Chotisuh Sazo v. Honble Speaker, Nagaland Legislative Assembly
2020-06-02
NANI TAGIA
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Nani Tagia, J. 1. The Court proceedings have been conducted by means of creating a Virtual Court with the help of technology so as to maintain distance between the Advocates, the Staffs and the presiding Judge. 2. Heard Mr. S. Borgohain, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. T.B. Jamir, learned counsel assisted by Ms. V. Soukhrie, learned counsel representing respondent No. 1 and Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel representing respondent Nos. 2 to 8. 3. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking a direction to the respondent No. 1, the Speaker of Nagaland Legislative Assembly, to decide the Disqualification Petitions filed by the petitioners for disqualification of respondent Nos. 2 to 8 within a period of 4 (four) weeks in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh Vs. the Hon'ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 547 of 2020. 4. Bare minimum facts necessary for disposal of the present writ petition may, briefly, be stated as follows. 5. In the General Election held for constitution of the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly on 27.02.2018, the result of which was declared on 05.03.2018, the petitioners as well as the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were elected as Members of Legislative Assembly of the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly from the Nagaland Peoples Front (hereinafter referred to as 'NPF' in short). Their Election to the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly from the NPF Party was duly notified by the Secretary, Election Commission of India, by the Notification No. 308/NL-LA/2018, dated 05.03.2018, and was also published in the Nagaland Extra Ordinary Gazette on 05.03.2018 (incorrectly written as 05.03.2019 in Paragraph 2 Sub-Clause II of the writ petition). On 18.03.2019, a meeting of the Legislature Party of the NPF was held, wherein, it was decided in the meeting that in the ensuing Parliamentary Election for 17th Lok Sabha Election in India, the NPF Party would not set up any candidate for contesting in the Parliamentary Election rather the Party would support the candidate set up by the Indian National Congress Party ('INC' for short) on an one time issue based support. In the meeting of 18.03.2019, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were also present and had put their signatures in the Attendance Sheet thereby agreeing with the decision taken in the meeting.
In the meeting of 18.03.2019, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were also present and had put their signatures in the Attendance Sheet thereby agreeing with the decision taken in the meeting. The 18.03.2019 meeting was followed by another meeting of the NPF Legislature Party on 23.03.2019, wherein, the decision taken in the meeting of 18.03.2019 not to set up any candidate for the ensuing Parliamentary Election by the NPF Party and to render one time issue based support to the candidate set up by the INC was reiterated. In the 23.03.2019 meeting, however, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were not present. On 25.03.2019, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 had issued a press statement which was published in the local newspapers; namely, 'Nagaland Post' and 'Morung Express' in its 26.03.2019 edition, wherein, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 had expressed and extended their support to the candidate set up by the Nationalist Democratic People's Party (hereinafter referred to as 'NDPP' for short) for ensuing Parliamentary Election, which is the rival party of the NPF Party. In view of the aforesaid action of the respondent Nos. 2 to 8, which was considered to be an anti-party activity by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8, a Show-Cause Notice, dated 26.03.2019, was issued to the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 by the President of the NPF Party asking the respondents to show cause on or before 02.04.2019 as to why action shall not be initiated against them for their anti-party activity. The respondent Nos. 2 to 8, thereafter, filed their reply to the Show-Cause Notice on 01.04.2019, wherein, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 had affirmed their conduct of supporting the candidature set up by the NDPP for the ensuing Parliamentary Election. Having gone through the reply filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 to the Show-Cause Notice issued to them for their anti-party activity, the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were suspended from the primary and active membership of the NPF Party by an Order dated 16.04.2019, issued by the President NPF. After the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were suspended from the primary and active membership of the NPF Party by an Order dated 16.04.2019, the petitioner Nos.
