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2020 DIGILAW 522 (ALL)

Shailendra Kumar v. State Of U. P. Through Secy. Of Edu. Secondary Lucknow

2020-02-17

SAURABH LAVANIA

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Gyanendra Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Sri Shubham Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. 2. The writ petition has been filed seeking direction to the respondents to accord financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher in Amar Shahid Chandra Shekhar Azad Inter College, Haraipur, District-Unnao (in short "College") and for payment of regular salary from the State Exchequer w.e.f. 01.11.2008. 3. Prior to filing of the present writ petition, the petitioner approached this Court by means of the Writ Petition No. 5854 of 2008 (Shailendra Kumar v. D.I.O.S. Unnao and others), thereby seeking direction to the respondents to appoint the petitioner on suitable post on compassionate ground under the Dying in Harness Rules. The said writ petition was finally disposed of by means of the judgment and order dated 19.09.2008, which reads as under:- "Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. The instant writ petition has been preferred with the following reliefs:- 1. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Opp. Parties particularly Opp. Party No. 2 to consider the case of the petitioner for his appointment on compassionate grounds under Dying-in-harness Rules on any post as per qualification of the petitioner. 2. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Opposite Parties to decide the petitioner's latest representation dated 12.07.2007 as contained in Annexure No. 9 to this writ petition. 3. To issue any such other order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 4. To award cost of the writ petition. The petitioner restricts his prayer only to the extent that his representation as contained in Annexure No. 9 to the writ petition may be directed to be disposed of within the stipulated period. Learned Standing Counsel has no objection to this innocuous prayer. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the petitioner to file a fresh comprehensive representation along with certified copy of this order as well as complete copy of the writ petition with all Annexures before opposite party no. Learned Standing Counsel has no objection to this innocuous prayer. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the petitioner to file a fresh comprehensive representation along with certified copy of this order as well as complete copy of the writ petition with all Annexures before opposite party no. 2 within a week from today and on such representation being filed, as stipulated above, the concerned competent authority shall decide the same by a speaking and reasoned order within three weeks of the receipt of representation, as contemplated above, exercising its unfettered discretion on the basis of record before him in accordance with relevant Rules, recent Government Orders, Scheme/Policy without being influenced by any of the observations in this judgment, since this Court has not entered into the merits of the present case. Subject to the above observations and directions, writ petition stands partly allowed by moulding the relief to the extent indicated above. No costs." 4. In compliance of the judgment and order dated 19.09.2008, the Committee of Management of the College considered the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground and vide order dated 16.10.2008, the petitioner was appointed by the respondent No. 4/Committee of Management of the College on the post of Assistant Teacher in the pay-scale of Rs. 5500-9000/-. 5. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3/State filed the counter affidavit annexing therewith the order dated 29.05.2009, passed by the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS), Unnao, whereby the claim of the petitioner with regard to appointment on suitable post on compassionate ground under the Dying in Harness Rules was rejected. On coming to know about the order dated 29.05.2009, the petitioner amended the writ petition and also challenged the order dated 29.05.2009. 6. In regard to the reliefs sought in the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the father of the petitioner was a Headmaster of the Institution and he expired on 17.05.1986. At that point of time, the petitioner was minor (one and half year old). 6. In regard to the reliefs sought in the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the father of the petitioner was a Headmaster of the Institution and he expired on 17.05.1986. At that point of time, the petitioner was minor (one and half year old). On attaining the age of majority and being found himself eligible for appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher, the petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground before the competent authority and on account of inaction on the part of the respondents in not providing the appointment on suitable post on compassionate ground, the petitioner approached this Court by means of the Writ Petition No. 5854 of 2008 (Shailendra Kumar v. D.I.O.S. Unnao and others), which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 19.09.2008 and in compliance thereof, the Committee of Management of the College appointed the petitioner on the post of Assistant Teacher, as such the appointment of the petitioner is valid and he is entitled to salary from the State Exchequer. 7. Per contra, Sri Gyanendra Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, on the basis of counter affidavit as also the contents of the impugned order dated 29.05.2009, submitted that the father of the petitioner expired on 17.05.1986 and at that point of time, the College was not in grant-in-aid. The Institution was taken up in grant-in-aid on 01.04.1996. 8. It is further stated that the provision for providing compassionate appointment to the employee of the Institution/College in grant-in-aid came into force on 30.07.1992 subsequently, amended in the year 1995. 