JUDGMENT : V.P. PATEL, J. 1. The Appellant-Original Plaintiff-Aakar Construction (for short ‘the Contractor’) has filed the First Appeal No. 3406 of 2001 under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940, (for short ‘the Act 1940’) being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge (SD), Godhra, District Panchmahal (for brevity ‘Learned Trial Court’) dated 22.9.2000 in Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 1989, preferred by the Appellant Contractor against the Respondent No. 1 Original defendant No. 1 National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. (for short ‘the Corporation’) under Section 14 read with Section 17 of the Act, 1940 which was dismissed. 1.1 The Appellant-Original Defendant No. 1-Aakar Construction (for short ‘the Contractor’) has filed the first appeal No. 3407 of 2001 under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940, (for short ‘the Act, 1940’) being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge (SD), Godhra, District Panchmahal (Learned Trial Court) dated 22.9.2000 in Special Civil Suit No. 129 of 1989, preferred by the Respondent No. 1 Original Plaintiff National Building Construction Corporation Ltd (for short ‘the Corporation’) against the appellant Original defendant No. 1 Aakar Contractor, under Sections 17, 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940 which was allowed and the Award passed by the Sole Arbitrator dated 14.6.1989 is quashed and set aside. 1.2 As per Para 1 of the impugned judgment, it is stated that “Both the Suits have been directed to be consolidated and to be disposed of by the common judgment. Therefore, both the parties in both the matters have laid their evidence in Special Civil Suit No. 129 of 1989 and accordingly I am herewith to dispose of both the suits by the common judgment in the interest of justice.” On perusing the Rojkam dated 11.09.2000 of the Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 1989, it is stated that “This instant suit is ordered to be consolidated with Special Suit No. 129 of 1989. However, the record proceeded in the matter referred by both the learned advocates for the parties therefore, exhibited as under.” Considering the facts that the Special Civil Suit Nos. However, the record proceeded in the matter referred by both the learned advocates for the parties therefore, exhibited as under.” Considering the facts that the Special Civil Suit Nos. 94 of 1989 and 129 of 1989 were consolidated and learned Trial Court has disposed both the suits by common judgment and order and learned advocates for the parties have no objection if both these Appeals are disposed of by common judgment, this Court has decided to dispose of both these First Appeals by common judgment. 2. Heard learned advocate Mr. G.T. Dayani for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Kedar B. Beniwale with learned advocate Mr. K.M. Patel for the Respondent No. 1 Accused. Though the Rule is duly served to the Respondent No. 2-Arbitrator, has not chosen to appear before the Court. Facts of the Case: 3. As per the memo of appeal as well as the plaint filed by the Corporation before the Trial Court the facts of the case are as under: 3.1 The Corporation has invited tenders for the construction of 20,000/- M.T. Capacity go-down at village Bhamiya, Taluka Godhra in Panchmahal District. The Contractor submitted the tender for 36% above the estimated cost of Rs. 81,08,552/-. The tender proposal sent by the Contractor was accepted and there was a contract to complete the work for Rs. 1,10,27,630/- with other Part-II Electricity Work for different amount. The Contractor was informed vide letter dated 14.2.1985 by the Corporation to complete the execution of Agreement and start work at once. 3.2 The Corporation, a Government of India Undertaking had entered into the agreement/contract for the construction of 20,000 MT capacity go down at Village Bahamian, Talus Godhra, District Panchmahal with the Contractor. The Appellant is a registered firm carrying on business at Alvarado. 3.3 The time limit to carryout the work and work was to be completed within nine months from the 30th day after the issuance of the order. The parties entered into the contract for the work on 14.2.1985 and therefore the work was to be completed by 14.12.1985. As per the record, due to some extra work for road and drains, the time was extended and the work was completed on 20.2.1986. However, later on dispute and differences arose between the Corporation on one hand and the Contractor on the other hand. As per the record, due to some extra work for road and drains, the time was extended and the work was completed on 20.2.1986. However, later on dispute and differences arose between the Corporation on one hand and the Contractor on the other hand. 3.4 As there was a dispute between the two parties and in view of the stipulated condition providing the arbitration clause, the matter was referred to the sole Arbitrator who is Original Defendant No. 2 in both the Suits (Respondent No. 2 in the present Appeals). The Arbitrator after affording the opportunities to both the parties made an Award on 14.06.1989. The Arbitrator informed the parties about the sign and making the Award. Therefore the Appellant herein instituted the Suit being Special Suit No. 94/1989 by presenting the Award for getting the decree. 3.5 On the other hand the Corporation (Original Plaintiff in Special Civil Suit No. 129/1989 and Original Defendant No. 1 in Special Civil Suit No. 94/1989) has, on receipt of the process, filed the Suit being Special Civil Suit No. 129/1989 before the Court to set aside the Award on the ground of alleged misconduct. The Corporation in Special Civil Suit No. 94/1989 has challenged the Award on the ground of maintainability. It is contended by the Corporation that the Contractor has no right to file the Award in the court inasmuch as it is the Arbitrator who can file the Award in the Court under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, 1940. The Corporation further contended in the Suit being Special Civil Suit No. 129/1989 under Section 30 r/w Sections 33 and 17 of the Act, 1940 to set aside the Award by way of objection to the Award and therefore the suit cannot be decreed. 3.6 Considering the facts and legal issues involved in the case, the following issues have been framed by learned Trial Court: (1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant No. 2 has misconducted himself in Arbitration proceeding? (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that Award has been improperly pronounced or is otherwise invalid? (3) Whether Award is liable to be set aside? (4) Whether Award by Sole Arbitrator is properly filed? (5) What order and decree? 3.7 The learned Court has consolidated both the Suits. Both the parties have led their evidence in Special Civil Suit No. 129/1989. (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that Award has been improperly pronounced or is otherwise invalid? (3) Whether Award is liable to be set aside? (4) Whether Award by Sole Arbitrator is properly filed? (5) What order and decree? 3.7 The learned Court has consolidated both the Suits. Both the parties have led their evidence in Special Civil Suit No. 129/1989. The learned Court has passed the common judgment. The Learned Trial Court, by the impugned judgment and order passed dated 22.9.2000 in Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 1989 preferred by the Contractor was dismissed and Special Civil Suit No. 129 of 1989 preferred by the Corporation was allowed and the Award made by the Sole Arbitrator dated 14.6.1989 is quashed and set aside. Hence these present appeals are filed. Arguments of the Learned Advocates for the Parties 4. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has argued on following points: (i) General (ii) Scope and extent of examination of the Award of the Arbitrator under the Act, 1940, by the Court. (iii) About Arbitrator misconducted himself or the proceedings? (iv) Power of the Arbitrator to award interest. (v) Compliance of Section 14 of the Act, 1940 4.1 learned Advocate for the respondent has also argued and replied in line of argument advance by the appellant. Therefore I will consider and appreciate the arguments point wise. 5. Considering the facts, legal points involved in the case and arguments advanced by the learned for the parties following points for determination are arisen for consideration of this appeal: (i) Whether learned Trial Court has rightly considered the scope and extent of examination of the award of the arbitrator under the Act, 1940? (ii) Whether learned Trial Court has rightly held that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings? (iii) Whether the Arbitrator can award interest at three stages ire, per-reference period, pendent lite and post award period? (iv) Whether the Award was properly filed before the Court under Section 14 of the Act, 1940? (v) Whether the Trial Court has justly exercised the power to set a side the Award passed by the Arbitrator? (vi) What order? 6. (iii) Whether the Arbitrator can award interest at three stages ire, per-reference period, pendent lite and post award period? (iv) Whether the Award was properly filed before the Court under Section 14 of the Act, 1940? (v) Whether the Trial Court has justly exercised the power to set a side the Award passed by the Arbitrator? (vi) What order? 6. Finding of the above points for determination are given below for which reasons stated their under: (i) Negative (ii) Negative (iii) Affirmative (iv) Affirmative (v) Negative (vi) As per final order Point No. I - The scope and extent of examination of the award of the arbitrator under the Act, 1940 by the Court 7. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has argued that the judgment and decree dated 22.9.2000 passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the Special Suit No. 94/1989 i.e. Application under Section 17 of the Act, 1940 filed by the appellant and allowing Special Civil Suit No. 129/1989 under Sections 30, 33 and 17 of the Act, 1940 and setting aside the Award passed by the Sole Arbitrator dated 14.6.1989 is contrary to law, illegal and wholly erroneous. That the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is against the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various pronouncements. 7.1 Learned Advocate for the Appellant has submitted that the Civil Court is not sitting as an appellate court over the Award and cannot review the reasons shown by the Arbitrator and there is limited ambit open for the Trial Court that too on the limited ground which is available for setting aside the Award. Since none of the grounds were raised in the application under section 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940, the learned Trial Court has committed serious error in setting aside the Award. That the learned Trial Court has overlooked the nature of the grounds raised in the Application under Section 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940 and has interfered the Award by exercising the jurisdiction impermissible under the law. That the learned Trial Court has overlooked the nature of the grounds raised in the Application under Section 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940 and has interfered the Award by exercising the jurisdiction impermissible under the law. 7.2 Learned advocate for the appellant has cited following judgments: (i) Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 532 (ii) U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Searsole Chemicals Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 397 (iii) Bhagwati Oxygen Ltd. vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462 (iv) State of Rajasthan vs. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. (1994) 6 SCC 485 (v) Rajesh Khanna vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2005 (0) AIJ-DL 1326131 (vi) Indian Hume Pipe Company Limited vs. State of Astrakhan, (2009) 10 SCC 187 (vii) Executive Engineer, Damanganga Project vs. Mukeshbhai Dhanjibhai Patel, 2012 (0) AIJ-GJ 227064 (viii) National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. Indus Engineering and Construction Company, 2015 (0) AIJ-GJ 234859 (ix) Harish Chandra and Company vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 9 SCC 478 8. The learned advocate for the respondent has argued that the Award is not speaking Award and it is violating the Clause 25 of the Agreement. Thus, the Award is without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of arbitration. That the Arbitrator has acted illegally and contrary to evidence and allowed various claims mentioned therein. That the amount Awarded is highly excessive and unreasonable and on account of non application of mind on the facts of the case, the Award becomes void and illegal. 