ORDER : This writ petition is directed against the order dated 20.01.2018 passed by the fifth respondent vide Annexure-D and the order dated 25.01.2018 passed by the fourth respondent vide Annexure-C whereby the respondent has exercised the power under Section 38(2) of the Agriculture Produce Marketing Committee (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966 (for short, ‘the APMC Act’). 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was the one amongst the elected candidates of the Committee of TAPCMS, Ramanagar. The constitution of third respondent APMC require that one of the members should be amongst the persons who are elected to the TAPCMS. The petitioner had been elected for the period from 201213 to 2016. Since the term of the Committee was due to expire, the board of the fourth respondent Society has been requesting for conduct of election to the third respondent. Since the term of the Committee expired, the Government appointed an administrator to the fourth respondent Society vide Annexure-A by order dated 25.03.2017. Immediately thereafter the third respondent passed the order indicating that in view of the expiry of the term the petitioner is ceased to be a member of TAPCMS and he was not continued as a member of APMC vide order dated 25.01.2018 as per Annexure-B enclosing the order passed by the fourth respondent at Annexure-C. Being aggrieved by the orders at Annexure-s C and D the petitioner is before this Court. 3. The only ground urged by the petitioner is as hereinbelow: “Section 11 of the APMC Act provides for the constitution of the second and subsequent Marketing Committee. Section 11 provides that except as provided under Section 10, every Market Committee is required to consist of various categories of members including representative of the Cooperative Marketing Society carrying on business as such. However, the term of the office as contemplated under Section 38 to be restricted under Section 38(2) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) of Section 38, the person who is a member of the Marketing Committee, as a representative of the Cooperative Marketing Society was ceased to be a member of the Managing Committee of the concerned society by efflux of the term or authorization. A similar matter had arisen before this Hon’ble Court in the case of CHIKKAPPA NINGAPPA SHYGOTI vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in 2000 (5) KLJ 135 where the learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court has held that the conspicuous reading of Section 10(1)(iv) and 11(1)(iv) and Section 38 would only indicate that once a person is elected as member of the Marketing Committee, the operation of Section 38(2) cannot deny the elected office of the petitioner consequent upon his ceasing as the member of the Managing Committee of the concerned TAPCMS. Sections 15 and 16 of the APMC Act which deals with calculations and disqualification would also clearly provide that the ceasing as a member would not by itself disqualify the continuance of the office as the member of the APMC hipso facto upon the efflux of time of such member in the concerned TAPCMS. Therefore, the order at Annexure-C is required to be quashed.” 4. Sri T.Swaroop, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 has contended that the order passed by this Court by the learned Single Judge in the case of CHIKKAPPA (supra) has been reversed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of VENKANAGOUDA vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2001 Kar.1126. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the writ papers. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was elected as a member of TAPCMS, Ramanagar, the fourth respondent herein. As per Section 11(1)(iv) of the APMC Act, one member shall be a representative of Cooperative Marketing Societies carrying on business in notified agricultural produce, within the market area. Petitioner is not disqualified under Section 16 of the said Act. The petitioner has been elected as a member of the TAPCMS, Ramanagara for the period from 201213 to 201617. In view of Section 11(1)(iv) he became member of the third respondent. Since his term is over in 2017, the third respondent passed an order under Section 38(2) of the APMC Act. Section 38(2) of the APMC Act is extracted hereinbelow: “38. In view of Section 11(1)(iv) he became member of the third respondent. Since his term is over in 2017, the third respondent passed an order under Section 38(2) of the APMC Act. Section 38(2) of the APMC Act is extracted hereinbelow: “38. Term of office of members: (1) ……… (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), a person who is a member of the market committee by virtue of being a representative of a Cooperative Marketing Society or an Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society, as the case may be, shall cease to be such member on his ceasing to be a member of the Managing Committee of the society concerned by efflux of his term of office or otherwise.” 