JUDGMENT : Ravikumar, J. The above appeal is directed against judgment dated 01.02.2019 in W.P.(C).No. 42445 of 2018. The third respondent in the said writ petition is the appellant herein. In fact, it is the perennial problem of deprival of the right of use of the land for residential purpose that made the first respondent herein to file the said writ petition. His application for building permit was rejected on the second occasion also, citing the existence of draft master plan for construction of an outer ring road for Thrissur Town. He is the owner in possession of 30.47 Ares of land comprised in Re-sy. Nos.666/4P, 666/5, 666/4, 666/3, 941/4-Re and 666/8 of Ollukkara village in Thrissur Taluk. The application submitted for permit for residential construction was rejected as per Ext.P7 dated 10.01.2018. A perusal of the same would reveal that existence of a proposal for construction of ring road as per the draft master plan prepared by the Thrissur Municipal Corporation and forwarded for approval of the State Government is the reason for rejecting the said application. Earlier, the first respondent, the writ petitioner had submitted an application for the very same purpose on 11.8.2017 and it was rejected as per Ext.P5 dated 23.08.2017, evidently assigning virtually the very same reason. Aggrieved by the rejection of the said application as per Ext.P5, the first respondent had filed W.P.(C).No.31198 of 2017. As per Ext.P6 judgment passed thereon, this Court set aside Ext.P5 and the Assistant Engineer, the third respondent therein was directed to pass fresh orders on the application for building permit submitted by the first respondent having regard to the proposed revision to the master plan referred to in Ext.P5 communication. Evidently, the application was again considered by the third respondent and it culminated in the impugned Ext.P7 order in W.P(C) No.42445 of 2018. A perusal of Ext.P7 would reveal that the reason assigned in Ext.P5 for rejecting the earlier application is virtually restated in Ext.P7. It is in such circumstances that the writ petitioner moved this Court by filing W.P.(C).No.42445 of 2018. The learned Single Judge disposed of the same with directions. The appellant herein, who was the third respondent therein, feels aggrieved by the same and hence this appeal. 2. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned standing counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3. The learned Single Judge disposed of the same with directions. The appellant herein, who was the third respondent therein, feels aggrieved by the same and hence this appeal. 2. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned standing counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3. At the very outset, it is to be stated that on going through the pleadings in the appeal and on scanning the impugned judgment, we are at a loss to understand as to how the appellant can be said to be a person aggrieved by the judgment in W.P.(C).No.42445 of 2018. The raison d'etre for the said observation is that on going through the directions issued by the learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition, we find absolutely nothing that could make the appellant to feel aggrieved. No volume of argument is required to reveal the said position as a mere glance at its operative portion would make it evincibly clear. The operative portion of the impugned judgment reads as hereunder:-. “Therefore, this writ petition is disposed of, directing the Secretary of the Corporation, to inform the petitioner whether the land is required for widening of the road as is specified in Ext.P7, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Needless to say, if no such information is given to the petitioner, within the period specified above, the Secretary of the Corporation shall reconsider the building permit application submitted by the petitioner and take a decision in accordance with law, de hors the findings contained under Ext.P7, at the earliest possible time.” (Underline supplied) 3. As a matter of fact, the oldness of the scheme in question is about three and a half decades and, to be precise, it was published in the year 1985. Though it is submitted that thereafter it was revised, the submission made before us by the learned Senior Government Pleader would reveal that the proposed revision of the scheme is yet to be approved by the Government. It is submitted that the proposal for revision mooted by respondents 2 and 3 is before the Chief Town Planner and that it would be forwarded for consideration by the Government. It is submitted that the proposal for revision mooted by respondents 2 and 3 is before the Chief Town Planner and that it would be forwarded for consideration by the Government. It would thus reveal that the revised scheme is yet to be placed before the Government and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that an approved revised scheme is actually in force. To state it pithily, what is now available is only a scheme which was published in the year 1985 and a proposal for its revision by respondents 1 and 2. It is true that the master plan under the scheme of 1985 includes a proposal for construction of an outer ring road in Thrissur Town and that the said proposal is there in the revised scheme pending for approval, as well. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Town Planning Scheme is prepared for the benefit of public and it will prevail over private rights and interests. True that the said position is indisputable. However, the moot question is whether based on such a plan, which is still in its embryonic stage despite the lapse of about three and a half decades, a land owner could be deprived of rights to use his own property for residential purpose? Whether deprival of such a right and keeping the public on tender hooks for so long, is illegal? Those issues are actually no longer res integra in the light of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Padmini v. State of Kerala ( 1999 (3) KLT 465 ) and a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Raju S. Jethmalani and others v. State of Maharashtra and others [ (2005) 11 SCC 222 ]. 