ORDER : The matter has been heard through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. I.A. No. 3794 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 506 days in preferring the present appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submission made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 506 days in preferring the present appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 3794 of 2019 stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 275 of 2019 5. The instant intra-court appeal has been filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order/judgment dated 09.10.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 5988 of 2007, whereby and whereunder the decision of the State-authorities dated 28.10.2003, as contained in Annexure 10 of the writ petition has been quashed, by which claim of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 for grant of B.A. Trained Scale and promotion to the post of Headmaster as his juniors have been granted has been rejected. 6. The brief facts of the case, which require to be enumerated herein for proper adjudication of the lis, reads hereunder as: The writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was initially appointed in the Matric trained scale on 01.01.1974. After joining his service, he passed the B.A. Examination in the year 1978 and thereafter he made a representation before the competent authority to grant him B.A. trained scale in terms of several circulars and guidelines issued by the State Government from time to time in this regard. Although the case of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was placed before the District Establishment Committee but the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was provided only I.A. trained scale w.e.f. 15.04.1984, which would be evident from office order dated 06.12.1984. In the meantime, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has also passed the M.A. examination in the year 1983. The grievance of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was placed before the District Establishment Committee but the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was provided only I.A. trained scale w.e.f. 15.04.1984, which would be evident from office order dated 06.12.1984. In the meantime, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has also passed the M.A. examination in the year 1983. The grievance of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 is that although he is entitled to get B.A. trained scale from 1978 i.e. right from the date of passing of the B.A. examination but the reasons best known to the respondents-authorities, the B.A. trained Scale was not provided to him rather he was granted I.A. trained scale along with several other junior persons, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto in spite of the fact that they have been appointed later than the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 in the Matric trained scale and further the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has passed the B.A examination as also the M.A. examination prior to said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto. Even then also, the said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto, being junior to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 in all respect right from the date of their appointment till possession of the requisite qualification i.e. B.A. and M.A examination, said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto, were granted B.A trained scale in the year 1987 but the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was not granted B.A. trained scale. Thereafter, vide order dated 18.03.1996, the said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto, who were juniors to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, were granted promotion to the post of Headmaster. Being aggrieved with the action of the respondents-State, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 submitted several representations but when no action was taken, he filed a writ petition, being C.W.J.C No. 3673 of 1997 (R), which was disposed of vide order dated 30.06.2003 with a direction to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 to file fresh representation before the concerned authority i.e. Director, Primary Education. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 submitted a representation on 14.07.2003 before the respondent-Director, Primary Education, who rejected the claim of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 vide order dated 28.10.2003, inter alia, on the ground that teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto are differently situated in comparison to the writ petitioner- respondent no. 1 since the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 submitted a representation on 14.07.2003 before the respondent-Director, Primary Education, who rejected the claim of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 vide order dated 28.10.2003, inter alia, on the ground that teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto are differently situated in comparison to the writ petitioner- respondent no. 1 since the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was posted in the district of Singhbhum (East) while said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto were posted in the district of Singhbhum (West) and subsequently after the district division where the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was posted, it was merged with the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan and as such taking into consideration the seniority position district-wise and also the vacancy position, the case of the said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have been considered as because on the date of their consideration on the B.A trained Scale due to availability of vacancy and considering their seniority they have been granted the B.A. trained scale while the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 since have been shifted to another district i.e. the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan, as such his case has not found fit to be considered along with the cases of said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto because after bifurcation of the district cadre of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has been shifted to the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan. The writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 being aggrieved with the order dated 28.10.2003 passed