7. As per Section 38(2) of the said Act, once the petitioner ceases to be a member of TAPCMS he cannot continue as a member of the third respondent APMC. The judgment passed by this Court in the case of CHIKKAPPA NINGAPPA SHYGOTI (supra) has been reversed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of VENKATANAGOUDA (supra). The relevant portions of the said judgment is extracted herein below: “14. The material question for consideration is the extent and operation of subsection (2). It is a well settled principle of law of interpretation of statute that if the words used in the statute or provision of an Act are clear, plain and unambiguous i.e, they are reasonably susceptible of one meaning, the Court is bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. When we so observe we find support from the decision of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Nelson Matiz v. Union of India . AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1981. and the relevant observations is contained in paragraph 8 wherein Their Lordships have observed:— “It is well settled that if the words of a statute are clear, free from any vagueness and are therefore reasonably susceptible of only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences.” Their Lordships made a reference to the earlier decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 . The language of Section 38 prima facie is very clear and unambiguous. Vijay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 . The language of Section 38 prima facie is very clear and unambiguous. It deals with and provides vide subsection (1) about the term of the office of the members and as per subsection (1) it provides that except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term of the members of the Market Committee to hold office shall be five years before the expiry of which election shall be held to a Market Committee meaning thereby the term of the members of the Market Committee will be five years and before the term of five years expires, the election for the new committee has to be held without any exception. subsection (2) of Section 38 appears to carve out an exception to the general principle under Section 38(1) or may be said to operate as an exception because this subsection (2) starts with the use of non-obstante clause to the effect “notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1)” and then it provides that a person who is a member of the Market Committee by virtue of being a representative of either Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Society or of Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society, as the case may be, such a member on his ceasing to be member of the Managing Committee of the Society concerned, either by expiry or efflux of his term of office or by any other manner which is expressed by the expression “otherwise”, shall cease to be the Member of the Market Committee. The language used in subsection (2) is also very clear, unambiguous and does not admit of two interpretations. The only one interpretation which comes out from the language of subsection (2) is that a member of the Market Committee who is in the Market Committee in his capacity as a representative of either Cooperative Marketing Society or of the Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society, such a member shall cease to be a member of the Marketing Committee in case he ceases to be the member of the Managing Committee of either two societies, namely Cooperative Marketing Society or Cooperative Processing Society irrespective of the fact that the cessation of his membership of the Managing Committee of the Society has been the result of either expiry of his term of office in that Society or by any other act or manner. For application of this clause, what necessary ingredient has to be seen is that the member concerned must have been a member of the Market committee by virtue of being a representative of such society namely Cooperative Marketing Society or Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society. The other ingredient for operation and application of subsection (2) would be that he should have ceased to be a member of the Managing Committee of such Societies as referred to above, whether the cessation of membership of the Managing Committee is the result of efflux of the term or in any other manner. “Any other manner” may include the cases where there has been supersession of such Society or Management of such Societies. If these two conditions are shown, definitely under subsection (2), such a member of the marketing Committee shall cease to be the member of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee. Prima facie this section does not appear to convey any other meaning or any other Legislative intent. The above interpretation appears to be in consonance with the letter and spirit of provisions of Section 11(1)(iv) and 11(1)(v). That from a perusal and analysis of the language of Section 10(1)(iv) and Section 10(i)(v) of the Act, we find the Legislature's mandate which provides that one member each under these clauses to be nominated to the market committee is to be a member of the Managing Committee of the Cooperative Society or of Managing Committee of the Agricultural Cooperative Processing Society. The question arises why Legislature did so provide? What is the purpose? The purpose appears to be that in the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, the due and proper representation is to be given to such Cooperative Marketing or Cooperative Processing Societies and to the extent possible it is only the representative of the members of such societies that can become the member even if placed in the Agricultural Market Committee by process of nomination. The Legislature appears to be of the view that members elected to the, Committee of Management of such Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Society or Agricultural Cooperative Processing society can be taken to be the proper representative of such Societies and the Legislature therefore clearly provided that one member to be nominated to the membership of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee is to be and shall be none else but the member of the Managing Committee of such societies, as referred to in Section 10(1)(iv) or (v) of the Act. 15. In Section 11(iv) and (v) also we find that the Legislature provides that one member each under these two clauses shall be a representative of the Cooperative