous person' his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression ‘public order'. A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order.” In paragraphs 15 and 16, the Division Bench has, after considering the factual position on the record, observed as under:- “15. We find that even going by the F.I.R. On the date of incident, it is alleged that the dentenu's father had a pistol with him. There is nothing to show that he had fired with the pistol or caused any harm to anybody. Possession of pistol by detenu's father without license may be an offence so far as father is concerned and not the son, the detenu. Further, it is also to be noted that though they had disturbed the programme, later, the programme continued without any disturbance. Further, they had not caused any harm or bodily injury to anybody present there. Even in the F.I.R. It is stated that they had not caused any serious harm or injury to anybody. Further, it is also to be noted that though they had disturbed the programme, later, the programme continued without any disturbance. Further, they had not caused any harm or bodily injury to anybody present there. Even in the F.I.R. It is stated that they had not caused any serious harm or injury to anybody. At the most, in our view, the incident occurred on that day might have raised problems of law and order, but we find it impossible to see that they impinged public order. No motive was also attributed against the detenu for creating such an incident. In order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order to fall out and extend and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature the ordinary law cannot deal with it or prevent the subversive activities affecting the society. In our view, those incidents are not sufficient to take action against the detenu under the provisions of the PASA Act. We are, therefore, unable to agree that the incident in question occurred on 10.02.2008 would be sufficient to disturb the tempo of life of the community so as to disturb the public tranquility and public order. 16. The incident referred to in the F.I.R. Had occurred on 10.02.2008 and criminal case was registered against the detenu and others and are being tried for the offences punishable under Sections 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act and Section 25(1B)A.B.) of the Arms Act. Registration of cases and trial undertaken would be sufficient enough to contain those situations, but not sufficient to detain a person, and to characterise him as a ‘dangerous person' curtailing his life and liberty. There is nothing to show that the detenu is a habitual offender, apart from the solitary incident occurred on 10.02.2008. May be, a solitary act has the propensity of affecting the tempo of life and public tranquility, but the incident occurred on 10.02.2008 will not fall under that category. The detaining authority could not point out any other incident in which he was involved or a criminal case registered against him. Even the three witnesses have also not filed any complaints against the detenu. The detaining authority could not point out any other incident in which he was involved or a criminal case registered against him. Even the three witnesses have also not filed any complaints against the detenu. The solitary incident pointed out in the F.I.R. And the reach and potentiality of that incident cannot be said to be so grave to disturb even the tempo or normal life of the community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. The mere fact that the order narrates the detenu as a ‘dangerous person' without any materials, a conclusion cannot be drawn that the detenu is a ‘dangerous person', unless the incident has reach and potentiality, and a single incident pointed out as such would not indicate that the detenu is a habitual offender. Power under the Act to detain a person in jail has to be exercised with restraint and great caution.” In the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the matter of Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v/s. State of Manipur and others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 618 , the Supreme Court has considered all aspects pertaining to individual liberty and has also held that in a criminal case, if it is initiated against the detenu, the prosecution would not be in a position to procure evidence to sustain conviction cannot be a ground to pass an order of preventive detention under the National Security Act. In the result, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order of detention dated 30 December, 2014 passed by the respondent authority is hereby ordered to be quashed and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute.” 14. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, it can be noticed that there are two cases against present petitioner being CR.No.I- 180 of 2019 on 14.11.2019 registered at Gomtipur police station of the offences punishable under sections 379, and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and CR.No.I-181 of 2019 again registerd at Gomtipur police station on 15.11.2019 for the offence punishable under sections 392 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act. His order of externment was passed being order dated M/22/19 on 23.09.2019 which had been served upon him on 27.09.2019 and he was externed for the period of 02 years vide order dated 15.11.2019 and since he made a breach, at Gomtipur police station offence being CR.No.II-3326 of 2019 came to be registered under section 142 of the Gujarat Police Act. 15. It is also to be noted that in the past, he was the detenue of PASA vide order No.258 of 2018. The same had been challenged by the petitioner and had been quashed by this Court. 16. Two secret witnesses, who have been relied upon for the purpose of continuing the exercise of Board against the present petitioner has stated of the apprehension from the present applicant, since he forces them to retain muddamal articles and also allegedly uses lethal weapons in the public and serious threats were given to the residents of the area. They both have stated that they did not muster the courage to file any complaint against this man. Since the instance of this man being a PASA detenue in the past has already been dealt with by this Court in Special Civil Application No.6180 of 2019 and the order has been quashed and set aside, the same cannot be regarded by this Court while taking into consideration his detention in the present case. It is also to be noted that out of the two secret witness, none of them is the complainant anywhere. 17. Assuming that there is a serious threat apprehended by either of them in lodging a complaint, the police officer can always be the complainant in such matters, which has not happened in the instant case. Noticing the nature of offence of 14.11.2019 and 15.11.2019, the Court is of the opinion that the same can be tackled by the ordinary law, for which the recourse cannot be taken to the provision of PASA Act. He appears be causing issues of law and order but he cannot be said to be impinging public order nor would offence of theft in the one matter and offence of Section 392 of IPC more particularly, in wake of the settled law, which has been discussed hereinabove, would permit to term him as dangerous person. 18. He appears be causing issues of law and order but he cannot be said to be impinging public order nor would offence of theft in the one matter and offence of Section 392 of IPC more particularly, in wake of the settled law, which has been discussed hereinabove, would permit to term him as dangerous person. 18. However, considering his past antecedents and these two offences, the Court while quashing and setting aside the order Impunged shall need to take into consideration voluntary nature of undertaking sought to be made before this Court by learned advocate, on instructions, from the petitioner. 19. While quashing and setting aside the order of detention dated 27.11.2019 passed by respondent No.1 and directing the jail authority to release the detenue from the detention, if not required in any other matter, the petitioner is directed to file an undertaking within 07 days before this Court and before the Police Commissioner by personally attending to his office. He shall abide by the order of dated M/22/19 on 23.09.2019 without fail and shall also further ensure the surety of his good conduct, to the satisfaction of the officer concerned, lest the officer concerned shall be at liberty to take necessary action for breach that may be committed of the undertaking. After furnishing undertaking, he shall immediately leave Ahmedabad district. 20. Accordingly, the petition to the aforesaid extent is allowed. Petition stands disposed of accordingly.