JUDGMENT : I.A. No.2544 of 2019 : 1. The instant case has been listed for its hearing through Video 2. Learned counsel for the parties, being fully satisfied with the audio 3. The instant interlocutory application is under Section 5 of the Conferencing (V.C.). and video connectivity have argued the matter through V.C. Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 375 days in preferring the instant appeal. 4.This Court, after taking into consideration the reason assigned in the instant application as also considering the fact that instead of dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation it would be appropriate in the ends of justice to decide the appeal on its merit, accordingly, the delay of 375 days in filing the appeal, is condoned. 5.In the result, the instant interlocutory application is disposed of. L.P.A. No.219 of 2019:- 6.The is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letter Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 09.01.2018 passed by a learned Single Judge of this in W.P.(S) No.2092 of 2010 whereby and where under the respondent Nos.1 to 3 have been directed to pass appropriate order on the representation filed by the writ petitioner with respect to the claim pertaining to overtime work as has been discharged by the petitioner beyond the permissible 150 hours per year by directing the authorities to complete the procedure of verification of record and pass necessary order for payment of the overtime work done by the petitioner within 12 weeks from the date of receipt or production of the copy of this order. 7.The brief facts of the case are enumerated hereunder as: The writ-petitioner of was an Assistant Operator working under the respondent at the relevant time, i.e., between April 1994 to June 2006. He was posted at Transmission sub-division Noamundi under Transmission Circle Chaibasa of Transmission Zone-III, Jamshedpur. He was directed along with other employees of Transmission sub-division to work overtime so that scarcity of electricity may not occur. In pursuance to the aforesaid direction, the writ-petitioner has worked actual hours of overtime beyond normal hours of duty from April 1994 to June 2006 but the monetary benefits in view of the work discharged by the writ-petitioner for the overtime work has not been paid. In pursuance to the aforesaid direction, the writ-petitioner has worked actual hours of overtime beyond normal hours of duty from April 1994 to June 2006 but the monetary benefits in view of the work discharged by the writ-petitioner for the overtime work has not been paid. Even after filing of repeated representations, the writ-petitioner had no option but to file a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.867 of 2003 before this Court for a direction upon the respondents to pay the overtime wages of the writ-petitioner which was disposed of vide order dated 11.07.2008 with a liberty to the writ-petitioner to make representation before the Superintending Engineer, who in turn was directed to consider the claim within a period of 3 months from the date of such representation. The writ-petitioner filed due representation in terms of the order dated 11.07.2008 passed in W.P.(S) No.867 2003 along with the copy of the order passed by this Court but he was paid the amount @ 150 hours per year though the actual overtime work done by the writ-petitioner was much more than that. The grievance of the writ-petitioner is that when the law has been laid down in this context by this Court in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi, reported in (2006) 3 JLJR 603 , the denial of such monetary benefit on the part of the respondents is absolutely illegal and improper and as such the petitioner has again been compelled to file another writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2092 of 2010 which has been disposed of by learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 09.01.2018 relying upon the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) and Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi, reported in (2016) 4 JLJR 164 directing the respondents to pass appropriate order on the representation filed by the writ-petitioner in view of the settled legal position as laid down in the judgments as aforesaid and after verifying the record to pass necessary order for payment of the overtime work done by the writ-petitioner. The said order is the subject matter of the present intra court appeal inter alia on the ground that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the fact as per the Boards Office No.451 dated 19.01.1995 and 1777 dated 13.08.2007 and upon an order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 and also upon the direction of S.E.S.T.C., Chaibasa overtime wages amounting to Rs.44,156/-has already been paid to the writ-petitioner and since the Circular dated 19.01.1995 and 13.08.2007 having not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge, hence the judgment/order, which is impugned in the instant appeal, is not sustainable in the eye of law. On being called upon by this Court vide order dated 11.09.2019, the writ-petitioner put his appearance through his counsel who has rebutted the ground as has been agitated by the appellants in assailing the impugned order. 8.Learned counsel for the writ-petitioner has submitted that when the similar matter has been decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra), as such the order passed by learned Single Judge cannot be faulted with. Further submission has been made that when the fact about discharge of overtime work has not been disputed by the respondents, the appellants herein, the monetary benefit, which the writ-petitioner is legally entitled to get, cannot be denied in the garb of Circular dated 19.01.1995, it is for the reason that the law has been laid down in this connection by this Court in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) as also relying upon the said judgment, a coordinate bench of this Court has also passed an order in the case of Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi (supra) and L.P.A. No.172 of 2010, i.e., in the case of R. N. Prasad @ Raghu Nandan Prasad vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board & Others. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the writ-petitioner that when the writ-petitioner has discharged his duty by way of overtime, the respondents cannot deny the said claim and if the denial of the respondents is accepted it will be nothing but mere exploitation of Class-IV workers who have followed the direction of their higher authority for the public cause, i.e., to maintain the power supply, in view thereof, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the writ-petitioner that after considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter and relying upon the judgments/orders passed by this Court in the cases of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) and Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi (supra) and taking into consideration the admitted fact about the discharge of the overtime beyond 150 hours, the judgment impugned cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity and hence the same way not be interfered with. 9.This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions, deem it fit and proper to first discuss about the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra). It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the issue raised by the writ-petitioner by agitating the claim for payment of dues for performing overtime work which was partly rejected on the ground that there is a limitation to take overtime work for more than 50 hours, the writ-petitioner, of the said case, has agitated the point about violation of the provisions of Sections 92 and 105 of the Factories Act, 1948. Jharkhand State Electricity Board filed a detailed counter affidavit therein justifying the action about denial of the payment of overtime beyond 50 hours on the ground of a circular as contained in office order No.IX/OT-1001/95-451/EB dated 19.01.1995, issued by the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and office order No.81/EB(811/EB) dated 13.01.1999 issued by the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna. Jharkhand State Electricity Board filed a detailed counter affidavit therein justifying the action about denial of the payment of overtime beyond 50 hours on the ground of a circular as contained in office order No.IX/OT-1001/95-451/EB dated 19.01.1995, issued by the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and office order No.81/EB(811/EB) dated 13.01.1999 issued by the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna. The court while discussing the issue as also considering the provision of Section 59 of the Factories Act, 1948 which deals with extra wages for overtime as also considering the provision of Sections 64 and 86 of the Factories Act, 1948 and further taking into account the office order No.81/EB dated 13.04.1999 came to a conclusive finding that denial of the overtime wages beyond 50 hours per quarter is absolutely improper and as such the writ petition was allowed with a direction upon the respondents to disburse the amount with a cost of Rs.5,000/-. Similarly, this Court in the case of Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi (supra) has also considered the same issue and relying upon the judgment rendered in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) has allowed the writ petition with a direction for making payment of overtime beyond the period of 50 years. 10.This court, therefore, is of the view that the consideration of the provision of Factories Act, 1948 have consequence in the facts and circumstances involved in this case as Section 59 of the Factories Act, 1948 deals with extra wages for overtime, relevant portion of which is quoted here under : “59. Extra wages for overtime. (1) Where a worker words in a factory for more than nine hours in any day or for more than forty-eight hours in any week, he shall, in respect of overtime work, be entitled to wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages. Extra wages for overtime. (1) Where a worker words in a factory for more than nine hours in any day or for more than forty-eight hours in any week, he shall, in respect of overtime work, be entitled to wages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1) ordinary rate of wages, means the basis wages plus such allowances, including the cash equivalent of the advantage accruing through the confessional sale to workers of food grains and other articles, as the worker is for the time being entitled to, but does not include a bonus and wages for overtime work.” Section 64 of the Factories Act, 1948 is also required to be referred herein which speaks that limit of booking workers on overtime work will be limited to 50 hours per quarter after observing the formalities as laid down in the section and in order to deal with such situation, in case of great exigency overtime may be allowed upto a limit of 75 hours in a quarter with a written permission from the Chief Inspector of Factories, Bihar as per the provision of Section 86 of the Factories Act, 1948. 11.It is not in dispute that the respondent herein is dealing with public utility service and as such to regulate the situation since the provision of Factories Act, 1948 is also applicable to the appellants herein and hence, the circular was issued by the erstwhile Bihar State Electricity Board as contained in office order No.4-51/EB dated 19.01.1995 prohibiting its officers from taking overtime work from the office staff beyond the particular hours, relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder: “In super-session of all the previous orders in respect of overtime issued by the Board from time to time, it has not been decided as follows:- (i) Noovertime work shall be taken from the office staff (i.e. Secretariat, Clerical, Accounts, Store Personnel etc.) including Class IV employees posted either at the headquarter of the Board or in the offices subordinate to the Board. In case it becomes necessary to take work from such employees on holidays and rest days, compensatory off or holidays should be allowed to them. Such compensatory off or holidays should be allowed to be accumulated be availed in the same calendar year which the same will automatically lapse. In case it becomes necessary to take work from such employees on holidays and rest days, compensatory off or holidays should be allowed to them. Such compensatory off or holidays should be allowed to be accumulated be availed in the same calendar year which the same will automatically lapse. (ii) Overtimework shall also not be normally taken from the Factory workers. However, exemptions can be taken under the following conditions, and that too very rarely and when the necessity arises:-- (a) Firstly; when it becomes unavoidable for attending to urgent repairs, breakdown work and to cover absenteeism in shift operations. Leave to the operation staff should be managed in such a manner that no O.T. is required for the shift operation. Strict watch should be kept on habitual absentees. (b) Secondly; limit of booking workers on overtime work will be limited to 50 hours per quarter after observing the formalities as laid down in Section 64 of the Factories Act, 1948. (iii) Overtime return will be scrutinized by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineers of the Area Board, Power Station and Transmission organization. (iv) In case of great exigency overtime may be allowed upto a limit of 75 hours in a quarter with a written permission from the Chief Inspector of Factories, Bihar as per provision of Section 86 of the Factories Act, 1948. The above decision will be adhered to. Any deviation from aforesaid instructions by the officers shall be at their own risk and cost and may expose them to disciplinary action.” 