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Jharkhand High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 510 (JHR)

St. Xavier’s School, Bokaro Steel City v. Krishna Kumar Jha, son of late Arjun Jha

2020-05-20

B.B.MANGALMURTI

body2020
JUDGMENT : Instant appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4th September, 2015 passed by learned Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi in Case No.16 of 2014 (JET) by which Tribunal has allowed the application of respondent herein and set aside the order dated 23.09.2013 passed by Secretary, St. Xavier’s School, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro dismissing the appellant Teacher from service with direction to reinstate him with immediate effect along with 50% back wages (salary) for the intervening period i.e. from the date of his discharge till the date of his reinstatement, and respondent will also maintain his seniority and other benefits as provided under the law. 2. The short fact of the case is that respondent herein Krishna Kumar Jha was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in St. Xavier’s School, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro. The conduct of respondent was not found good as he was found involved in willful disobedience of administrative orders of the school as well as insubordination. As per allegation, on 21.03.2012 only to cause harass to the parents of students of Class V-B, had called a meeting without taking prior permission from the school authority. Number of parents of students have come to attend the said meeting called by the respondent which was noticed by the Vice Principal of Middle School Section. Accordingly, Vice Principal intervened in the matter and requested the parents to leave the school premises as no official meeting was called and asked the respondent to return to the staff room. The incident was intimated to the Principal of school. Then the Principal called explanation from the respondent. The explanation was submitted denying the allegation. Since the Secretary of school was out of station, therefore, on his instruction, the Principal called an emergent meeting of the Managing Committee on 28.03.2012 and informed the Committee about the misconduct of respondent. The earlier incidences of misconduct of the respondents were also discussed in the said meeting and the same was recorded in the minutes of meeting. Thereafter, the Principal vide his letter dated 09.04.2012 put the respondent in suspension and initiated domestic enquiry against him as well as he was restrained to enter the premises of school but he was granted subsistence allowance. 3. During enquiry, after framing of formal charge, respondent filed his statement of defence. Thereafter, the Principal vide his letter dated 09.04.2012 put the respondent in suspension and initiated domestic enquiry against him as well as he was restrained to enter the premises of school but he was granted subsistence allowance. 3. During enquiry, after framing of formal charge, respondent filed his statement of defence. The Enquiry Committee found the allegation of charges against the respondent relating to negligence of duty, wasting of time during working hours and willful insubordination and disobedience of lawful and reasonable order of the School Authority stand proved and established. 4. On the basis of report of Enquiry Committee, respondent was discharged from his service with immediate effect and was directed to visit school for settlement of all his dues on 05.11.2013. The respondent was further intimated that his due amount of Rs.5,63,274/- towards final settlement of his account following his discharge from service was credited to his bank account. He was also directed to vacate the school Quarter and complete the other formalities. 5. The respondent thereafter moved the Jharkhand Education Tribunal against the decision of discharge from service from 23.09.2013. The Tribunal disposed of the case No.28 of 2013 on 04.04.2014 holding that the present petition is not maintainable and directed the respondent to prefer an appeal within a period of two weeks from the date of order along with application for condonation of delay and at the same time the appellate authority was directed to condone the delay and disposed of the appeal within two months after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. Thereafter, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority but the same was dismissed by order dated 06.06.2014 and order of dismissal dated 23.9.2013 was affirmed. Aggrieved by the appellate order dated 06.06.2014, the respondent again moved the Jharkhand Education Tribunal challenging the aforesaid order. The Tribunal by order dated 4th September, 2015 allowed the application filed by the respondent and set aside the order dated 23.09.2013 and directed for reinstatement of respondent along with 50% back wages (salary). 6. The appellant-school preferred instant appeal under Section 15 of Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005 against the judgment of Tribunal dated 4th September, 2015. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment/order dated 4th September, 2015 is bad in law as well as on facts. 6. The appellant-school preferred instant appeal under Section 15 of Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005 against the judgment of Tribunal dated 4th September, 2015. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment/order dated 4th September, 2015 is bad in law as well as on facts. The Tribunal has failed to consider the Draft Service Rules which gives power to Management Committee to take disciplinary action against the employee facing guilty of misconduct. The Draft Service Rules also has provision of relegation of power to the Principal in absence of Secretary. An employee can be terminated by the Management for the reason of misconduct if the charges are found to be true after investigation of the case. Learned counsel further submitted that the enquiry was conducted by the Independent Authority who was not connected with the affairs of the school administration. The Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the decision based on a disciplinary proceeding and there was no scope of re-appreciation of evidence led during departmental proceeding. Therefore, on these counts, the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that respondent-Teacher has declared in the Class that he is not able to teach a particular subject assigned to him which amounts to misconduct in view of Rule 19(v). The Management Committee has authorized the Principal to proceed in the matter as the Secretary of the school was out of station. Respondent-teacher was given full opportunity during enquiry and Enquiry Officer concluded that the charges levelled against the respondent-teacher was proved. On the finding of enquiry report, a second