8.1 Learned advocate for the Respondent has argued that the Corporation has neither accepted the Award nor expressed any willingness shown to accept the same. That the Corporation has filed Special Civil Suit No. 129 of 1989 under Section 30, Section 33 read with 17 of the Act, 1940 to set aside the Award by way of objection to the Award of the Arbitrator. That the Arbitrator has rightly rejected the Claims No. 2 to 5, 7, 11, 13 to 15, 18 to 20. That the Arbitrator has wrongly awarded for the Claims No. 1, 6, 8 to 10, 12, 16, 17 and 21. The amount of Rs. 11,58,980/- is not required to be awarded by the Arbitrator. Therefore, the appeals of the Contractor are required to be dismissed. 9. That the Arbitrator has wrongly awarded for the Claims No. 1, 6, 8 to 10, 12, 16, 17 and 21. The amount of Rs. 11,58,980/- is not required to be awarded by the Arbitrator. Therefore, the appeals of the Contractor are required to be dismissed. 9. The appellable orders are enumerated in section 39 and the Procedure and powers of Courts are provided in section 41 of the Act, 1940 read with section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as under: (A) 39. Appellable orders: (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order: An order: (iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement. (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award. (B) 41. Procedure and powers of Court: Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made there under: (a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, to all appeals, under this Act. (C) Code of civil Procedure 1908: Section 107. Powers of Appellate Court: (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power: (a) to determine a case finally. (b) to remand a case. (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial. (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. 10. The appellable orders are identified in the section 39 of the Act, 1940. In the present case the disputes are pertains to the setting aside an award, which is appellable order. As per section 41 of the Act, 1940, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall apply to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals, under this Act 1940. In the present case the disputes are pertains to the setting aside an award, which is appellable order. As per section 41 of the Act, 1940, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall apply to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals, under this Act 1940. It is provided in section 107 of the Code that the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. 11. To analyze the Scope and extent of examination of the Award of the Arbitrator, or power of the Civil Court under the Act, 1940, when award is filed by the arbitrator or party has moved for pronouncing judgment according to Award, one has to refer following sections of the Act, 1940: (A) Section 17. Judgment in terms of Award: Where the Court sees no cause to remit the Award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the Award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the Award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the Award and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the Award. (B) Section 31. Jurisdiction: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the awarded under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed and to no other Court. (3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may be, filed and to no other Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that Court and in no other Court. (C) Section 33. Arbitration agreement or Award to be contested by application - Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an Award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also and it may pass such orders for the discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit. 12. Learned advocate for appellant has cited following judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein the scope and extent of examination of the award of the arbitrator under the Act, 1940 by the Court has been discussed. 12.1 Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Private Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 532 : Para 9 - The scope and extent of examination by the Court of the award made by an arbitrator has been laid down in various decisions. It has to be noted that there is a tread in modern times that reasons should be stated in the award though the question whether the reasons are necessary in ordinary arbitration awards between the parties is pending adjudication by the Constitution Bench of this Court. Even, however, if it be held that it is obligatory for the arbitrator to state reasons, it is not obligatory to give any detailed judgment. An award of arbitrator should be read reasonably as a whole to find out the implication and the meaning thereof. Even, however, if it be held that it is obligatory for the arbitrator to state reasons, it is not obligatory to give any detailed judgment. An award of arbitrator should be read reasonably as a whole to find out the implication and the meaning thereof. Short intelligible indications of the grounds should be discernible to find out the mind of the arbitrator for his action even if it be enjoined that in all cases of award by an arbitrator reasons have to be stated. The reasons should not only be intelligible but should also deal either expressly or impliedly with the substantial points that have been raised. Even in a case where the arbitrator has to state reasons, the sufficiency of the reasons depends upon the facts and the circumstances of the case. The Court, however, does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons. The Court can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusion, or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is erroneous. See the observations of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Indian Carbon Ltd. (1988) 3 SCC 36 . Para 10 - It was contended before us that the arbitrator has made a non-speaking award. It was obliged to make a speaking award, it was submitted by terms of the order of this Court. We cannot sustain this submission because it is not obligatory as yet for the arbitrator to give reasons in his decision. The arbitrator, however, has in this case indicated his mind. It appears to us that the point that the non-speaking award is per se bad was not agitated before the High Court. We come to that conclusion from the perusal of the judgment under appeal though, however, this point has not been taken in the appellants appeal. It is one thing to say that an award is unintelligible and is another to say that the award was bad because it was a non-speaking award. The point taken was that the award was unintelligible and not that it was non-speaking, but there was nothing unintelligible about the award. Para 11 - Reasonableness as such of an award unless the award is per se preposterous or absurd is not a matter for the court to consider. The point taken was that the award was unintelligible and not that it was non-speaking, but there was nothing unintelligible about the award. Para 11 - Reasonableness as such of an award unless the award is per se preposterous or absurd is not a matter for the court to consider. Appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is ordinarily not a matter for the court. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word reasonable. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and the circumstances in which he thinks. The word reasonable has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. See the observations on this point in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. M/s. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 . Judged by the aforesaid yardstick the award cannot be condemned as unreasonable. 12.2 Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462 : (25) This Court has considered the provisions of Section 30 of the Act is several cases and has held that the court while exercising the power under Section 30, cannot re-appreciate the evidence or examine correctness of the conclusions arrived a t by the Arbitrator. The jurisdiction is not appellate in nature and an award passed by an Arbitrator cannot be set aside on the ground that it was erroneous. It is not open to court to interfere with the award merely because in the opinion of the court, other view is equally possible. It is only when the court is satisfied that the Arbitrator had misconduct himself or the proceedings or the award had been improperly procured or is ‘otherwise’ invalid that the court may set aside such award. (26) In the leading decision of Hodgkinson vs. Fernie, (1857) 140 ER 712, Williams, J. stated: “They law has for many years been settled and remains so at this day, that, where a cause or matters in difference are referred to an arbitrator, whether a lawyer or a layman, he is constituted the sole and final judge of all questions both of law and of fact. Many cases have fully established that position, where awards have been attempted to be set aside on the ground of the admission of an incompetent witness or the rejection of a competent one. The court has invariably met those applications by saying, you have constituted your own tribunal; you are bound by its decision.” (Emphasis supplied) (27) In Union of India vs. Rallia Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1685 , this Court said: “An award being a decision of an arbitrator whether a lawyer or a layman chosen by the parties, and entrusted with power to decide a dispute submitted to him is ordinarily not liable to be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous. In order to make arbitration effective and the awards enforceable, machinery is devised for lending the assistance of the ordinary Courts. The Court is also entrusted with power to modify or correct the award on the ground of imperfect form or clerical errors, or decision on question not referred, which are severable from those referred. The Court has also power to remit the award then it has left some matters, referred undermined, or when the award is indefinite, or where the objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of the award. The Court may also set aside an award on the ground of corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator, or that a party has been guilty of fraudulent concealment or willful deception. But the Court cannot interfere with the award if otherwise proper on the ground that the decision appears to it to be erroneous. The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by the agreement. The award is the decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, and the Civil Courts which are entrusted with the power to facilitate arbitration and to effectuate the awards, cannot exercise appellate powers over the decision. Wrong or right the decision is binding if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievance in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement.” (Emphasis supplied) (28) In U.P. Hotels vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, (1989) 1 SCC 359 , after referring to Halsbury's Law of England, 4th edition, Vol. Wrong or right the decision is binding if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievance in the manner provided by the arbitration agreement.” (Emphasis supplied) (28) In U.P. Hotels vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, (1989) 1 SCC 359 , after referring to Halsbury's Law of England, 4th edition, Vol. 2, Para 624, Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) stated that an award of an arbitrator may be set aside for error of law appearing on the face of it, though that jurisdiction is not lightly to be exercised. If a specific question of law is submitted to the arbitrator for his decision and he decides it, the fact that the decision is erroneous does not make the award had on its face so as to permit it being set aside and where the question referred for arbitration is a question of construction, which is, generally speaking, a question of law, the arbitrator's decision cannot be set aside only because the court would itself have come to a different conclusion; but if it appears on the face of the award that the arbitrator has proceeded illegally, as, for instance, by deciding on evidence which was not admissible, or on principles of construction which the law does not countenance, there is error in law which may be ground for setting aside the award. (29) In Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. vs. Eastern Engineering Enterprises and Another, (1999) 9 SCC 283 , this Court after considering several decisions on the point, held that if an Arbitrator has acted arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or beyond the terms of the agreement, an award passed by him can be set aside. In such cases, the Arbitrator can be said to have acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred on him. (30) In U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Searsole Chemicals Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 397 , this Court held that where the Arbitrator had applied his mind to the pleadings, considered the evidence adduced before him and passed an award, the court could not interfere by reappraising the matter as if it were an appeal. (31) In Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2001) 5 SCC 691 , it was observed that an Arbitrator is a Judge appointed by the parties and as such the award passed by him is not to be lightly interfered with. (31) In Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2001) 5 SCC 691 , it was observed that an Arbitrator is a Judge appointed by the parties and as such the award passed by him is not to be lightly interfered with. (32) In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. M/s. Annapurna Construction, (2003) 8 SCC 154 , this Court held that there is distinction between error within jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. The role of the Arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract and if he acts in accordance with the terms of the agreement, his decision cannot be set aside. It is only when he travels beyond the contract that he acts in excess of jurisdiction in which case, the award passed by him becomes vulnerable and can be questioned in an appropriate court. 