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2020 DIGILAW 518 (MP)

Ravi Shankar Singh v. MPPKWCL

2020-05-08

ATUL SREEDHARAN, SANJAY YADAV

body2020
JUDGMENT Atul Sreedharan, J. - The present petition has been filed, invoking the plenary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution , inter-alia praying for the quash of order granting sanction for prosecution dated 07/02/2019 (Annexure P/13) and 2910512019 (Annexure P/14). 2. The Petitioner was appointed on 09/09/2013 as an Assistant Engineer (Electrical-Contract) in the Madhya Pradesh Poorvi Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Company Limited (MPPKWCL) (hereinafter referred to as "the Company") on contractual basis. The said order of appointment is Annexure P/1 at page 27 of the petition. The Petitioner is at S. No. 14. The said order also deputed the Petitioner along with others for institutional training from 09/09/2013 to 23/09/2013. Clause 3 of the order fixes the contract period of the Petitioner for a term of two years from 09/09/2013, subject to successful completion of one month's training. It also provided that if the appointee does not complete the training successfully, his/her contract shall be terminated immediately. Clause 4 mentions that the engagement was on a contractual basis as per terms & conditions published for the purpose, and the agreement executed between them. It also provided that these appointees shall be discontinued with effect from the afternoon of 08/ 09I 15. 3. Annexure P/2, at page No.29, is an order dated 25/09/13 by which the candidates were deputed for field training for fifteen days at such places noted against their names, on the same terms & conditions as stipulated in the order of their appointment dated 09/09/13. The Petitioner is at S.No. 4 and was posted to (O&M) Circle Chhindwara. Annexure P/3 at page 30 of the petition is an order dated 01/10/16 passed by the Respondents, by which new contract was executed with the Petitioner and others similarly situated, extending their contract from 03/10/16, which would stand terminated on its own, after the lapse of three years. 4. The Petitioner was caught red-handed accepting a bribe of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand Only) resulting in Crime No.109 /2018 being registered against him on 17/05/18, at Police Station Special Police Establishment, Bhopal, for offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the PC Act") . The charge-sheet against him was submitted before the Court of the Ld . Special Judge, Chhindwara, on 03/07/19. The charge-sheet against him was submitted before the Court of the Ld . Special Judge, Chhindwara, on 03/07/19. In the entire petition, there is no mention of cognizance having been taken by the Ld. Trial Court of the offences charged against the Petitioner. The sanction order has admittedly been issued by the Chief Engineer of the Company at Jabalpur. In paragraph No.4 of the sanction order, the authority has held that it is the Chief Engineer who is the appropriate authority to grant sanction under section 19 of the PC Act. Both the impugned orders are identical. 5. The Petitioner has contended that as Mr. Prakash Dubey, the officer who had granted sanction as per section 19 of the PC Act, was only holding the post of Chief Engineer in current charge and so, could not exercise disciplinary authority over the Petitioner, as he was not empowered to remove the Petitioner from his post. 6. The Respondents in their reply have held that though Mr. Prakash Dubey was posted on current charge, he was given the complete powers of the Chief Engineer of the Company as per delegation of powers, which according to the Respondents is evident from Annexure P/9 at page number 184 of the petition. 7. Ld . Counsel for the Respondents has drawn our attention to the reply flied by them according to which, full power of appointment on posts up to the rank of Assistant Engineer on contract basis has been given by the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company dated 24/01/13, to the Managing Director of the Company. 8. At page No. 184, is the order dated 7.1.2019 issued by the DGM (Admn.) of the Company, which reads as follows: "Shri Prakash Dubey, G.M./R.R.C. Corporate Office, Jabalpur, is hereby transferred and posted as Additional Chief Engineer (JR}, Jabalpur, on current charge basis with full powers of Chief Engineer of the Company as per DOP issued vide letter No.AS/ PK/ Ado/ 9838, dated 24.1.2013. The current charge is being given as per administrative convenience without prejudice to seniority and will not attract any financial bearing." 9. The said order reveals that though he was given current charge , it was accompanied by full powers of the Chief Engineer. Thereafter , Ld. Counsel for the Respondents has drawn our attention to the delegation of authority. Even otherwise, Ld. The said order reveals that though he was given current charge , it was accompanied by full powers of the Chief Engineer. Thereafter , Ld. Counsel for the Respondents has drawn our attention to the delegation of authority. Even otherwise, Ld. Counsel for the Respondents has stated that the contract period of the Petitioner came to an end on 02/10/19 and therefore, the Petitioner is no longer in service of the Respondent organization. Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondents have stated if the Ld. Trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence against the Petitioner based on the impugned sanction order and if so, on what date? 10. Heard the Ld . Counsel for the parties and perused the documents filed along with the pleadings. The crux of the Petitioner's case is that the sanction order is non- est and void ab initio on account of the same having been passed by a person who was not authorised to pass the order of sanction, as the Petitioner could not have been removed from service by the authority that had passed the sanction order. To buttress his contention, the Petitioner has placed before us the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in G. S. Matharaoo v. CBI [Crl. M.C. No. 2695/2010 and Crl. M.A. No. 13999/2010 (stay)], wherein the High Court of Delhi held , that it was no longer res integra that, a defective sanction order, on account of the incompetence of the sanctioning authority, goes to the root of the case and in such a situation, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under section 482 Cr.P.C or Article 227 of the Constitution , is bound to examine and decide the same. However , in that case, the Ld. Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi held that there are no disputed questions of fact for which evidence was required to be adduced. 11. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has also drawn our attention to another judgment, yet again of the High Court of Delhi, passed in Crl.M.C.3137/2017 (Sandeep Silas v. CBI and others). The same issue once again cropped up before the Ld . Single Judge of the Hon 'ble High Court of Delhi. 11. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has also drawn our attention to another judgment, yet again of the High Court of Delhi, passed in Crl.M.C.3137/2017 (Sandeep Silas v. CBI and others). The same issue once again cropped up before the Ld . Single Judge of the Hon 'ble High Court of Delhi. The Counsel for the CBI in that case, had referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court passed in Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another v. Ashok Kumar Aswal and another, (2015) 16 SCC 163 , where a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in paragraph No.15 held, that time and again the Supreme Court has held that the validity of a sanction order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice caused to the accused , which is essentially a question of fact and therefore, should be determined in the course of the trial and not by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction , either under section 482 Cr.P.C or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The Ld. Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, however, relied upon another judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal v. CBI and others,2016 SCCOnlineDel 214, where the High Court, while dealing with the issue of the validity of a sanction order at the pre-evidence stage, rejected the contention of the Respondents therein that aforesaid issue can only be determined after evidence is adduced at trial. Likewise, in G. S. Matharaoo v. CBI, cited hereinabove, the High Court of Delhi High Court had taken note of the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in State of Goa v. Babu Thomas, (2005) 8 SCC 130 and Virender Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.,1991 CriLJ 1964 to hold that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and section 482 Cr.P.C, will quash the order of cognizance as the same is void ab initio. It is pertaining to mention here that none of these judgements examined whether, the Sanctioning Authority could be examined as a witness uj s. 311 CRPC at the pre-charge stage. 12. It is pertaining to mention here that none of these judgements examined whether, the Sanctioning Authority could be examined as a witness uj s. 311 CRPC at the pre-charge stage. 12. The dilemma with regard to the scope of adjudicating upon the validity of the sanction order by the High Court in exercise of its plenary powers under S. 482 Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the Constitution, especially where the State has strongly disputed the stand of the Petitioner that the sanction order has been passed by an authority not empowered to remove the Petitioner from service, compels us to examine if it is permissible, under the existing law, to record the evidence of the Sanctioning Authority before framing of charges. 13. The question whether sanction has been granted by the appropriate authority u/s. 19 of the PC Act or whether, there were any defects in the sanction order that could render it a nullity, has presented itself before the Courts earlier also. The same is no longer res integra, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Nanjappa's case, that a defect in the sanction order can be appreciated and acted upon by the Trial Court at any stage and that the bar of section 19(3) of the PC Act was only applicable on the Appellate or Revisional Court, which could not set aside a conviction, only on the ground of defective sanction, unless it arrived at the finding that there occasioned a failure of justice, or that the same, prejudiced the case of the accused. In Nanjappa's case, the Appellant before the Supreme Court, was a bill collector with the Gram Panchayat. The allegation against him was that he demanded rupees five hundred to issue a copy of the Panchayat resolution, by which it was decided to convert the road in front of the complainant's house into sites for allotment to third parties. The Appellant was caught taking bribe and tried. The Trial Court acquitted the Appellant only on the ground that sanction was not taken from the competent authority. Inter alia, the Trial Court also recorded a finding questioning the credibility of the demand for bribe . The Appellant was caught taking bribe and tried. The Trial Court acquitted the Appellant only on the ground that sanction