JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. 2. Heard parties. 3. The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 28.01.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 345 of 2019 whereby and where under the order dated 22.12.2018 has been refused to be interfered with by which the contract of employment of the appellant/writ petitioner dated 04.07.2018 has been terminated and the petitioner has been relieved from the post of General Manager (Public Works), JUIDCO. 4. The brief facts of the case which are required to be enumerated herein read here under as:- The writ petitioner/appellant was appointed as General Manager (Public Works) in pursuance of notice inviting application as contained in Advertisement No. 20 dated 10.04.2018 and on being found eligible/qualified in the interview, he was issued with the offer of appointment for the period of five years with an initial probation period of three months and accordingly in pursuance of the offer of appointment, the writ petitioner joined his service on 12.06.2018 as also executed a contract agreement as well as service bond in favour of JUIDCO on 04.07.2018. The writ petitioner satisfactorily completed the probation period of three months which was completed on 12.09.2018 and thereafter he was allowed to perform his duty and he discharged the same without any complaint from any quarter but all of a sudden, vide order dated 22.12.2018 his services have been terminated with immediate effect by referring a reason in the impugned order that his work has been found to be less than satisfactory by the appraising authority. The writ petitioner/appellant invoked the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 22.12.2018 inter alia on the ground that the order impugned is stigmatic since the work performed by the writ petitioner has been found to be less than satisfactory and the same has been passed without issuing any notice to him. The other ground has been agitated that the impugned order was passed on 22.12.2018 which is after the completion of the probation period of three months which was completed on 12.09.2018 which means that the service of the writ petitioner was found to be satisfactory during the period of three months as was provided in the advertisement/ agreement and hence allowing the writ petitioner to perform his duty beyond the probation period of three months suggests that the service of the petitioner was satisfactory but due to ulterior motive and in a highly arbitrary manner, the service of the writ petitioner has been terminated vide impugned order dated 22.12.2018 that too, without service of notice. 5. Mr. Kishore Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner has submitted that all these facts as above were raised before the learned Single Judge but without considering the same, the learned Single Judge has been declined to interfere with the impugned order only on the ground that the appointment of the writ petitioner was made on contractual basis for a period of five years. According to learned counsel even though appointment is on contract, the petitioner was required to be given notice and further, the reason was required to be assigned in the impugned order but having not done so, the learned Single Judge has committed gross illegality in dismissing the writ petition. 6. Per contra, Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 has submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned order since the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the nature of engagement which was on contract for a period of five years with a probation period of three months from the date of joining and as such, considering the nature of appointment since the service of the writ petitioner was found not satisfactory by the appraising authority which was based upon his subjective satisfaction and if such decision has been taken, the petitioner has got no legal vested right since he has accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the offer of appointment as also the agreement and hence, he cannot claim to be allowed to continue in service even if his services have been found to be not satisfactory by the appraising authority. The learned Single Judge has considered this aspect of the matter as also the nature of order of termination has been found to be simplicitor and not punitive and as such the principle of audi alteram partem will not be applicable. 7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions and considering the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in declining to interfere with the impugned order dated 22.12.2018, this Court first deems it fit and proper to consider the nature of appointment, for which, the recruitment notice as also the agreement are required to be considered. It is evident from the recruitment notice dated 10.04.2018, which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the memo of appeal, whereby and where under application has been invited from the suitable candidates for rendering services for the position of General Manager (Public Works) on direct recruitment (contractual). It is evident from condition No.2 of the Terms of Engagement wherein it has been provided that the contractual recruitment will be made for five years from the date of appointment which may be extended further, if required. However, contract may be terminated in case of unsatisfactory service. The petitioner participated in the process of selection and being found successful in the performance test based upon the interview, offer of appointment was issued on 06.06.2018, which has been annexed as Annexure-4 to the memo of appeal. 