12.3 State of Rajasthan vs. Puri Contractor Ltd. (1994) 6 SCC 485 : (26) THE arbitrator is the final arbiter for the dispute between the parties and it is not open to challenge the award on the ground that the arbitrator has drawn his own conclusion or has failed to appreciate the facts. In Sudarsan Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala it has been held by this court that there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. One has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess of the jurisdiction. Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid is a decision within the competency of the arbitrator. By purporting to construe the contract the court cannot take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and as such beyond jurisdiction. If on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded is a possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court. If on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded is a possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court. Where the reasons have been given by the arbitrator in making the award the court cannot examine the reasonableness of the reasons. If the parties have selected their own forum, the deciding forum must be conceded the power of appraisement of evidence. The arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as the quantity of evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator. (27) IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, it has been held by this court that appraisement of evidence by the arbitrator is ordinarily never a matter which the court questions and considers. It may be possible that on the same evidence the court may arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the arbitrator but that by itself is no ground for setting aside the award. It has also been held in the said decision that it is difficult to give an exact definition of the word reasonable. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasies of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. In cases not covered by authority, the verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge sitting as a jury usually determines what is reasonable in each particular case. The word reasonable has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably knows or ought to know. An arbitrator acting as a judge has to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life. Therefore, where reasons germane and relevant for the arbitrator to hold in the manner he did, have been indicated, it cannot be said that the reasons are unreasonable. (28) IN this case, claims before the arbitrators arise from the contract between the parties. Therefore, where reasons germane and relevant for the arbitrator to hold in the manner he did, have been indicated, it cannot be said that the reasons are unreasonable. (28) IN this case, claims before the arbitrators arise from the contract between the parties. It is well settled that if a question of law is referred to arbitrator and the arbitrator comes to a conclusion, it is not open to challenge the award on the ground that an alternative view of law is possible. In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions of this court in Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. vs. Union of India and Kapoor Nilokheri Cooperative Dairy Farm Society. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Indian Carbon Ltd. this court has held that the court does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons. The court can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is erroneous. (29) IT may also be mentioned here that it is not necessary to indicate in the award computation made for various heads and it is open to the arbitrator to give a lump sum award. In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions made in State of Rajasthan vs. R.S. Sharma and Co. and State of Orissa vs. Lall Bros. and Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan vs. Hukumchand Mills Ltd. (30) IN the State of Orissa vs. Lall Bros. it has been held that an award is conclusive as a judgment between the parties and the court is entitled to set aside an award only if the arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceedings or when the award has been made after the issue of an order by the court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act or where an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid under Section 30 of the Act. An award may be set aside by the court on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument, it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion. An award may be set aside by the court on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument, it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion. (Emphasis supplied) (31) A court of competent jurisdiction has both right and duty to decide the lis presented before it for adjudication according to the best understanding of law and facts involved in the lis by the judge presiding over the court. Such decision even if erroneous either in factual determination or application of law correctly, is a valid one and binding inter parties. It does not, therefore, stand to reason that the arbitrators award will be per se invalid and inoperative for the simple reason that the arbitrator has failed to appreciate the facts and has committed error in appreciating correct legal principle in basing the award. An erroneous decision of a court of law is open to judicial review by way of appeal or revision in accordance with the provisions of law. Similarly, an award rendered by an arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the arbitrator is a judge by choice of the parties, and more often than not, a person with little or no legal background, the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration by way of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award in the Arbitration Act. Over the decades, judicial decisions have indicated the parameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the courts have disfavoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and fact on the score of mis-appreciation and misreading of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to preserve the award as far as possible. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of “legal misconduct” of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is necessary, however, to put a note of caution that in the anxiety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the court should not reappraise the evidences intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out that the conclusion drawn from some facts, by the arbitrator is, according to the understanding of the court, erroneous. Such exercise of power which can be exercised by an appellate court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is alien to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award under the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible. Similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. Similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In ultimate analysis, it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous finding easily demonstrable from the materials on record and application of principle of law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous. It may be indicated here that however objectively the problem may be viewed, the subjective element inherent in the judge deciding the problem, is bound to creep in and influence the decision. By long training in the art of dispassionate analysis, such subjective element is, however, reduced to minimum. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, the challenge to the validity of the impugned award is to be considered with reference to judicial decisions on the subject. (32)... Even if it is assumed that on the materials on record, a different view could have been taken and the arbitrators have failed to consider the documents and materials on record in their proper perspective, the award is not liable to be struck down in view of judicial decisions referred to hereinbefore. Error apparent on the face of the record does not mean that on closer scrutiny of the import of documents and materials on record, the finding made by the arbitrator may be held to be erroneous. Judicial decisions over the decades have indicated that an error of law or fact committed by an arbitrator by itself does not constitute misconduct warranting interference with the award.... Hence, on the score of alleged misreading, misconstruction, mis-appreciation of the materials on record or failure to consider some of the materials in their proper perspective, the impugned award is not liable to be set aside....Lump sum award by itself is not illegal as held in a number of decisions of this court....Considering the magnitude of work involving costly machines and materials, if the two arbitrators in their wide experience have quantified the total damage and have given the award for Rs. 1 crore in favour of the respondent, it cannot be held that such award is so patently unjust and irrational and shocking to the conscience of the court, that the same should be interfered with. 13. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in cited judgments, Section 17, 31 and 33 of the Act, 1940, the power or scope and examination of the award of the arbitrator by the Civil Court is limited. The Civil Court has not to consider and examine the award as an Appellate Court and do not venture in the reasons stated by the Arbitrator. Here in this case, the learned Trial Court has considered and examined the award and re-appreciated the evidence on record, which is not permissible under the Act, 1940. Learned Trial Court has acted beyond the scope of the jurisdiction authorized under the Act, 1940. Considering the fact and circumstances of the case, I decided point No. 1 in negative. Point No. II - Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings? 14. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has argued that the learned Trial Court has not properly construed the provisions of Section 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940 and the learned Trial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction overlooking the legal position enumerated under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940. 14.1 That the learned Trial Court ought to have appreciated that the word ‘misconduct’ does not embaress in its sweep, the procedural irregularities if at all were committed by the Arbitrator in causing the original Award and the relevant record by filing in the Court, and therefore it would not give any ground much less the ground within framework of Section 30 for setting it aside. 14.2 That the learned Trial Court has committed error by answering the Issue No. 2 in affirmative solely on the ground that the Award has not been properly filed in the court by overlooking the fact that even if such a ground is permissible the same would not be sufficient to set aside the Award within the scope of Section 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940. 