ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. J.M. Naidu, learned counsel for petitioner, the learned Government Pleader for Social Welfare for respondent no. 1 and Mr. N. Bhupal Reddy, learned standing counsel for respondents 2 to 4. 2. Petitioner was working as Health Supervisor in Social Welfare School-cum-Junior College (Girls) (for short ‘Residential Institution’) at Kallur. On 7.4.2011 a student, by name, B. Vennala, who was studying in Class-V complained of loose motions. Her condition worsened and she was pronounced dead when taken to hospital. Alleging negligence on the part of petitioner, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by drawing up Charge Memo dated 22.07.2011. Not satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner, Enquiry Officer was appointed. The Enquiry Officer held both the charges as proved. A copy of the Enquiry Report was communicated to the petitioner. Petitioner submitted her explanation. On considering the report of the Enquiry Officer and the explanation offered by petitioner, the Chairman of the Social Welfare Educational Institutions passed final orders on 18.6.2012 imposing the punishment of stoppage of three annual grade increments. On 31.8.2012, petitioner submitted appeal to the Chairman requesting him to release three annual increments. Alleging that the said appeal is not disposed of, this writ petition is filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that having acknowledged the appeal on 18.9.2012, the Chairman grossly erred in not disposing of the appeal and keeping it pending for eight long years amounts to arbitrary exercise of power and is illegal. 4. Learned counsel further submits that on the same set of allegations, criminal prosecution was launched. On investigation, police filed charge sheet. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sathupally, took cognizance of the offence, conducted trial in C.C. No. 172 of 2011, and on recording the finding of not guilty, acquitted the petitioner of the charges levelled against her in the judgment rendered on 28.2.2018. After the judgment was rendered, orders were passed by the Secretary of the Residential Society on 28.2.2019 regularizing the period of suspension. Learned counsel therefore submits that since petitioner was subjected to criminal prosecution and she was acquitted by the competent Court, on the very same set of allegations, punishment imposed against her is not maintainable and is therefore liable to be set aside. 5. Learned Government Pleader submits that the alleged appeal preferred by the petitioner is not traced in office. Learned counsel therefore submits that since petitioner was subjected to criminal prosecution and she was acquitted by the competent Court, on the very same set of allegations, punishment imposed against her is not maintainable and is therefore liable to be set aside. 5. Learned Government Pleader submits that the alleged appeal preferred by the petitioner is not traced in office. Petitioner allegedly made an appeal on 31.8.2012 and kept quiet for more than seven years and instituted this writ petition challenging the punishment imposed on 18.6.2012. He would submit that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. He would submit that acquittal in criminal case has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated and concluded long before the conclusion of criminal proceedings. 6. Two issues require consideration in this writ petition. Firstly, whether the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches and secondly whether mere acquittal granted to the petitioner by the criminal Court would result in nullifying the disciplinary action taken against her. Delay and laches: 7. From the facts noted above, it is seen that the order of punishment was imposed by the Chairman. The alleged appeal was preferred to the very same authority. No appeal would lie to the same authority. Therefore, petitioner cannot be said to have availed legal remedy available to her and contend that for eight long years the said appeal is not disposed of. 8. Furthermore, except for asserting that petitioner was orally requesting to dispose of the appeal, no material is placed on record to show that reminders were sent and in spite of repeated reminders, the appeal was not disposed of. There is no explanation offered by the petitioner why she kept quiet for eight long years and instituted this writ petition now. The acquittal granted by the Criminal Court does not give rise to fresh cause of action to assail the punishment imposed on 18.06.2012. 9. Law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is intended to put quietus to litigation and remove uncertainty to an issue. A person ought not to be allowed to litigate on his claim after a long delay. Delay defeats even a legally sustainable claim. 10. The A.P. Administrative Tribunal was constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 9. Law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is intended to put quietus to litigation and remove uncertainty to an issue. A person ought not to be allowed to litigate on his claim after a long delay. Delay defeats even a legally sustainable claim. 10. The A.P. Administrative Tribunal was constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 21 of the Act prescribes period of limitation to avail the remedy under the Act. Admittedly, no case was filed within the period of limitation and right vested to avail judicial remedy was extinguished long ago. Merely because, the Tribunal is abolished and under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, no limitation is prescribed, petitioner cannot seek to resurrect cause extinguished long ago. Even if the Society entertained her appeal, not supported by any statutory provision, mere pendency of such appeal is no ground to resurrect such cause. 11. In S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 , challenging order of dismissal from service dated 13.1.1966 suit was instituted on 30.9.1969. Suit was dismissed on the ground of delay as it was not filed within three years from 13.1.1966. Reliance was placed on Article 58 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. If date of order of appellate authority i.e. 31.8.1966 and Section 80 notice dated 17.6.1969 are taken into consideration the suit was within time. The Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed its opinion as under: “20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. xxx xxx xxx 22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. xxx xxx xxx 22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. The writ remedy is discretionary remedy. Though no limitation is prescribed to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and no fetters are imposed on writ Court to entertain a writ petition, the principle of law is well settled that a person, who seeks intervention of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, should invoke the jurisdiction of this Court immediately after cause of action arises and at any rate within a reasonable time. Ordinarily, the reasonable time in prosecuting the writ remedy is the time available to prosecute civil law remedy. Anything beyond that cannot be said as reasonable for prosecuting the writ remedy. Whenever, there is delay in filing writ petition, detailed reasons must be assigned with supporting material. The burden is heavy on petitioner to explain the delay in filing the writ petition when such delay is unreasonably long. The court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims. Shiba Shankar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 471 . 13. Even if an adverse decision is void, inoperative and ultra-vires, but it is still in de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void and nullity, even where the ‘brand of invalidity’ is plainly visible. The Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. A person seeking to invalidate an order/decision must approach the court within the prescribed period of limitation/within reasonable time. The Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. A person seeking to invalidate an order/decision must approach the court within the prescribed period of limitation/within reasonable time. State of Punjab vs. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 and Prahalad Raut vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (2019) SCC Online 1110. 14. In Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 607 , on detail consideration of the various judgments on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition filed after long lapse of time, the Supreme Court laid down the parameters for entertaining the writ petition. They read as under: “The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition, it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. In City Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and Others, AIR 2009 SC 571 , the Supreme Court held as under: “A writ of Mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.” (Emphasis supplied) Disciplinary proceedings and Criminal proceedings: 16. The disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings operate in two different fields. Disciplinary action relates to employer losing trust and confidence on the employee on account of alleged misconduct affecting the image and reputation of the employer. Criminal proceedings relate to committing of crime by a person who is in public employment during the course of his employment. If employee indulges in acts of misconduct which also attract criminal prosecution, ordinarily employer not only initiates disciplinary action, but also lodges complaint with the Police setting in motion criminal law. 17. The relationship of employee–employer is based on trust and confidence of the employer on the employee. If the employer is not satisfied with the conduct of the employee, employer may penalize the employee. However, before taking action against an employee in public service, the employer is required to follow due process and on establishment of charges leveled against him, can impose appropriate punishment. In domestic enquiry on the charges leveled against the employee what is required is preponderance of probabilities of the charges leveled against the employee. Circumstantial evidence can be taken into consideration to hold that the charge is proved and to impose appropriate punishment. 18. On the contrary, criminal law requires that the charges leveled against a person must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and burden lies on the prosecution to establish the charges. Circumstantial evidence can be taken into consideration to hold that the charge is proved and to impose appropriate punishment. 18. On the contrary, criminal law requires that the charges leveled against a person must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and burden lies on the prosecution to establish the charges. Any deficiency and element of doubt will go against the prosecution. 19. In the departmental proceedings two charges were leveled against the petitioner. In the first charge it was alleged that petitioner failed to notice the deteriorating condition of the student during the intervening night of 07.4.2011 and 08.04.2011, though the student was suffering from motions since morning and became very weak, failed to take timely action in providing medical treatment, thereby violated the circular instructions issued on 09.04.2001, 23.2.2005 and 12.7.2005. In the second charge it was alleged that petitioner failed to maintain prescribed registers and thus violated the instructions of the Society issued vide circular dated 09.07.2002. During the domestic enquiry, the staff on duty and the students studying along with the deceased student were examined. From the findings of the Enquiry Officer recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, it is apparent that the students who were attending to the deceased student Kumari B. Vennela deposed that she was very weak, had motion on the bed, even while bathing and also while wearing the clothes. They also informed that the condition of the student was very serious and that her body turned green colour. The Disciplinary Authority opined that if only timely medical aid was provided to her the life of the student could have been saved. 20. From a reading of the order of the Disciplinary Authority, it appears that several circular instructions are issued how to deal with the sick students. But those circular instructions were violated. The allegation in the second charge was also held proved by holding that petitioner failed to maintain prescribed registers and the required medicines were not kept in the hostel at the relevant point of time. Though the allegations were grave, it appears a lenient view was taken to impose less severe punishment. In the criminal proceedings, the charge leveled against the petitioner was of causing death by negligence (Section 304-A of Indian Penal Code). The prosecution failed to establish the ingredients to attract Section 304-A of IPC and therefore, by granting benefit of doubt, she was acquitted. 21. In the criminal proceedings, the charge leveled against the petitioner was of causing death by negligence (Section 304-A of Indian Penal Code). The prosecution failed to establish the ingredients to attract Section 304-A of IPC and therefore, by granting benefit of doubt, she was acquitted. 21. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings were entirely on different aspects. In the departmental proceedings the allegations were on negligence in performing duties as a Health Supervisor and they were proved by cogent evidence, whereas, in the criminal proceedings the charge of causing death by negligence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is also significant to note that according to the deposition of Doctor (PW-9) in C.C. No. 172 of 2011, who conducted postmortem examination on the deceased student, it is clear that the cause of death was due to Hypo volemic Shock due to dehydration. The cause of this condition can be because of vomiting/Diarrhea/excessive bleeding. It is a life threatening condition, wherein organs do not get enough blood or oxygen. The symptoms include weakness, fatigue, fainting and drowsiness. From the order of the disciplinary authority, it is apparent that these conditions were noticed by the fellow students. 22. A cogent reading of the deposition of the Doctor indicating the cause of death and the evidence assessed by the Disciplinary Authority in the departmental proceedings would certainly point out that if only immediate care was taken, the life of the child could have been saved. 23. Having regard to these facts, the decision of the Criminal Court granting acquittal to the petitioner do not enure to the benefit of the petitioner to claim review of the punishment imposed on her as a result of the disciplinary action taken against her six years earlier to the acquittal. 24. I see no merit in the writ petition. The Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.