ORDER : 1. The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. They have no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. I.A. No. 2940 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 5 days in preferring the present appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submission made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 5 days in preferring the present appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 2940 of 2019 stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 256 of 2019 5. The instant intra-court appeal has been filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order/judgment dated 28.01.2019 passed in W.P. (S) No. 929 of 2016, whereby the order of punishment of removal from service has been declined to be interfered with. 6. The brief facts of the case, which require to be enumerated herein for proper adjudication of the lis, reads hereunder as: The writ petitioner-appellant was appointed in Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short ‘Corporation’) on 13.12.1990. He while working as Assistant and posted at Sales Training Centre, Jamshedpur was proceeded by conducting departmental proceeding under Regulation 39 of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 by inflicting the charge about commission of financial irregularities causing financial loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs. 4,98,011.99. On receipt of the charge-sheet, the writ petitioner-appellant submitted his reply and participated in the departmental proceeding by pleading the mistake about commission of such financial irregularities. On completion of enquiry, the enquiry officer has found the charge proved and forwarded the same before the disciplinary authority, who has accepted the same and thereafter second show cause notice was served upon the writ petitioner-appellant, to which, he responded but the same was found to be unsatisfactory and finally the order of punishment of removal from service was passed vide order dated 31.03.2010, against which, the writ petitioner-appellant preferred appeal, which was rejected vide order dated 14.10.2010. Being aggrieved by the order of punishment of removal from services dated 31.03.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority and appellate order dated 14.10.2010 passed by the appellate authority, the writ petitioner-appellant approached this Court by filing writ petition, being W.P. (S) No. 7808 of 2011 invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the writ petition was disposed of, on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of memorial, vide order 03.09.2015 with a direction to the writ petitioner-appellant to file a fresh memorial before the respondent no. 2-Chairman, Life Insurance of Corporation, who shall consider the same and pass appropriate order on the quantum of punishment vis-a-vis proved charges. Consequent thereupon, the writ petitioner-appellant preferred memorial, which was rejected vide order 18.01.2016. Aggrieved thereof, the writ petitioner-appellant has challenged order dated 18.01.2016 by way of filing W.P. (S) No. 929 of 2016, which was dismissed vide order dated 28.01.2019, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 7. The present intra-court appeal has been filed, inter-alia, on the ground that the materials, which were brought before the enquiry officer has not properly been appreciated. Further, the punishment of removal from services is harsh, which is not in commensurate with the irregularities. Further ground has been taken that the misappropriated money has been recovered and the same has been deposited with the Corporation, thus there is no loss to the Corporation. 8. Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents-LIC of India and its functionaries has submitted by raising the issue of limited scope of judicial review by the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference on the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority. It has been submitted that it is a case of financial irregularities and the writ petitioner-appellant has committed gross mistake and hence there is no scope of raising the issue about non-consideration of defence by the writ petitioner-appellant. It has further been submitted that since the writ petitioner-appellant has been provided with the opportunity of hearing and principles of natural justice has been complied with, therefore, there is no issue of lapses in the departmental proceeding, hence, taking into consideration the nature of irregularities, which pertain to financial irregularities, the learned Single Judge has rightly not interfered with the impugned orders of punishment. 9. This Court before proceeding to assess the legality and propriety of the impugned decisions passed by the authorities as also the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge deem it fit and proper to first take into consideration the nature of allegation, as has been levelled against the writ petitioner-appellant in the charge-sheet. It is evident from the charge-sheet, which is annexed as Annexure 1 to the memo of appeal, that while the writ petitioner-appellant was working as an Assistant at Mango Branch of LIC of India under Jamshedpur Division, he had frequently proceeded commission payments through ‘Add Pay’ commissions under four agency codes, which caused an excess payment in commission to the agents resulting into financial loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs. 4,98,011.99 out of which, an amount of Rs. 1,96,823.46 remains outstanding as on date. It has further been alleged that the writ petitioner-appellant fraudulently used the passwords of certain passing officials in passing these fraudulent payments to fulfill the foul intentions. Therefore, it has been alleged that the writ petitioner-appellant has failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and has displayed gross negligence in discharge of his duty and acted in a manner prejudicial to good conduct and detrimental to the interest of the Corporation, thereby violated the provisions of Regulations 21, 24 read with Regulation 39(1) of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The writ petitioner-appellant in pursuance to the aforesaid allegations has submitted his reply on 17.03.2009, as would appear from Annexure 2 to the memo of appeal, in which, the writ petitioner-appellant has pleaded guilt. Relevant portion of the reply is quoted hereunder as: “That, a mistake is a mistake and when it has occurred for which I was particularly assigned with to do the job there is no reason not to admit the mistake. But the said mistake should not necessarily be mistaken as a fraud that I have committed with an ulterior motive. Relevant portion of the reply is quoted hereunder as: “That, a mistake is a mistake and when it has occurred for which I was particularly assigned with to do the job there is no reason not to admit the mistake. But the said mistake should not necessarily be mistaken as a fraud that I have committed with an ulterior motive. I can never stoop so low to defraud the Corporation, my beloved organization, which generates bread and livelihood for me and for all the members of my family.” The respondents-authorities, even though on admission of allegation by the writ petitioner-appellant that it was a mistake, has subjected him to participate in the regular proceeding, accordingly he appeared before the enquiry officer and put his defence, but the enquiry officer has found the charges levelled against the writ petitioner-appellant to be proved and forwarded the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority who has proposed the punishment of removal from services and as such issued second show cause notice. The writ petitioner-appellant submitted his reply and even in the second show cause reply the mistake has been admitted and, therefore, by accepting the enquiry report in entirety and taking into consideration the fact that the charges have been found to be proved, the disciplinary authority has imposed the punishment of removal from services, which has been affirmed by the appellate authority as well as by the revisional authority. 10. Before proceeding further it requires to refer the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of decision taken by the disciplinary authority. It is settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got limited scope in showing interference in the decision taken by the authorities. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Another, (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Others vs. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 SC 200 , has laid down the guidelines at paragraph 8 showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : AIR 2011 SC 1931 (Para 6), this Court held as follows: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala-fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: “12. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala-fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 11. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 11. It also requires to refer herein the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court dealing with the case of the employees working in the financial institutions like the bank, holding therein that the bankers are supposed to perform their duty with utmost sincerity and integrity and they are to be treated differently to the other civil servants on the ground that they are dealing with the public money. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Others vs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 , which reads hereunder as: 14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. It is equally settled that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise the power of judicial review with respect to the quantum of punishment if the punishment is found to be disproportionate to the gravity of charge shocking the conscience of the Court. Simultaneously, it is also settled that on sympathy there should not be any interference in the quantum of punishment if the charge is grave one and the same has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer. Otherwise, if any, interference would be shown leaving apart the gravity of charge, same will be an example of misplaced sympathy towards the delinquent employee, as has been decided by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. A.L. Mohan Rao, (2006) 1 SCC 63 , wherein it has been observed that it is not for the Courts to interfere in cases of gross misconduct of this nature with decision of disciplinary authority, on any mistaken notion of sympathy, so long as inquiry has been fair and proper, and misconduct proved. In such matter it is for disciplinary authority to decide what is the fit punishment. Further in the case of Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan and Others vs. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC 106 , it has been held at paragraph 16, which reads hereunder as: “16. In the present case, it cannot be imputed that the departmental authorities while imposing the punishment acted in a manner which manifests lack of reasonableness or fairness. In Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. A.L. Mohan Rao, (2006) 1 SCC 63 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 59, charge against the delinquent employee was that he had colluded with one of the Branch Managers and enabled grant of fictitious loan. The High Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal and ordered reinstatement on sympathetic ground even when it found that the misconduct was proved. This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court. The High Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal and ordered reinstatement on sympathetic ground even when it found that the misconduct was proved. This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court. Repeatedly this Court has emphasised that the courts should not be guided by misplaced sympathy or continuity ground, as a factor in judicial review while examining the quantum of punishment.” 12. In the light of aforesaid settled position of law, this Court has proceeded to examine as to whether in exercise of power of judicial review, any interference can be made in the decision of the authority imposing the punishment of removal from services, for which, we have travelled across the memo of charge wherefrom we have found that the writ petitioner-appellant, who was working as Assistant at Sales Training Centre, Jamshedpur under LIC of India while dealing with the public money, has found to cause financial loss to the Corporation to the tune of Rs. 4,98,011.99, in the result, memo of charge was served upon the writ petitioner-appellant, which has been responded by him by pleading guilt basing upon which, he has sought for apology but the question is that when he has been assigned with the duty to deal with the public money it cannot be expected from him to act in a manner which is not expected from the writ petitioner-appellant, who was working in a financial institution like the LIC of India, since the writ petitioner-appellant has used the password of the passing officers and if in that circumstance, the enquiry officer has found the charge to be proved, basing upon the relevant documents and if the High Court will exercise the power of judicial review by interfering with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, it will nothing but an appraisal of the evidence which has been appreciated by the enquiry officer and if that would be done, the High Court will be said to be the appellate authority as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasakaran (Supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Others vs. Abrar Ali (Supra) showing therein the guidelines to interfere with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and in which circumstances, the power of judicial review is not to be exercised by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. 13. We, on critical examination of the factual aspect as also the allegation as has been leveled in the memo of charge is of the view that the case of the writ petitioner-appellant is not coming under the fold of the guidelines, as has been framed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment referred herein above requiring any interference by this Court in the fact finding of the enquiry officer and, therefore, this Court is of the considered view that no interference is required in the finding recorded by the enquiry officer proving the charge against the writ petitioner-appellant. In consequence of the above finding since the order of punishment of removal from services is based upon the finding recorded by the enquiry officer and as such we also decline to interfere with the order of punishment so far as its merit is concerned. 14. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant at this juncture submitted to consider the case of the writ petitioner-appellant by taking a lenient view about the quantum. As per the guidelines showing interference in exercise of power of judicial review in the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India vs. P. Gunasakaran (Supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Others vs. Abrar Ali (Supra), interference in the punishment so far as quantum is concerned is to be exercised only in a case if the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court. But, we on the basis of nature of allegation are of the view that it is not a case in the nature, which shocks the conscience of the Court even to exercise the power of judicial review by making interference in the quantum of punishment. It is also settled, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan and Others vs. J. Hussain (Supra) and Karnataka Bank Ltd. vs. A.L. Mohan Rao (Supra) that in a case of gross misconduct there cannot be any interference otherwise it will be said to be interference shown by the Court of law on the misplaced sympathy. 15. 15. We, on appreciation of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and on the basis of discussions made herein above as also taking into consideration the nature of allegation and the fact that the writ petitioner-appellant was working as assistant in the LIC of India, which deals with the public money as also the writ petitioner-appellant has admitted the guilt, therefore, the learned Single Judge has declined to interfere with the decision of the respondents-authorities, are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. 16. In the result, the present intra-court appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.