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2020 DIGILAW 535 (ALL)

Sugara v. State of U. P.

2020-02-18

PATHAK, SUNITA AGARWAL

body2020
JUDGMENT : Dinesh Pathak, J. Order on Criminal Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 01 of 2020: 1. Heard Shri Vikas Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant on the application filed for condonation of delay in filing special leave to appeal under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C. As per the report submitted by the Reporting Section, there is a delay of 18 days in filing of the present leave to appeal. 2. We have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application. Cause shown in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application is found sufficient for condoning the delay. 3. Accordingly, delay in filing the instant leave to appeal is condoned. Delay Condonation Application is allowed. 4. Instant application, on board, is treated having been filed within time as prescribed by law. Order on Appeal: 5. Heard Sri Vikas Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant. 6. The present criminal application for special leave to file appeal (under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C.) has been preferred by the present appellant (prosecutrix) against the judgment and order dated 23.10.2019 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court (Offence against Women), Rampur in Sessions Trial No. 351 of 2015 (State of U.P. v. Abrar and others) acquitting all the three accused persons (respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4) under Sections 376-D, 452, 323 and 506 I.P.C. 7. By means of instant application, applicant seeks the indulgence of this Court to grant special leave to appeal which is arising out of Complaint No. 254 of 2014 moved by the prosecutrix under Sections 376, 452, 504 and 506 IPC against Abrar (respondent No. 2), Hidakat Hussain (respondent No. 3) and Gose Azam (respondent No. 4) in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur leveling allegation against them that in the intervening night of 29/30.8.2013 at about 2:00 a.m., while victim was sleeping alone in her house, all the three accused persons, as mentioned above, armed with Tamancha (country made pistol) entered her house with intention to sexually assault her. While entering into the room, they grabbed the victim and subjected her, on the gun point, to rape and molested her taking a turn one by one. 8. It is further alleged that while she protested, accused have beaten her up by the butt of Tamancha and thrashed her resulted in inflicting several injuries. While entering into the room, they grabbed the victim and subjected her, on the gun point, to rape and molested her taking a turn one by one. 8. It is further alleged that while she protested, accused have beaten her up by the butt of Tamancha and thrashed her resulted in inflicting several injuries. When she raised alarm, Aftab Hussain, Asiya and other persons have entered into the scene and challenged the accused persons but they ran away by brandishing gun and have threatened them to life, in case anyone tried to follow them. Asiya, while seeing the victim in naked condition, dressed her up. The victim approached the Police Station, Tanda to get her report registered but she received negative response. On 31.8.2013, she got herself medically examined in the District Hospital, Rampur and moved representation before the Superintendent of Police, Rampur but it went in vain. Ultimately, on her complaint after considering her statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and statement of her witnesses namely Aftab Hussain (victim's son) and Asiya (victim's sister-in-law) under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Court below has taken cognizance under Section 376-D, 452, 323 and 506 IPC and registered a case as Sessions Trial No. 351 of 2015. 9. Learned Court below has framed charges on 7.1.2016 against the accused persons under Section 376-D, 452, 323 and 506 I.P.C. 10. In order to substantiate the accusations, prosecution has examined as many as three witnesses. 11. PW-1 (Prosecutrix) has deposed that the incident took place as long as three years back at about 2:00 a.m. and at that time she was sleeping alone in her room. The accused persons namely Abrar, Hidakat Hussain and Gose Azam entered the room armed with Tamancha and put it on her temple. On awakening, she was threatened to life, if she raises alarm, thereafter she had been sexually assaulted by all the three accused persons by taking a turn one by one. Lastly, when she raised alarm, Aftab Hussain (victim's son) and Asiya (victim's sister-in-law), who were sleeping in another room, entered into the scene. The accused had threatened them that they would be shot dead in case they followed them. Thereafter they jumped over the wall and fled away. Asiya dressed up the victim. In the morning the husband of the victim came back and alongwith him she went to police station. The accused had threatened them that they would be shot dead in case they followed them. Thereafter they jumped over the wall and fled away. Asiya dressed up the victim. In the morning the husband of the victim came back and alongwith him she went to police station. The Police Inspector had scolded her and refused to register the report. Next day she appeared before the Superintendent of Police, Rampur but he also did not take any action. Same day, she went to the District Hospital, Rampur and got herself medically examined. Ultimately, she engaged a counsel and filed the complaint. 