Show-Cause notice was issued and after receiving the reply of respondent, Management Committee has passed the impugned order which was affirmed by the Appellate Authority also. The Tribunal cannot re-appreciate or review the findings of misconduct which was held to be proved in the Departmental Enquiry. The service rules and regulations of the school was applicable to all employees and every employee are expected to obey the rules and regulations. The misconduct committed by the respondent was found sufficient so the Management Committee decided to dismiss the respondent from the service. Rule 19 defines the misconduct whereas Rule 13 provides termination of service by the management for reasons of misconduct if the charges are found true. The misconduct committed by the respondent was found sufficient so the Management Committee decided to dismiss the respondent from the service. Rule 19 defines the misconduct whereas Rule 13 provides termination of service by the management for reasons of misconduct if the charges are found true. As per Rule 23, the Management can take into account the gravity of misconduct as well as the previous record of said staff while deciding the final outcome relating to the employee. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly submitted that the Hon’ble Tribunal had considered the application under Article 311 of Constitution but the same is not applicable to Private Schools rather it is applicable in Government Schools. He relied on a decision of the case of P.V. Srinivasa Sastry & Others Versus Comptroller and Auditor General & Others reported in AIR 1993 SC 1321 in which at Paragraph 4 it has been observed :- “4. Article 311(1) says that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds civil post under the Union or a State "shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed". Whether this guarantee includes within itself the guarantee that even the disciplinary proceeding should be initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well known that departmental proceeding consists of several stages; the initiation of the proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled against that delinquent officer and the final order which is passed after the conclusion of the inquiry. Article 311(1) guarantees that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any Rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such Rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holder of a civil post. Any such Rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holder of a civil post. But in absence of any such Rule, this right or guarantee does not flow from Article 311 of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences, and the farmers of the Constitution did not consider it necessary to guarantee even that to holders of civil posts under the Union of India or under the State Government. At the same time this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether any such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a Rule, any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority, can initiate such proceeding. He also relied on a decision of Steel Authority of India Another Versus Dr. R.K. Diwakar & Others reported in AIR 1998 SC 2210 in which at Para 5 it has been observed :- “5. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the authority who issued the charge-sheet was the controlling authority. That being the position, the judgment of High Court cannot be sustained and accordingly it is set aside and the appeals are allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.” Learned counsel also submitted that departmental proceeding could be initiated by Controlling Authority. In the present case, initiation of departmental proceeding by the Principal has not caused any prejudice to the respondent-teacher as he has also not made any complaint in this respect during departmental proceeding. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that sufficiency of evidence cannot be weighed in exercising power of judicial review by the Hon’ble Tribunal. Learned counsel also submitted that non-examination of Principal and Vice Principal during the enquiry proceeding could not vitiate the finding. He also relied on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushmita Basu & Others Versus Ballygunge Siksha Samity & Others reported in (2006) 7 SCC 680 in which at Para 5 it has been observed that :- “We must remember that the profession of teaching is a noble profession. He also relied on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushmita Basu & Others Versus Ballygunge Siksha Samity & Others reported in (2006) 7 SCC 680 in which at Para 5 it has been observed that :- “We must remember that the profession of teaching is a noble profession. It is not an employment in the sense of it being merely an earner of bread and butter. A teacher fulfils a great role in the life of the nation. He is the “guru”. It is the teacher, who moulds its future citizens by imparting to his students not only knowledge, but also a sense of duty, righteousness and dedication to the welfare of the nation, in addition to other qualities of head and heart. If teachers clamour for more salaries and perquisites, the normal consequence in the case of private educational institutions, if the demand is conceded, would be no pass on the burden to the students by increasing the fees payable by the students. Teachers must ask themselves whether they should be the cause for putting education beyond the less ken of children of parents of average families with average incomes. A teacher’s profession calls for a little sacrifice in the interests of the nation. The main asset of a teacher is his students, former and present. Teachers who have lived up to ideals are held in great esteem by their disciples. The position of the guru, the teacher, in our ethos is equal to that of God (Matha, Pitha Guru Daivam). The teachers of today must ensure that this great Indian concept and the reverential position they hold, is not sacrificed at the altar of avarice.” So far payment of back wages is concerned it cannot be awarded as a right to the workman. In the case of The Management of Regional Chief Engineer P.H.E.D. Ranchi Versus Their Workmen Rep. by District Secretary in Civil Appeal No.9832 of 2018 following has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court :- 11. In our considered opinion, the Courts below completely failed to see that the back wages could not be awarded by the Court as of right to the workman consequent upon setting aside of his dismissal/termination order. by District Secretary in Civil Appeal No.9832 of 2018 following has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court :- 11. In our considered opinion, the Courts below completely failed to see that the back wages could not be awarded by the Court as of right to the workman consequent upon setting aside of his dismissal/termination order. In other words, a workman has no right to claim back wages from his employer as of right only because the Court has set aside his dismissal order in his favour and directed his reinstatement in service. 