Marketing Societies and of the Agricultural Cooperative Processing Societies. A person in a democratic process elected directly by a body or by members of electoral college as may be as representatives of that society. Here, under Section 11(iv) and (v), the representative of Society is to be elected not directly by members of the Cooperative Marketing Societies or Cooperative Processing Societies, but are to be elected indirectly i.e, to be elected by the members of Managing Committee of such Societies, who on being elected to the Committee of Management of Societies, act as the representative of the members of such Societies. If any person other than from amongst the members of the Committee of Management of Societies referred to under Clause ‘iv’ and ‘v’ are elected by the members of Committee of Management to be the members of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, they may not be considered to be the real representative of aforesaid Cooperative Societies. As such it appears to be the legislative intent that one person each to be elected under clause ‘iv’ and ‘v’ indirectly by committee of management of such Societies should be from amongst the representatives of these Cooperative Societies. This appears to be the intention of Legislature conveyed by use of expression “shall be a representative of Cooperative Marketing Societies/or under clause ‘v’ of the Agricultural Cooperativee processing Societies and by use of expression “elected by Committee of Management of such Societies”. This appears to be the intention of Legislature conveyed by use of expression “shall be a representative of Cooperative Marketing Societies/or under clause ‘v’ of the Agricultural Cooperativee processing Societies and by use of expression “elected by Committee of Management of such Societies”. Rule making authority has also understood the legal position in this manner and enacted Rule 5C, according to which the Deputy Commissioner or Authorised Officer shall maintain in his office a list of all the Members of the Managing Committees of Cooperative Marketing Societies and Agricultural Cooperative processing Societies. The Rule further provides for updating the said list from time to time. This Rule is meant to enable the Deputy Commissioner to verify whether the representative sent by the said Societies remained as a Member of the Managing Committee of each such Society or not. On a reasonable interpretation, keeping in view the objective of the provision, we have to read the expression “from amongst them” by necessary implication in clauses (iv) and (v) of Section 11. This interpretation harmonises with and flows from a reading of Section 38(2) of the Act which clearly provides that a person who has been elected to the Market Committee as a representative of the Cooperative Marketing Society or as a representative of the Cooperative Agricultural Processing Society shall cease to be the member of the Market Committeeon his ceasing to be the member of the Management Committee of such Society. In view of the above, it naturally follows that a person who ceases to be member of the Managing Committee of the respective Cooperative Societies, and has been elected to the Agricultural Market Committee under Section 11(iv) will definitely cease to be the member of the Agricultural Market Committee on his ceasing to be member of the Managing Committee of such Societies under Section 38(2) of the Act. 16. Another argument that has been raised on behalf of the Writ Petitioners and Appellant in Writ Appeal No. 952 and Respondents in Writ Appeals No. 4641 and 4473 by the learned Counsel appearing for them has been to the effect that a perusal of Section 15 does not show that for being elected to be a member, of the Market Committee, the Legislature prescribed any such qualification of being Member of the Managing Committee of the two Societies. We do not see any relevance of Section 15 with the present controversy, as the said Section deals with qualifications for election as members of Market Committees from agriculturists and traders' constituencies of the market area itself. 17. The object of subsection (2) of Section 38 seems to be to ensure that the persons who become Members of the Market Committees under Clauses 4 or 5 of Section 11, on being elected by the Managing Committee of such societies, should continue to be the true representatives of such Societies. When the Managing Committee of that Society itself becomes nonfunctional for whatsoever reasons, it may be, the representative member of the Market Committee will have no legal or moral authority to continue as member of the Market Committee, that is the plain effect of subsection (2) of Section 38. The said subsection squarely applies to those members of a Market Committee, who are also members of the Managing Committee of the two kinds of Societies, which send them to the Market Committees as their representatives. If the contention of the Appellants/Writ Petitioners' Counsel is to be accepted; subsection (2) would become otiose and fails to achieve this intended purpose. On a harmonious reading of Section 38(2) read with Section 11(iv) and (v) it is clear that the representatives elected by the Managing Committees of Cooperative Marketing Societies and Cooperative Agricultural Processing Societies will have no locus standi to continue as members of Marketing Committees even after they cease to be the Members of the Managing Committees of their parent societies for whatever reasons it be”. 8. In view of the above, the impugned orders vide Annexure-s C and D passed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are in conformity with the provisions of Section 38(2) of the APMC Act. Hence, the writ petition is devoid of merit. Accordingly, it is dismissed.