12. PW-2 (Aftab Hussain) stated that the incident took place on 30.8.2013. He was sleeping with her aunt (Phuphi) in a room which is adjacent to her mother's room. While hearing screaming of her mother, he and his aunt came outside the room and saw that Abrar, Hidakat Hussain and Gose Azam, who are the residents of his village, were coming out of the room of his mother, armed with Tamancha, and warned him that in case he move forward, he would be killed. Thereafter, trio jumped over the wall and ran away. His aunt brought her mother out of the room who had narrated the incident that Abrar, Hidakat Hussain and Gose Azam had sexually assaulted her and thrashed her. 13. PW-3 (Asiya) had stated on oath that the incident occurred approximately a quarter to six years back. On the date of the incident, she was at the residence of her brother Rahim Uddin in village Mundia. She came there to know the well being of his brother. She and Aftab Hussain were sleeping in one room whereas her Bhabhi (prosecutrix) was sleeping in the adjoining room. When the victim screamed, she alongwith her nephew went to the victim's room. Three persons were coming out of the victim's room armed with Tamancha. When they have been asked about their identity, firstly, Abrar then Hidakat Hussain and then Gose Azam brandished their Tamancha and stated that they came here to assassinate and thereafter they jumped over the wall and ran away. When she entered the room, the victim was lying naked on the double bed and on close sight she saw blue marks and injuries on her body. She dressed her up, who became conscious thereafter. When she entered the room, the victim was lying naked on the double bed and on close sight she saw blue marks and injuries on her body. She dressed her up, who became conscious thereafter. She narrated the entire incident to PW-3 as to what had happened to her in the night at about 2:00 p.m. 14. The accused have made their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They pleaded innocence and false implication in the present case. In addition, Abrar Hussain (respondent No. 2) has stated that false implication has been made, in revenge, to create pressure upon him so that he may enter into a compromise in another criminal case. He stated that Rahim Uddin (husband of victim), his two sons namely Askar and Aftab and brother Amin Uddin and Qutub Uddin fired on his uncle Hidakat Hussain. In that incident, his cousin Hamid had also sustained injuries. In the aforesaid incident, FIR was lodged by Sadakat (brother of Hidakat Hussain). Consequently, a case under Section 307 IPC had been registered in the Police Station Tanda, District Rampur, which is still pending. Remaining accused persons namely Hidakat Hussain and Gose Azam (respondent Nos. 3 and 4) have also stated same version as stated by Abrar Hussain that they have been falsely implicated to create pressure upon them with respect to the case registered under Section 307 IPC. In support of their defence, accused persons have filed a copy of the FIR registered as Case Crime No. 613-A of 2010 under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 IPC, Police Station Tanda District Rampur and also filed Charge-Sheet No. 193 of 2010 and 193-A of 2010. 15. After considering the entire evidence, learned Trial Court vide impugned judgment dated 23.10.2019 acquitted the accused persons (respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4) by observing that the prosecution has failed to establish its accusation beyond all reasonable doubts. Consequently, all the accused persons were acquitted by the Court below. 16. Learned counsel for appellant has submitted that the Trial Court has illegally acquitted the accused persons (respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4) whereas prosecution has successfully proved it's accusation. He has further submitted that the statement of prosecution witnesses has been misled and misinterpreted by the Court below whereas commission of crime is fully corroborated by the statement of the prosecution witnesses and surrounding circumstances. 17. 2, 3, 4) whereas prosecution has successfully proved it's accusation. He has further submitted that the statement of prosecution witnesses has been misled and misinterpreted by the Court below whereas commission of crime is fully corroborated by the statement of the prosecution witnesses and surrounding circumstances. 17. We have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the present case, submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned judgment. 18. As per complaint version, on the date of occurrence i.e. intervening night dated 30.8.2013 at about 2:00 a.m. while prosecutrix was sleeping alone in her room all three accused persons (respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4) entered the room. Each of them armed with Tamancha had sexually assaulted her and subjected her to rape on the gun point, taking a turn one by one. On screaming, her son Aftab Hussain, Asiya (victim's sister-in-law) and others reached on the spot and challenged the accused persons who brandished their Tamancha and threatened them to be killed in case they followed them. Thereafter the accused persons jumped over the boundary wall and ran away. Asiya entered the room and dressed up the victim, who was in naked condition and sustained injuries. In compelling circumstances, wherein neither her report was registered by the police personnel nor the Superintendent of Police had paid any heed to her grievances, she moved complaint which has been entertained and cognizance has been taken by the Court below to initiate criminal proceedings against the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 19. Learned Trial Court has raised doubt over the facts and circumstances of the present case, wherein the prosecutrix was allegedly sexually assaulted by the accused persons. Learned Trial Court had pointed out several discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and circumstantial evidences and found them enough to acquit the accused persons. Trial Court has discussed the evidences and pointed out that: (i) PW-1 deposed that there was no light in the house at the time of incident whereas P W-2 stated that a wick lamp was lighting at that time. (ii) It