2 to 8 were suspended from the primary and active membership of the NPF Party by an Order dated 16.04.2019, issued by the President NPF. After the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 were suspended from the primary and active membership of the NPF Party by an Order dated 16.04.2019, the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2, who are also the elected member of Nagaland Legislative Assembly of the NPF Party, filed a petition before the Speaker, Nagaland Legislative Assembly, on 24.04.2019, seeking disqualification of the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 on the ground of their voluntary giving up the membership of original political party, namely, NPF Party, by indulging in anti-party activities. The said Disqualification Petitions, filed by the petitioners on 24.04.2019, was registered as Petition 1A-G/2019. The grievance of the writ petitioners is that, despite more than a year have lapsed, the Disqualification Petitions filed by the petitioners have not been brought to a logical conclusion. The petitioners, therefore, by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered on 21.01.2020 in Keisham Meghachandra Singh Vs. The Hon'ble Speaker of Manipur Assembly in Civil Appeal No. 547/2020, have approached this Court seeking a direction to be issued to the respondent No. 1 for conclusion of the Disqualification Proceedings and pass appropriate orders within a period of 4 (four) weeks. 6. The respondent No. 1 has contested the case by filing a counter-affidavit, wherein, in paragraph 17 of the counter-affidavit the respondent No. 1 has highlighted the timeline of the proceedings of the Disqualification Petitions that took place before the respondent No. 1. The timeline of Disqualification Proceeding, as highlighted in paragraph 17 of the counter-affidavit, is quoted herein below - "A. 24.04.2019:Received the disqualification petitions. B. 27.05.2019:Order passed for issuing notice upon the respondents. C. 11.06.2019: Application received from the for providing complete set of papers as the petition contain illegible pages. D. 21.06.2019:Received legible copies from the petitioners along with Additional Affidavit. E. 10.09.2019:Written Statement filed by the respondents has been recorded. Petitioners allowed to withdraw the Interlocutory Applications. Five weeks granted to the petitioners to file reply. F. 23.09.2019: Petitioners filed Affidavit-in-Reply. Notice served to the respondents. G. 15.10.2019: Both parties to submit suggested Issues on or before 15.11.2019. H. 08.11.2019: Received suggested issues from the petitioner.
E. 10.09.2019:Written Statement filed by the respondents has been recorded. Petitioners allowed to withdraw the Interlocutory Applications. Five weeks granted to the petitioners to file reply. F. 23.09.2019: Petitioners filed Affidavit-in-Reply. Notice served to the respondents. G. 15.10.2019: Both parties to submit suggested Issues on or before 15.11.2019. H. 08.11.2019: Received suggested issues from the petitioner. I. 15.11.2019: Received application from the counsel for the respondent that he is out of station and praying for adjournment of the matter for four weeks to the suggested Issues. J. 20.11.2019: Prayer of the respondent for time is considered and directed to submit on or before the expiry of four weeks from the date of passing of the order. K. 04.01.2020: Respondent prayed for extension of time on medical ground. Due to Winter holidays for Christmas and New Year, the file was put up only on 3.1.2020. As reflected in the Order dated 04.01.2020, the extension of time was granted on medical ground and in view of the anticipated Budget Session, the respondent was granted time to file suggested Issues on or before 17.02.2020. L. 18.02.2020:Notice issued to both the parties for framing of Issues and the matter was fixed on 20.03.2020. M. 20.03.2020: Heard both the respective counsels on framing of Issues. Order reserved. N. 21.03.2020: The following Issues has been framed: 1. Whether the petition is maintainable in its present form? 2. Whether there was/is any anti-party activities on the part of the respondents? 3. Whether the respondents have given up the membership of the original political Party voluntarily? Whether the alleged anti-party activities of the respondents can be inferred as voluntarily given up the membership of the NPF Party? 4. Whether the respondents are liable to be disqualified and whether the reliefs sought in the Petition can be granted or the Petition is liable to be dismissed? The matter is fixed on 24.04.2020 for submission of list of evidence.
4. Whether the respondents are liable to be disqualified and whether the reliefs sought in the Petition can be granted or the Petition is liable to be dismissed? The matter is fixed on 24.04.2020 for submission of list of evidence. O. 18.04.2020: In view of the general shutdown announced in Nagaland, necessitated by the evolving Novel Corona Virus (Covid-19) pandemic situation, by letter dated 18.04.2020, issued by the Secretary, Nagaland Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Nagaland Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Kohima the parties were informed that the submission of list of evidence fixed for 24.04.2020, is cancelled and that, fresh date for the same will be intimated as soon as the shutdown is lifted and normalcy in the functioning of public offices is restored in the State." 7. In the context of the proceedings held on the Disqualification Petitions, as highlighted herein above, the respondent No. 1 contends that there was no any inordinate delay in conducting the Disqualification Proceedings and the same was conducted on a regular interval leading to framing of the issues on 21.03.2020. However, because of the outbreak of Covid-19 Pandemic, though the next date was fixed on 24.04.2020, the next date fixed had to be cancelled by an Order dated 18.04.2020, also indicating in the order that a fresh date for the same would be intimated to the Parties as soon as the lockdown is lifted or the normalcy in the functioning of the public offices is restored. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1, it has also been contended in Paragraph 19 that the ratio laid down in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) would not be applicable in the present case because the decision in the Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) was rendered in the context of Speaker not taking any action on the Disqualification Petitions filed, whereas, in the instant case, the Speaker had already initiated the process for deciding the Disqualification Petitions leading to framing of issues on 21.03.2020. 8. The respondent Nos.