14.3 Learned Advocate for the Appellant has further argued that even if the reasons and conclusions which are based on the assumption are to be taken correct, in that case setting aside of the Award is not permissible as neither there is any apparent error on the face of Award not is there any misconduct on the part of the learned Arbitrator in any manner not is there any ground or supporting evidence of misconducting the proceedings. 14.4 It is also submitted that the conclusion on the evidence arrived at by the learned Trial Court are absolutely incorrect, without any basis and justification and on the contrary the learned Trial Court has exceeded the jurisdiction by throwing aspersions on the Arbitrator to extend the benefits in favour of the Contractor. This presumption is based on no evidence. 14.5 It is further argument that the learned Trial Court ought to have appreciated that the Award dated 14.6.1989 is a reasoned Award. That the learned Trial Court has completely failed to appreciate that out of the total claim of Rs. 36,00,000/- the Arbitrator has Awarded the claim of Rs. 11,58,980/- and that too with simple interest @ 12% and the claims Awarded by the Arbitrator were just, fair and reasonable and therefore the reasons given by the Arbitrator could not have been reviewed by the Hon'ble Trial Court. 15 Learned Advocate for the respondent has argued that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself and the proceedings. The Arbitrator has to assign the reason for claim of amount of more than Rs. 25000/-. That the Award is also not reasoned. Therefore, it is otherwise invalid as per the agreement. It amounts misconduct on the part of Arbitrator. 15.1 It is further argued that the Arbitrator has acted beyond jurisdiction, without authority of law, it can be said to be misconduct under Section 30 of the Act, 1940. That the Arbitrator has committed illegality in awarding interest. That the Arbitrator has acted against the principle established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Gujarat Water Supply Sewage Board vs. Unique Contractor. Ultimately learned advocate for the respondent has requested the Court to dismiss both the appeals with Cost. 16. That the Arbitrator has committed illegality in awarding interest. That the Arbitrator has acted against the principle established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Gujarat Water Supply Sewage Board vs. Unique Contractor. Ultimately learned advocate for the respondent has requested the Court to dismiss both the appeals with Cost. 16. Before discussing the evidence on record it may be assistive to see factual aspects in terms of the events happened since agreement came into force between the parties, which reads thus: S. No. Date Nature of Event 1 12.01.1985 Date of agreement between parties 2 14.02.1985 Letter written by the Corporation to the Contractor 3 23.01.1988 Claim presented by Contractor before Arbitrator 4 27.01.1988 Letter by the Contractor for refund 5 10.08.1988 Appointment of Arbitrator 6 03.09.1988 Corporation has not received letter 7 22.09.1988 Arbitrator entered into the reference 8 30.09.1988 Contractor has filed documents 9 07.01.1989 Corporation has filed counter claim 10 10.04.1989 First hearing at Patna 11 11.04.1989 First hearing at Patna 12 17.04.1989 Hearing at New Delhi 13 19.04.1989 Hearing at New Delhi 14 21.04.1989 Forwarding letter of the Arbitrator to the Court 15 29.04.1989 Claim Nos. 18, 20 by claimant 16 14.06.1989 Date of Award declared 17 16.06.1989 Time for extended 18 17.06.1989 Letter of Arbitrator to party for intimation and for necessary action Exh.27 19 10.07.1989 Special Suit No. 94 is filed (application) 20 12.07.1989 Letter of Arbitrator address to the corporation intimating making and signing of Award Exh.26 21 15.07.1989 Summons issued by the Court 22 21.07.1989 Summons received by the Corporation 23 26.06.1990 The Arbitrator has forwarded the record of case 17. Learned Trial Court has in Para 17 of the impugned judgment quoted the list of claims given at Annexure A by the contractor. It will be benefited to refer hereunder claim amount and the amount granted by the Arbitrator: S. No. Description of claim Amount claimed Amount Awarded 1 Anti. Termite treatment: (a) Due to mode of measurement. 16541.84 475873.16 (b) Due to increase in the quantity owing to change in draings. 467429.15 2 Due to more of measurement for R.C.C. band at tie level. 21392.15 Rejected 3 Due to mode of measurement for centering and shuttering for R.C.C. band at Tie level. 6550.12 Rejected 4 Due to mode of measurement of rolloing shutters. 7780.19 Rejected 5 Extra for pdg. ‘J’ hooks on AC sheets. 467429.15 2 Due to more of measurement for R.C.C. band at tie level. 21392.15 Rejected 3 Due to mode of measurement for centering and shuttering for R.C.C. band at Tie level. 6550.12 Rejected 4 Due to mode of measurement of rolloing shutters. 7780.19 Rejected 5 Extra for pdg. ‘J’ hooks on AC sheets. 52806.50 Rejected 6 Extra due to additional lead of earth work. 20151.10 20151.10 7 Escalation in the rate of structural steel/reinforcement. 384282.05 Rejected 8 Refund of deduction made by the department for cartage of cement. 13324.41 13324 9 Loss due to irregular payments. 1038741.28 240149.00 10 Escalation in the cost of petrol, oil and lubricants. 5916.14 5916.00 11 Difference in the rate for pdg/laying C.C. 1:5:10 under floors and C.C. 1:5:10 in fdn. and plinth. 65514.68 Rejected 12 Losses on account of overstay at site during extended period of contract. 318724.73 132000.00 13 Losses due to deviation beyond 59% in superstructure and 100% in foundation. 147965.73 Rejected 14 Loss of profit due to savings in the quantities of schedule ‘B’. 433410.68 Rejected 15 Losses due to over all rise in prices. 566336.43 Rejected 16 Reduction in the rate of premix carpet for road. 32861.72 32861.00 17 Refund of deductions made from the final bill due to change in the pitch of the roof. 66008.50 6608.00 18 Restoration of loss due to interruption owing to occupation of Godwons. 64000.00 Rejected 19 Restoration of loss due to non payment of bills incurred at our other projects. 200000.00 Rejected 20 Loss due to non use of labour owing to non availability of materials supplied by the department. 50000 Rejected 21 Interest -- 248640 18. The Trial Court may set aside award on the ground enumerated in the Section 30 of the Act, 1940, which reads as under: “Section 30. Grounds for setting aside Award - An Award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) that an Arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings. (b) that an Award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35. (c) that an Award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.” 19. (b) that an Award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35. (c) that an Award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.” 19. Learned advocate for the appellant has cited the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Harish Chandra and Company vs. State of U.P. (2016) 9 SCC 478 : “Para 22 - What is the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 30 when it examines the question as to whether any case of legal misconduct on the part of an arbitrator in passing an award is made out or not has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court and remains no more res integra? 23. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Allied Constructions, (2003) 7 SCC 396 while examining the scope of Section 30 held as under: “...Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine. Sudarshan Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala, (1989) 2 SCC 38 , Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final. The court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference herewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the fact of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering.” Para 24 - Justice S. Mukharji, as His Lordship then was, speaking for the Bench in M/s Sudarsan Trading Co. vs. Government of Kerala, (1989) 2 SCC 38 while examining the jurisdiction of Court under Section 30 held as under: “However, there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. vs. Government of Kerala, (1989) 2 SCC 38 while examining the jurisdiction of Court under Section 30 held as under: “However, there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. One has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess of the jurisdiction. Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained, was a decision within the competency of the arbitrator in this. By purporting to construe the contract the court could not take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. If on a view taken of a contract, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded, is a possible view through perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court.” The aforesaid view was consistently followed in later decisions by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. R.V. Rayanim and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 433 and Ravindra Kumar Gupta and Co. vs. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 409 . Para 25 - One cannot, therefore, dispute the legal proposition, which is now fairly settled keeping in view the aforementioned law laid down by this Court that an award can be set aside only on the grounds specified in sub-clause (a) (b) and (c) of Section 30 of 1940 Act and on no other grounds. Indeed this is clear from the opening words of Section 30 itself which starts with the words “An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds.” A fortiori, a reasoned award cannot be set aside unless it falls in any of the three sub-clauses (a) (b) and (c) of Section 30 of the Act 1940. Para 26 - The grounds such as inadequacy of reasons in support of an award, error committed by the arbitrator on facts, alternate or/and more plausible view could be taken then what is taken by the arbitrator, improper appreciation of evidence done by the arbitrator in recording any finding etc. are not the grounds on which any award much less a reasoned award can be set aside. In other words, none of these grounds can be made the foundation for setting aside the award because they do not fall within the four corners of any of the three sub-clauses of Section 30 of the Act 1940.” Recording of Reasons in Award by Arbitrator 20. Learned advocate for the appellant Contractor has submitted that the arbitrator has assigned reason while making the award. Arbitrator has given patient hearing to both the parties. Therefore, he has not misconducted himself or to the proceedings. Misconduct Error within jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction are different. 20.1 That the learned Trial Court ought to have held that it was within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to consider the Claim No. 1(B) which related to a dispute regarding the extra payment for extra work. Anti termite treatment was given as per the Item of foundation as per sub clause 12(v)(d) of the agreement. That the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of State of Gujarat vs. Vir Vijay Construction Co. 1994 (1) GLR 119 wherein it has been held that the Arbitrator is not required to give reasons in detail and that Award can be set aside only on the ground of error of law on the face of it that is to say, if the Award is based upon legal proposition which is erroneous. Therefore the objection raised by the Respondent that the Award was not a reasoned Award was wholly erroneous and unsustainable. 21. Learned advocate for the Respondent has argued that the arbitrator has not given sufficient reasons and more particularly no reasons are assigned for awarding interest in the award. That violating the clause 25 of the agreement/contract, which provides that Arbitrator shall be obliged to record the reasons for making Award where the claim amount exceeds Rs. 25000/-. The Arbitrator has awarded amount of various claim contrary to the record and evidence. That violating the clause 25 of the agreement/contract, which provides that Arbitrator shall be obliged to record the reasons for making Award where the claim amount exceeds Rs. 25000/-. The Arbitrator has awarded amount of various claim contrary to the record and evidence. That the Award is highly excessive and unreasonable. The Award is not speaking by reasons. It can be said to be against the principle of natural justice. 22. Learned trial Court has also believed that the arbitrator has not given proper reasons, more particularly in awarding interest. 