was not taken from the competent authority. Inter alia, the Trial Court also recorded a finding questioning the credibility of the demand for bribe . On appeal by the State of Kamataka to the High Court, the High Court found that the validity of sanction was not questioned at the appropriate stage and so, the Appellant was not entitled to raise the same at the conclusion of the trial. Thus, the High Court reversed the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court and convicted Nanjappa under section 7 and 13 r/w section 13(2) of the PC Act and sentenced him to undergo a sentence of six months for the offence u/s. 7 and one year for the offence u/s. 13 of the PC Act. 14. On appeal to the Supreme Court by Nanjappa , the State argued that the validity of the sanction order had to be raised at the earliest point of time and not at the fag end of the trial. The Supreme Court held "The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non-est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution" ( Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 , Paragraph 22). 15. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non-est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution" ( Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 , Paragraph 22). 15. As regards the argument put forth by the State of Karnataka that in view of section 19(3) of the PC Act, the plea of defective sanction has to be taken at the earliest point of time and the same cannot be taken by the accused , or looked into by the Trial Court at the fag end of the trial more so, when there was no miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held "A careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order suffers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court before whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason of such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-section (3), in other words, simply forbids interference with an order passed by the Special Judge in appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or revisional court finds that failure of justice has occurred by such invalidity. What is noteworthy is that sub- section (3) has no application to proceedings before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution of the accused had not been produced as required under Section 19(1)" ( NanJappa Vs. state of Karuataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 , .ph 23.2). state of Karuataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 , .ph 23.2). Thereafter, the Supreme Court goes on to hold that the Trial Court had fallen in error in acquitting the Appellant on arriving at the finding that the sanction was defective and instead held in the following words that "In the case at hand, the Special Court not only entertained the contention urged on behalf of the accused about the invalidity of the order of sanction but found that the authority issuing the said order was incompetent to grant sanction. The trial court held that the authority who had issued the sanction was not competent to do so, a fact which has not been disputed before the High Court or before us. The only error which the trial court, in our opinion, committed was that, having held the sanction to be invalid, it should have discharged the accused rather than recording an order of acquittal on the merit of the case. As observed by this Court in Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi case Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi v. State of Bhopal, (1957) AIR SC 494 : 1957 Cri LJ 597 , the absence of a sanction order implied that the court was not competent to take cognizance or try the accused. Resultantly, the trial by an incompetent court was bound to be invalid and non-est in law" ( Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 , Paragraph 24) 16. After taking cognizance, the earliest point of time where the Trial Court can examine the validity of an order of sanction u / s. 19 of the PC Act, is at the stage of framing charges. At this stage, the Trial Court can discharge the accused if it finds that cognizance has been taken based on an invalid sanction and return the charge sheet to the investigating agency. It is trite law that a discharge does not clothe the accused with the protection of autrefois acquit u/s. 300 Cr.P.C. Thus, the investigating agency can file the charge sheet again with a fresh order of sanction, if need be. It is trite law that a discharge does not clothe the accused with the protection of autrefois acquit u/s. 300 Cr.P.C. Thus, the investigating agency can file the charge sheet again with a fresh order of sanction, if need be. However, if the Trial Court frames charges and proceeds to the stage of evidence and, upon examination of the sanctioning authority, material comes out that he was not the authority vested with power to issue the order of sanction then, in such a situation, there is no provision in the CRPC that would enable the Trial Court to truncate further proceedings. The Trial Court would necessarily have to go through the process of trial by recording the entire gamut of prosecution evidence before it and then pass its final orders which, must be one of discharge and not acquittal, as held by the Supreme Court in Nanjappa supra and, the investigating authority can thereafter seek a fresh sanction to prosecute the accused and put him to trial once again. 