8. This Court has gone across the terms and conditions of the offer of appointment and the very first condition contained therein is to the effect that the appointment is purely on contractual basis for a period of five years with an initial probation period of three months. After successful completion of probation period the performance will be assessed. In case of satisfactory performance in the probation period the services will be continued for five years. The service may be renewed after five year of service on performance, output and desired conducts. The petitioner, in pursuance of the offer of appointment dated 06.06.2018, has given his joining and also entered into an agreement on 04.07.2018 which also contains a condition at Condition No.3 which reads hereunder as :- “3. The service may be renewed after five year of service on performance, output and desired conducts. The petitioner, in pursuance of the offer of appointment dated 06.06.2018, has given his joining and also entered into an agreement on 04.07.2018 which also contains a condition at Condition No.3 which reads hereunder as :- “3. The Employer intends hereby to appoint the Employee purely on contractual basis for a fixed period of 5 years (five years) from the date of acceptance of joining of the Employee including three months of probation period and the same has been accepted by the Employee.” The petitioner, after accepting conditions of offer of appointment and entering into the agreement dated 04.07.2018, joined his duty. After having discharged his duty for a period of three months, his performance in the service was sought for by a communication issued under the Signature of Project Director (Administration) addressed to the Project Director (Technical), JUIDCO Limited, Ranchi dated 12.09.2018, as has been annexed as Annexure-6 to the memo of appeal, asking the concerned authority to provide immediately the work performance of the writ petitioner/appellant for the period from 12.06.2018 to 12.09.2018. The work performance for the period of three months was submitted but the same was found not satisfactory by the appraising authority and in consequence thereof, the service of the writ petitioner/appellant was terminated. 9. Admittedly herein, the writ petitioner/appellant had entered into a contractual engagement for a period of five years out of which three months from the date of appointment was earmarked as probation. It is further admitted position that the concerned competent authority had sought for the work performance for the period of three months in order to take decision for further continuation of the writ petitioner in service for rest of the five years. Thus, the conditions of the recruitment notice, offer of appointment and the agreement clearly reflect about the terms of appointment which contains the contractual period of five years out of which three months from the date of appointment would be the period of probation. 10. There is no dispute about the settled position of law that if the appointment is on contract, the service condition would depend upon the terms and conditions of the offer of appointment since the same is treated to be a bilateral contract in between the employee and the employer. 10. There is no dispute about the settled position of law that if the appointment is on contract, the service condition would depend upon the terms and conditions of the offer of appointment since the same is treated to be a bilateral contract in between the employee and the employer. However, if the engagement would be in the regular establishment, position of law would be different and in such circumstances the appointee would be governed by the service rule applicable but same is not applicable to the contractual employee, as the case herein. Therefore, the condition of offer of appointment vis-à-vis the condition of termination of service if the service would not be found satisfactory during the period of three months from the date of joining, meaning thereby, it is the subjective assessment of the appointing authority to assess the performance of work and if not found to be satisfactory, the authority has got right to dispense with the services of such contractual employee. 11. The question agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner is that no reason has been assigned in the impugned order and therefore, the same being non-speaking, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. This argument is not acceptable to us for the reason that when in the notice inviting application, offer of appointment as also in the agreement, the condition about assessment of the performance of the writ petitioner after completion of a period of three months from the date of engagement is to be considered which itself suggests for keeping the writ petitioner in service or dispensing him from services will depend upon the satisfactory service. Since the question of satisfactory service depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the employer and as such the same is itself a reason for dispensing a contractual employee. Further ground has been agitated that no notice has been issued prior to issuance of the impugned order dated 22.12.2018. The question of applicability of principle of audi alteram partem i.e., providing an opportunity of hearing, will only be applicable if the order is stigmatic. The question of service having been found not satisfactory will be treated to be a stigmatic order or not, fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. The question of service having been found not satisfactory will be treated to be a stigmatic order or not, fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Bhagwan Singh reported in (2002) 9 SCC 636 wherein the fact of the case was about a probationer who was discharged during the period of probation on the ground that his service was not found satisfactory. While answering the said issue, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down at paragraph 4 there of :- “4. … … when a probationer is discharged during the period of probation and if for the purpose of discharge, a particular assessment of his work is to be made, and the authorities referred to such an assessment of his work, while passing the order of discharge, that cannot be held to amount to stigma.” Further, at paragraph 5 it has been held :- “5. The other sentence in the impugned order is, that the performance of the officer on the whole was “not satisfactory”. Even that does not amount to any stigma.” In yet another judgment, in the case of Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd. Vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Another reported in (2007) 1 SCC 491 the same issue has again been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court and by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and Another Vs. C.G.Sharma, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 132 the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to lay down that the services of an employee who is on probation can be terminated due to unsatisfactory work. The Hon'ble Apex Court in another judgment rendered in the case of P.N.Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and Another reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 has held that the service of a probationer can be terminated at any time before confirmation, provided that such termination is not stigmatic. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the judgment rendered in the case of State of M.P. and Another Vs. Virendra Kumar Chourasiya reported in 1999 SCC (L&S) 1155 has held that in the event of a non-stigmatic termination of the services of a probationer, the principles of audi alteram partem are not applicable. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the judgment rendered in the case of State of M.P. and Another Vs. Virendra Kumar Chourasiya reported in 1999 SCC (L&S) 1155 has held that in the event of a non-stigmatic termination of the services of a probationer, the principles of audi alteram partem are not applicable. 12. We have proceeded to examine the impugned order as to whether the same is stigmatic for which we thought it proper to refer the content of the impugned order which reads hereunder as :- “Letter No. 5487 Ranchi, Dated 22/12/2018 To, Mr. Venna Sriniwasula Reddy General Manager (Public Works), JUIDCO Ltd., Ranchi. Sub:- Termination of Your Contractual Employment along with Agreement thereto. Dear Sir, With reference to subject cited above, it is to be informed that you was engaged on Contract Employment under Recruitment notice dt-10.04.2018 on the post of General Manager (Public Works) vide Appointment Letter dt-06.06.2018 for maximum period of five years, however subject to satisfactory performance during initial probation period of three Months and so on. Whereas clause 1.1 of the Contract Employment Agreement dt-04.07.2018 r/w clause-2 of the Recruitment Notice inter-alia provides that in case of performance being found not satisfactory, same shall lead to termination of Contract Employment along with Agreement. AND whereas on sincere evaluation of your performance during probation and so on, the same has been recorded to be less than satisfactory by the Appraising Authority. AND whereas since the management agrees with the same, the Contract Employment along with Agreement dt-04.07.2018 entered with you is hereby simply terminated/cancelled. Accordingly you are relieved from the position of General Manager (Public Works) JUIDCO Ltd with immediate effect. It has got Approval of CMD. “Yours faithfully” Sd/- 22.12.2018 (Dharm Deo Mishra) Project Director (Administration)” It is evident from the impugned order as quoted above that by referring to Clause 1.1 of the contract agreement dated 04.07.2018 read with Clause 2 of the recruitment notice which inter alia provides that in case of performance being found not satisfactory, same shall lead to termination of Contract Employment along with Agreement. The authorities have called upon the performance of the writ petitioner for the period of three months from the date of appointment i.e., with effect from 12.06.2018 to 12.09.2018 which is available on record as also referred hereinabove and in pursuance thereof, the work performance of three months was provided to the competent authority which was found to be less than satisfactory by the appraising authority and as such, it is evident from the impugned order dated 22.12.2018 that the reason for termination of the writ petitioner was, performance of his work found to be less than satisfactory. 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court since has already held that termination of probationer on the ground of performance being not satisfactory, cannot be said to be stigmatic as has been held in the case of State of Punjab and Others Vs. Bhagwan Singh (Supra) reiterated in the case of Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd. Vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Another (supra), as such, this Court is of the considered view that the reason for termination herein is also the performance of the writ petitioner found to be less than satisfactory and hence it cannot be held to be stigmatic and once it is not stigmatic, there is no reason for the competent authority to issue a show cause notice for the purpose of following the principle of audi alteram partem. 14. We have gone across the impugned order and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has appreciated the aforesaid legal position as discussed above and taking into consideration the nature of appointment which was purely on contract basis for a period of five years and the condition reflected in the offer of appointment having been accepted by the writ petitioner and for that purpose he has entered into an agreement and considering these aspects of the matter, the learned Single Judge, if not interfered with the impugned order dated 22.12.2018, it cannot be said to have committed any infirmity. 15. In view thereof, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in passing the order which has been impugned in the instant intra court appeal. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 16. 15. In view thereof, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in passing the order which has been impugned in the instant intra court appeal. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 16. At this juncture, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that some observation may be made not to treat this termination order as stigmatic for the future appointment. Upon this, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 has fairly submitted that this Court may pass appropriate order. 17. Considering the aforesaid submissions and taking into consideration the predicament of the writ petitioner, this Court is making an observation that the impugned order dated 22.12.2018 will not be treated to be an order having stigma. 18. The instant appeal stands disposed of.