22.1 It will be advantageous to place hereunder some paragraphs of the award wherein the arbitrator has come to the conclusion to grant the claim and some of the paragraph wherein the arbitrator has come to the conclusion to reject the claim. So one can assume that the arbitrator has assigned reasons while making the award or not. 23. The arbitrator has granted below mentioned claims by assigned reasons, which read as under: 23.1 Claim No. 1: Anti termite treatment (a) Dispute regarding the mode of measurement and (b) Dispute regarding extra payment for greater surface are treated. Amount claimed Rs. 4,75,873.76: “During the arguments both the parties agreed that changes are made in the depth of foundation and the plinth level in view of the site condition and the requirement of the Food Corporation. Claimants claimed that the projection in the RCC caping outside by 22.50 cms has not been taken into account in the final measuring of the plinth area for payment. Respondent however argued that the measurement is as per the stipulated mode of measurements. Claimant also pointed out that at the time of execution the foundation was taken to a greater depth than what was shown in the tender drawings and similarly the plinth was increased. Consequently, he has to treat a greater surface area for the same plinth area. Respondent confirmed that these changes in foundation and plinth level were necessitated by the site conditions. The position as stated by Respondent in respect of the claim 1(a) is correct and as such the claim in rejected. The position as stated by claimant in respect of claim 1(b) is correct and his claim is accepted. I award payment of Rs. 4,59,331/- on this account.” 23.2 Claim No. 9 - Loss due to irregular payments: Amount claimed Rs. The position as stated by claimant in respect of claim 1(b) is correct and his claim is accepted. I award payment of Rs. 4,59,331/- on this account.” 23.2 Claim No. 9 - Loss due to irregular payments: Amount claimed Rs. 10,38,741.28: “The claimant contended that as per the Agreement, he is to be paid for the work done within 10 days of submission of the Running Account Bill but no payment was made within the stipulated time. In as many as 20 cases, the payment has been delayed from 7 days to 249 days beyond the limit. Also no bill has been paid in one installment. Since the payments were being made from Bombay, they has to make frequent trips and also spend lot of time at Bombay to get the payment. To keep the project going, they have to invest more money than what would have been necessary had the payments been made regular. Moreover, because of the irregular payments, they could also not plan the purchases properly resulting in payment of increased prices. Even in the case of Security Deposit, they were promised that the deposit deducted from the bill will be returned if FDR for an equivalent amount is given. The claimant indicated that he made FDRs and submitted the same to the respondent for return of the security deposit. After retaining the FDRs for quite some time, it was returned to them informing that SD can not be returned. In addition, the respondent also directing the security deposit from the bills even though the FDRs with them. He, therefore, claimed that he should be reimbursed a loss on this account amounting Rs. 1038741.28. The Respondent agreed that the payment have not been regular and it was not on account of non-receipt of money from the FCI. However, they claimed that the necessary extension of time has been granted and no further compensation is required. On going through the documents submitted by the respondent and various correspondence exchanged between the claimant and the respondent, it is very clear that there has been delay in payment of bills by the respondent, also the payment of some bills has been made in installments clearly creating problems with cash flow. On going through the documents submitted by the respondent and various correspondence exchanged between the claimant and the respondent, it is very clear that there has been delay in payment of bills by the respondent, also the payment of some bills has been made in installments clearly creating problems with cash flow. I am unable to accept the argument that the contractor is not entitled to any compensation if there is delay in the execution of contract by reason of default on the part of the Government. Delay payment definitely causes problem and leads to delayed completion. The contractor will be entitled to recover damages for delay causes by the respondent even if, the extension of time has been granted. I find that the claim is partially justified and I award sum of Rs. 240149/- in this regard.” 23.3 Claim No. 12 - Losses on account of overstay at site during extended period of contract for the amount of Rs. 318724.73: “The claimant has claimed an amount of Rs. 318724.73 on account of losses due to overstay at site. The contract was stipulated to be over by 14.12.1985 and the work was actually completed by 20.02.1986. This he claimed was because the first two godowns were loaded on 03.01.1986 and hindrance were caused due to movement of trucks for loading and unloading of the goods from godowns. The hindrance was mainly on road, drain and external finishing. Respondent only stated that action has been taken as per contract. It is an accepted fact that if there is any delay in the completion of contract by reasons of default on the part of the respondent claimant is entitled to make a claim on account of expenses on overhead and establishment charges. The arbitrator is entitled to award damages on account on increase in the cost of extra expenses on overheads and establishment charges because this is the damage which the claimant suffers because of the prolongation of the contract. The claim is partly justified and I award an amount of Rs. 132000/- on the account.” 24. The arbitrator has assigned reasons for rejecting the below mentioned claim which read as under: 24.1 Claim No. 2: Payment of RCC band at Tie level. Amount claimed Rs. The claim is partly justified and I award an amount of Rs. 132000/- on the account.” 24. The arbitrator has assigned reasons for rejecting the below mentioned claim which read as under: 24.1 Claim No. 2: Payment of RCC band at Tie level. Amount claimed Rs. 21,392.63: “Claimant indicated that the RCC band work executed by him is not an item of the bill of quantities and as such should be paid as extra item on the basis of DSR item plus his tender percentage. Respondent countered that this work is part of the Tie level beam and has been paid under the item of lintels and beams. The position as stated by the Respondent is correct and consequently the claim of the claimant stands rejected.” 24.2 Claim No. 5 - Provision of ‘J’ Books on A.C. Sheets. Amount claimed Rs. 52,806.50 “The claimant claims that he should be paid separately the cost of ‘J’ books along with washers as ‘complete’ does not mean provision of ‘J’ or ‘L’ hooks. Also as per specification of the agreement nomenclature supersedes specification. Respondent contends that work has been measured as per agreement. Also the nomenclature clear spells the items whose cost is excluded. This “exclusion” does not include J or L Hooks as such extra payment is claimed is not justified. The position as stated by the respondent is accepted and the claim is rejected.” 24.3 Claim No. 7 - Escalation in the vote of structural steel and reinforcement. Amount claimed Rs. 384282.05: “The relevant clause in the contract is provide for the payment of escalation in the cost of structural steel and reinforcement on the basis of prevalent price of SAIL at the subject time and at the time of tendering. During the currency of contract there was an increased in the price of steel. The claimant claims since he was not able to procure this steel items from SAIL on account of non availability he should be paid the escalation based our market price. Respondent concedes increase in price of steel and therefore, worked out this cost as provided in the agreement. The respondent further pointed out that the market rate is very loose item and therefore to avoid complication and controversy the agreement stipulated that this is to be based on SAIL rate which can be easily verified at any time. Respondent concedes increase in price of steel and therefore, worked out this cost as provided in the agreement. The respondent further pointed out that the market rate is very loose item and therefore to avoid complication and controversy the agreement stipulated that this is to be based on SAIL rate which can be easily verified at any time. They therefore, contended that the claim is not justified and should be rejected. The claim has been paid as per the agreement and his claim is therefore rejected.” 25. One can see obviously from the above paragraphs that the Arbitrator has given reasons for granting or rejecting the claims of the Contractor. The learned Trial Court has rejected the arbitrator’s award mainly on the grounds that arbitrator has not assigned reasons in granting the different claims; the arbitrator has acted beyond the scope of reference and jurisdiction. That the arbitrator has not considered the evidence produced by the Corporation in proper perspective. And come to the conclusion that the arbitrator has misconducted the arbitration proceedings. 25.1 Learned Trial Court has erred in not believing the reasons should not only be intelligible but should also deal either expressly or impliedly with the substantial points that have been raised. The Trial Court acted as an Appellate Court over the award and reviewed the reasons. That the Trial Court has set aside the award considering it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusion. 25.2 The Trial Court while exercising the power under Section 30, re-appreciated the evidence and examined correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator, which is not permissible under the law. The learned Trial Court has interfered with the award merely because in his opinion the other view is possible. He has acted as a review authority. 25.3 As discussed herein above, the scope and extent of examination of award of the arbitrator, Section 30 of the Act, 1940, the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, I am of the view that learned Trial Court has not rightly held that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings. Hence I decided the Point No. 2 in negative. Point No. 3 - the Arbitrator’s power to award Interest 26. Hence I decided the Point No. 2 in negative. Point No. 3 - the Arbitrator’s power to award Interest 26. Learned advocate for the appellant has argued that the Interest awarded by the Arbitrator is as per the precedent or the direction issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. To Award an interest without the scope of agreement cannot be said to be misconduct. If, the claim as regard to the interest is not forwarded to the Arbitrator, inspite of this, interest can be Awarded as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various Judgments. Item No. 21 is the claim for interest. the Arbitrator has observed that Corporation has not filed any counter claim/statement in respect of claim Nos. 18 to 22. Therefore, interest is payable by the Corporation. Arbitrator has Awarded interest as per rule he has not committed any error. 26.1 That the learned Trial Court ought to have appreciated that the Award of interest is just and proper as it is implied term of reference and therefore the learned Arbitrator has properly awarded the interest which is in consonance with the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462 . 27. Learned advocate for the Respondent has argued that there was no clause in the agreement between the parties as regards to the interest. The dispute regarding interest was not referred to the Arbitrator. That the Arbitrator has to give reasons for the Award of Rs. 2,48,640/- for interest. In-spite of this, the interest was awarded by the Arbitrator without authority of law. That the Arbitrator is not a Court and the Arbitrator is not entrusted power under Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Court to Award interest. That the Arbitrator has not worked out as to how he arrived at the amount of interest to the tune of Rs. 2,48,640/-. Therefore, the Award is vague and invalid. Award of interest is without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of arbitration. 28. Learned Trial Court has observed in Para 9 of the impugned judgment as under: “It is mentioned that as there was no provision of payment of interest as per the agreement that was no question of or likely hood of Awarding of interest by the Arbitrator. Award of interest is without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of arbitration. 