ORDER : 1. With the consent of the parties, hearing of this matter has been done through video conferencing. I.A. No. 9052 of 2019 2. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 490 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Heard. 4. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the averments made in the interlocutory application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 5. Accordingly, I.A. No. 9052 of 2019 is allowed and delay of 490 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 616 of 2019 6. This instant intra court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 04.04.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (L) No. 4567 of 2015, whereby and whereunder the order dated 30.07.2015 has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition, by which the appellant’s claim of registering an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 1947’) has been refused on the ground that the service of the appellant-writ petitioner was terminated under ‘Early Separation Scheme’ with effect from 31.01.2003. 7. The brief facts of the case, which require to be referred for proper consideration of the case, read hereunder as: The appellant-writ petitioner was appointed on 18.01.1996 for the post of Miner having his date of birth as 29.01.1974. It is the case of the appellant that for some time he suffered from mental disease since the year 2002 and as such, was treated from various doctors at his native place and was diagnosed as Schizophrenia. While the appellant was working as ‘SBL Operator’ at Digwadih Colliery, he met with a mining accident on 16.11.2002 and sustained left leg injury and was kept on medicine for longer time, meanwhile, the appellant was transferred from Digwadih Colliery to Jamadoba Colliery where he was working as Miner/Loader having been appointed on the ground of medical unfitness of his father. The grievance of the writ petitioner is that even though he was suffering from mental illness, but was terminated on a scheme floated by the respondent known as Early Separation Scheme with effect from 31.01.2003. The grievance of the writ petitioner is that even though he was suffering from mental illness, but was terminated on a scheme floated by the respondent known as Early Separation Scheme with effect from 31.01.2003. It is the further grievance that the signature in the Early Separation Scheme for the separation of the appellant-writ petitioner has fraudulently been obtained without following the procedure laid down under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and accordingly, he made an application on 31.01.2015 before the Director to consider the case and finally an application was filed under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad III, but the same has been refused to be registered as an industrial dispute on the ground that it is not a matter of industrial dispute, the same has been challenged by filing writ petition before this Court being W.P. (L) No. 4567 of 2015 but has been dismissed vide order dated 04.04.2018 which is the subject matter of the present intra court appeal. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the writ Court has not appreciated the fact that the scheme under which separation of the service of the appellant-writ petitioner was effected, has fraudulently been obtained and since the appellant-writ petitioner was suffering from mental illness, hence he could not be able to file objection immediately after the separation from service rather only after being declared medically fit in the year 2015, an objection was filed raising such grievance, but the same has been rejected by the authority by not accepting the dispute as under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore, the learned Single Judge, while not considering such aspect of the matter, has committed error and hence the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. 9. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent-Tata Steel has submitted that the learned Single Judge has come to a rightful conclusion in dismissing the writ petition since the appellant was separated from service by way of separation known as Early Separation Scheme and once he has been separated, he cannot raise a dispute by taking aid of the provision of Section 2-A of the Act, 1947. His further contention is that the appellant was separated from service on 31.01.2003 but no such objection was raised by the appellant immediately after the order of separation, rather objection was raised in the year 2015 i.e. after lapse of about 12 years and as such, the same has rightly not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge, hence the order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with. 10. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the parties and having appreciated their arguments, as also the materials brought on record, deem it proper to first refer Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which reads hereunder: “2-A. Dismissal, etc. of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute - (1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).” Section 2-A has been brought under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by way of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010 (24 of 2010) with effect from 15.09.2010 whereby and whereunder any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. The further provision as under sub section 2 to Section 2-A has also been inserted by the Act 24 of 2010 to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. Further under sub section 3 to Section 2-A, it has been provided that the application referred to in sub section 2 shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1). 11. The fact which is in admission herein, is that the appellant-writ petitioner was in service of the respondent-Management. 