is very astonishing and creates suspicion that PW-2 who is student of Intermediate has not stated the occurrence to any of his relatives and neighbours till morning, even not to his father. (ii) It is very astonishing and creates suspicion that PW-2 who is student of Intermediate has not stated the occurrence to any of his relatives and neighbours till morning, even not to his father. (iii) PW-2 stated that Asiya is real sister of his father who came in morning about 6 O' clock, on the date of incident, whereas Asiya (PW-3) deposed that she reached at her brother's house three days prior to the incident. At page 5', while she had been cross-examined by another counsel, states that she came one day before the incident. (iv) PW-2 deposed that he was sleeping with his aunty (Phuphii) in a room adjacent to his mother's room. But, on the contrary PW-3 deposed at page 3' that distance between the two rooms is about 20 steps. Later on at page 5' she states that it was dark in the night on the date of incident and she was sleeping in the room where cattle were tethered. Further she deposed that in one room her sister-in-law (victim) was sleeping and in' the verandah of another room she and Aftab were sleeping. In this view of the matter, there is a great contradiction with respect to the place of sleeping of important witnesses i.e. PW-2 and PW-3. (v) PW-3 deposed that she used to come to her brother's house in a year or six months, but later on she stated that she did not come to the house of his brother. (vi) There is a great contradiction with respect to the time as to when Asiya reached to his brother's house and, when his brother (husband of victim) had left the house alongwith his remaining children. (vii) PW-1 stated that his son Aftab and sister-in-law Asiya came into the room, after hearing her screams, and Asiya had dressed her up whereas Asiya (PW-3) deposed that when she entered the room, victim was lying unconscious on the double bed and while she dressed her up, victim regained consciousness. (viii) PW-1 deposed that at the time of sexual assault white bed-sheet was spread on the bed and it was soaked with spermatozoa of accused persons. Said bed-sheet had never been produced for examination. (ix) PW-2 stated that after the incident he did not enter the room of his mother. (viii) PW-1 deposed that at the time of sexual assault white bed-sheet was spread on the bed and it was soaked with spermatozoa of accused persons. Said bed-sheet had never been produced for examination. (ix) PW-2 stated that after the incident he did not enter the room of his mother. On the contrary, PW-3 stated on page 6' that while she dressed up the victim, Aftab (PW-2) entered the room. (x) PW-3 Asiya deposed at page 7' that his brother had carried bedsheet and salwaar to the police station but in the statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. no such version was put forward by the prosecutrix. (xi) PW-1 stated on page 5 that she reached the hospital at about 2.00 P.M. and narrated the story, with respect to sexual assault, to the doctor concerned, who had examined the injuries of victim. In the injury report dated 31.8.2013, there is no endorsement with respect to the sexual assault on victim. Even doctor had not opined anything in this respect, which evinces that the prosecutrix had narrated anything about sexual assault. In the application dated 31.8.2013 moved before the Medical Officer, District Hospital, Rampur nothing has been averred with respect to the sexual assault. No one had been produced on behalf of the prosecution to prove the injury report. (xii) PW-1 deposed that she had not seen as to when the accused entered her room. They thrashed her but blood was not oozing out, whereas, on the contrary, PW-2 Aftab Hussain deposed on page 3 that he saw injuries on the body of her mother where-from blood was oozing out. He further stated that because of darkness he was not sure about the seat of injuries. Even he was not sure about the number of injuries. PW-3 Asiya states that blood was oozing out from the injuries. (xiii) It is admitted to the prosecution witnesses that right hand, above elbow, of accused Abrar was amputated. In light of the said fact, it is hard to believe that a person, having amputated right hand above the elbow had raped a lady having a Tamancha in his left hand and, thereafter, jumped over the wall and fled away. 20. Prosecution has admitted old enmity and criminal litigation with accused persons and their family members, in which husband and sons of the victim, were roped in as accused. 20. Prosecution has admitted old enmity and criminal litigation with accused persons and their family members, in which husband and sons of the victim, were roped in as accused. It was vehemently argued by the defence counsel, before the trial Court, that present case has been filed with a purpose to create pressure upon the accused and their family members, so that earlier criminal case filed against the husband of victim and her sons, could be compromised. Documents relating to the said criminal case, which is filed against the husband of victim, had been admitted by the prosecution. It is said that the prosecutrix is cousin sister of father of one of the accused Gose Azam meaning thereby victim is Aunty (Bud) of Gose Azam. PW-1 had admitted that Hidaqat is her cousin brother. In this view of the matter, it is hard to believe that cousin brother alongwith his nephew had committed rape of the prosecutrix. 21. In criminal law, it is imperative that the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt and there should be evidence on record to hold the accused guilty. In the matter of rape, in the case of Narendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2012 AIR SCW 3391, Hon'ble Supreme Court had expounded the law in paragraphs 23 and 24 as under: "23. The Courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses which are not of a substantial character. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witness have falsely implicated the accused. Prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the Court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the Court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide: Tukaram and another v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 185 ; and Uday v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639 ). 24. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the Court has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be rejected. The Court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence in totality of the background of the entire case and not in the isolation. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the Court is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of." 22. It is imperative that to prove the offence of rape committed by accused, testimony of the prosecutrix alone could be made basis for conviction of the accused persons unless there are some compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. In several decisions, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid emphasis on the testimony of the prosecutrix unless something can be inferred adverse to the conclusion of conviction. In the matter in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others, (1996) 2 SCC 384 , wherein prosecutrix aged about 16 years was abducted and raped, Hon'ble Supreme Court expounded importance of the testimony of the victim in paragraph 8 of the judgment. The relevant portion of paragraph 8 is being reproduced below: "8. In the matter in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others, (1996) 2 SCC 384 , wherein prosecutrix aged about 16 years was abducted and raped, Hon'ble Supreme Court expounded importance of the testimony of the victim in paragraph 8 of the judgment. The relevant portion of paragraph 8 is being reproduced below: "8. ............................The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl of a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost at par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be over-looked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. It must not be over-looked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another persons's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain ( 1990 (1) SCC 550 ) Ahmadi, J. (as the Lord Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench summarised the position in the following words: "A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be - accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction of her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 23. Further in the matter of Mohd. Ali alias Guddu v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 272 , wherein 14 years age girl was abducted from outside of her house and raped, Hon'ble Supreme Court had given importance to the deposition of prosecutrix. Paragraph 30 of said judgment is being reproduced below: "30. True it is, the grammar of law permits the testimony of a prosecutrix can be accepted without any corroboration without material particulars, for she has to be placed on a higher pedestal than an injured witness, but, a pregnant one, when a Court, on studied scrutiny of the evidence finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix, because it is not unreproachable, there is requirement for search of such direct or circumstantial evidence which would lend assurance to her testimony. As the present case would show, her testimony does not inspire confidence, and the circumstantial evidence remotely do not lend any support to the same. In the absence of both, we are compelled to hold that the learned trial Judge has erroneously convicted the accused-appellants for the alleged offences and the High Court has fallen into error, without re-appreciating the material on record, by giving the stamp of approval to the same." 24. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, deposition of the prosecutrix/victim itself is under cloud and requires corroboration. Her testimony cannot be made the solitary basis to convict the accused persons for commission of rape. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, deposition of the prosecutrix/victim itself is under cloud and requires corroboration. Her testimony cannot be made the solitary basis to convict the accused persons for commission of rape. Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence and the circumstantial evidence remotely do not lend any support to the same. It cannot be said that the statement of the victim is not irreproachable and, therefore, there is a requirement for such direct or circumstantial evidence which would authenticate the testimony of the prosecutrix. Unfortunately, deposition of PW-1 is neither worthy of credibility nor is corroborated by PWs-2 and 3. After careful examination, the depositions of PWs-2 and 3 are found explicitly unreliable. Admission made by the prosecutrix with regard to the criminal litigation going on between the parties shows mala fide intention of the prosecution to rope in the accused persons in a criminal case so that pressure can be created upon them for compromise. 25. While considering the scope of interference in an appeal or revision against acquittal, it has been held by the Supreme Court that if two views on appreciation of the evidence are reasonably possible, one supporting the acquittal and other indicating conviction, the High Court should not, in such a situation, reverse the order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. In the matter of State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalkrishna, (2005) 9 SCC 291 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, observed as under: "In such an appeal the Appellate Court does, not lightly disturb the findings of fact recorded by the Court below. If on the basis of the same evidence, two views are reasonably possible, and the view favouring the accused is accepted by the Court below, that is sufficient for upholding the order of acquittal. However, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the findings of the Court below are wholly unreasonable or perverse and not based on the evidence on record, or suffers from serious illegality including ignorance or misreading of evidence on record, the Appellate Court will be justified in setting aside such an order of acquittal." 