12. Subsequently, another officer order was issued being office order No.81/EB dated 13.04.1999 wherein policy decision was taken for implementation office order No.451/EB dated 19.01.1995 in respect of overtime in letter and spirit, as quoted hereunder: “The Board has issued specific instruction not to take overtime from office staff likewise broad guidelines has also been given for taking overtime from O&M staff in case of acute emergency and unavoidable circumstances within the provision of Factories Act, 1948. But it has come to the notice of the Board that the field officers are not adhering to the instructions strictly. They are taking overtime work even beyond 50(fifty) hours per quarter from a workman which is against the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 Section 64. But it has come to the notice of the Board that the field officers are not adhering to the instructions strictly. They are taking overtime work even beyond 50(fifty) hours per quarter from a workman which is against the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 Section 64. After examining the matter, it has been decided to enforce the order of the Board issued vide office order no.451 dated 19.01.1995 in true spirit. In case of any deviation in taking O.T. work from any staff violating instruction of the Board it will be at the risk and cost of the officer concerned. The amount involved in payment of such irregular O.T. will be recovered from the pay of the erring officer and they will also be liable for disciplinary action.” [emphasis ours] It is evident from the provisions of law / guidelines / circulars issued by the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna that the Board restricted overtime beyond 50 hours per quarter but made it clear that if any officer deviates from such instruction then it will be at the risk and cost of the officer concerned and the amount involved in payment of such irregular O.T. will be recovered from the pay of the erring officer and they will also be liable for disciplinary action. 13.So far as the fact of the case herein is concerned, the fact which is not in dispute is that the work by way of overtime was taken for the period commencing from April 1994 to June 2006 and the said aspect of the matter, i.e., overtime work beyond the period limited, has not been disputed by the appellants before the writ Court since it is the admitted as would be evident from the record that a counter affidavit was filed before the writ Court which has been taken into consideration by making reference of the same at paragraph-5 of the impugned order wherein the fact about the overtime work @ 150 hours per year has not been disputed rather the dispute about the disbursement of the amount pertaining to the work performed by way of overtime beyond the period of 150 hours has been disputed and that is on the aid of the circular dated 05.08.1993and the board’s office No.451 dated 19.01.1995 as also office order No.1777 dated 13.08.2007. 14.Learned counsel for the appellants has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition which according to the learned counsel has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2092 of 2010 and in order to aid his arguments he has relied upon a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 (R. N. Prasad @ Raghu Nandan Prasad vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board & Others) disposed of on 31.08.2010. 15.Rebutting the aforesaid ground, learned counsel for the writ-petitioner has submitted that when the fact is not in dispute about discharge of overtime beyond the period of 150 hours in a year it is not correct to say that the writ Court has no jurisdiction to issue mandamus commanding the respondents to make payment of the dues, moreover, when the same issue has already been dealt with by this Court in the cases of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) and Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi (supra), as such, said argument is not fit to be accepted. 16.This Court, before appreciating the aforesaid argument about the maintainability of the writ petition, deem it fit and proper to discuss about the order passed in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 (R. N. Prasad @ Raghu Nandan Prasad vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board & Others), which is being quoted hereunder: “Heard the parties. Admittedly, the claim of money, which the petitioner has prayed for relates to December, 1993 till March, 2001. He demanded the overtime dues for the aforesaid period. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches. In our considered opinion, the ground taken by the learned counsel for the appellant is unsustainable in law. The law of limitation is for three years only for recovery of money. For the amount said to be due up to the year 2001, even a civil suit would not have been maintainable. The question of maintaining the writ petition is out of question. In that view of the matter, the order of learned Single Judge is not considered to be interfered with. For the amount said to be due up to the year 2001, even a civil suit would not have been maintainable. The question of maintaining the writ petition is out of question. In that view of the matter, the order of learned Single Judge is not considered to be interfered with. Accordingly, this memo of appeal is dismissed.” It is evident from the aforesaid order that the Division Bench of this Court has affirmed the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby and where under the writ Court has declined to interfere in a claim pertaining to overtime dues for the period from December 1993 till March 2001 on the ground that the claim being the money claim since has been filed beyond the period of three years and as such as per the law of limitation for filing a money claim as has been provided is of three years and taking into consideration the claim which was up to the period of March 2001 if the writ Court has declined to interfere on the ground that claim having been made beyond the period of three years, no interference is required. Admittedly, the judgment/order of Division Bench, upon which the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon, pertains to overtime dues for the period from December 1993 till March 2001, however, the writ petition was filed in the year 2010 being W.P.