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2020 DIGILAW 514 (ALL)

Ram Dinesh Singh v. State of U. P.

2020-02-17

ANIL KUMAR

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. By means of present writ petition, petitioners have prayed for quashing of the impugned order dated 26.12.2007 passed by respondent no.3/Director of Education (Basic), U.P. at Allahabad. 3. Facts, in brief, of the present case are that in the city of Fatehpur, there is an Institution known as Thawaishwar Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Thawai, Fatehpur (in short 'Institution') is a recognized Basic Junior High School from the State of U.P under U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972. 4. As per the case of the petitioners, on 12.02.1989 three vacancies for the post of Peon was advertised in the Local Newspaper (Dainik Varta) of District Fatehpur by the Principal/Manager of the Institution. In pursuance of said advertisement, petitioners were appointed by order dated 01.07.1989 issued by the Manager of the Institution, as contained in annexure no.3 to the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the date of their joining, the petitioners were performing their duties regularly on the post of Peon. When the Institution has been brought under grant-in-aid list on 01.12.2006, the petitioners were under the impression that their names were sent by the Manager of the Institution to the respondent no.4. It came to the knowledge of the petitioners that their names are not in the grant-in-aid list, they submitted their representations to the competent authority. When the representations of the petitioners were not decided of by competent authority, they approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.46761 of 2007 (Ram Dinesh Singh and another Vs. State of U.P. and others) which was disposed of by means of order dated 25.09.2007, the same on reproduction reads as under:- "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel and Sri Suresh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Petitioners allege to have been appointed as Peon in a Junior High School in the year 1989. It is further stated that at the time the petitioners were appointed, the institution was recognized as a Junior High School by the Basic Shiksha Parishad, U.P., at Allahabad. It is claimed that they have been continuously working in the institution. A news item has been published whereby the State Government has taken a decision to bring large number of recognized Junior High Schools within the grant-in-aid list. It is claimed that they have been continuously working in the institution. A news item has been published whereby the State Government has taken a decision to bring large number of recognized Junior High Schools within the grant-in-aid list. Because of such application, the Management of the institution with an ulterior motive to engage its own men, has started to modify/alter the managers' return, inasmuch as teacher whose names find mention in the managers' return would become entitled for payment of salary under grant-in-aid list by the State Government. At this stage of the proceedings, the petitioner have approached this Court for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to alter/modify the managers' return as well as not to interfere in the function of the petitioner as Peon. Large number of writ petitions for practically the same relief and with same allegations, are being filed before this Court every day. It is desirable that the State Government/Director of Education (Basic) U.P. Lucknow, may, therefore, issue necessary directions for ensuring; (a) That teachers, who have been validly appointed in recognized Junior High Schools are not adversely affected because of deliberate arbitrary actions of the Management of the Institution, as which are to be taken in the grant-in-aid list of the State Government. (b) The right of the teachers, who are validly appointed since prior to the date institution is taken on the grant-in-aid list against sanctioned post is to be protected in accordance with law. For the said purpose, it is necessary that the authority competent to sanction salary bills for payment of salary to such teachers, amongst others must enquire as to whether the appointment of the teachers/head masters concerned has been made in strict compliance of the U.P. Recognized Basic School (Junior High School) (Recruitment) and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 or not, inasmuch as once the institution is granted recognition as Junior High School under the U.P. Basic Education Act. The aforesaid prevision became applicable to the institution. The authority must record specific findings individually in respect of such teachers, who are entitled for payment of salary through the public exchequer. Let the Director of Education, (Basic) U.P. Lucknow take appropriate action as aforesaid, with intimation to the Basic Shiksha Parishad, preferably within six weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before him. The authority must record specific findings individually in respect of such teachers, who are entitled for payment of salary through the public exchequer. Let the Director of Education, (Basic) U.P. Lucknow take appropriate action as aforesaid, with intimation to the Basic Shiksha Parishad, preferably within six weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before him. With the aforesaid observations/directions, this writ petition is finally disposed of." 6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that in pursuance of the aforesaid order, opposite party no.3/Director of Education (Basic) U.P. at Lucknow has passed the impugned order dated 26.12.2007. 7. Accordingly, a query has been put to learned counsel for the petitioner to show in the writ petition on the basis of pleading whether the appointment of the petitioners was made as per rules or not. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show any averment by way of pleading in the writ petition that their initial appointment on the post of Peon in the Institution by the Manager were as per the Rules which governs the field. 9. Thus taking into consideration the said facts as well as reasoning given in the impugned order dated 26.12.2007 passed by opposite party no.3/Director of Education (Basic) U.P. Lucknow while rejecting the claim of the petitioners that their names were not mentioned in the attendance register and the photocopy of the attendance register which has been given by the petitioner no.1 available in the institution/college and their appointment orders were also not available in the record of the institution/college and on the basis of the same, it is clearly established that the petitioners are not working in the institution/college, accordingly the representation of the petitioners have been rejected . So no interference is needed in the matter in question while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as in the case of 10. So no interference is needed in the matter in question while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as in the case of 10. Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935, the scope of judicial review has been held by Lord Diplock is stated as under:- "Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. By 'illegality' as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the State is exercisable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness'. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system... I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice." 11. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 38 Hon'ble the Apex Court held that there is a very limited scope under Article 226 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 12. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union (2000) 4 SCC 245 , observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to re-appreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 13. And in the case of Union of India v. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472 , it has been held that the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below. 14. Hon'ble the Apex Court has held in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 , this Court identified the grounds of judicial review of administrative action in the following words : "The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. 14. Hon'ble the Apex Court has held in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 , this Court identified the grounds of judicial review of administrative action in the following words : "The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be : 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under : (i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety." 15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India Private Ltd. And another vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 443 after placing the reliance on the judgment of Reid Vs. Secy. Of State for Scotland (1999) 1 ALL ER 481 (HL) held that Judicial review involves a challenge to the legal validity of the decision. It does not allow the court of review to examine the evidence with a view to forming its own view about the substantial merits of the case. It may be that the tribunal whose decision is being challenged has done something which it had no lawful authority to do. It may have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decisions itself it may be found to be perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what was required. It may have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decisions itself it may be found to be perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what was required. Or the decision may be found to be erroneous in respect of a legal deficiency, as for example, through the absence of evidence, or of sufficient evidence, to support it, or through account being taken of irrelevant matter, or through a failure for any reason to take account of a relevant matter, or through some misconstruction of the terms of the statutory provision which the decision maker is required to apply. But while the evidence may have to be explored in order to see if the decision is vitiated by such legal deficiencies it is perfectly clear that in case of review, as distinct from an ordinary appeal, the court may not set about forming its own preferred view of evidence. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. 17. No order as to costs.