8. The respondent Nos. 2 to 8 have also contested the case by filing a counter-affidavit, wherein, apart from highlighting the similar timeline of the proceedings that have taken place in the Office of the Speaker, as highlighted by the respondent No. 1, have raised 3 (three) preliminary objections; (i) the present writ petition, being filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, which are two distinct and separate jurisdictions, both the jurisdiction cannot be invoked and exercised by this Court in a Single and common petition; and therefore, the petition is not maintainable; (ii) the writ petitioners having filed an Interlocutory Application before the respondent No. 1 for expeditious disposal of the Disqualification Petitions, in question, within a time frame of 4 (four) months which was withdrawn later on and the same prayer having been made in the present petition, the writ petitioners would be hit by the principle of estoppel by conduct and accordingly, the present petition would not be maintainable. In other words, the prayer once made before the Speaker as well as the prayer made before this Court being one and the same and the earlier Application filed before the Speaker having been withdrawn, the same prayer cannot be made before this Court inasmuch as the petitioners would be hit by the principle of estoppel by conduct and accordingly, the present writ petition would not be maintainable; and (iii) as the writ petitioners have filed this writ petition by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) and the facts of the case therein being distinct and different from the present case inasmuch as in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), the Speaker had refused to act on the Disqualification Petitions filed, whereas, in the instant case, the Speaker of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly has not refused to act rather it has promptly initiated the process leading to framing of the issues to be determine and accordingly, the ratio of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) being not applicable in the present case, this writ petition is premature and would not be maintainable. 9. Mr.
9. Mr. Borgohain, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 21.01.2020, have in no uncertain terms held that the Speaker acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide Disqualification Petitions within a reasonable period. Though what is reasonable period would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but in the absence of any exceptional circumstances, the reasonable time period would mean a period of 3 (three) months from the date on which the petition is filed. Therefore, Mr. Borgohain, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that since more than a year have lapsed since the filing of the Disqualification Petitions and substantial progress have also been made in the proceeding before the respondent No. 1, appropriate direction may be issued to the respondent No. 1 to pass appropriate orders on the Disqualification Proceedings within a period of 4 (four) weeks from today. 10. Mr. Jamir, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, submits that the basis for filing of the writ petition by the present petitioners being the decision rendered in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) which was rendered in the context of Speaker not taking action on the Disqualification Petitions, the ratio laid down in the said case cannot be applied in the present case and therefore, no direction should be given to the respondent No. 1 inasmuch as the respondent No. 1, unlike in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), has initiated the process for adjudication of the Disqualification Petitions from time to time leading to framing of the issues on 21.03.2020 and fixing the matter on 24.04.2020 for submission of list of evidences. It was only because of the outbreak of Covid-19 Pandemic, the proceedings had to be cancelled and therefore, no such direction be given in the present case as the respondent No. 1 would be resuming the proceedings as and when the normalcy in the functioning of the Office is restored and accordingly, no intervention is called for at this stage by this Court in exercise of the power under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Mr. Zho, learned counsel representing respondent Nos.
11. Mr. Zho, learned counsel representing respondent Nos. 2 to 8, raising the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition, has submitted that the writ petitioners having filed the writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the same is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed as the jurisdictions under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India are distinct and different; and, unless a specific jurisdiction of this Court either of the Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India is invoked, in a petition of this nature wherein both the Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution have been mentioned the adjudication of the writ petition is not permissible in the present form and therefore, not maintainable. In support of his submission, Mr. Zho, learned counsel, has relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Radhey Shyam & Anr. Vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors., reported in : (2015) 5 SCC 423 , and attention of this Court has been drawn to paragraphs 26 & 29.02, which are quoted hereinbelow: "26. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Articles 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215 ], Ouseph Mathai vs. M. Abdul Khadir : (2002) 1 SCC 319 ], Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil : (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] and Sameer Suresh Gupta vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal : (2013) 9 SCC 374 ]. In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court observed: "64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes.