9. It is also stated that at the time of death of the father of the petitioner i.e. on 17.05.1986, there was no provision to provide appointment to the dependent of the employee of unaided school or college, as the case may be, covered under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (in short "Act, 1921") nor there exits any provision under the Act, 1921, under which compassionate appointment can be provided to the dependent of deceased employee of unaided school or college, covered under the Act, 1921. The Institution was taken up in grant-in-aid on 01.04.1996 and beings so, under Regulations 103-107 of Chapter III of the Act, 1921, the petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground as when the father of the petitioner expired, the College in issue was not in grant-in-aid. The Institution was taken up in grant-in-aid on 01.04.1996 and beings so, under Regulations 103-107 of Chapter III of the Act, 1921, the petitioner is not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground as when the father of the petitioner expired, the College in issue was not in grant-in-aid. The provisions as envisaged under Regulation 103-107 of the Act, 1921 were/are applicable only on the Institution/College which were/are in grant-in-aid and the same would apply if an employee of the college, during service tenure, expires after college is taken in grant-in-aid and it would not apply in relation to the employee of unaided college. 10. It is further stated that even otherwise the mandatory provision as prescribed under Regulation 103-107 of the Act, 1921 have not been followed for providing appointment on compassionate ground to the petitioner. Without following the procedure prescribed under Regulation 103-107 of the Act, 1921, the Committee of Management of the College appointed the petitioner on the post of Assistant Teacher in the pay-scale of Rs. 5500-9000/-. 11. Accordingly, it is submitted that the appointment of the petitioner is not valid and he is neither entitled to continue on the post in issue nor he is entitled to payment of salary from the State Exchequer. 12. The prayer is to dismiss the writ petition. 13. In response to the submissions made by Sri Gyanendra Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appointment of the petitioner was made in the year 2008 vide order dated 16.10.2008 and he is still continuing in the College on the post of Assistant Teacher and in view of the facts and circumstances of the case particularly the continuation of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Teacher since 16.10.2008 (the date of appointment of the petitioner), the petitioner is entitled to continue on the post in question and his appointment on compassionate ground, at this stage, is not liable to be interfered with. 14. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Rani Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine All 535 : (1990) 1 LLN 633 : (1990) 16 ALR 357 : (1990) 1 AWC 342 . The relevant portion of the same on reproduction reads as under:- "2. The relevant portion of the same on reproduction reads as under:- "2. Undisputedly, Sri Gita Bal Mandir Junior High School, Kashipur (Nainital), is recognised under Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972. In June 1984, the petitioner was appointed on a fixed salary on probation till 30 November 1984. By letter, dated 15 November 1984, she was made permanent with effect from 1 December 1984. In August 1985, a fresh letter was issued that she is being appointed temporary and her services were liable to be terminated at any time. The petitioner immediately made representation that she having become permanent by letter, dated 15 November 1984, she could not be appointed afresh temporary. No action was taken on it. And the process of issuing letter by secretary that she was being appointed temporarily either till June or May or April continued in 1986, 1987 and 1988. Each time petitioner objected. In 1985, she represented to secretary, that she having been appointed permanently the fresh letters of appointment treating her temporary were illegal. In 1989, it appears one of the members raised an issue that for better administration of college it was necessary to appoint a male principal and Basic Shiksha Adhikari also raised peculiar objection and wrote to the management that unless regular principal was appointed he was not willing to grant approval to the appointment of teachers. Consequently management issued advertisement, aggrieved by which petitioner approached this Court. 3. Doubt was raised on the language of letter appointing petitioner permanently in November 1984, and it was urged that the second clause indicated that petitioner was not a permanent employee. Needless to say that the order was issued in printed form containing various clauses. Therefore, no assistance could be derived from it. Moreover the original filed with supplementary affidavit dispelled any doubt as Cl. 2 and other clauses which were not relevant were either scored or crossed to show that it was not applicable. 4. Resignation by petitioner was yet another issue which was attempted to be pressed, but it could not be supported by any document. Even the letters issued in 1985, 1986 and 1987 do not state that since petitioner had resigned she was being appointed afresh temporarily. It was a futile attempt to give strength to letter appointing petitioner temporarily in 1985. Mere vague assertion that petitioner being headmistress must have removed papers was of no consequence. Even the letters issued in 1985, 1986 and 1987 do not state that since petitioner had resigned she was being appointed afresh temporarily. It was a futile attempt to give strength to letter appointing petitioner temporarily in 1985. Mere vague assertion that petitioner being headmistress must have removed papers was of no consequence. How could she remove the record of secretary or committee of management? No material thus could be brought on record to show that petitioner resigned in 1985. 