ORDER : Saumitra Dayal Singh, J. 1. Heard Sri Anil Kumar Aditya, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri Rahul Sahai, learned counsel for the private respondent Nos. 3 to 6; Sri Kaushal Kishore Mani, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha and; Sri Ashutosh Kumar Rai, learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. By means of the present writ petition, challenge has been raised to the order dated 25.10.2019, whereby the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mirzapur allowed the revision filed by the private respondents and set aside the order dated 13.12.2017 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation who had entertained the appeal filed by the present petitioners against an order passed under Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) read with section 42-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 3. In short, the private respondents claim existence of an order dated 26.05.1987 passed under Section 9-A(2) of the Act, by the Consolidation Officer, whereby, title in the property in dispute is claimed to have been settled in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents after negating the claim of the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners. It is on record that, against that order, the petitioners have filed an appeal being Appeal No. 227/536 (Sampurnanand & Ors. Vs. Amitabh Soni & Ors.) before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. That appeal is admittedly pending. 4. Also, though that appeal is still pending, however, there is no interim order operating in favour of the present petitioners. In such circumstances, upon application filed under Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') read with Section 42-A of the Act, the private respondents got their names recorded in the revenue records. This order was passed by the Consolidation Officer on 18.07.2017. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal against the said order, on which an issue of maintainability had arisen. It was dealt with and decided by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, vide order dated 13.12.2017, wherein he held the appeal to be maintainable. Upon the revision filed by the private respondents, the order dated 13.12.2017 has been set aside and the appeal held not maintainable. It was dealt with and decided by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, vide order dated 13.12.2017, wherein he held the appeal to be maintainable. Upon the revision filed by the private respondents, the order dated 13.12.2017 has been set aside and the appeal held not maintainable. At the same time, as to the substantive rights being claimed by the parties, the Revisional Court had left it open to the parties to raise all contentions before the Appellate Authority in Appeal No. 227/536. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners' appeal against the order dated 18.07.2017 was wholly maintainable, in view of the clear provision of Rule 109-A of the Rules. The opposition to the said submission also stems from the reading of Rule 109-A of the Rules. It would therefore be profitable to extract the provision of Rule 109-A of the Rules. It reads as under: "109-A. Section 52(2). - (1) Orders passed in cases covered by sub-section (2) of Section 52 shall be given effect to by the consolidation authorities, authorised in this behalf under sub-section (2) of Section 42. In case there be no such authority the Assistant Collector, incharge of the sub-division, the Tahsildar, the Naib-Tahsildar, the Supervisor kanungo, and the Lekhpal of the area to which the case relates shall, respectively, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the Consolidator and the Consolidation Lekhpal respectively for the purpose of giving effect to the orders aforesaid. (2) If for the purpose of giving effect to any order referred to in sub-rule (1) it becomes necessary to reallocate affected chaks, necessary orders may be passed by the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. (3) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer, or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, may, within 15 days of the order passed under sub-rule (2), file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, or the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division, as the case may be, who shall decide the appeal after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, which shall be final. (4) In case delivery of possession becomes necessary as a result of orders passed under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3), as the case may be, the provisions of Rules 55 and 56 shall, mutatis mutandis, be followed.]" 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that recording of the names of the respondents in place of the petitioners would amount to reallocation of chaks and therefore, the order dated 18.07.2017 falls in the category of the orders rendered appealable under Rule 109-A(2) of the Rules. 7. Opposing the petition, learned counsel for the respondents would submit, in the context of proceedings under the Act, reallocation of affected chaks refers only to cases where as a result of some proceedings or orders, the description of either the area or the valuation or the location of chaks is affected or altered i.e. the boundaries of any chak are altered. No such alteration has been made in the present case and the chak originally carved out remain unaltered. The present is a case where effect is being given to an order passed adjudicating title. Thus, the only alteration that is taking place is the name of the title holder as recorded. It has no bearing on the allocation of chaks in the village map. In this regard, reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Ram Achchaibar Vs. Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Jaunpur, (1985) RD 194. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, there can be no exception to the proposition invoked by learned counsel for the respondents that appeal is a creature of statute. Unless the statute provides for an appeal against an order, no forum of appeal may ever arise. In the present case, the provisions of Rule 109-A(1) of the Rules enables a party to apply to the consolidation authorities to give effect to orders of the description given under that sub-Rule. 9. Thus, section 52 of the Act, after preparation of fresh maps and records, the State Government issues a notification to declare closure of consolidation operations. However, despite such closure, solely by virtue of express provision contained in sub-section (2), a residuary jurisdiction survives with the consolidation authorities to give effect to certain orders. 9. Thus, section 52 of the Act, after preparation of fresh maps and records, the State Government issues a notification to declare closure of consolidation operations. However, despite such closure, solely by virtue of express provision contained in sub-section (2), a residuary jurisdiction survives with the consolidation authorities to give effect to certain orders. Rule 109-A of the Rules, in the first place provides for authorities who may pass orders to give effect to any order falling under section 52(2) of the Act. It does not contemplate grant of any opportunity of hearing for that purpose i.e. to pass orders to give effect to any order falling under section 52(2) of the Act. Then, under sub-Rule 109-A of the Rules, in cases involving reallocation of chak - while giving effect to an earlier order, opportunity of hearing is required to be given. Then, under Rule 109-A(3) of the Rules, appeal has been provided only in cases where the order may have been passed under sub-Rule (2). 10. A reading of Rule 109-A of the Rules in entirety, brings out that in the first place, it provides for orders to be passed by specified authorities to give effect to certain specified type of orders. Thus, it is a power in nature of execution proceedings only. It is essentially, non-adjudicatory. In such proceedings, in the first place, no opportunity of hearing is contemplated. Then, its sub-Rule (2) is really in the shape of a proviso to sub-Rule (1), inasmuch as it mandates an opportunity of hearing be given in all cases where an order (to be passed), under sub-Rule (1) would result in reallocation of chak. Reallocation, as word has not been defined under the Act. Reallocate is a transitive verb, the direct object here being the chak. Used in sub-Rule (2) of Rule 109-A of the Rules, it only implies - to again allocate chaks. Clearly, it refers to drawing chaks afresh. Reallocation, as word has not been defined under the Act. Reallocate is a transitive verb, the direct object here being the chak. Used in sub-Rule (2) of Rule 109-A of the Rules, it only implies - to again allocate chaks. Clearly, it refers to drawing chaks afresh. Websters Third New International Dictionary, defines the word reallocate, thus:- "1: to apportion for a specific purpose or to particular persons or things (if blame) were to be allocated it must be apportioned elsewhere as: a: to give (a share of money, land or responsibility) to a person b: to distribute or to divide and distribute according to relative contribution to an objective whether on an equal, proportional or judiciously calculated basis (a fortune two charitable foundations) c: to apportion and distribute (as costs or revenues) among accounts according to some pre-determined ratio or agreed measure of involvement (as degree of responsibility or benefit received) d: to deal out (something limited in supply) according to an allowance schedule established especially by a public authority or major producer: RATION (under a mobilization program metals may be allocated among manufacturer) 2: to set apart and ear mark or designate: ASSIGN (materials or facilities for a project) (government of the conscience is allocated to the clergy--New Republic" 11. In the context of the statute which provides different stages for different proceedings under consolidation operations - being correction of records; settlement of title claims; mutation during proceedings and; last - allotment of chaks, clearly a proceeding to give effect to an order passed in a title dispute is distinct, different and also independent of a proceeding for allocation of chak. Therefore, where the Rule refers to reallocation of chak, it clearly appears to point to and is confined to proceedings for allotment of chak and not to settlement of title disputes. As noted above, the proceeding such as the one involved in the present case was only to record the name of the lawful chak holder. That question could get decided in the title dispute alone. Whether the chak is recorded in the name of the petitioners or the private respondents would not have any bearing on the demarcation of the chak, in any manner. The identity of the chak would remain the same, irrespective of the title over it. 12. Similar view appears to have been taken by this Court in Ram Achchaibar & Others Vs. The identity of the chak would remain the same, irrespective of the title over it. 12. Similar view appears to have been taken by this Court in Ram Achchaibar & Others Vs. Settlement Officer Consolidation, Jaunpur & Others (supra), wherein it was observed as under:- "The order of the Consolidation officer purports to have been passed under Rule 109-A(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules where this order was given effect to: One of the modes of giving effect to the order is that by entering the name of the successful, person in the revenue records, in other words the Amaldaramad proceedings. It is this procedure which has been adopted and the name of the successful party has been entered in pursuance of the impugned order of the Consolidation Officer dated August 18, 1983 (Annexure 2' to the writ petition). Against this order that the appeal was preferred which was dismissed by order dated February 10, 1984. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no notice was given to the petitioners in the proceedings under Rule 109(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules. The provisions of Rule 109-A(1) as quoted above are quite clear and no notice is contemplated to be given to any party and the order is sought to be given effect to. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeal has been incorrectly held to be not maintainable. Under Rule 109-A(3), the appeal can be filed only if an order has been passed under Rule 109-A(2) and not in the case, the order has been passed under Rule 109-A(1). As the present order was not passed under Rule 109-A(1), hence no appeal could have been filed against that order. The learned counsel for the petitioner next urged that this was allocation of Chak proceeding in pursuance of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and just making Amaldaramad in the revenue records was not the sufficient remedy available to any party. But it was still open to the petitioners that in case they seek the effect of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in any other mode than the Amaldaramad proceeding they can still approach the Consolidation Officer and for that they can make an application to that effect. But it was still open to the petitioners that in case they seek the effect of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in any other mode than the Amaldaramad proceeding they can still approach the Consolidation Officer and for that they can make an application to that effect. Further it may be stated that it is only when the proceedings under Section 109-A the Rules are initiated for the allocation of the Chaks, notice to any party can be given and not in proceedings under Rule 109-A(1) of the Rules. Hence there was no question of giving any notice to the petitioners in the proceedings under Rule 109-A(1) of the Rules. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners it is the allocation of Chak proceedings which was the only proper mode of giving effect to the order dated January 17, 1978. In my opinion giving effect to the order in the revenue records was also the mode and it is the mode of proceedings under Rule 109-A(1) and hence it was not necessary to give notice in the said proceedings. Provisions of Rule 109-A(1) and Rule 109-A(2) are exclusive to each other. Therefore, separate provisions has been made under Rule 109-A(1) and under Rule 109-A(2). Hence the allocation of Chak procedure was correctly not adopted by the Consolidation Officer." 13. In contrast, in Ramapati & Others Vs. D.D.C., Jaunpur & Others reported in 2014 (125) RD 364, the dispute involved was also as to the modification of the chak. It is in that context that the appeal filed under Rule 109-Awas found to be maintainable. 14. Even otherwise, it is seen that the dispute as to the title has yet not attained finality, inasmuch as the petitioners appeal against the order dated 26.05.1987 is still pending. Assuming that the appeals were to be allowed, it would still not require any further notice to be given to the private respondents at that stage (if that arises) for the purpose of change in the name of the chak-holder, in the revenue records. 15. Looked from whichever angle, there does not appear to be involved, any issue of reallocation of chak in the dispute existing between the parties. That dispute is found to be confined only to record the name of the lawful title holder over the chak. 15. Looked from whichever angle, there does not appear to be involved, any issue of reallocation of chak in the dispute existing between the parties. That dispute is found to be confined only to record the name of the lawful title holder over the chak. Hence, no opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioners, before the order dated 18.7.2017 came to be passed and the said order would remain referable to Rule 109-A(1) of the Rules and not to Rule 109-A(2) of the Rules. Therefore, and for that reason alone, it would never become appealable as that remedy has been created and provided by the statutory Rules only against orders passed under Rule 109-A(2) of the Rules i.e. orders required by law to be passed after affording opportunity of hearing. Consequently, it must be held, the appeal filed by the petitioners was not maintainable. 16. The further submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the order dated 18.07.2017 was passed, both under Rule 109-A of the Rules and Section 42-A of the Act. Therefore, the appeal would lie insofar as that order is referable to Section 42-A of the Act, also does not merit acceptance in view of the fact that the Act does not provide a remedy of appeal against those orders as observed by a division bench of this Court in Khageshwar alias Kharag vs. Hoshram & Others 1965 RD 389. Therefore Section 42-A of the Act, may also not come to the aid of petitioners to render their appeal maintainable. 17. As to the further and other challenge made by the petitioners to the order dated 18.07.2017, by directly approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a valid objection has been raised by learned counsel for the private respondent that the petitioners have an adequate alternative remedy of revision available under Section 48 of the Act. In view of the fact that the petitioners have already availed the remedy of appeal against the order dated 26.05.1987 which is still pending and the fact that the order dated 18.07.2019 is undisputably revisable, no interference is warranted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. Therefore, interference with the order dated 18.07.2017 is declined. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. 18. Therefore, interference with the order dated 18.07.2017 is declined. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. However, in any case, dismissal of the writ petition will have no bearing on the substantive rights of the parties which are pending adjudication in appeal No. 227/536 (Sampurnanand & Ors. Vs. Amitabh Soni & Ors.) pending before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. It is expected that appeal may be heard and decided, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months.