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2020 DIGILAW 535 (GUJ)

Ilias Gulam Rasul Mehsaniya v. State Of Gujarat

2020-06-11

ASHOKKUMAR C.JOSHI

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Learned APP waives service of rule on behalf of respondent-State and Maulik Nanavati, learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 5. 2. Heard learned advocate Mr. Ankit Y. Bachani for the petitioner, learned advocate Mr. Maulik Nanavati for Nanavati & Company for respondent Nos.2 to 5 and learned APP Mr. Manan Mehta for the respondent No.1 State. 3. By way of present Special Criminal Application, the petitioner – original complainant has prayed for following reliefs:- (A) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to admit and allow the present Special Criminal Application; (B) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased for issuance of writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus quashing and setting aside the order dated 19-12-2014 passed by Sessions Court and thereby, maintain the order of J.M.F.C., as well as, preserve the condition clause no.3 and restrain the respondent no.2 to 5 from violating the said condition, in the interest of justice in the interest of justice; (C) YOUR LORDSHIP be pleased to stay the proceedings of order dated 19-12-2014, till the pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition;” 4. Brief facts of petition in narrow compass can be summarized as under: 4.1 The accused – Atikbhai Rafikbhai Muman (Nedariya), Imranbhai Mehmudbhai Muman (Nedariya), Irfanbhai Memudbhai Muman (Nedariya) and Arhadbhai Memudbhai Muman (Nedariya) were booked with I Crime Register No.83 of 2010 for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 474 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code registered at Chhapi Police Station. While considering the bail application in connection with the said offence, the accused persons were directed to be enlarged on regular bail, each for the sum of Rs.25,000/- with surety for the like amount, however, with a condition of surrendering their passport to the learned trial court with a specific rider that without permission of the learned trial court, their passport shall not be released. 4.2 The accused persons, being dissatisfied with the said condition, initially, approached to the learned trial court at Vadgam, District : Banaskantha with a request to release their passport, especially by deleting the condition clause No.3, which was imposed while granting bail. 4.2 The accused persons, being dissatisfied with the said condition, initially, approached to the learned trial court at Vadgam, District : Banaskantha with a request to release their passport, especially by deleting the condition clause No.3, which was imposed while granting bail. The learned trial court, while entertaining their said request, observed that the condition of bail was put-up upon by Hon'ble High Court therefore, considering the citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied on by the learned APP at the relevant point of time, and it was also categorically observed that the petitioners would be at liberty to move the Hon'ble Supreme Court for waiving of the said condition. The learned trial court also observed that the petitioners would be at liberty to move a fresh application to the court concerned and the court concerned would decide the application independently without taking into account the objections of the CBI. On that basis, the learned trial court rejected the application for releasing the passport in respect of deletion of condition clause No.3. 4.3 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said decision of the learned trial court, the accused persons moved before the learned Sessions Court at Palanpur. The learned Sessions Court, while setting aside the order of the learned trial court, more particularly while dealing with the condition of not returning back the passport without order of the court concerned, observed and directed the learned trial court to hand over the passport, if it is in their custody, to all the accused and also to maintain certified copy of the said record, instead of original passport. 4.4 Aggrieved with the said decision of the learned Sessions Court, the present Special Criminal Application has been filed before this Court by original complainant. 5. In support of the present application, the petitioner – original complainant has urged that, he is aged about 60 years, he is a businessman and doing farming work as well and also residing with his family at the address mentioned in the cause title of this application. The petitioner has also submitted that the present respondent Nos.2 to 5 namely, Akbarkhan and his son-in-law, through forged Banakhan of agricultural land to be converted into non-agricultural have grabbed huge amount to the tune of Rs.81,80,000/-. The petitioner has also submitted that the present respondent Nos.2 to 5 namely, Akbarkhan and his son-in-law, through forged Banakhan of agricultural land to be converted into non-agricultural have grabbed huge amount to the tune of Rs.81,80,000/-. The petitioner has also averred that the respondent Nos.2 to 5 had not done scam of a small amount, but it is of a huge amount of Rs.81,80,000/-. The petitioner has also stated that the petitioner was compelled to lodge an FIR being I CR No.83 of 2010 in connection with the said incident. 5.1 The petitioner has also averred that at the time of entertaining the bail application in connection with the said offence, this court had directed to enlarge the accused on regular bail, upon imposition of appropriate terms and conditions, one amongst them was to deposit their respective passport. The petitioner submits that at the relevant point of time of granting bail and while imposing the conditions of bail, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 have agreed upon and accepted as well as assured to abide by the terms and conditions of bail, however, post the same, now, the accused persons seek to delete one of the condition of bail. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Ankit Y. Bachani for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that until now, the charge sheet is not filed in connection with the said offence. He has further urged that out of all the accused persons, two accused persons are still absconding. He has also contended that the accused persons are knowingly and with specific intention, dragging the matter. He has also submitted that the learned trial court had rightly observed that the condition of bail were put-up as per the authority cited by learned APP at the relevant point of time and that therefore, in case, the accused persons seek to release their passport, then they were at liberty to move afresh application to the concerned court. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that, the learned Sessions Court, at the time of entertaining application against the said order of the learned trial court, ignoring the settled principles of law, set aside the order of learned trial court and directed the learned trial court to hand over the passport to the accused and in place of original passport to maintain certified copy thereof. In light of above submissions, learned advocate for the petitioner prays that the present application may be allowed by quashing and setting aside the order of the learned Sessions Court and the order of learned trial Court may be maintained and the condition clause No.3 may also be preserved and the respondent Nos.2 to 5 may be restrained from violating the said condition. 7. Per contra, Mr. Maulik Nanavati learned advocate for the respondent Nos.2 to 5 original accused urged that it makes no difference as to where the passport is lying, such as whether it is lying in the custody of the court or with the accused persons or in the custody of the concerned police station. He has also submitted that it is the function of the learned trial court to expedite the matter. According to learned advocate for the respondent Nos.2 to 5 there is no substance in the present application and hence, the present application deserves to be dismissed. 8. Learned APP Mr. Manan Mehta for the respondent No.1 State authorities has submitted that in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, an appropriate order may be passed. 9. In the present case, it is undisputed fact that while the accused were enlarged on bail, certain conditions were laid down by the High Court and one such condition was about the passport wherein learned J.M.F.C. has disallowed the application of accused to delete that condition and subsequently, the accused persons were before the learned Sessions Court wherein the learned Sessions Court set aside the order passed by learned J.M.F.C. and directed to hand over the passport against which, it appears that the petitioner has moved to this court. But it is surprising for this court that the petitioner has approached this Court neither in appeal nor in revision, but praying for writ of mandamus for quashing and setting aside the order dated 19.12.2014 passed by the learned Sessions Court. 10. But it is surprising for this court that the petitioner has approached this Court neither in appeal nor in revision, but praying for writ of mandamus for quashing and setting aside the order dated 19.12.2014 passed by the learned Sessions Court. 10. Having regard to the arguments advanced by both the sides, before I invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code [hereinafter referred to as “Code”], I would like to refer to Section 482 of the Code which is as under: “482 Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 10.1 Upon plain reading of the section, it starts with the word “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit....”. It means this Court has extraordinary powers where there is no limit under the provisions to exercise for the same. Further, it states “affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code”. It means, again if the powers are exercised under this provision, it shall not effect to the inherent powers of the High Court. Further, legislation has used the word “May”. Therefore, it is purely discretionary power. Further, it reads with the words “to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. It means I have to examine (i) to prevent the abuse of process of the Court; and (ii) to secure ends of justice. Both the objectives are also considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Narendra sing. v. State of Punjab [ 2014 (6) SCC 466 ]. 10.2 It is true that nowhere in the Code, there is definition of abuse of process of the court, nowhere it is discussed. Simultaneously, explanation for securing the ends of justice is also not defined and therefore, every case has different facts and circumstances, but simultaneously, to arrive at true conclusion or to exercise the extraordinary powers, I have to rely on landmark decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, for exercising powers under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. Simultaneously, explanation for securing the ends of justice is also not defined and therefore, every case has different facts and circumstances, but simultaneously, to arrive at true conclusion or to exercise the extraordinary powers, I have to rely on landmark decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, for exercising powers under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. [A] Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Parbhatbhai Ahir v. State of Gujarat [ 2017 (9) SCC 641 ], following 10 principles are laid down, which are as under:- “1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inherent in the High Court. 2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (a) to secure the ends of justice. (b) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 6. In the exercise of the power under section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. 6. In the exercise of the power under section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and. 10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance." [B] Further, in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [ AIR 1992 SC 604 ], following 7 categories of cases had been laid down, which are as under:- “1. Where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the FIR and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the allegations made in the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer, unless a Magistrate has issued an order for the same, as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR are absurd to the extent that no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act, under which a criminal proceeding is instituted, with regard to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and / or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide intention and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and/or personal grudge.” [C] Further, in case of R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1960 SC 260 ], Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a criminal proceedings against a person can be quashed if the case belongs to any one of the following classes: “1. Where there is a legal bar against institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings. 2. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute an offence, even if taken at face value and in their entirety. 3. Where there is a legal bar against institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings. 2. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute an offence, even if taken at face value and in their entirety. 