17. Experience reveals that offences under the PC Act can be long drawn and may even stretch over a decade before conclusion. If the prosecution can seek a fresh sanction and put the accused to trial again, after the accused is discharged at the end of the trial stretching over a decade, several question are raised with regard to the loss of precious time of the Trial Court, the hardship placed upon the witnesses who would have to be called and examined all over again, the violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused and lastly, the financial loss caused to the State in conducting the trial all over again. 18. The trial of a criminal case India is Accusatorial/Adversarial in procedure. The prosecution presses the charge against the accused and must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused defends his innocence (where the burden of proof has been shifted upon the accused). In all this, the Trial Court plays the role of an impartial arbiter without any involvement on behalf of prosecution or the defence. The prosecution presses the charge against the accused and must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused defends his innocence (where the burden of proof has been shifted upon the accused). In all this, the Trial Court plays the role of an impartial arbiter without any involvement on behalf of prosecution or the defence. This aloofness of the Trial Court, has been qualified by various judgements of the Supreme Court that it does not mean that the Trial Court act like an unconcerned observer and instead , participate in the trial process to ensure that the cause of justice is served without stepping into the shoes of either the prosecution or the defence. Thus, the Trial Court should participate without being partisan, in the trial process. 19. Once the charge has been framed, as a rule, the Trial Court cannot discharge an accused . Instead, it must necessarily record an acquittal or a conviction. A three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani's case held that a trial in a criminal case, commences after the framing of charges and held "Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no power under Section 227 or any other provision of the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the proceedings to the stage of Section 253 and discharge the accused. The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of the charge if the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the manner provided in Sections 254 to 258 to a logical end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant case, instituted either on complaint or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can either acquit or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under Section 349 and 562 of the Code of 1898 (which correspond to Sections 325 and 360 of the Code of 1973) ( Ratllal Bhanji Mithani Vs. State ofMaharaahtra & Ora., (1979) 2 SCC 179 -Paragraph 28) The Supreme Court unequivocally laid down that (a) Once charge if framed, the Magistrate/Court has no power to discharge the accused, (b) the trial in a warrant case commences with the framing of charge and the proceedings prior to that are only an enquiry and (c) after charges are framed, the Magistrate can only acquit or convict the accused. The proposition of law that after the framing of charge, the Magistrate has no power to discharge the accused and that he must either acquit or convict accused, has been followed by the Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 10 SCC 109 . 20. At first blush, the judgement of the two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Nanjappa's case appears to conflict with the judgement of the Supreme Court, passed by the three-judge bench in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani's case. However, the three-judge bench in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani's case had examined the power of the Magistrate to discharge an accused after charges had been framed . The three-judge bench never examined the effect of framing charges where the cognizance taken itself was defective in law on account of a statutory prerequisite which was not satisfied. In Nanjappa's case, though the two-judge bench had not referred to the judgement of the three- judge bench in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani's case, there is no conflict between the two judgements. The decision of the three-judge bench in Nanjappa's case examined whether, the trial court had the power to discharge an accused after the entire trial was concluded on account of the sanction under section 19 of the PC Act, being defective . In Nanjappa's case, the Supreme Court held that the very cognizance taken by the learned trial court was defective and non-est which rendered the entire trial void ab initio. Thus, there is no conflict between the two judgements of the Supreme Court, both having been passed in appreciation of different circumstances. 21. In Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others, a reference was made to a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court which framed five queries to be answered by it. Thus, there is no conflict between the two judgements of the Supreme Court, both having been passed in appreciation of different circumstances. 