28. Learned Trial Court has observed in Para 9 of the impugned judgment as under: “It is mentioned that as there was no provision of payment of interest as per the agreement that was no question of or likely hood of Awarding of interest by the Arbitrator. It is alleged that the claim of interest beyond the jurisdiction and authority of the Arbitrator and therefore by Awarding the interest beyond the jurisdiction and the authority the Arbitrator has misconducted grossly amongst other allegations.” 29. This Court has to consider as to whether the arbitrator is empowered to award interest. There are three types of interest (1) Interest prior to the arbitration proceedings (2) Interest during the arbitration proceedings (3) Interest after the Award is passed till realization of amount, the learned advocate for the Appellant has cited below mentioned judgments wherein, It is held that the Arbitrator is empowered to award above three types of interest. 29.1 Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462 : (36) The last question relates to payment of interest. The Arbitrator awarded interest to BOL at the universal rate of eighteen per cent for all the three stages, pre-reference period, pendente-lite and post award period. It is not disputed that in the arbitration agreement there is no provision for payment of interest. The learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench were right in observing that the Arbitrator, in the facts and circumstances, could have awarded interest. The Arbitrator had granted interest at the rate of eighteen per cent on the ground of loan so advanced by HCL to BOL at that rate. (37) Now Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to arbitration proceedings since Arbitrator cannot be said to be a ‘court’ within the meaning of the Code. But an Arbitrator has power and jurisdiction to grant interest for all the three stages provided the rate of interest is reasonable. (38) So far as interest for pre-reference period is concerned, in view of the conflicting decisions of this Court, the matter was referred to a larger Bench in Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division and Others vs. N.C. Budhraj (Deceased) by LRs. and Others, (2001) 2 SCC 721 . (38) So far as interest for pre-reference period is concerned, in view of the conflicting decisions of this Court, the matter was referred to a larger Bench in Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division and Others vs. N.C. Budhraj (Deceased) by LRs. and Others, (2001) 2 SCC 721 . The Court, by majority, held that an arbitrator has power to grant interest for pre-reference period provided there is no prohibition in the arbitration agreement excluding his jurisdiction to grant interest. The forum of arbitration is created by the consent of parties and is a substitute for conventional civil court. It is, therefore, of unavoidable necessity that the parties be deemed to have agreed by implication that the Arbitrator would have power to award interest in the same way and same manner as a court. (39) Regarding interest pendente-lite also, there was cleavage of opinion. The question was, therefore, referred to a larger Bench in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa and Others vs. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508 . The Court considered several cases and laid down following principles: “43. The question still remains whether arbitrator has the power to award interest pendente-lite and if so on what principle. We must reiterate that we are dealing with the situation where the agreement does not provide for grant of such interest nor does it prohibit such grant. In other words, we are dealing with a case where the agreement is silent as to award of interest. On a conspectus of aforementioned decisions, the following principles emerge: (i) A person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. The basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Section 34, Civil Procedure Code and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator. (ii) An arbitrator is an alternative forum for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties. This is the principle of Section 34, Civil Procedure Code and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator. (ii) An arbitrator is an alternative forum for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties. If the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente-lite, the party claiming it would have to approach the court for that purpose, even though he may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. (iii) An arbitrator is the creature of an agreement. It is open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and prescribe such procedure for him to follow, as they think fit, so long as they are not opposed to law. (The proviso to section 41 and Section 3 of Arbitration Act illustrate this point). The arbitrator must also act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land and the agreement. (iv) Over the years, the English and Indian courts have acted on the assumption that where the agreement does not prohibit and a party to the reference makes a claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendente-lite, Thawardas has not been followed in the later decisions of this court. It has been explained and distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no claim for interest but only a claim for un-liquidated damages. It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute or universal rule as they appear to, on first impression. Until Jena case almost all the courts in the country had upheld the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente-lite. Continuity and certainty is a high desirable feature of law. (v) Interest pendente-lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-reference period). For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred.” (40) As to post-award interest, the point is covered by the decision of this Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1992) 4 SCC 217 . For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred.” (40) As to post-award interest, the point is covered by the decision of this Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1992) 4 SCC 217 . It was held there that an arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period from the date of the award to the date of decree or date of realization, whichever is earlier. 29.2 Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 187 : (7) By a long catena of cases decided by this Court from time to time, it is too well settled that arbitrators have the competence, jurisdiction and power to award interest for the period from the date of award to date of payment as also for pre-reference, pendente-lite and post award. The only caveat is that the amount of interest so awarded should be reasonable and agreement between the parties should not prohibit grant of such interest. (8) In the light of several judgments of this Court, the question projected in this appeal is no more res integra. (9) The question with regard to grant of interest by an arbitrator for the period from the date of award to date of payment stands settled by a judgment of this Court in the case of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1992) 4 SCC 217 . The aforesaid question has been dealt with by this Court in Para 5 of the said judgment reproduced herein-below: “5. The question of interest can be easily disposed of as it is covered by recent decisions of this Court. It is sufficient to refer to the latest decision of a five Judge bench of this Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa vs. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508 : JT (1991) 6 SC 309. Though the said decision deals with the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente-lite, the principle of the decision makes it clear that the arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period commencing with the date of award to the date of decree or date of realization, whichever is earlier. Though the said decision deals with the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente-lite, the principle of the decision makes it clear that the arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period commencing with the date of award to the date of decree or date of realization, whichever is earlier. This is also quite logical for, while award of interest for the period prior to an arbitrator entering upon the reference is a matter of substantive law, the grant of interest for the post-award period is a matter of procedure. Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure provides both for awarding of interest pendente-lite as well as for the post-decree period and the principle of Section 34 has been held applicable to proceedings before the arbitrator, though the section as such may not apply. In this connection, the decision in Union of India vs. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd. (1967) 1 SCR 324 : AIR 1967 SC 1032 may be seen as also the decision in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 532 : (1989) 1 SCR 318 which upholds the said power though on a somewhat different reasoning. We, therefore, think that the award on Item No. 8 should have been upheld.” 30. It is not disputed that in the arbitration agreement there is no provision for payment of interest. Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, it is held that the arbitrator is competent to award interest at all three stages i.e. re-reference period, pendente-lite and post award period. The learned Trial Court was wrong in observing that the Arbitrator, in the facts and circumstances, could not award interest. Hence I decide point no 3 in affirmative that the Arbitrator has power to award the interest. 31. Now what is the reasonable rate of interest to be awarded to the contractor. The arbitrator has awarded Claim No. 21 as interest as under: “Claim No. 21 Interest: The claimant has claimed interest @ 24% from the date of the above claims were, due till the date of realization/decree. The respondent has not filed any counter statement of facts against this claim. As a matter of fact, respondent have not filed any counter statement in response to Claims No. 18, 19, 20 and 22. The respondent has not filed any counter statement of facts against this claim. As a matter of fact, respondent have not filed any counter statement in response to Claims No. 18, 19, 20 and 22. Payment of interest can be distributed in three zone: (a) From day the claims have been fallen due to the day of start of arbitration proceedings. (b) From the date the arbitration proceedings commence to the date of award or date of publication of award. (c) From the date of award to the date of payment. Recent judgments in the various Courts indicate that the arbitrator can give his award with respect to payment of interest at (a) and (c) above not for the period as indicated at (b) above. Consequently, I award a payment of interest of Rs. 2,48,640/- (@ rate 12% per annum) for the period covered under (a). I also award the claimant will be paid simple interest on the amount of award @ 12% per annum till the date of actual payment.” 32. Learned advocate for the appellant has produced the statement in form of Table 74: Structure of Interest Rate from the year 1975-76 to 2010-11 from the website of the Reserve Bank of India. He requested to take the said statement on record. The same is taken on record. Learned advocate for the appellant has produced the statement in form of Table 74: Structure of Interest Rate from the year 1975-76 to 2010-11 from the website of the Reserve Bank of India. He requested to take the said statement on record. The same is taken on record. 