(S) No.1655 of 2010 (in the present case, the claim for overtime dues is for the period from April 1994 to June 2006) and as such, the writ Court by taking into consideration the dues which was up to the month of March 2001 but the writ Court has been approached in the year 2010, hence, considering the inordinate delay of about nine years in approaching the writ Court by the writ-petitioner of W.P.(S) No.1655 of 2010, order passed therein was the subject matter of L.P.A. No.172 of 2010, the writ petition has been dismissed which cannot be said that the same has got any infirmity. 17.It is the settled position of law that every judgment is to be tested on the facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be any universal application of order/judgment and the claim for overtime dues has been agitated by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.2092 of 2010 on 06.05.2010 beyond the period of three years and hence, the claim being money claim ought not to have been entertained by the learned Single Judge being barred by the period of limitation but this Court by coming across the factual aspects is of the view that the principle which is being raised about non-maintainability of writ petition, will not be applicable. Since the writ-petitioner herein, earlier to the present writ petition, has filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.867 of 2003 which was disposed of vide order dated 11.07.2008 as would be evident from Annexure-1 annexed to the memo of appeal and hence, the ground as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the appellants that there is delay in approaching the writ Court and the claim since has been raised beyond the period of three years, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. It has been gathered by this Court that the occasion for filing W.P.(S) No.867 of 2003 has arisen to the writ-petitioner for seeking a claim of overtime dues from April 1994 to September 2002 although the same was disposed of but amount having not been paid and in the meanwhile further overtime work was taken from the writ-petitioner but monetary benefit not been paid, hence, the writ-petitioner again approached to this Court with a cumulative prayer for a direction upon the respondents for making payment of overtime dues for the period from April 1994 to June 2006, therefore, the writ petitioner is pursuing his grievance for the admitted overtime dues since the year 2003 as such on facts which admittedly was within the period of three years so far the dues up to the month of September 2002 is concerned. However, subsequent demand which was claimed by the writ-petitioner was up to the month of June 2006, for which second writ petition has been filed being W.P.(S) No.2092 of 2010 with a prayer to make payment from the month of April 1994 to June 2006. However, subsequent demand which was claimed by the writ-petitioner was up to the month of June 2006, for which second writ petition has been filed being W.P.(S) No.2092 of 2010 with a prayer to make payment from the month of April 1994 to June 2006. In view of the aforesaid facts, the judgment as has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 will not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 18.It is further settled position of law that the writ Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is having extraordinary jurisdiction and there is no restriction in issuing appropriate writ by issuing a direction upon the respondents to make payment of the amount if the rendering of work is not in dispute and as such merely for the purpose of relegating the matter before the competent court of civil jurisdiction treating the claim as money claim for its adjudication it will be nothing but a great injustice to the litigant like the writ-petitioner herein, otherwise also there is no bar in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India rather it is a self imposed restriction upon the High Court to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. Herein, the learned Single Judge has entertained the writ petition relying upon the judgment passed by this Court in Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) and Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi (supra). Considering the fact that the claim which has been agitated by the writ petitioner about rendering the overtime work has not been disputed by the appellants before the writ Court rather as would be evident from the stand inter alia taken in the counter affidavit the fact about rendering the work beyond the period of 150 hours has been admitted. It is further evident from the fact of the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) wherein the claim of overtime dues has been agitated which pertains to period in between the month of January 1994 to December 2001 but the writ petition was filed by Mr. It is further evident from the fact of the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) wherein the claim of overtime dues has been agitated which pertains to period in between the month of January 1994 to December 2001 but the writ petition was filed by Mr. Nipendra Narayan Sinha in the year 2005 being W.P.