21. In Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others, a reference was made to a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court which framed five queries to be answered by it. Primarily , the Supreme Court was concerned with the stage at which the power under section 319 CRPC could be invoked and secondly, the material on the basis on which such power could be invoked and thirdly, the manner in which such power could be exercised. The Supreme Court held that "The stage of inquiry commences, in so far as the court is concerned, with the filling of the chargesheet and the consideration of the material collected by the prosecution, that is mentioned in the chargesheet for the purpose of trying the accused. This has to be understood in terms of section 2(g) CRPC, which defines an inquiry as follows: 2 (g) inquiry means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this code by a Magistrate or court" ( Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 - Paragrapb27). The Supreme Court further held "trial is distinct from an inquiry and must necessarily succeed it. The purpose of the trial is to fasten the responsibility upon a person based on facts presented and evidence led in this behalf. In Moly v. State of Kerala, this court observed that though the word "trial" is not defined in the code, it is clearly distinguishable from enquiry. Inquiry must always be a forerunner to the trial" ( Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 - Paragraph 29). Thereafter, the bench examines several case laws and holds "In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that as "trial" means determination of issues at judging the guilt or the innocence of a person , the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the "trial" commences only o charges being framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being taken" ( Hardeep Singh Vs.State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 - Paragraph 38). The bench goes on to hold that an inquiry envisaged U/S 319 CRPC is a procedure adopted by the court after the chargesheet is filed, in the following words "Section 2(g) CRPC and the case laws referred to above, therefore, clearly envisage inquiry before the actual commencement of the trial, and is an act conducted under CRPC by the Magistrate or the court. The word "inquiry" is, therefore, not any inquiry relating to the investigation of the case by the investigating agency but is an inquiry after the case is brought to the notice of the court on the filling of the charge-sheet . The court can thereafter proceed to make inquiries and it is for this reason that an inquiry has been given to mean something other than the actual trial" ( Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 - Paragraph 39) The Constitution bench, inter-alia holds that the power U/S 319 CRPC can be exercised by the trial court even at the stage of an inquiry, which precedes a trial. Where the Trial Court is satisfied, that on the basis of the material gathered m the course of the investigation, a person who ought to have been arraigned as an accused and sent up for trial, has erroneously or deliberately been left out from the chargesheet, and also, where it appears to the trial court that a person , who was never arraigned as an accused , nor mentioned in the FIR, but who, after the conclusion of investigation, appears to be Particeps ' Criminis, can also be arraigned as an accused at the stage of the inquiry itself, as envisaged UIS 319 CRPC. 22. Under the circumstances, we thought it necessary to examine the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to ascertain if the trial court can examine the sanctioning authority as a witness before the framing of charge? If the code permits such a procedure, valuable time and resources of the court would be saved. On the other hand, the right to a speedy trial of the accused would also be protected. If the code permits such a procedure, valuable time and resources of the court would be saved. On the other hand, the right to a speedy trial of the accused would also be protected. If the CRPC does not proscribe the examination of the sanctioning authority before framing of charge, the trial court, can discharge the accused where it arrives at a finding that the order of sanction is bad in law either on account of the same having been passed by an authority who was incompetent or, on account of non-application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. In such a situation, the trial court can return the chargesheet to the police or the investigating authority who, then may seek a fresh sanction from the competent authority and file the chargesheet afresh before the learned trial court. This would ensure that the accused does not get the benefit of escaping a second chance at assessing his guilt, only on the ground of a delayed trial, as has been seen in Nanjappa 's case. 23. Section 311 Cr.P.C. falls under Chapter XXIV (General Provisions as To Enquiries and Trials). The said section is being extracted herein for the sake of convenience: "311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.- Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined , and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case." Though the provision is usually used in the course of a trial to re-examine a witness or to call a witness who has never been called before, the first part of this provision is extremely significant as it reads that "any court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness .......". There are two parts to section 311 Cr.P.C. The first part, which is discretionary , and the second part, which is mandatory. There are two parts to section 311 Cr.P.C. The first part, which is discretionary , and the second part, which is mandatory. Where the trial court arrives at the conclusion that the evidence of a person appears to be essential to the just decision of the case, the trial court must examine, recall and re-examine such a witness. The first part that grants the Court discretion is extremely wide. It is not merely a power that can be exercised only during the course of trial, viz., after the framing of charge and commencement of evidence , but can be exercised by the Court even at the stage of "inquiry" or "other proceedings" under the CRPC. 24. Section 2(g) of the CRPC defines "inquiry" as follows: "inquiry " means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. From the definition , it is clear that inquiry is that part of the proceeding before a trial court, which is other than a trial, which is conducted by a Magistrate or a court. Thus, the Cr.P.C. vests the trial court with inquisitorial powers also, though the trial which commences after the framing of charge, is adversarial. Under the circumstances, the legislative intent in 311 Cr.P.C. is to empower the trial court to deal with a situation that arises from a case like the one at hand . The stage between the taking of cognizance and the framing of charge is an inquisitorial stage before the trial court. Therefore, can it be laid down as a proposition of law that section 311 CRPC enables Trial Court to examine the sanctioning authority before framing the charge? 25. The testimony of the Sanctioning Authority has no relevance to an Adjudicative Fact. "An adjudicative fact is a fact which is either a fact in issue or is relevant to a fact in issue .....In the case of adjudicative facts, the doctrine of judicial notice has restricted scope, for in the common law system the facts are appropriately determined on the evidence presented by the parties unless the fact is of such notoriety that to call for evidence would be a waste of time" (Cross on Evidence, 10" Edition by J D Heydo n, Page 162) Simply put, adjudicative facts are "Facts in Issue" or "Relevant Facts". A Fact in Issue in a criminal trial, is a fact relating to a charge against the accused, which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt to establish the guilt of the accused. A Relevant Fact is a fact which is relevant, on account of its relation to a fact in issue. In other words, Fact in Issue and Relevant Facts are seminal to the merits of the case against the accused. The testimony of the Sanctioning Authority , however, has no bearing on a fact in issue or a relevant fact and, its only relevance is as a fact of procedural fulfilment. His testimony will reveal whether the requirement of section 19 of the PC Act, has been complied with and that the Sanctioning Authority (a) is competent to issue the order of sanction and (b) the sanction order reflects the application of mind by the Sanctioning Authority. Witnesses testifying to a fact in issue or a relevant fact, are material witnesses and those testifying to fulfilment of procedural requirement are formal witnesses . Thus, the Sanctioning Authority would fall in the category of a formal witness. 26. At this juncture , we feel it essential to refer to an order passed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 797/2015 (Prabhu Lal Tatwal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh). A similar proposition was considered by the co-ordinate bench. The Petitioner had moved an application for discharge before the Trial Court on the ground of defective order of sanction. The Trial Court dismissed the application. The order of the Trial Court was challenged by the Petitioner before this Court by way of a Cr.R 96/2005. This Court dismissed Cr. 96/2005. Against the order of dismissal passed by this court, the Petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 9999/2011. The Supreme Court disposed of the SLP with a direction to the Trial Court, to conduct a "proper inquiry" as to whether all the relevant materials had been placed before the competent authority and whether, the competent authority had referred to the same. Armed with the order from the Supreme Court, the Petitioner approached the Trial Court once again and moved an application U/S 311 CRPC praying that the Sanctioning Authority be examined as a witness before framing charges. The application was dismissed by the Trial Court. Armed with the order from the Supreme Court, the Petitioner approached the Trial Court once again and moved an application U/S 311 CRPC praying that the Sanctioning Authority be examined as a witness before framing charges. The application was dismissed by the Trial Court. Against the order of the Trial Court, the Petitioner preferred the Cr. R No. 797/2015 before this Court. 27. The co-ordinate bench of this Court disposed of Cr. R 797/2015, directing the Ld. Trial Court to arrive at a finding, whether there was application of mind on the part of the Sanctioning Authority, based on the record of the case. The Court however did not accede to the prayer of the Petitioner to direct the Trial Court to examine the Sanctioning Authority before framing of charge. In paragraph 8 of the order, the co-ordinate bench held, "it is true that in general provisions as to inquiries and trials under section 311 CRPC, court has power to summon material witnesses, or to examine a person present at "any stage" of "any enquiry", or "trial", or "any other proceedings" under the Code, if his evidence appears to be essential for the just decision of the case. Sections 239 and 240 of CRPC which speak regarding trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate and powers of court to summon any witness at any stage is essential for just decision of the case; in our considered opinion, it does not intend the recording of statement of prosecution witness before framing of charge". In paragraph 9 of the judgement, this court further elaborates "as discussed above, in our opinion, recording of statement of prosecution witness, prior to framing of charge, is not warranted, nor is it is permissible as per the scheme in the CRPC. Proper enquiry is very well possible without recording oral evidence also.....". Thus, it is seen that the coordinate bench of this court has held that the enquiry envisaged U/S 311 CRPC is to be done on the basis of the record of the case and oral testimony of the witness is not only not required, but the same is not provided for in the scheme of the CRPC as evidence is to be recorded only after framing charge. 