4. True that in Padmini's case, the Division Bench was dealing with a proposal to acquire land under the Land acquisition Act. At the same time, in Raju S. Jethmalani's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a case under the town planning scheme. In Padmini's case, the Division Bench held that at the time of submission of the application for building permit, there was no proposal to acquire the land in question. At the same time, in Raju S. Jethmalani's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a case under the town planning scheme. In Padmini's case, the Division Bench held that at the time of submission of the application for building permit, there was no proposal to acquire the land in question. The petitioner therein submitted a further application for construction of a building on 23.12.1997 and the same was rejected, but the Municipality endorsed that no notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. Taking note of all such circumstances and relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal [ AIR 1985 SC 1622 ], the Division Bench set aside the order impugned therein and the endorsement on the application was quashed and the Municipality was directed to take back the application to file and pass appropriate orders thereon. In Raju S. Jethmalani's case, the Apex Court held that the failure on the part of the Government and the Corporation to acquire land could not be a reason to deprive of the use of the land for residential purpose. When the land of a land owner is acquired by the State in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the relevant law of acquisition, it would not adversely affect the land owner's right to livelihood. The State acquires the land in exercise of its power of eminent domain for a public purpose and the land owner, in turn, would receive compensation as well as solatium and other benefits under the law of acquisition, in lieu of land. In such circumstances, no doubt, the right of the land owner must give way to the public purpose. 5. In the decision in Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimlal Totame ( AIR 1990 SC 630 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the right to life is guaranteed in any civilised society and that it would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. In the decision in Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimlal Totame ( AIR 1990 SC 630 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the right to life is guaranteed in any civilised society and that it would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The Apex Court went on to hold that the difference between the need of animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in view and that for an animal it is the bare protection of body; for a human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would allow him to grow in every aspect-physical, mental and intellectual. 6. In the decision in State of Karnataka v. Narasimhamurthy ( AIR 1996 SC 90 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court regarded the right to shelter in Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21 to guarantee right to residence and settlement. 7. In the decision in Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1996 SC 1051 ), the Apex Court observed:- “Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right.” 8. Later, the Hon'ble Apex Court re-iterated the concept of shelter as hereunder : “Right to shelter is a Fundamental Right, which springs from the right to residence assured in Article 19(1)(e) and right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.” (See the decision in U.P Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & another v. Friends Co.op. Housing Society Ltd. ( AIR 1996 SC 114 ), J.P Ravidas & ors. v. Navyuvak Harijan Uthapan Multi Unit Industrial Co.op. Housing Society Ltd. ( AIR 1996 SC 114 ), J.P Ravidas & ors. v. Navyuvak Harijan Uthapan Multi Unit Industrial Co.op. Society Ltd. ( AIR 1996 SC 2151 ), Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan ( AIR 1997 SC 152 ) 9. True that the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 978 transformed the right to property from the category of Fundamental Rights by repealing Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and converted it into an ordinary constitutional right by enacting Article 300A to provide that 'no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law'. One of the reasons for the deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 and insertion of Article 300-A was to reduce the right to property from the status of fundamental right to that of a legal right, i.e, the right will be available against the executive interference but not against the legislative interference. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 44th Amendment, as can be seen from the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 would reveal the said reason. The relevant portion of the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1978 (Bill No.88 of 1978) which was enacted as the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 reads thus:- “2. It is, therefore, proposed to provide that certain changes in the Constitution which would have the effect of impairing its secular or democratic character, abridging or taking away fundamental rights prejudicing or impeding free and fair elections on the basis of adult suffrage and compromising the independence of judiciary, can be made only if they are approved by the people of India by a majority of votes at a referendum in which at least fifty-one per cent of the electorate participate. Article 368 is being amended to ensure this. 4. Similarly, the right of persons holding land for personal cultivation and within the ceiling limit to receive compensation at the market value would not be affected. 