by the Director, Primary Education, invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge, after hearing learned counsel for the parties has quashed and set aside the order dated 28.10.2003 vide order dated 09.10.2017 with a direction to respondent no. 4 to grant the scale of B.A. Trained w.e.f. 06.03.1987, as has been granted to the junior, namely, Surendra Mahto and consider the case of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 for promotion, if comes within the zone in accordance with law, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 7. The appeal has been preferred by the respondent-State of Jharkhand, inter alia, on the ground that the position of writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 in the seniority list has changed after bifurcation of the district of Singhbhum (East) since the writ petitioner-respondent no. 7. The appeal has been preferred by the respondent-State of Jharkhand, inter alia, on the ground that the position of writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 in the seniority list has changed after bifurcation of the district of Singhbhum (East) since the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was appointed and posted in the district of Singhbhum (East) and subsequent to the bifurcation of the district of Singhbhum (East) and part of the district has been merged with the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan, in consequence thereof the services of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was placed to the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan and as such the case of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was not found fit to be considered on the date when the case of said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto had been considered in absence of vacancy and no junior to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 Saraikela have been granted such scale while on the other hand the case of two juniors, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have been found fit to be considered taking into consideration their position in the seniority list and the vacancy position and, therefore, there is no parity with the case of writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 with the case of said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto, but the learned Single Judge without appreciating the aforesaid aspect of the matter has quashed the impugned order dated 28.10.2003, which is not sustainable in the eye of law. Further ground has been agitated to the effect that the case of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has not been considered since no junior to him in the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan, after bifurcation of the earlier distirct of Singhbhum (East) have been granted the B.A trained scale and as such the ground which has been agitated by the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 before the writ Court in assailing order dated 28.10.2003 is not fit to be considered by the learned Single Judge since the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has failed to make out a case about discrimination taking into consideration the fact that none of the teachers in the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan, who are junior to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, have been granted B.A. trained scale. 8. The writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, after being noticed by this Court vide order dated 24.10.2019 has put his appearance through the Counsel, namely, Mr. 1, have been granted B.A. trained scale. 8. The writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, after being noticed by this Court vide order dated 24.10.2019 has put his appearance through the Counsel, namely, Mr. Altamas Khan who has submitted that the respondents-authorities while rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 for grant of B.A. trained scale has committed gross illegality in view of the fact that the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 at the time of initial appointment was appointed in the district of Singhbhum (East) and admittedly, said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have been appointed subsequent to the appointment of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 in the Matric trained scale as also in the I.A. trained scale but by virtue of service of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was placed to another district, the state-authority, taking the ground of bifurcation of the district, has considered the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 as junior to the said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto even though at the time of initial appointment they were junior in Matric trained scale as also in I.A. trained scale and as such submission has been made that if by virtue of policy decision of the State Government if the district has been bifurcated and in consequence thereof services of one or the other teachers has been placed to the other district he cannot be allowed to suffer adversely. In view of said position of law, in case of policy decision there cannot be alteration in the policy decision even it is detrimental to the service condition of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1. Learned counsel has further advanced his submission that it is the admitted position that both the assistant teachers, namely, Surendra Nath and Kanu Kishore Mahto joined services in the Matric trained scale and I.A. trained scale subsequent to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 but they have been granted B.A. trained scale prior to writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, as such the claim of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 for grant of B.A. trained scale ought not to have been rejected by the authority concerned and the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration of these aspects of the matter, has come to the conclusive finding about the discrimination, which has been meted out to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 for grant of B.A. trained scale ought not to have been rejected by the authority concerned and the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration of these aspects of the matter, has come to the conclusive finding about the discrimination, which has been meted out to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 due to policy decision of the State authority and, therefore, the decision of the authority dated 28.10.2003 has been quashed and set aside and while doing so the learned Single Judge has committed no illegality. It has further been submitted that the writ petitioner has already retired from services in the month of July, 2012 as such now it is only question of monetary benefit. 