In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court observed: "64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above.
This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly. 29.2. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226." 12. Mr. Zho, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 8, further contended that the writ petitioners having filed an Interlocutory Application before the Speaker, Nagaland Legislative Assembly, praying for expeditious disposal of the Disqualification Petition within a time frame of 4 (four) months which was later on withdrawn, cannot make the same prayer by filing the present writ petition inasmuch as such a conduct of the petitioners is not permissible under the law and would be hit by the principle of estoppel by conduct. Mr. Zho, learned counsel, finally contends, in the line of the contention advanced by Mr. Jamir, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, would contend that the ratio of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) would not be applicable in the instant case inasmuch as in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), the decision was rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of the Speaker not taking any action on the Disqualification Petitions filed, whereas, in the instant case, it is not so and the Speaker of the Nagaland Legislative Assembly is in Seisin of the Disqualification Petitions which have been taken up at regular intervals leading to framing of issues on 21.03.2020. Accordingly, the ratio of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) being not applicable in the instant case; and, the entire case of the petitioners being founded on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), the writ petition is premature and the same is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. 13. Rival submissions advanced at the bar have received due consideration of this Court. 14. Before adjudicating on the merits of the issues raised by the petitioners, it would be apposite to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8; namely, due to filing of the common petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the writ petition would not be maintainable.
14. Before adjudicating on the merits of the issues raised by the petitioners, it would be apposite to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8; namely, due to filing of the common petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the writ petition would not be maintainable. True it is that the jurisdictions under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India are distinct and different. Though the jurisdictions under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India are distinct and different, yet the issue involved in the present case is the amenability of Office of the Speaker, acting under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, to judicial review under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. I have considered the submissions made by Mr. Zho, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 as well as perused the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred by him in this context. However, in the case of Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu & Ors., reported in : 1922 Supp (2) SCC 651, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 111, in no uncertain terms, have held that the Speakers/Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating right and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review under Articles 136, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance of Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned. The relevant sub-paragraphs of paragraph 111 of the Kihoto Hollohan (supra) is quoted hereinbelow - " .. That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities bases on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned. The Speakers/Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review." 16.
The Speakers/Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review." 16. Thus, it is noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), which is a decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, have held that the powers and functions bestowed on the Office of the Speakers or Chairmen under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is amenable to judicial review under Articles 136, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. In view thereof, I am of the considered view that although the present writ petition have been filed by the petitioners under Articles 226 as well as 227 of the Constitution of India, the same will be maintainable notwithstanding the mentioning of both the Articles in one writ petition. Accordingly, the first objection raised vehemently by Mr. Zho, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 8, is rejected. 17. Mr. Zho, learned counsel, next, argues that the present writ petition would not be maintainable on the principle of estoppel by conduct inasmuch as the petitioners had earlier filed an Interlocutory Application before the Speaker making the same prayer that have been made in the present writ petition. The argument of estoppel by conduct, in the considered view of this Court, cannot be accepted for the reason that under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, it is the Speaker alone who is required to decide the Disqualification Petitions filed in accordance with law. In other words, a power and duty have been vested on the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India to decide the Disqualification Petitions as and when filed; and, therefore, since it is the mandate of law that it is the Speaker, who, under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, has been mandated to decide the Disqualification Petitions filed, no amount of conduct either by the petitioners or for that matter by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 can in any manner take away the powers and functions that have been entrusted upon the Speaker under the law nor the petitioners can be estopped from approaching this Court or for that matter in any other forum seeking appropriate relief(s) as may be permitted under the law.
