JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. I.A.No.10079 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 67 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. Heard. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the averments made in the interlocutory application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, I.A.No.10079 of 2019 is allowed and delay of 67 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No.607 of 2019 The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 11.06.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.2851 of 2010, by which, the learned Single Judge has refused to interfere with the impugned order dated 01.06.2004, whereby and whereunder, the respondent no.2 has cancelled the appointment of the writ petitioner made on compassionate ground. 2. The brief facts of the case are required to be enumerated which reads as hereunder:- The father of the writ petitioner late Krishna Sahu was a permanent employee working as Junior Account Clerk in the Office of Block Development Officer, died in harness leaving behind a son and daughter as his sole dependents. The writ petitioner, on the death of his father has made an application for appointment on compassionate ground on the basis of circular dated 05.10.1991 without disclosing therein that the mother of the writ petitioner is a Government servant and lives separately and a panchnama dated 25.12.1995 to that effect has been prepared. He also did not enclose the documents with the application such as copy of the said panchnama dated 25.12.1995 as also the ration card issued in favour of the mother of the writ petitioner on 17.01.1996 in which the name of her deceased husband-the father of the writ petitioner does not find place in the column meant for family members. The respondent authority, after considering the case of the writ petitioner, had referred the case for consideration of appointment on compassionate ground before the District Level Compassionate Appointment Committee, where the case of the writ petitioner was considered for appointment on compassionate ground and accordingly, the respondent no.2 had issued an appointment order appointing the writ petitioner vide order dated 22.05.2003. The writ petitioner, thereafter, started discharging his duty. On 20.02.2004, the respondent no.3 informed the writ petitioner about a complaint having been received against him stating therein that the mother of the writ petitioner, namely Rukmani Devi, is a government servant and by suppressing this fact, the writ petitioner has got appointment on compassionate ground and accordingly, the writ petitioner was asked to submit an explanation within two days. According to the writ petitioner, although the show cause notice was issued to him and he was asked to give reply within two days but the day when the copy of the show cause notice was received by him, the period of two days had already expired, however, he made a representation before the competent authority on 25.02.2004 but without considering the same and without initiating a regular departmental proceeding order of dismissal from service has been passed on 01.06.2004. Thereafter, the writ petitioner filed an objection against the order of termination as on 05.06.2004 but the same has not been considered which resulted into filing of writ petition before this Court being W.P.(S) No.2851 of 2010, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court, after considering the stand, inter-alia, as has been taken by the State authority about inadmissibility of the appointment on compassionate ground on the basis of a circular of the State as contained in Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department letter no.13293 dated 05.10.1991, which provides that if both husband and wife are in government service and if any one dies, the appointment on compassionate ground is not to be provided to any of the dependent, declined to interfere with the impugned decision, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 3. Ms. Khalida Haya Rashmi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered the fact that the order of termination has been passed without providing an opportunity of hearing. 3. Ms. Khalida Haya Rashmi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not considered the fact that the order of termination has been passed without providing an opportunity of hearing. According to the learned counsel, the respondent authorities ought to have initiated a regular departmental proceeding, since the order of punishment was of termination, as required under the Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules which provides for initiating a regular departmental proceeding, in case of inflicting major punishment such as discharge, dismissal or removal but having not resorted to such discipline and appeal rule, the authority passed the impugned order cancelling the appointment made on compassionate ground which has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order, hence the order impugned is not sustainable in the eye of law. 4. Per contra, Mr. Krishna Shankar, learned S.C. (L&C)-II appearing for the State of Jharkhand has submitted that the ground as has been agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant about applicability of observance of principle of natural justice or initiation of departmental proceeding will not be attracted, since the writ petitioner has not come with the clean hands at the time of making application for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground rather the writ petitioner has suppressed the material fact which was required to be disclosed by the writ petitioner before getting benefit under the government’s circular dated 05.10.1991 which prohibits about appointment on compassionate ground, if both mother and father are in government service and if any one dies, the dependent will not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground but even though, the mother of the writ petitioner was working as a government servant but by suppressing the material fact, the writ petitioner has got appointment on compassionate ground and as such, it is the case of fraud since, the writ petitioner has concealed the fact and when it came to the notice of the authority concerned and when it has been found that the mother of the writ petitioner is a government servant, the State authority has taken a correct decision in cancelling the appointment on compassionate ground by terminating him from service. It has further been submitted that there is no question of observance of principle of natural justice or the departmental proceeding required to be initiated in the fact of the case as because the writ petitioner has got appointment by suppressing material facts which amounts to fraud and it is settled position of law that fraud vitiates everything and in such circumstances, there is no reason to initiate regular departmental proceeding. Further, even if the matter would be remitted before the authority at this juncture for the purpose of observance of principle of natural justice, there will be no change in the factual situation since it is admitted case of the writ petitioner that his mother was a government servant at the time of consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground and it is settled that when the fact is not in dispute, no purpose would be served by remitting the matter for observation of principle of natural justice since there would be no chance in change of final outcome. According to him, the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration these aspects of the matter, has declined to interfere with the impugned order dated 01.06.2004, as such, no infirmity has been committed, hence, the order impugned may not be interfered with. 5. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions as also the material brought on record, deem it fit and proper first to refer certain undisputed fact in this case which requires to be referred as hereunder:- The father of the writ petitioner while working as Junior Account Clerk in the Office of Block Development Officer died in harness on 19.10.1999. The mother of the writ petitioner was also in the government job. The writ petitioner has made an application for consideration of appointment on compassionate ground under the scheme floated by the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department in letter no.13293 dated 05.10.1991, which has been considered by the authority by forwarding his name before the District Level Compassionate Appointment Committee, wherein the writ petitioner has been found to be eligible for appointment on compassionate ground and accordingly, he has been appointed by issuing an order by the competent authority as on 22.05.2003, in pursuance thereto, the writ petitioner has started discharging his duty. The respondent-authority has received a complaint against the writ petitioner with respect to suppression of fact about employment of his mother in the government establishment and accordingly, a fact finding inquiry was directed to be conducted, in which, the fact about employment of the mother of the writ petitioner has been found to be correct. The respondents-authorities have issued a notice for explanation. 6. This court has gone across the circular no.13293 dated 05.10.1991 issued by the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department of the State of Jharkhand, wherein a condition has been provided not to provide appointment on compassionate ground in a case where both husband and wife are in government service and if any one dies, in that situation, the dependent will not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. 7. It is settled position of law that appointment on compassionate ground is an exception to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India but in order to consider the predicament of the dependent of the deceased employee and to provide immediate succor to the dependent of the bereaved family of the deceased employee, the State government has come out with a circular as on 05.10.1991 to provide the immediate source of earning of bread, so that, the family members of the deceased employee, may not be subjected to starvation. The State Government in order to achieve the object and intent of appointment on compassionate ground and considering the fact that it is exception to the regular appointment since it is contrary to the principle laid down under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India has taken care of by inserting a condition in a circular dated 05.10.1991 providing therein that if both husband and wife are in government service and one of them if dies, the dependent would not be provided appointment on compassionate ground, it is for the reason that if father and mother both are in government service and one of them if dies the source of earning will be available due to presence of one earning member, in that situation, there will be no occasion for starvation of the dependent of the deceased employee. It is also settled position of law that if anyone seeking any advantage under the statute or executive instruction, it is incumbent upon such applicant to approach to the authority with clean hands and if there is suppression, if found, the authority will be at liberty to review its own decision treating it a suppression of fact. The admitted fact herein is that the mother of the writ petitioner was in government service but the said fact has been suppressed for the purpose of taking benefit of circular dated 05.10.1991 and therefore, according to the respondent authority there is material suppression of fact. This Court before further proceeding, deem it fit and proper to consider the fact as to whether the fact which has been said to be suppressed by the writ petitioner can be said to be material fact resulting into dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant, disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief, therefore, suppressed fact must be material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. The definition of material fact has been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166 , wherein it has been held at paragraph-13 which reads as hereunder:- “13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the Court, whatever view the Court may have taken. Thus when the liability to Income Tax was questioned by an applicant on the ground of her non-residence, the fact that she had purchased and was maintaining a house in the country was held to be a material fact the suppression of which disentitled her from the relief claimed. Thus when the liability to Income Tax was questioned by an applicant on the ground of her non-residence, the fact that she had purchased and was maintaining a house in the country was held to be a material fact the suppression of which disentitled her from the relief claimed. Again when in earlier proceedings before this Court, the appellant had undertaken that it would not carry on the manufacture of liquor at its distillery and the proceedings before this Court were concluded on that basis, a subsequent writ petition for renewal of the licence to manufacture liquor at the same distillery before the High Court was held to have been initiated for oblique and ulterior purposes and the interim order passed by the High Court in such subsequent application was set aside by this Court. Similarly, a challenge to an order fixing the price was rejected because the petitioners had suppressed the fact that an agreement had been entered into between the petitioners and the Government relating to the fixation of price and that the impugned order had been replaced by another order.” In the other judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Arunima Baruah Vrs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 , wherein it has been held while dealing with the effect of suppression of material fact as referred under paragraph-12, which reads as hereunder:- “12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.” 8. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.” 8. This Court in order to assess as to whether the fact which has been suppressed by the writ petitioner is a material one, in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. Admittedly, herein the writ petitioner has made an application for consideration of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground on the basis of circular dated 05.10.1991 which contains a clause that if both mother and father are in the government service and one of them if dies, the dependent, would not be entitled for consideration of appointment on compassionate ground, meaning thereby, the object, for which, scheme dated 05.10.1991 has been floated by the State Government will be mis-utilized, in such situation, if after the death of either father or mother if appointment will be provided to the dependent of such deceased employee there would be no situation of facing the dependents of the deceased employee with the condition of penury and if such fact would not be reflected by the applicant at the time of making application for consideration, it would have material effect since if this fact would have been brought to the notice of the authority, there would not have any occasion for taking positive decision by the competent authority by providing appointment on compassionate ground, therefore, we are of the view that the fact about service of the mother of the writ petitioner as has been suppressed by the writ petitioner is a material suppression. It is further settled position that in exercising extraordinary power, a writ court, is required to bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials and otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter as because the very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials and otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter as because the very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible, in this regard, reference may be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Prestige Lights Ltd. Vrs. State Bank of India, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 449 , wherein at paragraph 35 the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that:- “35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.” 9. It is not in dispute that suppression of material fact amounts to fraud as per the definition of ‘fraud’ as provided under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which reads as hereunder:- “17. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.” 9. It is not in dispute that suppression of material fact amounts to fraud as per the definition of ‘fraud’ as provided under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which reads as hereunder:- “17. ‘‘Fraud’’ defined –‘‘Fraud’’ means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” It would be evident from the definition of ‘Fraud’ as provided under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as referred and quoted above that the active concealment of a fact by way of misrepresentation will be treated to be fraud. Herein, the writ petitioner knows very well that his mother was in government service but this fact has not been disclosed in the application, therefore, there is active suppression of material fact, hence, the same is fraud, even as per the definition of ‘fraud’ as provided under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It is further settled position of law that fraud vitiates everything. Forgery avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. The Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the ambit of forgery, in the case of Devendra Kumar Vrs. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 , wherein at paragraph-13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- “13. Forgery avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. The Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the ambit of forgery, in the case of Devendra Kumar Vrs. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 , wherein at paragraph-13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as follows:- “13. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an office by misrepresenting the facts or by playing fraud upon the competent authority, such an order cannot be sustained in the eye of law, “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath.) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. V. Beasley the Court observed without equivocation that: (QB p. 712) “…….No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.” 14.In A.P. State Financial Corpn. Vs. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and State of Maharashtra Vs. Prabhu this Court has observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtleties invented to evade law.” 15. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Sahw Bros., it has been held as under: (SCC p. 553, para 20) “20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 16. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh this Court observed that “fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has not lost temper over all these centuries. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in M.P. Mittal v. State of Haryana. 17. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi this Court held that “misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud”, and further held: (SCC p. 327, para 18).” Thus, the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove lays down that where dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit those persons who have frauded or misrepresented, in such circumstances, the court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining petitions on their behalf. 10. 10. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid law as discussed above and considering the fact of the case in hand, has found therefrom that it is admitted case of the writ petitioner that his mother was in the government service but this fact has not been disclosed in the application submitted at the time of making application for consideration of his candidature for appointment on compassionate ground and when it came to the notice of the authority that the fact has been suppressed, a notice was issued to the writ petitioner and subsequently, the order of appointment has been cancelled vide order dated 01.06.2004. 