9. This Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and on appreciation of rival submissions, deem it fit and proper to refer certain admitted fact, which this Court has gathered in course of argument and on going across the pleadings made by the parties in their respective affidavits. Admitted position herein is that the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was appointed in the Matric trained scale on 01.01.1974. While he was in service, he passed the B.A. examination in the year 1978. After passing B.A. examination, he submitted a representation before the competent authority, which was placed before the District Establishment Committee but in place of granting B.A trained scale, he was granted I.A. trained scale w.e.f. 15.04.1984, which would be evident from the order dated 06.12.1984. Subsequently, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 passed M.A. examination in the year 1983. The writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 raised his grievance by submitting representation before the competent authority stating therein that the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was appointed on 01.01.1974 in the Matric trained, whereas, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have been appointed on 22.04.1975 and 19.08.1974 in the Matric trained scale respectively and further the writ petitioner was granted I.A. trained scale on 15.04.1984 and the persons junior to him, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto were granted I.A. trained scale on 15.04.1984 and in the year 1983 respectively and further the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 passed the B.A examination in the year 1978 much prior to Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto, who passed B.A. examination in the year 1983 and 1982 respectively, but without assigning any reason B.A. trained scale was not granted to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 whereas B.A. trained scale was granted in favour of said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto w.e.f. 06.03.1987 and 07.03.1987 respectively. But, when no action was taken on the representation of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, he having left with no option has approached this Court raising the ground of hostile discrimination by invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being C.W.J.C No. 3673 of 1997(R), which was disposed of vide order dated 30.06.2003 with a liberty to file fresh representation before the competent authority, who shall consider the points raised by the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 and pass appropriate order. With the liberty aforesaid, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 submitted representation before the competent authority ventilating his grievance, but the same was rejected vide order dated 28.10.2003, in which, though the seniority with respect to appointment in comparison to said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto has not been disputed but ground for not granting B.A. trained scale to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was taken to the effect the bifurcation of the district of Singhbhum (East), the district where the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was initially appointed in the Matric trained scale and subsequent to the appointment of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have been appointed in the Matric trained scale. It has further been stated that there cannot be any parity so far as position of the petitioner vis-à-vis Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto is concerned, since subsequent to the appointment of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 due to the policy decision of the State, part of the Singhbhum (East) has been bifurcated from the district of Singhbhum (East) and amalgamated to the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan. The services of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was automatically placed to the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan since at the time of his joining he was posted in the block, which was falling in the area which was subsequently merged to the district of Saraikela Kharsawan and as such the seniority position of the writ petitioner-respondent no. The services of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was automatically placed to the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan since at the time of his joining he was posted in the block, which was falling in the area which was subsequently merged to the district of Saraikela Kharsawan and as such the seniority position of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, which he was retaining at the time of his initial appointment falling within the district of Singhbhum (East) have been changed while the services of Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto remained in the district of Singhbhum (East) and as such due to different place of posting which the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 got subsequently, he cannot claim advantage of his seniority position, which he was retaining at the time of his initial appointment. 10. Learned counsel for the State-appellant has submitted that learned Single Judge ought to have taken into consideration this aspect of the matter at the time of consideration of the reason assigned in the impugned order dated 28.10.2003 but having not done so gross illegality has been committed. 11. In view of such rival submissions, the foremost question which is to be answered if by virtue of policy decision services of one or the other employee has been allocated to the other district, can such employee be allowed to put to detrimental situation by altering the service condition? 12. In order to answer this question, we have taken aid of provision of the State Re-organization Act, 1956 wherein under Section 115(7) it has been provided that conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. Pari materia provision is there under Section 73 of the Bihar Re-organisation Act, 2000 which reads hereunder as: “73. Pari materia provision is there under Section 73 of the Bihar Re-organisation Act, 2000 which reads hereunder as: “73. Other provisions relating to services.