2 to 8 can in any manner take away the powers and functions that have been entrusted upon the Speaker under the law nor the petitioners can be estopped from approaching this Court or for that matter in any other forum seeking appropriate relief(s) as may be permitted under the law. In that view of the matter, in the considered view of this Court, the second preliminary objection raised by Mr. Zho, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 8, on the principle of estoppel by conduct is also found to be not sustainable in law and the same is rejected. 18. The third argument made by Mr. Zho, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 8, with regard to the non-maintainability of the present writ petition by making a distinction in the applicability of the ratio laid down in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) is interconnected with the merits of the case and accordingly, we would deal with the third contention raised by Mr. Zho, learned counsel, together with the merits of the case. 19. Having held that the writ petition filed by the petitioners is maintainable, the merits of the issues raised may now be determined. It is noticed from the rival pleadings of the parties that the following facts are not in dispute, i.e. the petitioners had filed a Disqualification Petition before the respondent No. 1 seeking disqualification of the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 from the membership of the Legislative Assembly of the 13th Nagaland Legislative Assembly on 24.04.2019; that written statements were filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 on 10.09.2019 thereby leading to framing of as many as 4 (four) issues to be determined by an order dated 21.03.2020. It is also noticed that while framing as many as 4 (four) issues, by an order dated 21.03.2020, 24.04.2020 was fixed as the next date for submission of list of evidences. However, by a Letter dated 18.04.2020, issued by the Secretary, Nagaland Legislative Assembly, the parties were informed that in view of the general shutdown announced in the State of Nagaland due to Covid-19 Pandemic, the next date fixed on 24.04.2020 stands cancelled and fresh date would be intimated as soon as normalcy in the functioning of the public offices is restored. 20.
20. As noted above, since the filing of the Disqualification Petitions by the petitioners on 24.04.2019, substantial progress have been made in the adjudicatory process of the Disqualification petitions filed, leading to framing of the issues as far back as on 21.03.2020; what, now, remains to be further done by the Office of the Speaker is to allow the parties to produce their respective evidence in their supports, give them a hearing and pass appropriate orders, thereby bringing the Disqualification Petitions filed to a logical conclusions. 21. In the facts and circumstances narrated, hereinabove, to decide as to whether a relief, as sought for by the petitioners in the present case, can be granted by this Court in exercise of the power of judicial review conferred on this Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 21.01.2020 in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) be now perused. In paragraph 29 of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) in Civil Appeal No. 547 of 2020, it has been held as follows - "29. A reading of the aforesaid decisions, therefore, shows that what was meant to be outside the pale of judicial review in paragraph 110 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) are quia timet actions in the sense of injunctions to prevent the Speaker from making a decision on the ground of imminent apprehended danger which will be irreparable in the sense that if the Speaker proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified, he would incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership of the House for a long period. Paragraphs 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) do not, therefore, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period.
Paragraphs 110 and 111 of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) do not, therefore, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule is bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. What is reasonable will depend on the facts of each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for which there is good reason, a period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit within which disqualification petitions filed before the Speaker must be decided if the constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to. This period has been fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the States is 5 years and the fact that persons who have incurred such disqualification do not deserve to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), if they have infracted the provisions of the Tenth Schedule." 22. It is noticed from the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that this Court in exercise of the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can intervene in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision under the Provisions of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. While recognizing the power of this Court to intervene in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision under the Provisions of the Tenth Schedule, it is further held that the Speaker in acting as a Tribunal under Tenth Schedule is bound to decide Disqualification Petitions within a reasonable period which has been expressed to be 3 (three) months from the date on which the petition is filed save and except under exceptional circumstances with good reason. The Speaker, therefore, ideally should decide the Disqualification Petitions within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of filing of the Disqualification Petitions except under exceptional circumstances with good reason. 23. That being the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), in the instant case, we notice that the Disqualification Petitions were filed on 24.04.2019, which is more than 13 (thirteen) months by now.
23. That being the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), in the instant case, we notice that the Disqualification Petitions were filed on 24.04.2019, which is more than 13 (thirteen) months by now. At the same time, it is also noticed that substantial progress have already been made in the adjudicatory process of the Disqualification Petitions by the Speaker leading to framing of issues as far back as on 21.03.2020. Having noted the fact that issues to be decided in the Disqualification Petitions have already been framed on 21.03.2020 and thereafter, no further progress have been made in the proceeding, this Court is of the considered view that it would be just and appropriate if the respondent No. 1, the Speaker, Nagaland Legislative Assembly, is directed to conclude the Disqualification Proceedings and pass appropriate orders within a period of 6 (six) weeks from today, for which, the petitioners as well as the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 shall appear before the respondent No. 1 either in person or through their authorized representatives on 08.06.2020 to receive further instructions to enable the respondent No. 1 to conclude the proceeding within a period of 6 (six) weeks from today. 24. It is ordered accordingly. 25. In reaching the above conclusion as well as the directions issued, this Court has also taken note of the valued observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 1 , wherein, in paragraphs 84, 85 & 86 it has been observed as follows - "84. Before parting, another aspect urged before us deserves to be considered. However, at the outset, we do wish to state that the Speaker enjoys a very high status and position of great respect and esteem in the Parliamentary Traditions. He, being the very embodiment of propriety and impartiality, has been assigned the function to decide whether a member has incurred disqualification or not. In Kihoto Hollohan's judgment various great Parliamentarians have been noticed pointing out the confidence in the impartiality of the Speaker and he being above all parties or political considerations. The High office of the Speaker has been considered as one of the grounds for upholding the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule in Kihoto Hollohan's case. 85.