28. 28. The interpretation given by the coordinate bench of this Court, appears to be in conflict with the opinion of the Supreme Court with regard to the term "inquiry" as used in section 319 CRPC in Hardeep Singh's case, which is the same as the term "inquiry" used in section 311 CRPC. Paragraphs 42,43 and 44 of the Supreme Court judgement in Hardeep Singh's case is extremely relevant and the same are being reproduced by us in their entirety. The said paragraphs, read as under. "42. To say that powers under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised only during trial would be reducing the impact of the word "inquiry" by the court. It is a settled principle of law that an interpretation which leads to the conclusion that a word used by the legislature is redundant, should be avoided as the presumption is that the legislature has deliberately and consciously used the words for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal maxim a verbis legis non est recedendum which means, "from the words of law, there must be no departure" has to be kept in mind. 43. The court cannot proceed with an assumption that the legislature enacting the statute has committed a mistake and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot go behind the language of the statute so as to add or subtract a word playing the role of a political reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. The court has to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is some defect in the phraseology, etc., it is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The statute requires to be interpreted without doing any violence to the language used therein. The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the reason that it has no power to legislate. 44. No word in a statute has to be construed as surplusage. No word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless. Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. While construing a provision, full effect is to be given to the language used therein, giving reference to the context and other provisions of the statute. By construction, a provision should not be reduced to a "dead letter" or "useless lumber". Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. While construing a provision, full effect is to be given to the language used therein, giving reference to the context and other provisions of the statute. By construction, a provision should not be reduced to a "dead letter" or "useless lumber". An interpretation which renders a provision otiose should be avoided otherwise it would mean that in enacting such a provision, the legislature was involved in "an exercise in futility" and the product came as a "purposeless piece" of legislation and that the provision had been enacted without any purpose and the entire exercise to enact such a provision was "most unwarranted besides being uncharitable ". The paragraphs recited from Hardeep Singh's judgement make it noticeably clear, that no word or phrase used in a statute can be considered a surplusage and discarded. Every word has to be construed harmoniously with the entire statute and the unequivocal meaning of the word used by the legislature must be given effect to. Thus, the Supreme Court, held very clearly in Hardeep Singh's judgement that the powers under section 319 CRPC cannot be whittled down to mean that the same can be used only in the course of the trial and not at the stage of an inquiry which precedes the trial. 29. The legislative intent in using the term "inquiry" in S. 311 CRPC is identical to the use of the term "inquiry" in section 319 CRPC, the effect of which was examined by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case. Under the circumstances, we feel bound to give effect to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case and ascribe the same meaning to the term "inquiry" as used in S. 311 CRPC as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case. In Hardeep Singh's case, the Supreme Court held that "inquiry" as used in section 319 CRPC relates to a stage preceding the framing of charge and is an inquisitorial proceeding. The Supreme Court held that an accused who is kept in column 2 of the charge sheet or person not proceeded against as a suspect during investigation, against whom there is material to proceed against in the chargesheet , can be called to stand trial by the court by exercising power under S. 319 CRPC. The Supreme Court held that an accused who is kept in column 2 of the charge sheet or person not proceeded against as a suspect during investigation, against whom there is material to proceed against in the chargesheet , can be called to stand trial by the court by exercising power under S. 319 CRPC. However, where a person has been discharged or such persons against whom there is no prima facie evidence, cannot be proceeded against till evidence is adduced during the trial against them . The Supreme Court also held in Hardeep Singh's case that there would be no necessity to adduce evidence before framing charge, to exercise jurisdiction under S. 319 CRPC and the Court can do so if the charge sheet reveals sufficient evidence to proceed against such individuals. 