(S) No.7200 of 2005 and while dealing with several provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 as also the office order dated 13.04.1999 the Court has entertained the writ petition and passed an order directing for making payment of overtime dues. It is further admitted that the order/judgment passed by this Court in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) has never been challenged by the respondents and as such the same has attained its finality. Further, the learned Single Judge of this court has also entertained a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6630 of 2014 filed by one Nand Kishore Sah as referred above for the overtime dues for the period of September 1997 to December 2006 and even though the writ petition has been entertained and no opposition has been made by respondents, appellants herein. It is further evident that while disposing of the writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6630 of 2014 (Nand Kishore Sah vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board through its Chairman, Ranchi) the learned Single Judge of this Court has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) passed in W.P.(S) No.7200 of 2005. 19.Now the question arise that can in the present facts and circumstances the appellants would be allowed to rely upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010. This Court is of the considered view that a judgment is having the ratio decidendi if the judgment has not been passed by taking into consideration the prevalent rules/circulars applicable on issue, the judgment would be said to be per incuriam. The issue of binding precedence fell for consideration before Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. The issue of binding precedence fell for consideration before Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 wherein at paragraphs 64 & 65 it has been held that whereby obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. For ready reference these paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted here in below :- “64. “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. Thus the “quotable in law”, is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. 65. In Mamelshwar Prasad vs. Kanhaiya Lal reported in (1975) 2 SCC 232 this Court held: (SCC P.235, para7) “7. …..Where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision of obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission.” In the case of State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty (supra) while dealing with the principle of per incuriam, it is evident that the binding precedence of a judgment would only be there if the order has been passed taking into consideration the prevalent law/regulations governing the field. 20.This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the judgment rendered in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 has been passed by considering the relevant rules/circulars applicable. 20.This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the judgment rendered in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 has been passed by considering the relevant rules/circulars applicable. It is required to refer herein that after the issuance of the office order dated 09.08.1993 and 19.01.1995 the erstwhile Bihar State Electricity Board came out with an office order No.81/EB dated 13.04.1999, reference of which has been made as above laying down the policy that in any circumstances the workers would be engaged for taking overtime beyond the period of 150 hours, the amount involved in payment of such overtime shall be recovered from the pay of the erring officers and they will be also liable for disciplinary action, therefore, if the circular dated 09.08.1993 and 19.01.1995 would be read together with the circular dated 13.04.1999 it would be evident there from that the work beyond the period of 150 hours in no way can be taken from a worker and if such work would be taken and if the payment would be made, the same would be recoverable from the erring officers as would be evident from the circular dated 13.04.1999. The fact leading to this case is that the authority of the appellants have not supplied with the circular dated 09.08.1993 as also 19.01.1995 and they have repeatedly engaged the writ-petitioner to work beyond the period of overtime as prescribed and in order to deal with such employees, circular dated 13.04.1999 has been introduced making it the personal responsibility of the concerned officers and if the payment, if made, shall be recoverable from such erring officers as also disciplinary action to be initiated against such officers. We, after going through the judgment of the Division Bench of this in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010 have found there from that there is no such discussion of any such circular, i.e., circular dated 13.04.1999 and further even the relevant provisions of Factory Act, as has been considered in the case of Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra), has been considered by the Court while passing the judgment in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010, as such, as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty (supra), the judgment passed in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010, is having no binding precedence and hence the same is not binding. vs. Mamata Mohanty (supra), the judgment passed in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010, is having no binding precedence and hence the same is not binding. 21.Now coming to the legality and propriety of the impugned order, this Court finds from the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge wherefrom it is evident that the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) and considering the aforesaid judgment the order has been passed directing the authority to pass appropriate order on the representation by completing the procedure of verification of record and pass necessary order for payment of overtime work done by the petitioner. 22.We are of the considered view that since the law has been laid down by taking into consideration several provisions of Factories Act, 1948 as also the circular dated 13.04.1999 and since we have already came to a conclusive finding about non-applicability of the judgment passed in L.P.A. No.172 of 2010, as such, taking into consideration the circular dated 13.04.1999 wherein in case of payment of overtime dues it will be personal accountability of the said officer for making recovery of the amount paid and also liable for disciplinary action, the said circular having been dealt with by this Court in Nipendra Narayan Sinha vs. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (supra) and when the order/judgment has been passed relying upon the said judgment. 23.This Court, therefore, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference by this Court. 24.In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 25.Pending Interlocutory applications, if any, also stands dismissed.