3. Where the allegations made constitute an offence, but there is no evidence which can prove them.” 11. Pursuant to the provisions under Section 482 of the Code as well as pursuant to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it transpires that merely deleting the clause for releasing the passport is not an abuse of process of court since it is the concerned court who decides whether to release the passport or not, when the conditions were imposed while allowing bail by the High Court. Further, this Court is not sitting in appeal upon the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Palanpur, and therefore also, at this juncture, the merits cannot be decided. Scope of Article 226 and 227 12. It is made clear that the petitioner has very well remedy available before the learned trial Court and, therefore, also this Court does not find any reason or any substance to exercise the extraordinary powers including under Section 482 of the Code as well as Constitutional powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. Further the petitioner has prayed Constitutional remedies before this Constitutional Court especially under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it would be appropriate to discuss in brief that only FIR is filed against the present petitioner wherein remedies are very well available before the learned Trial Court, in case, of chargesheet is filed, petitioner can file discharge application as well as petitioner can very well defend his case before learned Trial Court. Therefore, whenever there is alternative efficacious remedy available with the petitioner, petitioner is not entitled for Constitutional remedies. 14. This Court has referred to decision of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Anr. V/s. Mathew K.C. in Civil Appeal No.1281 of 2018 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.24610 of 2015, judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed on 30.01.2018, held at paragraph no.43 as under:- 43. 14. This Court has referred to decision of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Anr. V/s. Mathew K.C. in Civil Appeal No.1281 of 2018 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.24610 of 2015, judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed on 30.01.2018, held at paragraph no.43 as under:- 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 15. In the latest judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.2548 of 2009 dated 26.2.2015, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as under: “18. Thus, it has been clearly laid down by this Court that an Order of civil court could be challenged under Article 227 and not under Article 226. 19. We may now come to the judgment in Surya Dev Rai. Therein, the appellant was aggrieved by denial of interim injunction in a pending suit and preferred a writ petition in the High court stating that after CPC amendment by Act 46 of 1999 w.e.f. 1 July, 2002, remedy of revision under Section 115 was no longer available. The High Court dismissed the petition following its Full Bench Judgment in Ganga Saran to the effect that a writ was not maintainable as no mandamus could issue to a private person. The High Court dismissed the petition following its Full Bench Judgment in Ganga Saran to the effect that a writ was not maintainable as no mandamus could issue to a private person. The Bench considered the question of the impact of CPC amendment on power and jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ of certiorari under Article 226 or a petition under Article 227 to involve power of superintendence. The Bench noted the legal position that after CPC amendment revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against interlocutory order was curtailed. The Bench then referred to the history of writ of certiorari and its scope and concluded thus : "18. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar case was cited before the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra case and considered. It has been clearly held: (i) that it is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with the [pic]prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under our constitutional scheme; (ii) that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by a superior court to an inferior court which certifies its records for examination; and (iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much less can the writ jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our constitutional scheme. 19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the orders and proceedings of a judicial court subordinate to the High Court are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. xxxx 24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai [1986 Supp. SCC 401]. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article to tribunals as well. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in [pic]practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, maybe, by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. 20. It is the above holding, correctness of which was doubted in the referring order already mentioned above. 21. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article”227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article”227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another, Ouseph Mathai vs. M. Abdul Khadir, Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil and Sameer Suresh Gupta vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal. In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court observed : "64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 65. In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." (emphasis added) 23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.” 16. Learned advocate Mr. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.” 16. Learned advocate Mr. Ankit Y. Bachani for the petitioner has heavily placed reliance upon the facts that two accused persons are absconding and the matter is getting dragged in that case, the concerned person or to say aggrieved person can move to the concerned trial court and the remedy is very well available there, but merely on the basis of delay in the matter, condition of passport, which is released by the learned Sessions Court, cannot be set aside by this court under the jurisdiction of Special Criminal Application, especially when learned advocate has placed reliance upon quashing of that order. 17. Learned advocate Mr. Maulik Nanavati for the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 has vehemently opposed and stated that what makes it difference, whether passport is lying with the court or with the police station or with the accused and therefore, that order cannot be set aside. 18. This Court is in agreement with the learned advocate Mr. Maulik Nanavati that this is not a case to exercise extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code or under the inherent powers of this court nor under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the order of the learned Sessions Court. Resultantly, in fleri, the petition stands devoid of merits. Hence, it is disallowed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated.