JUDGMENT Instant appeal is directed against the order dated 22.02.2020 passed by learned Sub Judge, Chadoora (with powers of District Judge under Guardian and Wards Act), whereby the learned trial court while deciding the matter relating to interim custody of minor son of the parties in terms of Section 12 of Guardian and Wards Act, directed that custody of the minor shall remain with respondent herein (father) for two days in a fortnight whereas for rest of the days of the month the custody of the minor shall remain with the appellant herein (mother). 2) In the appeal it is contended that the parties entered into a wedlock in November, 2015, out of which one male child, namely, Mohammad Anas was born on 17th of March, 2017. It is averred that due to matrimonial discord between the parties, the appellant (wife) left the company of respondent (husband) and started living separately with her parents since 18th June, 2019. It is alleged that the respondent, in order to defeat the petition of the appellant filed under Section 488 of Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Procedure Code for grant of maintenance, made a petition under Section 25 and 12 of Guardian and Wards Act before the trial court seeking custody of the minor son. The said petition was contested by the appellant before the trial court by filing objections thereto and the learned trial court, on 22.02.2020, passed an order under Section 12 of the of Guardian and Wards Act, which is impugned in this appeal. 3) The appellant has challenged the order of the learned trial court on the ground that in the interest of minor’s welfare, it was necessary that his custody is given to his mother i.e. appellant herein because the minor son is a milk sucking baby. According to the appellant, the said aspect of the case has been ignored by the trial court and the impugned order has been passed without keeping in view the welfare of the minor. It has been further contended that by virtue of the impugned order, the minor has been forced to live with his father for two days in a fortnight and the same will be detrimental to the psyche of the minor. It has been further contended that by virtue of the impugned order, the minor has been forced to live with his father for two days in a fortnight and the same will be detrimental to the psyche of the minor. It is also contended that as per Mohammadan law, custody of the minor child has to remain with the mother for seven years and this aspect has been ignored by the learned trial court while passing the impugned order. 4) Respondent has contested the appeal by taking a preliminary objection to its maintainability. According to respondent, an order passed under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act is not appealable. On merits, it has been contended that the appeal is misconceived, inasmuch as the trial court vide the impugned order has given the interim custody of the minor to the respondent only for two days in a fortnight whereas for rest of days of the month, the custody of the minor has to remain with the appellant. It has been contended that the respondent, being father of the minor, has always taken good care of his minor son, so he is entitled to shower his love and affection upon his son for which he requires sometime to spend with the minor. 5) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. I have also gone through the written submissions filed by the learned counsel for the parties. 6) Before coming to the merits of the appeal, the preliminary objection with regard to its maintainability is required to be dealt with. 7) It is not in dispute that the impugned order has been passed by the learned trial court in exercise of its powers under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act. Section 47 of the said Act provides for appeal to the High Court from an order by a Court in certain cases. It reads as under: “47. 7) It is not in dispute that the impugned order has been passed by the learned trial court in exercise of its powers under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act. Section 47 of the said Act provides for appeal to the High Court from an order by a Court in certain cases. It reads as under: “47. Order appealable.—An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by a Court,— (a) under section 7, appointing or declaring or refusing to appoint or declare a guardian; or (b) under section 9, sub-section (3), returning an application; or (c) under section 25, making or refusing to make an order for the return of a ward to the custody of his guardian; or (d) under section 26, refusing leave for the removal of a ward from the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or imposing conditions with respect thereto; or (e) under section 28 or section 29, refusing permission to a guardian to do an act referred to in the section; or (f) under section 32, defining, restricting or extending the powers of a guardian; or (g) under section 39, removing a guardian, or (h) under Section 40, refusing to discharge a guardian; or (i) under section 43, regulating the conduct or proceedings of a guardian or settling a matter in difference between joint guardians or enforcing the order; or (j) under section 44 or section 45, imposing a penalty.” 8) From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that an order made under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act is not appealable. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that even if the impugned order is not appealable under Guardian and Wards Act, its legality can be tested by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by converting the instant appeal into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case titled Seema vs. Sanjeev Goda, reported in II (1993) DMC 413. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case titled Seema vs. Sanjeev Goda, reported in II (1993) DMC 413. It was a case in which an order of interim custody of child was held to be not appealable in terms of Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act but the which could not have been made under the provisions of law, the Court can exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9) Now let us consider the contentions raised in this appeal by treating it as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Before adverting to the facts of the case and testing the legality of the impugned order, we have to bear in mind that though Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers power of superintendence on the High Court over all courts and tribunals within its jurisdiction, yet such power, no doubt, has to be exercised very sparingly in cases where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court quashes the order of the court below or of the Tribunal. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being discretionary in nature, as such, no party can claim exercise of such power as a matter of right. 10) The extent and scope of jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam & anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors, (2009) 5 SCC 616 . The Court, while doing so, held that the said Article vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to be exercised very sparingly to keep tribunals and courts within bounds of their authority. It was further held that under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage has been occasioned and that such power is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. It was further held that under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage has been occasioned and that such power is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. 11) Let us now analyze the impugned order in the backdrop of the legal position that this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has limited jurisdiction of interring with the order of the trial court and that interference is permissible under this jurisdiction only in exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has occasioned. 12) The relationship between the parties is not in dispute and it is also not in dispute that the respondent happens to be the natural father of the minor. There is no allegation in the pleadings filed by the appellant either before this Curt or before the trial court to even remotely suggest that the behaviour of the father towards the minor is or has been cruel or unbecoming of a father. The only allegation made by the appellant against the respondent is that he is seeking custody of the minor in order to defeat her petition for grant of maintenance filed under Section 488 of the Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Procedure Code. I am afraid, the said contention of the appellants appears to be misconceived because it is not a case where trial court has transferred the custody of the minor in favour of the respondent but it is a case where the trial court has permitted the respondent (father) to live with his minor son and have his company only for two days in a fortnight. There was no material on record before the trial court to show that such an arrangement would have an adverse impact upon the psyche of the minor. In fact, the learned trial court has been very meticulous while passing the impugned order, inasmuch as even the timing of taking over the interim custody of the minor by the father and handing it over back to the mother is laid down in the order and it has also been provided that this exercise is to be undertaken in presence of two witnesses in the Court premises itself. 13) As already observed this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere in the orders passed by the trial courts unless it is shown that some manifest injustice has occasioned by passing such orders. The instant case does not appear to be of such a category. Therefore, no interference is called for in the impugned order. 14) For the foregoing reasons, this appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed and the order passed by the learned trial court is upheld. However, it shall be open to the learned trial court to review its order in case any material is brought before it by the appellant herein showing that the grant of interim custody of the minor to the respondent for two days in a fortnight has resulted in any adverse impact upon the psyche of the minor. 15) Copy of this order be sent to the learned trial court.*