5. Principal infirmity in appointment of petitioner, that could be pointed out, was that it was made without issuing any advertisement and recommendation by selection committee. May be; but could the management which appointed petitioner in 1984, and the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, who did not raise any objection to payment of salary for five years raise this objection in 1989? The appointing authority under rules is the committee of management. And the approving authority is the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, who under Uttar Pradesh Act 6 of 1979, is also to supervise the payment of salary and is empowered to inspect and check. For five years no objection was raised by him. And then suddenly when one of the members desired that a male principal should be appointed, he also raised an objection. The petitioner had raised objection as far back as 1985, against her being treated as temporary employee. No action was taken on it. Nor any decision was given. For procedural irregularity the petitioner should not be made to suffer. Normally it is to be presumed that management must have sent papers for appointment of petitioner to Basic Shiksha Adhikari who must have granted approval unless it is rebutted either by placing any communication by management or from record of Basic Shiksha Adhikari to show that things did not proceed as they are provided in the Act. In absence of any material there is no reason to doubt that committee of management would have appointed without intimating Basic Shiksha Adhikari and would have even issued letter appointing petitioner permanently and Basic Shiksha Adhikari would not have raised any objection in respect of payment of salary, etc., from 1984 to 1989. In absence of any material there is no reason to doubt that committee of management would have appointed without intimating Basic Shiksha Adhikari and would have even issued letter appointing petitioner permanently and Basic Shiksha Adhikari would not have raised any objection in respect of payment of salary, etc., from 1984 to 1989. Change of secretary or Basic Shiksha Adhikari should not be permitted to create any difference, otherwise it shall result in creating arbitrariness and expose teachers of being thrown out of employment on one or the other pretext and shall never have security which is necessary for efficient discharge of duty. Equity stands in her favour and prevents both the appointing and approving authority from taking recourse to their own mistakes, for causing prejudice to petitioner. Estoppel, the principle of equity, is the shield for such unjust and unfair actions." 15. The prayer is to allow the writ petition. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 17. From the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the documents on record, it is undisputed fact that the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 16.10.2008 on the post of Assistant Teacher in the pay-scale of Rs. 5500-9000/-by the Committee of Management/respondent No. 4 of the College. 18. It is also undisputed that prior to issuing the order of appointment dated 16.10.2008, the procedure as prescribed under Regulation 103-107 of the Act, 1921 was not allowed. 19. It is also undisputed that the provisions for providing appointment came into existence on 30.07.1992 subsequently amended in the year 1995 and the same were/are applicable on the Institutions/Colleges covered under the Act, 1921, which are on grant-in-aid. 20. It is also undisputed rather admitted that when the father of the petitioner expired on 17.05.1986, the School/Institution, in which the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 16.10.2008, was not in grant-in-aid as the same was taken in grant-in-aid on 01.04.1996. 21. It is also admitted fact that the father of the petitioner expired when the petitioner was minor (one and half year old) and on attaining the age of majority, the petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground in the year 2008 i.e. after 22 and a half year of death of his father. 22. 21. It is also admitted fact that the father of the petitioner expired when the petitioner was minor (one and half year old) and on attaining the age of majority, the petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground in the year 2008 i.e. after 22 and a half year of death of his father. 22. From Regulations 103-107 under Chapter III of the Act, 1921, it appears that the appointment on compassionate ground can only be made on the recommendation of the Committee as provided under Regulation 105 and in the instant case as appears from the record, the appointment of the petitioner was not made on the recommendation made by the Committee as provided under Regulation 105 of the Act, 1921. 23. A Division Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 09.05.2017 passed in Special Appeal No.264 of 2017 (Abdul Qadir Vs. State of U.P.) observed as under:- "Accepted position in the present case is that father of petitioner-appellant has died in the year 2012, and at the said point of time, when father of petitioner-appellant has died, there was no provision under which compassionate appointment could have been provided to the dependent of the deceased incumbent who have been serving in Government aided Madarsa. Service conditions at the said point of time was governed by non-statutory rule known as ‘Uttar Pradesh Ashaskeeya Arbi Tatha Fasi Madarson Ki Manata Niyamawali, 1987. On the date of death of petitioner-appellant's father, there was no provision in existence for offering appointment, is clearly indicative of the fact that the terms and condition of service that has been prevailing on the said date, there has been no provision for providing compassionate appointment, in case incumbent had died in harness. Rules in question namely, Uttar Pradesh Non-Governmental Arbic and Persian Madarsa Recognition, Administration and Services Regulation, 2016 has been enforced w.e.f. 22.07.2016 wherein categorical mention has been made that it shall came into force from the date of notification in the gazette. Part-III of aforementioned Regulations deals with teaching and non-teaching employees, and in the said chapter while considering the terms and condition of teaching and non-teaching employees, provision has been incorporated for providing compassionate appointment to one of the dependent on death of an employee during service. One dependent has to apply within a period of five years in the