12. It is necessary for the workman in such cases to plead and prove with the aid of evidence that after his dismissal from the service, he was not gainfully employed anywhere and had no earning to maintain himself or/and his family. The employer is also entitled to prove it otherwise against the employee, namely, that the employee was gainfully employed during the relevant period and hence not entitled to claim any back wages. Initial burden is, however, on the employee. In the case of Uttarakhand Transport Corporation (Earlier known as UPSRTC) & Others Versus Sukhveer Singh reported in (2018) 1 SCC 231 in Paragraph 7 it has been held that:- 7. ……………. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority communicated the report of the inquiry officer to the respondent along with the show-cause notice. There is no dispute that the respondent submitted his reply to the show-cause after receiving the report of the inquiry officer. On considering the explanation submitted by the respondent, the disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal. Though, it was necessary for the appellants to have supplied the report of the inquiry officer before issuance of the show-cause notice proposing penalty, we find no reason to hold that the respondent was prejudiced by supply of the inquiry officer’s report along with the show-cause notice. This is not a case where the delinquent was handicapped due to the inquiry officer’s report not being furnished to him at all. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Teacher submitted that respondent was a permanent teaching staff who was appointed by the Management Committee on the basis of recommendation by the Selection Committee. He was appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher on 08.08.1988 and was serving the school efficiently. The respondent is going to superannuate in the month of December, 2019. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Teacher submitted that respondent was a permanent teaching staff who was appointed by the Management Committee on the basis of recommendation by the Selection Committee. He was appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher on 08.08.1988 and was serving the school efficiently. The respondent is going to superannuate in the month of December, 2019. It is admitted that on 22.03.2012, the Principal asked explanation from the respondent and after receipt of his explanation, the respondent-teacher was put under suspension on 09.04.2012. Learned counsel further submitted that during Enquiry proceeding neither the Principal nor Vice Principal was examined as witness and in spite of prayer made by the respondent, the Enquiry Officer did not issue summon to them to appear as witness. It is also submitted that this respondent had made application before the Superintendent of Police, Bokaro on 19.03.2008 against the Chairman of Appellate Committee, therefore, biased order was passed by him. It is further submitted that the management witnesses have admitted that calling of such meeting was a common practice and no prior permission was required if it is held during leisure period. The Enquiry Officer violated the principle of natural justice and held the respondent guilty without any proper appreciation of management witness. The order passed by the Tribunal setting aside the order of appellate authority is very much valid and justified. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Disciplinary Authority has considered past conduct of respondent-Teacher without bringing to the notice to him as also while imposing the punishment of dismissal. He relied on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus Khan Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Others reported in (2010) 10 SCC 539 . Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Enquiry Officer must act as an independent adjudicator as he holds the quasi judicial authority and he must be wholly unbiased and should not act as a prosecutor as well as a Judge. He relied on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Versus Saroj Kumar Sinha reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 . He relied on a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Versus Saroj Kumar Sinha reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 . On consideration of the submissions advanced on behalf of both side counsel, it appears that respondent-Teacher was asked to explain of his misconduct by calling the parents of the students without obtaining any prior permission from the competent authority of the school. His explanation was not found satisfactory and then he was put under suspension and departmental proceeding was initiated. The respondent herein participated in the departmental proceeding but never complained about the conduct of the enquiry officer, therefore, inference would be that the enquiry was conducted in a fair manner. On the basis of finding of enquiry, a second show-cause notice was issued and order of dismissal was passed. The order of appellate authority was challenged in which one of the ground was that a complain was made by the respondent-Teacher before the Police Authority, Bokaro, therefore, a biased order was passed by the appellate authority. Learned Tribunal has considered the Rules applicable upon the employee but failed to consider that as per Rule 13 (viii), the services of a confirmed employee could be terminated by the Management for the reasons of misconduct if the charges are found true. The other Rule 19 provides that organizing or attending any meeting in the school premises or outside during school hours or entertaining any guest in the staff room or work place without permission or order of the Principal would fall under misconduct. Since all the Rules and Regulations of the school were followed by the Management and on a proper communication regarding the imposition of punishment, the services of respondent-Teacher was terminated on reasonable ground. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The State of Karnataka & Another Versus N. Gangaraj reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 185 considered and quoted the following judgments :- 9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., again, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., again, a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is restored. 10. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 4th September, 2015 passed by learned Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi in Case No.16 of 2014 (JET), is hereby, set aside. 11. In the result, instant appeal is allowed.