—(1) Nothing in section 72 shall be deemed to affect on or after the appointed day the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State: Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day in the case of any person deemed to have been allocated to the State of Bihar or to the State of Jharkhand under section 72 shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. (2) All services prior to the appointed day rendered by a person— (a) if he is deemed to have been allocated to any State under section 72, shall be deemed to have been rendered in connection with the affairs of that State; (b) if he is deemed to have been allocated to the Union in connection with the administration of the Jharkhand shall be deemed to have been rendered in connection with the affairs of the Union, for the purposes of the rules regulating his conditions of service. (3) The provisions of section 72, shall not apply in relation to members of any All-India Service.” It is evident from the provisions of Section 73 of the Bihar Re-organization Act that by virtue of bifurcation of erstwhile State of Bihar in two successor States i.e. the State of Bihar and the State of Jharkhand the condition of service shall not be altered to the disadvantage of the employee. Reference in this regard be made to the decision rendered in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Reference in this regard be made to the decision rendered in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Durga Charan Das reported in AIR 1966 SC 1547 , wherein it has been held that the conditions of service of any member of Provincial or Subordinate service serving immediately before the 1st day of April, 1936 in or in connection with the affairs of the province of Bihar and Orissa, who is required to serve in or in connection with the affairs of Orissa shall not in the case of any such person while he is serving in or in connection with the affairs of Orissa be less favourable than they were immediately before the 1st day of April, 1936. Further reference is being made in this context is the judgment rendered in the case of Grid Corporation of Orissa & Ors Vs. Rasananda Das reported in (2003) 10 SCC 297 , wherein at paragraphs it has been held that service conditions of the employees are to be protected cannot be changed to his detriment by virtue of regulation of the Board. 13. It is settled position of law that the service condition cannot be altered, which is detrimental to the interest of the concerned employee. It requires to refer herein that the services of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was allocated to the newly created district after merger of the portion of the earlier district where the writ petitioner was posted i.e. in the district of Singhbhum (East) rather the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was forced to remain in the newly created district of Saraikela-Kharsawan and as such seniority being a service condition, if allowed to be changed it will nothing but a alteration in the service condition which in the facts of the cast at hand is detrimental to the interest of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was forced to remain in the newly created district of Saraikela-Kharsawan and as such seniority being a service condition, if allowed to be changed it will nothing but a alteration in the service condition which in the facts of the cast at hand is detrimental to the interest of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1, therefore, the ground as has been agitated by the appellant-State of Jharkhand that due to bifurcation of the district of Singhbhum (East) resulting into creation of new district of Saraikela-Kharsawan after merger of some part of the Singhbhum (East) will come in the way of denying parity to the writ petitioner in comparison to that of Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto, if the petitioner would be deprived from the benefit of his seniority which he was retaining at the time of initial appointment in the district of Singhbhum (East), the same will lead in alteration in the service condition of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1. 14. It further requires to refer herein that this point was not canvassed before the learned Single Judge but this ground since been raised which being a pure question of law has been allowed to be raised by this Court, upon which, learned counsel for the appellant-State furnished no answer, neither adjournment has been sought for to answer the same, therefore, taking aid of provision of Section 115 (7) of the State Re-organization Act 1956 or Section 73 of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000 which prohibit alteration in service condition in case of bifurcation of State, we have proceeded to examine the facts of the present case to assess the legality and propriety of the authority rejecting the claim as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. Admittedly, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has been appointed in the Matric trained scale prior to that of the two assistant teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto. It is also admitted fact that in the seniority list, as was prevailing at the time of undivided district of Singhbhum (East), the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was senior to those assistant teachers. It is also admitted that the petitioner has passed the B.A. and M.A. examination prior to that of those assistant teachers but these two assistant teachers have been granted B.A. trained scale as also the post of Headmaster prior to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1. 1 was senior to those assistant teachers. It is also admitted that the petitioner has passed the B.A. and M.A. examination prior to that of those assistant teachers but these two assistant teachers have been granted B.A. trained scale as also the post of Headmaster prior to the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1. The ground for taking such decision, as contended by the State-authorities is that on the day when cases of these two teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have been considered, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 was no more in the district of Singhbhum (East) due to bifurcation of two districts, namely, the district of Singhbhum (East) and the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan. The writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 who was posted in the block, which was earlier attached to the district of Singhbhum (East), due to the re-constitution of these two districts the said block has been shifted to the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan and as such the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has been treated to be in the different district. According to State-authorities the two assistant teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto have no nexus with the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 by virtue of having gone other district i.e. the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan, as such the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 cannot be allowed to claim parity with these assistant teachers. 