Madarsa. Part-III of aforementioned Regulations deals with teaching and non-teaching employees, and in the said chapter while considering the terms and condition of teaching and non-teaching employees, provision has been incorporated for providing compassionate appointment to one of the dependent on death of an employee during service. One dependent has to apply within a period of five years in the Madarsa. Thus these statutory provisions are clear to the effect that for the first time while introducing the terms and condition of teaching and non-teaching employees, the aforementioned provisions has been introduced for providing compassionate appoint on death of employee in Madarsa during service period and dependent was free to move an application within a period of five years. Consequently, under the scheme of things provided for, Regulations are clearly prospective in nature and effect and for the first time provision has been incorporated for providing compassionate appointment on death of incumbent during service period to one of the dependent under the terms and condition of service, in this backdrop, claim that has been made to provide compassionate under the aforementioned regulation, certainty cannot be directed by us inasmuch as, we cannot proceed to enlarge the scope of aforementioned regulation, as on its face value, it is prospective in nature and would not include within its fold all such teaching and non teaching staff under whose condition of service, there has been no provision for providing compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment has to be considered as per the scheme that has been in vague at the time of death of employee concerned. Apex Court in the case of Canara Bank v. Mahesh Kumar (2015) 7 SCC 412 , has further provided that compassionate appointment cannot be made in the absence of Rules and Regulations, and request has to be considered strictly in accordance with the governing scheme, and no discretion is left with any authority to make compassionate appointment dehors the scheme. Here the scheme in question introduced by way of Regulation for providing compassionate appointment w.e.f. 22.07.2016 in no way suggests that benefit of the same would be extended even in reference of those employees, teaching and non teaching, whose death has taken place, prior to enforcement of Regulation. In view of this, Special Appeal stands dismissed.” 24. Here the scheme in question introduced by way of Regulation for providing compassionate appointment w.e.f. 22.07.2016 in no way suggests that benefit of the same would be extended even in reference of those employees, teaching and non teaching, whose death has taken place, prior to enforcement of Regulation. In view of this, Special Appeal stands dismissed.” 24. Insofar as the arguments made by the counsel for the petitioner pertaining to the vested rights accrued in favour of the petitioner is concerned, the law in this connection is well settled in the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138 , the Supreme Court explained the basic purpose of providing compassionate appointment to the dependent of a deceased employee, died in harness. “The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. … For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.” 25. The law in this connection is well settled by the Supreme Court in large number of cases. The law in this connection is well settled by the Supreme Court in large number of cases. The Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Public Instructions v. K.R. Vishwanath (2005) 7 SCC 206 laid down the following principles:— “…the claim of person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that he was dependent on the deceased employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. …High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplate such appointments.” 26. Similar view has been again taken by the Supreme Court in the case of State of J. & K. v. Sajad Ahmad Mir, (2006) 5 SCC 766 : 2006 (6) AWC 6209 (SC), wherein the Court observed as under:- “Normally, an employment in Government or other public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates who can come forward to apply and compete with each other. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of the sole breadwinner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the set back. Once it is proved that in spite of death of bread earner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say ‘goodbye’ to the normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 27. Once it is proved that in spite of death of bread earner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say ‘goodbye’ to the normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 27. Certain principles of law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of V. Shivamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 13 SCC 730 , namely:— “(a) Compassionate appointment based only on descent is impermissible. Appointments in public service should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and comparative merit, having regard to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Though no other mode of appointment is permissible, appointments on compassionate grounds are a well recognised exception to the said general rule, carved out in the interest of justice to meet certain contingencies. (b) Two well recognized contingencies which are carved out as exceptions to the general rule are: (i) appointment on compassionate grounds to meet the sudden crisis occurring in a family on account of the death of the bread-winner while in service. (ii) appointment on compassionate ground to meet the crisis in a family on account of medical invalidation of the bread winner. Another contingency, though less recognized, is where land holders lose their entire land for a public project, the scheme provides for compassionate appointment to members of the families of project affected persons. (Particularly where the law under which the acquisition is made does provide for market value and solatium, as compensation). (c) Compassionate appointment can neither be claimed, nor be granted, unless the rules governing the service permit such appointments. Such appointments shall be strictly in accordance with the scheme governing such appointments and against existing vacancies. (d) Compassionate appointments are permissible only in the case of a dependant member of the family of the employee concerned, that is, spouse, son or daughter and not other relatives. Such appointments should be only to posts in the lower category, that is, Classes III and IV posts and the crises cannot be permitted to be converted into a boon by seeking employment in Class I or II posts.” 