32.1 On perusing the Table 74: Structure of interest Rate of RBI, the relevant portion is placed here under: TABLE 74: STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES (Percent per annum) COMMERCIAL BANK RATES Year Call/Notice money rates 1 to 3 years Deposit rates Lending rates Over 3 years and upto 5 years Above 5 years SBI advance rate Key lending rates as prescribed by RBI (All commercial banks including SBI) Ceiling rate general Minimum rate general Minimum rate selective credit control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1986-87 9.99 8.50-9.00 10.00 11.00 16.50 17.50 -- 16.50-17.50 1987-88 9.88 9.00-10.00 10.00 10.00 16.50 16.50 -- 16.5 1988-89 9.77 9.00-10.00 10.00 10.00 16.50 -- 16.00 16 1989-90 11.49 9.00-10.00 10.00 10.00 16.50 -- 16.00 16 1990-91 15.85 9.00-10.00 11.00 11.00 16.50 -- 16.00 16 1991-92 19.57 12.00 13.00 13.00 16.50 -- 19.00 19 1992-93 14.42 11.00 11.00 11.00 19.00 -- 17.00 17 1993-94 6.99 10.00 10.00 10.00 19.00 -- 14.00 15 1994-95 9.40 11.00 11.00 11.00 15.00 -- 15.00 Free 1995-96 17.73 12.00 13.00 13.00 16.50 -- 16.50 Free 1996-97 7.84 11.00-12.00 12.00-13.00 12.50-13.00 14.50 -- 14.50-15.00 Free 1997-98 8.69 10.50-11.00 11.50-12.00 11.50-12.00 14.00 -- 14.00 Free 1998-99 7.83 9.00-11.00 10.50-11.50 10.50-11.50 12.00-14.00 -- 12.00-13.00 Free 1999-00 8.87 8.50-9.50 10.00-10.50 10.00-10.50 12.00 -- 12.00-12.50 Free 2000-01 9.15 8.50-9.50 9.50-10.00 9.50-10.00 11.50 -- 11.00-12.00 Free 2001-02 7.16 7.50-8.50 8.00-8.50 8.00-8.50 11.50 -- 11.00-12.00 Free 2002-03 5.89 4.25-6.00 5.50-6.25 5.50-6.25 10.75 -- 10.75-11.50 Free 2003-04 4.62 4.00-5.25 5.25-5.50 5.25-5.50 10.25 -- 10.25-11.00 Free 2004-05 4.65 5.25-5.50 5.75-6.25 5.75-6.25 10.25 -- 10.25-10.75 Free 2005-06 5.60 6.00-6.50 6.25-7.00 6.25-7.00 10.25 -- 10.25-10.75 Free 2006-07 7.22 7.50-9.00 7.75-9.00 7.75-9.00 12.25 -- 12.25-12.50 Free 2007-08 6.07 8.25-8.75 7.50-9.00 7.50-9.00 12.25 -- 12.25-12.75 Free 2008-09 7.06 8.00-8.75 7.75-8.50 7.75-8.50 12.25 -- 11.50-12.50 Free 2009-10 3.24 6.00-7.00 6.50-7.50 6.50-7.50 11.75 -- 11.00-12.00 Free 2010-11 4.51 6.75-7.25 7.00-7.25 7.00-7.75 7.50 -- 7.50-8.00 (Continued) Free 33. As per Para 3 of the plaint of the Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 1989, the contractor has requested the Corporation vide his letter dated 27.01.1988, to resolve the remedy for his dispute under Clause 25 of the agreement by referring matter to the arbitrator. The corporation has by letter dated 10.08.1988 of the Chairman cum Managing Director of the Corporation appointed the defendant No. 2 She S.G. Balasubramanian as sole Arbitrator. The arbitrator has entered into the reference on 22.09.1988. The arbitrator has made and signed award on 14.06.1989. 33.1 the court has to consider the interest i.e. for the three stages, 1. pre-reference period, 2. pendente-lite and 3. post award period: (A) Before arbitration proceedings-before 22.9.1988 (B) During arbitration proceedings-from 22.09.88 to 14.06.1989 (C) After arbitration proceedings-after 14.06.1989 declaration of Award. 34. On perusing the Table 74: Structure of interest rate of RBI, the rate of interest was fixed at a @ 9 to 10%, during the year 1986-87 to 1990-91 for the fix deposit for duration of 1 to 5 years. The rate of interest is fluctuated from 11% to 13% during year from 1991-92 to 2000-01 and thereafter decrease the rate of interest @ 7 to 7.75% during year 2001-02 to the year 2011 i.e. after the award is passed. Now in view of the prevailing rate of interest for deposit fix by the RBI, I am of the considered opinion that if interest at @ of 9.00 is fixed, from the date of request letter dated 27.1.1988 of the Contractor for reference till the payment is made to the Contractor, it will be just and Proper. Thus I decrease the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrator from 12 % to 9 %. Thus the contractor is entitled to get interest at a rate of 9% from 27.1.1988 till payment is made to the contractor. (IV) Filing of Award in the Court for decree and Compliance of Section 14 of the Act, 1940 35. Learned Advocate for the Appellant has argued that the learned Trial Court has wrongly answered Issue No. 4, in negative overlooking the fact that the learned Arbitrator has filed the Award and other connected record sent through a person on 26.6.1990 and, therefore, it is wholly erroneous to hold that the learned Arbitrator has not properly filed the Award before the Trial Court. 35.1 It is further argued that the learned Trial Court has misconstrued the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act, 1940 as it is not necessary that the Arbitrator should personally file the Award but he can cause the Award and other proceedings filed through an authorized person. 35.2 It is submitted that the learned Trial Court ought to have appreciated after making sign and publishing the Award, the Arbitrator had given a copy of the Award to both the parties and, therefore, the Application filed by the Appellant was legal and proper. The learned Arbitrator being the party in the suit proceedings has later on caused the Award and proceedings filed before the Court and as such it would be inferred that there was proper authority delegating to the person to file the Award. 35.3 It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court ought to have appreciated that the record of the Arbitrator was in sealed cover and as per record it was opened in the court which contained two files. Such records are produced on behalf of the Arbitrator who has authority to make the Award. If it is not produced, the Court is empower under section 14(2) to direct the Arbitrator cause the award or signed copy of it to be filed in Court. The impugned order is wrong, illegal, contrary to law and perverse and requires to be quashed and set aside. He requested to allow the appeal and pass decree in terms of Award passed by the Arbitrator. 35.4 It is further argued that the learned Trial Court has misapplied the ratio in the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in Kumbha Mawji vs. Dominion of India, AIR 1953 SC 313 and Binod Bihari Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1245 . That the learned Trial court ought to have appreciated the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in Ram Nath International Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 367 wherein it has been held that if the Arbitrator has considered any work it would be the matter and interpretation of contract and therefore it is within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. 36. Learned advocate for the Respondent Corporation has argued that the Contractor has no right to file Award in the Court. 36. Learned advocate for the Respondent Corporation has argued that the Contractor has no right to file Award in the Court. As much as it is the Arbitrator who can file the Award in the court under Section 14 of the Act, 1940. That the Contractor is not entitled to file an Award for the registration and for the decree the same is prayed to be dismissed. 37. Learned Trial Court, after examined Section 14(2) of the Act, has observed that “an analyses of Section 14(2) of the Act shows that it mandates the Court, after filing of Award duly signed by the Arbitrator to give notice to the parties of the filing of Award. Section 14(1) requires the Arbitrator to give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of Award. The two provisions operate under different set of circumstances. The issuance of notice under Section 14(2) of the Act by the Court is mandatory requirement though the Section does not prescribe any formal mode of the service of the notice. What is essential under the said provision is that there must be service of notice or intimation or communication of the filing of the Award by the Court to the parties, the mode of service of such notice being immaterial. It is the substance and not in form of notice which is relevant and once it is established that a notice or communication or information of the filing of the Award has been issued by the Court and served on the party concerned, the statutory requirement of section 14(2) of the Act would stand satisfied. Notice need not be in writing, it can be oral also but what is necessary is that the notice, communication or information to the effect that an Award has been filed in the Court must be given by the Court to the parties concerned. A notice by the Arbitrator under Section 14(1) of the Act is not a substitute for the notice which the Court is enjoyed upon to issue under Section 14(2) of the Act. A notice by the Arbitrator under Section 14(1) of the Act is not a substitute for the notice which the Court is enjoyed upon to issue under Section 14(2) of the Act. Where the Arbitrator himself files an Award in the Court the Court is bound to give notice to the parties that the Award has been filed and the Court cannot pass a decree in terms of Award, unless such notice has been served on the party concerned and till after expire of period of 30 days from the date of service of such notice as contemplated by the Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act. No formality in the act of filing of the Award in the Court is required but what is required is that the filing of Award must be by or on behalf of the Arbitrator and after the same has been filed the notice of the filing of Award must follow from the Court under Section 14(2) of the Act. It is further observed that if an Award is filed by one of the parties the authority of the Arbitrator to the party concerned to file the Award must be established under the onus is on the party to establish that he had been so authorized by the Arbitrator to file the Award in the Court. A plea to that effect must be found in the application which accompanies the Award. Such authority has to be specifically alleged and positively prove otherwise the filing of Award in the Court cannot be said to be by or under the authority of Arbitrator.” 38. The section 14 provides the filing of the Award, it is the procedure of next step after the Award is declared. It is provided as under: 38.1 Section 14 - Award to be signed and filed: (1) When the Arbitrators or umpire have made their Award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and Award. It is provided as under: 38.1 Section 14 - Award to be signed and filed: (1) When the Arbitrators or umpire have made their Award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and Award. (2) The Arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and Award and of the costs and charges of filing the Award, cause the Award or signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the Award. (3) Where the Arbitrators or umpire state a special case under clause (b) of section 13, the Court, after giving notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of, the Award. (B) Arbitration Act - Section 31(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in his Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. 39. The record and proceeding of the arbitrator have been sent by the Arbitrator to the learned trial court through special manageress. It is to be noted that two files were received from the Arbitrator at Exh.13 in Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 1989. On perusing the Rojkam of Special Civil Suit No. 94/1989, it is stated against Ex 13 that “Matter presented Suit No. 94/89 Chaturbhai Patel has produced letter dated 26.6.1990 matter is kept for order” on perused the record it appears that the documents no 12 to 22 are destroyed therefore Exh.13 could not be perused. On perusing the Rojkam of Special Civil Suit No. 94/1989, it is stated against Ex 13 that “Matter presented Suit No. 94/89 Chaturbhai Patel has produced letter dated 26.6.1990 matter is kept for order” on perused the record it appears that the documents no 12 to 22 are destroyed therefore Exh.13 could not be perused. 39.1 The statement of person who has produced the filed is recorded by the court on 26.06.1990 at Exh.23. On perusal the statement at Exh.23, it is stated as under: “I, Chaturbhai P Patel resident of A/1 Rajlaxmi Society, Nizampura, Vadodara 2, gives in writing that, S.G. Balasubramanian who is the Arbitrator, has sent one seal cover through his messenger to me to produce such cover before the court. the said seal packet cover is produced my me and the same is opened in presence of mine.” 39.2 There is forwarding letter with two files, which is exhibited at Exh.24, the same Letter written by the Arbitrator dated 21.04.1990. On perusal forwarding letter at Ex 24, it is transpired that the forwarding letter was written by the Arbitrator S.G. Balasubramanian address to the Registrar, Civil Judge, SD, Godhara, (Gujarat) it is stated therein that “please find enclosed on file containing the proceedings including the award and another file containing photocopy of the agreement.” On the blue file no SGB/ARB/3/88 it is certified that “certified this file contains 233 (two hundred and thirty three pages) and the drawing.” 39.3 Yellow colour file containing tender document is at Exh.25 it contain office copy of the letter dated 12.7.1989 written by the sole Arbitrator S.G. Balasubramanian address to the officers of the Corporation, this letter is exhibited at 26. it is stated that “A copy of the Award dated 14th June, 1989 in the above case forwarded to the concerned parties on 17th June 1989, is enclosed for your information and further necessary action.” this file contains O/c of letter forwarding a copy of Award to the parties, Original Award with other correspondence are produced at Exh.27. 40. On bare reading the section 14(1) of the Act, 1940, When the arbitrator has made the award, he shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Herein this case the sole Arbitrator S.G. Balasubramanian, has written a letter dated 12.7.1989 address to the officers of the Corporation. 40. On bare reading the section 14(1) of the Act, 1940, When the arbitrator has made the award, he shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Herein this case the sole Arbitrator S.G. Balasubramanian, has written a letter dated 12.7.1989 address to the officers of the Corporation. This letter is exhibited at 26, it is stated that “A copy of the Award dated 14th June, 1989 in the above case forwarded to the concerned parties on 17th June 1989, is enclosed for your information and further necessary action.” 40.1 It appears that after making and signing the award dated 14th June, 1989 by the Arbitrator, he has intimated to the concerned parties on 17th June 1989. Thus the Arbitrator has been completed the formality to be made under the section 14(1) of the Act, 1940. 40.2 Now the next step to be taken by the Arbitrator is under section 14(2) of the Act, 1940. The arbitrators has to cause the award or signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court. 40.3 It appears from the record that the sole Arbitrator has intimated the department/corporation vide his letter dated 12.7.1989 at exhibit 26 address to the officers of the Corporation. Though it was the duty of the Arbitrator under section 14(2) of the Act, 1940 to file the Award and produce records before the court, the reasons best known to the Arbitrator, he has not done so till the suit is filed by the Contractor on 10.7.1989 and Summons issued by the Court on 15.7.1989. The Arbitrator has forwarded the record of case 26.6.1990 i.e. he took nearly one year. 40.4 The Appellant has filed the suit before the Court because he has no option but to file suit for direction of the court under section 14(2) of the Act, 1940. The Arbitrator has forwarded the record of case 26.6.1990 i.e. he took nearly one year. 40.4 The Appellant has filed the suit before the Court because he has no option but to file suit for direction of the court under section 14(2) of the Act, 1940. The contractor has stated the cause of action in Para 8 of his plaint/application as under: “the cause of action for the claim and for filling this award and for a decree arose on 14th June, 1989 when the award was pronounced and notice thereof given to the parties, and continues to arise till this date.” 40.5 No doubt that the party to the agreement may request to the Arbitrator for filing of an award before the court under section 14(2) of the Act, 1940. 40.6 The Arbitrator can withhold to file an award before court, if he has not received payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award. But herein this case though notice is served to the Arbitrator in both the cases, he has chosen not to appear before the court and explain any circumstances for not to file award before the court, only the Arbitrator has forwarded the record of case nearly after one year. 40.7 The court is empowered to direct an Arbitrator to file Award or signed copy of the Award, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before him, be filed in the court. This powers can be exercised by the court suo-moto or by an application made by any party to the arbitration agreement. Further under section 31(2) of the Act, 1940, the Court has jurisdiction that all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award shall be decided by the court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed. 41. In this case, after the award has been passed by the learned Arbitrator, the contractor who is the party to the arbitration agreement, has filed suit before the court. During the suit proceedings the Arbitrator has sent the copy of Award with record and proceedings which had been taken and proved before him. Therefore, no need to exercise power by the court under section 31(2) of the Act to call for record and proceedings. During the suit proceedings the Arbitrator has sent the copy of Award with record and proceedings which had been taken and proved before him. Therefore, no need to exercise power by the court under section 31(2) of the Act to call for record and proceedings. Sending of the copy of Award with record and proceedings by the Arbitrator can be said to be filing of Award before the court. The learned trial court has raise very technical issue for non filing of award by the arbitrator ignoring the Court’s power under section 14(2) of the Act, 1940. The procedural defect pointed out by the learned trial court is not such a Procedural defects which go to the root of the matter, by which if it is permitted which defeat a just cause. I relied upon following Judgments. 42. This Court in case of Pam Pharmaceuticals vs. Richardson Vicks Inc. and Others, 2001 (1) GLR 125 has observed in paragraph 37, 38 as under: “37. Learned Advocate Shri Shah has made several super-technical submissions with regard to signing of the plaint, carrying out of the amendment and signing of certain documents only by one of the plaintiffs. I consider these arguments and submissions to be of super-technical nature. It is a well settled legal position that as far as possible, no proceeding in a Court of Law should be allowed to be defeated on mere technicalities because all rules of procedure are intended to advance justice and not to defeat it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in case of Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 that: “Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is ‘procedure’ something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up....” 38. The above-referred well established legal position clearly reveals that the Court has to give more importance to the substance and not to the procedural law while administering justice. Signing here or there with or without permission of the Court in the matter of amending the plaint or in the matter of signing application are all procedural aspects. The above-referred well established legal position clearly reveals that the Court has to give more importance to the substance and not to the procedural law while administering justice. Signing here or there with or without permission of the Court in the matter of amending the plaint or in the matter of signing application are all procedural aspects. Everywhere, at least one of the plaintiffs has signed.” 42.1 The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of United Bank of India vs. Naresh Kumar and Others, AIR 1997 SC 3 has observed in paragraph 8, 9 and 10 as under: “8. In this appeal, therefore, the only question which arises for consideration is whether the plaint was duly signed and verified by a competent person. 9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.” 43. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, Ratio laid down in the judgments referred as above, facts and law points involve in the cited judgments of Kumbha Mawji vs. Dominion of India, AIR 1953 SC 313 and Binod Bihari Singh vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1245 , are not applicable to the present case. 44. Considering the fact that the Award is not filed by the Arbitrator but suit is filed by the contractor can be said irregularity but not an illegality. Powers can be exercised by the court suo-motu or by an application made by any party to the arbitration agreement under section 14(2) of the Act. That the appellant has produced certified copy of the Award. There is no dispute about the genuineness of the Award produced by the Appellant. Therefore, merely that the Arbitrator has not filed the Application cannot be a ground for rejection of the Award. That the appellant has produced certified copy of the Award. There is no dispute about the genuineness of the Award produced by the Appellant. Therefore, merely that the Arbitrator has not filed the Application cannot be a ground for rejection of the Award. It appears that learned trial court has become too technical and rejected the award which is resulted in the miscarriage of justice. Therefore, I decide point no. 4 in Affirmative. Conclusion - Point No. 5 and 6 45. Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in above cited judgments, Section 17, 30, 31 and 33 of the Act, 1940, the power or scope and examination of the award of the arbitrator by the Civil Court is limited. The Civil Court has not to consider and examine the award as an Appellate Court and do not venture in the reasons stated by the Arbitrator. 45.1 Here in this case, the learned Trial Court has considered and examined or reviewed the award and re-appreciated the evidence on record, which is not permissible under the Act, 1940. The learned Trial Court has rejected the arbitrator’s award mainly on the grounds that arbitrator has not assigned reasons in granting the different claims; the arbitrator has acted beyond the scope of reference and jurisdiction. That the Trial Court has set aside the award considering it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusion, and come to the conclusion that the arbitrator has misconducted the arbitration proceedings. The Trial Court, while exercising the power under Section 30, re-appreciated the evidence and examined correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the Arbitrator, which is not permissible under the law. It is seen from the impugned judgment that the learned Trial Court has interfered with the award merely because in his opinion the other view is possible. 45.2 The learned Trial Court was wrong in observing that the Arbitrator, in the facts and circumstances, could not award interest. Further The powers can be exercised by the court suo-moto or by an application made by any party to the arbitration agreement under section 14(2) of the Act, the learned Trial Court was wrong in deciding that the award was not duly filed. Further it is to be noted that the appellant has filed or produced certified copy of the Award duly declared. Further it is to be noted that the appellant has filed or produced certified copy of the Award duly declared. There is no dispute that the copy of the Award produced by the Appellant and its genuineness. That learned trial court has become too technical and rejected the award which is resulted in the miscarriage of justice. As a result the Trial Court has wrongly exercised the power to set a side the Award passed by the Arbitrator. Therefore, I decide the point no 5 in Negative and point no 6 accordingly. In view of the discussion made herein above the appeals are allowed and following order is passed: FINAL ORDER: 1. The First Appeal No. 3406 of 2001 filed by the Appellant-Original Plaintiff-Aakar Construction under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940, is hereby allowed. 1.2 The judgment and order passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge (SD), Godhra, District Panchmahal dated 22.9.2000 in Special Civil Suit No. 94 of 1989 preferred by the Appellant Contractor against the Respondent No. 1 Original defendant No. 1 National Building Construction Corporation Ltd under Section 14 read with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, is hereby set aside. 1.3 The Claims awarded vide Award dated 14.6.1989 by S.G. Balasubramanian, the learned Sole Arbitrator is hereby confirmed except the claim no 21 i.e. interest, the same is modified. The Appellant-Original Plaintiff-Aakar Construction is entitled interest at a rate of 9% (Nine Percent) per annum on the awarded amount from the date of its request letter dated 27.1.1988 to avail Arbitration clause-25 of agreement/contract till the payment is made to the Contractor. Decree be drawn accordingly. 2. The First Appeal No. 3407 of 2001 filed by the Appellant-Original Plaintiff-Aakar Construction under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940, is hereby allowed. 2.1 The judgment and order passed by the learned 4th Joint Civil Judge (SD), Godhra, District Panchmahal dated 22.9.2000 in Special Civil Suit No. 129 of 1989, preferred by the Respondent No. 1 Original Plaintiff National Building Construction Corporation Ltd against the appellant Original defendant No. 1 Aakar Contractor, under Sections 17, 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, is hereby dismissed. Decree be drawn accordingly. 3. Decree be drawn accordingly. 3. As per Order 41 Rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, copy of the judgment and the decree certified by the officer as appointed in this behalf shall be sent to the Court which pass the decree appealed from and shall be filed with the original proceeding in the suit, and entry of the judgment of this court shall be made in the institution register. 4. No order as to cost. Rules made absolute. 5. Record and proceedings be sent to the learned Trial Court forthwith.