26. In Sudershan Kumar v. State of Himachal, (2014) 15 SCC 666 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: "31. In Sudershan Kumar v. State of Himachal, (2014) 15 SCC 666 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: "31. It has been stated and restated that a cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced by an order of the acquittal. The appellate Court, in such a case, would interfere only for very substantial and compelling reason. There is plethora of case laws on this proposition and we need not burden this judgment by referring to those decisions. Our purpose would be served by referring to one reasoned pronouncement entitled Dhanapal v. State which is the judgment where most of the earlier decisions laying down the aforesaid principle are referred to. In para 37, propositions laid down in an earlier case are taken note of as under: "37. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 9 SCC 291 , this Court held: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies-are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 32. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 32. Thereafter, in para 39, the Court curled out five principles and we would like to reproduce the said para here-under: "39. The following principles emerge from the cases above: (1) The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial Court. The trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. (2) The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate Court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial Court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial Court. (3) The appellate Court should always keep in mind that the trial Court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial Court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. (4) The appellate Court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial Court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. (5) If two reasonable or possible views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/appellate Courts must rule in favour of the accused." 27. In Dilawar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 1 SCC 737 , the Supreme Court reiterated the same in paragraphs 36 and 37 as under: "36. The Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach is vitiated by manifest illegality. In an appeal against acquittal, this Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because on the evaluation of the evidence, a different plausible view may arise and views taken by the Courts below is not correct. In other words, this Court must come to the conclusion that the views taken by the learned Courts below, while acquitting, cannot be the views of a reasonable person on the material on record." 28. In other words, this Court must come to the conclusion that the views taken by the learned Courts below, while acquitting, cannot be the views of a reasonable person on the material on record." 28. After considering the facts and circumstances of present case and perusal of the impugned judgment and the record filed by the appellant, we are of the considered view and reach to a conclusion that by any stretch of imagination it cannot be held that the prosecution was not known to the accused persons, prior to incident, who are in fact in close relation and already indulged in a previous criminal litigation. In fact, it appears that the prosecutrix had tried to frame the accused persons just to create pressure upon them so that criminal litigation going on between two families could be compromised. 29. It cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was subjected to sexual assault and accused persons i.e. respondents 2, 3 and 4 are directly involved in the commission of such crime. There is scope of probabilities and the prosecution had failed to discharge its onus to prove its accusation. There is no proper evidence and material on record and the surrounding circumstances to hold the contesting respondents/accused guilty. 30. If the evidence of the prosecutrix is read and considered in totality of facts and circumstances of the instant case, in which the crime is alleged to have been commissioned, we are of the view that the deposition of the prosecution witnesses does not inspire confidence of this Court. Evidence of the prosecutrix is not worthy of credibility and explicitly unreliable. Therefore, in the present matter, statement of the prosecutrix cannot be made the solitary basis for conviction of the accused. There is no substantial and compelling reasons to reverse the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 31. The prosecution has not disclosed the true genesis of crime. In such a situation of fact, accused persons i.e. respondents 2, 3 and 4 are entitled to get benefit of doubt and their innocence could easily be inferred. Thus, we find no good ground to interfere in the findings of fact returned by the Court below in favour of the accused persons and in our opinion, it should be accepted by this Court. 32. Thus, we find no good ground to interfere in the findings of fact returned by the Court below in favour of the accused persons and in our opinion, it should be accepted by this Court. 32. As such, in the light of the observations as made above, special leave to appeal, as prayed, is hereby refused. Consequently, present criminal appeal is dismissed in limine.