28. Such appointments should be only to posts in the lower category, that is, Classes III and IV posts and the crises cannot be permitted to be converted into a boon by seeking employment in Class I or II posts.” 28. Further the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Shashank Goswami (2012) 11 SCC 307 : 2012 (5) AWC 4734 (SC) has held that appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are quoted below:- “9. There can be no quarrel to the settled legal proposition that the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is based on the premise that the applicant was dependent on the deceased employee. Strictly, such a claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. 10. As a rule public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of the employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis and not to confer a status on the family. Thus, the applicant cannot claim appointment in a particular class/group of post. Appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased.” 29. Thus, the applicant cannot claim appointment in a particular class/group of post. Appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased.” 29. Once again the Supreme Court in the case of Chief Commissioner, Central Excise and Customs, Lucknow v. Prabhat Singh (2013) (5) AWC 5062 (SC) held that compassionate appointment is not a gift to all those who seeks court's intervention and the Court may issue directions in the case where appointment on compassionate ground, could deprive a really needy family requiring financial support, and thereby, push into penury a truly indigent, destitute and impoverished family. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below:— “We are constrained to record that even compassionate appointments are regulated by norms. Where such norms have been laid down, the same have to be strictly followed…The very object of making provision for appointment on compassionate ground, is to provide succor to a family dependent on a government employee, who has unfortunately died in harness. On such death, the family suddenly finds itself in dire straits, on account of the absence of its sole bread winner. Delay in seeking such a claim, is an anti thesis, for the purpose for which compassionate appointment was conceived. Delay in raising such a claim, is contradictory to the object sought to be achieved… Courts and Tribunals should not fall prey to any sympathy syndrome, so as to issue directions for compassionate appointments, without reference to the prescribed norms. Courts are not supposed to carry Santa Claus's big bag on Christmas eve, to disburse the gift of compassionate appointment, to all those who seek a court's intervention. Courts and Tribunals must understand, that every such act of sympathy, compassion and discretion, wherein directions are issued for appointment on compassionate ground, could deprive a really needy family requiring financial support, and thereby, push into penury a truly indigent, destitute and impoverished family. Discretion is therefore ruled out. So are, misplaced sympathy and compassion.” 30. In the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 : AIR 2013 SC 3365 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Every appointment to public office must be made by strictly adhering to the mandatory requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. So are, misplaced sympathy and compassion.” 30. In the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 : AIR 2013 SC 3365 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Every appointment to public office must be made by strictly adhering to the mandatory requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An exception by providing employment on compassionate grounds has been carved out in order to remove the financial constraints on the bereaved family, which has lost its bread-earner. Mere death of a Government employee in harness does not entitle the family to claim compassionate employment. The Competent Authority has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased employee and it is only if it is satisfied that without providing employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis, that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. More so, the person claiming such appointment must possess required eligibility for the post. The consistent view that has been taken by the Court is that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as it is not a vested right. The Court should not stretch the provision by liberal interpretation beyond permissible limits on humanitarian grounds.” 31. A division Bench of this Court in the case of Vishal Singh v.State of U.P. reported in 2018 (2) ESC 1036 (All.) (DB) was pleased to hold that the appointment on compassionate ground is given to tide over the immediate financial difficulties faced by the family of the deceased and that a minor cannot claim appointment on compassionate ground unless scheme itself envisages that as and when such minor becomes major, he can be appointed without any time limit. 32. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Dubey v. State of U.P., 2014 AWC 3016, formulated the principles which must govern the compassionate appointment in pursuance to the Dying in Harness Rules. In paragraph 29(ii), it was held by Full Bench of this Court that there is no general or vested right to compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment can be claimed only where a scheme or rules provide for such appointment. Relevant portion in this regard is quoted below:— 29. In paragraph 29(ii), it was held by Full Bench of this Court that there is no general or vested right to compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment can be claimed only where a scheme or rules provide for such appointment. Relevant portion in this regard is quoted below:— 29. We now proceed to formulate the principles which must govern compassionate appointment in pursuance of Dying in Harness Rules: (i) A provision for compassionate appointment is an exception to the principle that there must be an equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. The exception to be constitutionally valid has to be carefully structured and implemented in order to confine compassionate appointment to only those situations which subserve the basic object and purpose which is sought to be achieved; (ii) There is no general or vested right to compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment can be claimed only where a scheme or rules provide for such appointment. Where such a provision is made in an administrative scheme or statutory rules, compassionate appointment must fall strictly within the scheme or, as the case may be, the rules; 33. In view of the facts as stated, it is clear that a person can not be given appointment on compassionate ground unless the Rules or the scheme provides for such appointment or their exists some vested rights in his favour. 34. In the present case, from the facts as narrated above, it is clear that:- (i) At the time of death of father of petitioner, there was no Rule or statutory provisions for providing appointment on compassionate ground to the dependent of deceased employee working in unaided school/college covered under the Act, 1921 and as such no vested right accrued in favour of the petitioner on the death of his father to get appointment on compassionate ground. (ii) In the year 2008, when the petitioner was appointed by the Committee of Management even at that point of time there was no provision or Rule under which the dependent of deceased employee of unaided school/college, covered under the Act, 1921, subsequently taken up in grant-in-aid, could be appointed on compassionate ground. (iii) Even, subsequent to aforesaid, till date, no provision has been made under the Act, 1921 for providing compassionate appointment to the dependent of deceased employee of unaided school/college or unaided school/college subsequently taken up in grant-in-aid. (iii) Even, subsequent to aforesaid, till date, no provision has been made under the Act, 1921 for providing compassionate appointment to the dependent of deceased employee of unaided school/college or unaided school/college subsequently taken up in grant-in-aid. (iv) The appointment of the petitioner on compassionate ground is in violation of Regulation 105 under Chapter III of the Act, 1921, as without the recommendation of Committee provided under Regulation 105, the Committee of Management of the college appointed the petitioner on compassionate ground on the post of Assistant Teacher. (v) The petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground after 22 and a half year of death of his father. Highly belated appointment, against the spirit of providing compassionate appointment. 35. Taking into consideration the facts of the case and aforesaid settled legal preposition on the issue of providing compassionate appointment, according to which compassionate appointment can be given strictly as per the scheme/rule applicable at the time of death of the employee and should not be provided at highly belated stage, as also the Regulations 103-107 of Chapter III of the Act, 1921 this Court is of the view that the ground taken in the order impugned to the effect that the College was not in grant-in-aid when the father of the petitioner expired and accordingly, no right was accrued in his favour for seeking appointment on compassionate ground under the aforesaid Regulations, is justified. 36. In the aforesaid factual background and taking into consideration the settled legal position, narrated hereinabove with regard to compassionate appointment, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Unnao dated 29.05.2009 is not liable to be interfered with. 37. 36. In the aforesaid factual background and taking into consideration the settled legal position, narrated hereinabove with regard to compassionate appointment, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Unnao dated 29.05.2009 is not liable to be interfered with. 37. In regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed vide order dated 16.10.2008 and he is still continuing in service on the post of Assistant Teacher in the College in question and the appointment of the petitioner, at this stage, is not liable to the interfered with and the direction be issued to the State/Respondents to pay salary to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.11.2008, this Court considered the judgment placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his case, referred hereinabove, and on due consideration of the same and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753, wherein the Apex Court observed that any appointment made in violation of the Rules as also in violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be nullity, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to any indulgence from this Court on the ground that he is continuing on the post since 01.11.2008. The appointment made in violation of mandatory provisions of Statute/Rule would be illegal and thus, void. Illegality cannot be rectified. Illegality cannot be regularized, only an irregularity can be. 38. Needless to say that it is well settled that when there is conflict between law and equity, it is law which has to prevail. It is latin maxim "dura lex sed lex" is to be taken note of, which means 'that law is harsh but it is law. Equity can only supplement the law, but it cannot supplant or override it. 39. Further, it is also settled principle of law that Court should not exercise its jurisdiction only on sympathy. 40. Considering the entire aspects of the case including the reasoning recorded by this Court, hereinabove, this Court finds that the writ petition lacks merit. 41. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.