11. The fact which is in admission herein, is that the appellant-writ petitioner was in service of the respondent-Management. An Early Separation Scheme was floated and the writ petitioner had opted for separation under the scheme as would appear from the impugned order dated 30.07.2015, whereby and whereunder the respondent-Management has considered the application submitted by the appellant-writ petitioner giving option for early separation and on consideration, has been accepted by the Management by taking decision of termination under the Early Separation Scheme with effect from 31.01.2003. It has nowhere been stated by the appellant in the memo of appeal that no such application for separation under the Early Separation Scheme has been filed, save and except the plea to the effect that in the Early Separation Scheme the signature has been done fraudulently. The question of taking the plea of obtaining the signature fraudulently by the Management for the first time has been raised by the appellant sometime in the year 2015 i.e. after lapse of about 12 years on the pretext that the appellant-writ petitioner claims himself to be medically unfit, but when he has made an application for separation under the Early Separation Scheme, it cannot be accepted that it will take about 12 years for raising the plea of the fraud in obtaining the signature rather the bona fide approach of the appellant would have been to raise objection immediately after the decision of separation but, herein, objection for the first time has been raised after 12 years. This plea is not acceptable to us, it is for the reason that the Annexure-4 (the impugned order) passed by the authority reflects about submission of an application showing option for early separation, meaning thereby, the application has been submitted making option for separation and once the application has been made, there is no question of the signature to be obtained by commission of fraud by the Management, as is being raised by the appellant-writ petitioner. 12. 12. The question of applicability of Section 2-A of the Act, 1947 would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case, for the reason that the section 2-A applies only in the case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination but here the fact which is available on record about making option for early separation under the Early Separation Scheme, it cannot come under the definition of discharge or dismissal or removal or otherwise termination and as such, Section 2-A of the Act, 1947 cannot be applicable. Further, Section 2-A of the Act cannot be applicable as because the said section as provided under sub section 2-A thereof, the dispute has been raised before the Conciliation Officer and if the appropriate order has not been passed within the period of 45 days, the concerned workman will have liberty to approach before the Labour Court or Tribunal, but herein no such case has been made out by the appellant rather as would appear from the record that after failure report of conciliating Officer, the application under Section 2-A of the Act, 1947 was filed and once there is a failure report of the Conciliation Officer in terms of the provision of Section 12(5) of the Act, 1947, the same is not required to be assailed by approaching the Labour Court or Tribunal as under Section 2-A of the Act, 1947 since the same is beyond the scope of the provision as contained in Section 2-A of the Act, 1947. Sub-Section 3 of Section 2-A provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1). Sub-Section 3 of Section 2-A provides that the application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1). In the case in hand, the petitioner was separated from service w.e.f. 31.03.2003 but the application was filed after lapse of 12 years and Section 2-A of the Act, 1947, which is for expeditious disposal of the dispute and under sub section 3, it has been provided to file “an application mandatorily within three years before the Labour Court or Tribunal from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1)” but admittedly the application was filed after lapse of 12 years, in our considered view, in view of specific bar as provided under sub section 3 to Section 2-A, such application was not fit to be entertained by the Labour Court or Tribunal. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted by taking aid of the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 treating the separation of the appellant-writ petitioner from the services under the Earlier Separation Scheme to be a retrenchment within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, we are not in agreement with such ground as has been agitated as because Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen by which no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until:- (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months. (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government. (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months. (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government. It is evident from the aforesaid provision of Section 25-F that condition has been provided before retrenchment of the workman but section 25-F will not be applicable here in the facts of the case, for the reason that it is not the case of the appellant that he has been retrenched from the services even after serving the Management continuously for a period of not less than one year, rather the case of the appellant is that he has submitted an application giving therein option for separation under Early Separation Scheme which after lapse of 12 years he has approached by taking the plea of commission of fraud on the part of the Management and therefore, it is not the case which will come under the ambit of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. 14. This Court on the basis of the discussions made hereinabove and after appreciating the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and upon consideration that the separation of option was furnished by the writ petitioner under the Early Separation Scheme floated by the respondent-Management and after its acceptance with effect from 31.01.2003, is of the considered view that the appellant has rightly not been allowed to take aid of the Section 2-A of the Act, 1947, thus, no interference is required in the impugned order. 15. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.