16. In the light of the above fact, we have referred herein above, Section 115 (7) of the State Re-organization Act 1956 and Section 73 of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000 which prohibit alteration in the service condition of a public servant in case of any policy decision by bifurcating State by re-constituting and bifurcating. 17. Here, in the instant case also writ petitioner’s seniority has been changed due to policy decision of the State-authority by which the district of Singhbhum (East) has been reconstituted and a portion of the area of district Singhbhum (East) has been merged with the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan. 18. The question further would be that can the seniority be termed to be a service condition. It is well settled position of law that since promotion depends upon the inter se seniority of the one or the other employees in the cadre, therefore, the seniority is a service condition. 18. The question further would be that can the seniority be termed to be a service condition. It is well settled position of law that since promotion depends upon the inter se seniority of the one or the other employees in the cadre, therefore, the seniority is a service condition. Since seniority is a service condition as because seniority regularize holding of a post by a person since by the seniority only promotion of one or the other employee depends. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors Vs. Shardul Singh reported in 1970 (1) SCC 108 , wherein at paragraphs 8 and 9 has been held as under: “8. One of the powers conferred under this proviso is to make rules regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to civil services of the Union or the State as the case may be. The expression “conditions of service” is an expression of wide import. As pointed by this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court [ (1955) 2 SCR 1331 ] the dismissal of an official is a matter which falls within “conditions of service” of public servants. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand [(1948) LR 75 IA 343] took the view that a right of dismissal is a condition of service whithin the meaning of the words under Section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Lord Thankerton speaking for the Board observed therein: “apart from consideration whether the context indicates a special significance to the expression “conditions of service” Their Lordships are unable in the absence of any such special significance, to regard provisions which prescribe the circumstances under which the employer is to be entitled to terminate the service as otherwise than conditions of the service, whether these provisions are contractual or statutory; they are therefore of opinion that the natural meaning of the expression would include such provision.” In P. Batakotaiah v. Union of India [(1958) SCR 1052] this Court proceeded on the basis that a rule providing for the termination of the service of a railway official can be made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by Sections 241(2), 247 and 263(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. 9. 9. The expression “conditions of service” means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it in matters like pension, etc.” The judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors Vs. Shardul Singh (Supra) has been considered in the case of Syed Khalid Rizvi & Ors v. Union of India & Ors reported in (1993) Suppl. 3 SCC 575, wherein the three judges Bench held at paragraph 30 and 31 hereunder as: 30. The next question is whether the seniority is a condition of service or a part of rules of recruitment? In State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh [ (1970) 1 SCC 108 : (1970) 3 SCR 302 ] , this Court held that the term conditions of service means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment (emphasis supplied) to his retirement and even beyond, in matters like pensions etc. In I.N. Subba Reddy v. Andhra University [ (1977) 1 SCC 554 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 178 : (1976) 3 SCR 1013 ] , the same view was reiterated. In Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India [ (1975) 3 SCC 76 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 454 : (1975) 1 SCR 449 at 468] a Constitution Bench held that the rule which confers a right to actual promotion or a right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribing a condition of the service. In Mohd. Bhakar v. Krishna Reddy [ 1970 SLR 768 ] another Constitution Bench held that any rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to his condition of service. In State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit [1967 SLR 753], this Court held that a rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service. The same view was reiterated in another Constitution Bench judgment in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] . No doubt conditions of service may be classified as salary, confirmation, promotion, seniority, tenure or termination of service etc. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service. The same view was reiterated in another Constitution Bench judgment in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1974) 1 SCC 317 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 137] . No doubt conditions of service may be classified as salary, confirmation, promotion, seniority, tenure or termination of service etc. as held in State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath [ (1989) 1 SCC 321 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 128] by a Bench of two Judges but the context in which the law therein was laid must be noted. The question therein was whether non-prosecution for a grave offence after expiry of four years is a condition of service? While negativing the contention that non-prosecution after expiry of 4 years is not a condition of service, this Court elaborated the subject and the above view was taken. The ratio therein does not have any bearing on the point in issue. Perhaps the question may bear relevance, if an employee was initially recruited into the service according to the rules and promotion was regulated in the same rules to higher echelons of service. In that arena promotion may be considered to be a condition of service. In A.K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India [ (1991) 1 SCC 544 at 548 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 601 : (1991) 16 ATC 501] , this Court held that seniority is an incidence of service and where the service rules prescribe the method of its computation it is squarely governed by such rules. In their absence ordinarily the length of service is taken into account. In that case the direct recruits were made senior to the recruits by regularisation although the appellants were appointed earlier in point of time and uninterruptedly remained in service as temporary appointees along with the appellants but later on when recruited by direct recruitment, they were held senior to the promotees. 31. No employee has a right to promotion but he has only the right to be considered for promotion according to rules. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service and are defeasible. Take an illustration that the Promotion Regulations envisage maintaining integrity and good record by Dy. S.P. of State Police Service as eligibility condition for inclusion in the select-list for recruitment by promotion to Indian Police Service. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service and are defeasible. Take an illustration that the Promotion Regulations envisage maintaining integrity and good record by Dy. S.P. of State Police Service as eligibility condition for inclusion in the select-list for recruitment by promotion to Indian Police Service. Inclusion and approval of the name in the select-list by the UPSC, after considering the objections if any by the Central Government is also a condition precedent. Suppose if ‘B’ is far junior to ‘A’ in State Services and ‘B’ was found more meritorious and suitable and was put in a select-list of 1980 and accordingly ‘B’ was appointed to the Indian Police Service after following the procedure. ‘A’ was thereby superseded by ‘B’. Two years later ‘A’ was found fit and suitable in 1984 and was accordingly appointed according to rules. Can ‘A’ thereafter say that ‘B’ being far junior to him in State Service, ‘A’ should become senior to ‘B’ in the Indian Police Service. The answer is obviously no because ‘B’ had stolen a march over ‘A’ and became senior to ‘A’. Here maintaining integrity and good record are conditions of recruitment and seniority is an incidence of service. Take another illustration that the State Service provides — rule of reservation to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. ‘A’ is a general candidate holding No. 1 rank according to the roster as he was most meritorious in the State service among general candidates. ‘B’ scheduled castes candidate holds No. 3 point in the roster and ‘C’, scheduled tribe holds No. 5 in the roster. Suppose Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules also provide reservation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well. By operation of the equality of opportunity by Articles 14, 16(1), 16(4) and 335, ‘B’ and ‘C’ were recruited by promotion from State Services to Central Services and were appointed earlier to ‘A’ in 1980. ‘A’ thereafter in the next year was found suitable as a general candidate and was appointed to the Indian Police Service. Can ‘A’ thereafter contend that since ‘B’ and ‘C’ were appointed by virtue of reservation, though were less meritorious and junior to him in the State service and gradation list would not become senior to him in the cadre as IPS officer. Undoubtedly ‘B’ and ‘C’, by rule of reservation, had stolen a march over ‘A’ from the State Service. Can ‘A’ thereafter contend that since ‘B’ and ‘C’ were appointed by virtue of reservation, though were less meritorious and junior to him in the State service and gradation list would not become senior to him in the cadre as IPS officer. Undoubtedly ‘B’ and ‘C’, by rule of reservation, had stolen a march over ‘A’ from the State Service. By operation of rule of reservation ‘B’ and ‘C’ became senior and ‘A’ became junior in the Central Services. Reservation and roster were conditions of recruitment and seniority was only an incidence of service. The eligibility for recruitment to the Indian Police Service, thus, is a condition of recruitment and not a condition of service. Accordingly we hold that seniority, though, normally an incidence of service, Seniority Rules, Recruitment Rules and Promotion Regulations form part of the conditions of recruitment to the Indian Police Service by promotion, which should be strictly complied with before becoming eligible for consideration for promotion and are not relaxable. (Own emphasis) Again, the judgment rendered by three Judge Bench in the case of Syed Khalid Rizvi & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (supra) has been referred in the case of S.S. Bola & Ors Vs. B.D. Sardana & Ors. reported in (1997) 8 SCC 522 , wherein at paragraph 145 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “145. It is true that the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution can be issued by amending or altering the Rules with retrospectivity as consistently held by this Court in a catena of decisions, viz., B.S. Vadera v. Union of India [ AIR 1969 SC 118 : (1968) 3 SCR 575 ] ; Raj Kumar v. Union of India [ (1975) 4 SCC 13 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 198 : (1975) 3 SCR 963 ] ; K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P. [ (1985) 1 SCC 523 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 280] ; T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana [1986 Supp SCC 584 : (1987) 2 ATC 595] and a host of other decisions. But the question is whether the Rules can be amended taking away the vested right. But the question is whether the Rules can be amended taking away the vested right. As regards the right to seniority, this Court elaborately considered the incidence of the right to seniority and amendment of the Act in the latest decision in Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. [ (1997) 5 SCC 201 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1299 : (1997) 3 Scale 289 ] relieving the need to reiterate all of them once over. Suffice it to state that it is settled law that a distinction between right and interest has always been maintained. Seniority is a facet of interest. The rules prescribe the method of selection/recruitment. Seniority is governed by the existing rules and is required to be worked out accordingly. No one has a vested right to promotion or seniority but an officer has an interest to seniority acquired by working out the Rules. It would be taken away only by operation of valid law. Right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribed by conditions of service. A rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to conditions of service. The rule merely affecting the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying the conditions of service. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service. A rule which merely affects the chances of promotion does not amount to change in the conditions of service.” The aforesaid judgment has also been considered in the case of Dhole Govind Sahebrao & Ors Vs. Union of India & Ors reported in (2015) 6 SCC 727 . 19. In the facts of the discussions made herein above, it can safely be said that promotion from which the writ petitioner has been deprived will be said to be condition of service since the case of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has not been considered with the other two assistant teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto even though, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 at the time of initial appointment was senior to them. 20. 1 has not been considered with the other two assistant teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto even though, the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 at the time of initial appointment was senior to them. 20. In that view of the matter and applying the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, as referred above, we come to a conclusive finding that it is not a case of chance of promotion rather the chance of promotion has become inevitable the district would not have been re-constituted in that situation, the petitioner would have got the chance of promotion, therefore, in the facts of the case promotion from which the petitioner has been deprived will be said to be a condition of service. 21. This Court applying same analogy as provided under Section 115 (7) of the State Re-organization Act 1956 and Section 73 of the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000 is of the view that seniority being a service condition and since the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 admittedly was in the cadre of teaching staff prior to that of these staffs, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto at the time of initial appointment and joined their services in the undivided district of Singhbhum (East) his seniority cannot be taken away treating the writ petitioner as an employee of the district of Saraikela-Kharsawan. 22. In this context, if the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 would be allowed to suffer by not granting higher scale in comparison to that of these assistant teachers, namely, Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto that too for no fault of his own rather the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has been made to suffer due to policy decision of State and, therefore, according to our considered view if the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 has made a claim of parity with these assistant teachers, it cannot be said to be unjustified. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant-State has also raised ground in assailing the impugned order to the effect that the post of assistant teacher is having district-wise cadre and hence there would be different position of seniority of one or the other teachers and one cannot claim parity with the teachers of another district. 24. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant-State has also raised ground in assailing the impugned order to the effect that the post of assistant teacher is having district-wise cadre and hence there would be different position of seniority of one or the other teachers and one cannot claim parity with the teachers of another district. 24. Upon which, this Court put a specific query as to on what basis argument is being advanced that the assistant teachers are not having State Cadre rather they have district cadre but no specific reply or document has been placed before us, however, learned counsel for the appellants-State has tried to impress upon the Court by drawing the attention towards Annexure 7, which is a letter written by the District Education Officer, Singhbhum (West) to the Director, Primary Education, Bihar, Patna whereby and whereunder correspondence has been made to prepare seniority list and send it prior to 31.12.1985 so that the matter for promotion can be considered, but this Court after going across the content of the said letter is of the view that if the post of assistant teachers would have been a district cadre post, there would not have been any occasion to address it to the Director, Primary Education, Bihar, Patna for preparation of a seniority list rather such letter can only be made by the district authority to the State authority if the post is of the State cadre, save and except this annexure, no other document has been placed on record to justify the stand that the Assistant Teachers have district cadre and not the State Cadre. 25. Further, even the State-appellant has not come out with the document pertaining to appointment letters of the writ petitioner-respondent no. 1 and said Surendra Mahto and Kanu Kishore Mahto to come to a conclusive finding about this and if in this circumstance, the learned Single Judge has come to a finding by showing interference with the impugned order dated 28.10.2003, then cannot be faulted with. 26. In that view of the matter and basing upon the detailed discussions made herein above, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 27. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 09.10.2017. 28. In the result, the present intra-court appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. 29. 26. In that view of the matter and basing upon the detailed discussions made herein above, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 27. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 09.10.2017. 28. In the result, the present intra-court appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. 29. In view of the dismissal of the instant intra-court appeal, I.A. No. 3075 of 2019 stands disposed of.