30. Here, we see a distinction with regard to the scope of application of S. 311 CRPC and 319 CRPC. While section 319 CRPC, which was elaborately examined by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case, related to the power of the Trial Court to add a person as an accused "...in the course of any inquiry into, or trial....", For this purpose, the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to examine any witness before framing charge and that the Trial Court could proceed against such person(s) based upon the material collected in the course of the investigation itself . However, as regards the scope and application of S. 311 CRPC, the provision is for the purpose of adducing the evidence of a witness "....at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this code....". The meaning and scope of the term "inquiry" is no longer res integra in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case. Thus, even though the Supreme Court had held that there was no necessity to record the evidence of any witness before framing charge, in order to arraign a person as an accused, even before the framing of charges, for the purpose of S. 319 CRPC, S. 311 CRPC specifically empowers the Trial Court to adduce evidence of a witness even at the stage of an inquiry viz., before the framing of charge if need be. 31. 31. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that section 311 CRPC empowers the trial court to examine the sanctioning authority as a witness at the pre-charge stage itself and record his statement and also subject him to cross- examination, if need be, to ascertain whether he was competent to grant sanction or where the authority was competent to grant sanction, the same was granted without due application of mind to the record of the case. Where, after recording the statement of the competent authority, the Trial Court is of the opinion that the sanction has indeed been given by a person who was not authorized to remove the accused from office or that the sanction order was passed without an application of mind, it can discharge the accused and return the file to the prosecution to seek fresh sanction from the appropriate authority. As this recording of evidence would have taken place at a pre- charge stage, subject to the exception U /S. 300(5) CRPC, the defence of autrefois acquit/ convict will not come to the aid of the accused, as the trial itself has not commenced . 32. In our considered opinion , the advantage of recording the evidence of the Sanctioning Authority U/S. 311 CRPC, before framing of charge, are as follows. (a) The Court saves precious time if the evidence of the Sanctioning Authority reveals that the Sanction is bad either on account of it being passed by an incompetent authority or passed without application of mind in which case, the accused can be discharged and the chargesheet returned to the investigating agency. (b) The investigating agency has the opportunity of seeking fresh sanction and refiling the chargesheet before the Trial Court. (c) The accused does not get the benefit of autrefois acquit/ convict as charge has not been framed, and (d) The accused cannot get the benefit of a seeking quashment of the case on the ground of delayed trial, which he may otherwise get if he is discharged by the Trial Court at the end of the trial after a protracted trial spanning over a decade . 32. In view of what we have discussed and held hereinabove ; we propose to lay down the following guidelines to be followed by the learned trial court while trying a case under the prevention of corruption act. 32. In view of what we have discussed and held hereinabove ; we propose to lay down the following guidelines to be followed by the learned trial court while trying a case under the prevention of corruption act. (a) The trial court shall examine the sanctioning authority exercising powers under section 311 CRPC before framing charge, even if there is no challenge to the same by the accused, as the validity of the sanction order can go to the root of the case and can render the very act of taking cognizance itself void ab initio. (b) If the trial court finds that the sanction passed is in consonance with the provisions of section 19 of the PC act on both the parameters of competence of the sanctioning authority and application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority, then the trial court shall proceed to the next stage and decide whether charges should be framed against the accused after hearing the prosecution and the defence. (c) If, the trial court is of the opinion that the sanction order under section 19 of the PC act is fundamentally defective on either of the parameters , it shall discharge the accused and return the chargesheet to the investigating agency, which shall be at liberty to me the chargesheet once again after seeking a fresh sanction under section 19 of the PC act. (d) These directions are prospective in nature and shall not affect the proceedings in those cases where the charges have been framed and evidence has commenced before the trial court. It goes without saying that these directions shall have no effect on the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 CRPC or its powers of revision under section 397 read with 401 CRPC. 33. In this case, the issue whether the sanction has been granted by the appropriate authority is not an accepted fact by the Respondents. The Respondents have prima facie established in paragraph 9 supra that by way of delegation , the Sanctioning Authority, in this case was vested with the power of removing the Petitioner from his service and, therefore, was the competent authority. Thus, in view of the law laid down by us hereinabove , the petition filed by the Petitioner must fail. 34. Under the circumstances, this petition is dismissed. No costs.