11. The writ petitioner has tried to impress upon the Court that the mother was living separately as would be evident from the panchnama dated 25.12.1995 as also the ration card wherein, under the description of the husband, the column was blank but the question is of suppression of fact. Even if this ground is accepted to be correct, even then it was incumbent upon the writ petitioner to bring this fact in the application by disclosing the fact about living separately by the mother from her husband giving occasion to the authority to conduct an inquiry in this regard. Since this fact has admittedly been suppressed so the authority could not get an opportunity to conduct an inquiry, as such, this ground would not be available to the writ petitioner. Further ground has been agitated by the appellant that the principle of audi alteram partem has not been followed, as according to the learned counsel for the appellant since the consequence of passing the impugned order is termination from service, therefore, a regular departmental proceeding ought to have been initiated by resorting to the provision of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules but we are not persuaded to consider such limb of argument favourably as the settled position of law is that fraud vitiates very solemnity of the proceeding. Further, even if the departmental proceeding will be directed to be initiated by remitting the matter before the competent authority, no purpose would be served as admittedly the mother of the writ petitioner was in service at the time of making application for appointment on compassionate ground. Further, even if the departmental proceeding will be directed to be initiated by remitting the matter before the competent authority, no purpose would be served as admittedly the mother of the writ petitioner was in service at the time of making application for appointment on compassionate ground. It is settled position of law that a show cause notice or a departmental proceeding is to be initiated if the fact is in dispute so that before taking any decision, if leads to civil consequence, the sufferer is required to be provided with an opportunity to defend but when there is no chance of change in the factual situation as the case in hand, even if it remitted, there would be no chance of change in the outcome and, as such, it would be a futile exercise or empty formality and in that situation principle of natural justice which is not a straight-jacket formula, would not be applicable as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & others, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 281 , wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held at paragraph-64 which is being quoted herein below:- “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and others, reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 wherein their Lordships have held at paragraph-39 which is being quoted herein below:- “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling-it is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”-meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker.” 12. This Court having gone through the factual aspect and the finding recorded by the writ court and as per the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that admittedly the writ petitioner was not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground in pursuance to the circular dated 05.10.1991 as his mother was in government service but even then the writ petitioner has been able to get the appointment by suppressing that fact and when the authority found the same, in order to rectify the illegality committed at its inception, the appointment made in favour of the writ petitioner has been cancelled, which according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from any error as it is settled position of law that the illegality if committed and if came to the knowledge of the authority, the same has to be rectified the moment it came to the notice as the same cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment renered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment renered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein at paragraph-8, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court which reads as hereunder:- “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or 10 court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. V. Jagjit Singh, Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab.)” In the other judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chaman Lal Vrs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in AIR 2014 SC 3640 , wherein at paragraph 15 as quoted hereinbelow:- “15. Moreso, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj and Anr. V. The Spl. Moreso, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj and Anr. V. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 considered this issue and held as under: “It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but 9 has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforce by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide: Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705 ; M/s. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565 ; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 898 ; and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1937 ).” Likewise in the case as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 13 of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 as also in paragraph 16 of the judgment rendered in the case of Kulwinder Pal Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 532 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold as follows:- “13. … … … … The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”) cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality.” 16. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that when the other candidates were appointed in the post against dereserved category, the same benefit should also be extended to the appellants. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equalities. In State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma it was held as under: (SCC p. 337, para 15). “15. Even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another person. Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P.; Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain; State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann; Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. DG, Health Services; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh; State of Punjab v. Rajeev Sarwal; Yogesh Kumar v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi); Union of India v. International Trading Co. and Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Indore Development Authority.)” Merely because some persons have been granted benefit illegally or by mistake, it does not confer right upon the appellants to claim equality.” 13. (NCT of Delhi); Union of India v. International Trading Co. and Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit v. Indore Development Authority.)” Merely because some persons have been granted benefit illegally or by mistake, it does not confer right upon the appellants to claim equality.” 13. This Court, taking into consideration the fact in entirety as per the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the learned single Judge has committed no error by not interfering with the impugned order dated 01.06.2004, hence, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. In the result, the instant appeal fails and it is dismissed.