5. Property, while ceasing to be a fundamental right, would, however, be given express recognition as a legal right, provision being made that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law.” 10. Article 300A is not a Fundamental Right and it is only a Constitutional Right. 5. Property, while ceasing to be a fundamental right, would, however, be given express recognition as a legal right, provision being made that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law.” 10. Article 300A is not a Fundamental Right and it is only a Constitutional Right. Nevertheless, it would not make much of a difference except that a writ petition is not maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court to vindicate the right under Article 300A. In such circumstances, a challenge against violation of Article 300A will lie only before a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1995 SC 142 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the word 'law' used in Article 300A must be an Act of Parliament or of State Legislature, a rule or statutory order having the force of law. The deprivation shall be only by authority of law, be it an Act of Parliament or State Legislature, but not by an executive fiat or order. The word 'deprive' conveys the idea of taking away that which one has, or withholding that which one may have. To take something from; to keep from acquiring, using, or enjoy something. 11. Apex Court, in Raju.S.Jethmalani's case (supra) in unambiguous terms, held that a citizen could not be deprived of his right to enjoy his property without following a proper procedural law. Right to property is now considered to be not only a Constitutional Right but also a Human Right. The declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 26th August, 1789 enunciates under Article 17 thus:- “Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has been paid”. Further, under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 dated 10-12-1948, adopted in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution, it is stated that : “(i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. Further, under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 dated 10-12-1948, adopted in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution, it is stated that : “(i) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” The long and short of the discussions is that denying right to effect construction in a property citing existence of a scheme which had been in force for more than three and half decades without any concrete steps for the effectuation of the scheme is nothing but one that takes away the right of a citizen to have a shelter, to enjoy his property also negation of human right. We have seen that the scheme which is in existence was published in the year 1985. Citing that reason, the earlier application submitted by the writ petitioner/first respondent herein was rejected under Ext.P5 dated 23.08.2017. As already noticed, it is the setting aside of Ext.P5 and the consequential direction issued as per Ext.P6 Judgment for fresh consideration of the application rejected as per Ext.P5 that led to the issuance of Ext.P7 impugned order. Both in Ext.P5 and Ext.P7, the reason for rejection is given as proposal to effect construction of an outer ring road under the master plan. We have already found that such a proposal was there in the scheme published in the year 1985 and no concrete steps for its effectuation has been taken and at present what is available is only revision of the scheme which is yet to get approval of the Government. Upon scanning the judgment of the learned Single judge, it is evident that despite the aforesaid situations, the learned Single Judge evidently granted further opportunity to the respondents including the appellant herein. This is evident from the afore-extracted operative portion of the impugned judgment. The Secretary of the Corporation was only directed to inform the first respondent/writ petitioner whether the land in question is required for widening of the road specified in Ext.P7 within two months from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment and in case of his failure to comply with the said direction, the Secretary of the Corporation was directed to re-consider the building permit application dehoring the findings contained in Ext.P7. It is in such circumstances that we made an opening remark that we are at a loss to understand as to how the appellant gets aggrieved by the judgment in question. The fact, which is evident from the materials on record, would reveal that the first respondent/writ petitioner who purchased the property in question long ago is being deprived of the right to enjoy his property by putting up a shelter thereon, without any authority of law. This is a country where a 'safer shelter' is still a dream to cherish, for a sizable numbers. The bureaucracy should realise and remember that by denying permit for residential construction and making such persons to engage in long drawn litigation unnecessarily might make many to live and then leave the earth as 'homeless'. As noticed hereinbefore, the proposal to revise the scheme of the year 1985 is yet to get approval from the Government. In such circumstances, we do not find any reason at all to uphold the contentions of the appellant and to upturn the judgment in W.P.(C).No.42445 of 2018. We are also of the view that the Secretary of the Corporation while considering the application must bear in mind the findings and observations made in this judgment while re-considering the application for building permit. This appeal is therefore liable to fail and accordingly, it is dismissed.