In Kihoto Hollohan's judgment various great Parliamentarians have been noticed pointing out the confidence in the impartiality of the Speaker and he being above all parties or political considerations. The High office of the Speaker has been considered as one of the grounds for upholding the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule in Kihoto Hollohan's case. 85. Undoubtedly, in our constitutional scheme, the Speaker enjoys a pivotal position. The position of the Speaker is and has been held by people of outstanding ability and impartiality. Without meaning any disrespect for any particular Speaker in the country, but only going by some of events of the recent past, certain questions have been raised about the confidence in the matter of impartiality on some issues having political overtones which are decided by the Speaker in his capacity as a Tribunal. It has been urged that if not checked, it may ultimately affect the high office of the Speaker. Our attention has been drawn to the recommendations made by the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution recommending that the power to decide on the question as to disqualification on ground of defection should vest in the Election Commission instead of the Speaker of the House concerned. Our attention has also been drawn to the views of number of other experts, committees/commissioner to the effect that the power of disqualification as a result of defection need to be exercised in accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission as in the case of decision on question as to disqualification of members provided for in Article 103 and 194(2) of the Constitution (See Anti-Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges by Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, M.P. Jain's Indian Constitutional Law, 5th Edn., Constitutional Law of India, 2nd Edn. by T.K. Tope, Reviewing the Constitution edited by Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap & Ors., First V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture on "Indian Democracy Reality or Myth?" delivered by Shri Soli J. Sorabjee). 86. Whether to vest such power in the Speaker or Election Commission or any other institution is not for us to decide. It is only for the Parliament to decide.
Subhash C. Kashyap & Ors., First V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture on "Indian Democracy Reality or Myth?" delivered by Shri Soli J. Sorabjee). 86. Whether to vest such power in the Speaker or Election Commission or any other institution is not for us to decide. It is only for the Parliament to decide. We have noted this aspect so that the Parliament, if deemed appropriate, may examine it, bestow its wise consideration to the aforesaid views expressed also having regard to the experience of last number of years and thereafter take such recourse as it may deem necessary under the circumstances." And in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh Vs. The Hon'ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 547/2020, wherein, in paragraphs 30 and 31, it has been observed as follows - "30. In the years that followed the enactment of the Tenth Schedule in 1985, this Court's experience of decisions made by Speakers generally leads us to believe that fears of the minority judgment in Kihoto Hollohan (supra) have actually come home to roost. Verma, J. had held: "181. The Speaker being an authority within the House and his tenure being dependent on the will of majority therein, likelihood of suspicion of bias could not be ruled out. The question as to disqualification of a member has adjudicatory disposition and, therefore, requires the decision to be rendered in consonance with the scheme for adjudication of disputes. Rule of law has in it firmly entrenched natural justice, of which, Rule against Bias is a necessary concomitant; and basic postulates of Rule against Bias are: Nemo judex in causa sua-'A Judge is disqualified from determining any case in which he may be, or may fairly be suspected to be, biased'; and 'it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.' This appears to be the underlying principle adopted by the framers of the Constitution in not designating the Speaker as the authority to decide election disputes and questions as to disqualification of members under Articles 103, 192 and 329 and opting for an independent authority outside the House. The framers of the Constitution had in this manner kept the office of the Speaker away from this controversy.
The framers of the Constitution had in this manner kept the office of the Speaker away from this controversy. There is nothing unusual in this scheme if we bear in mind that the final authority for removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court and High Court is outside the judiciary in the Parliament under Article 124(4). On the same principle the authority to decide the question of disqualification of a member of legislature is outside the House as envisaged by Articles 103 and 192. 182. In the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is made not only the sole but the final arbiter of such dispute with no provision for any appeal or revision against the Speaker's decision to any independent outside authority. This departure in the Tenth Schedule is a reverse trend and violates a basic feature of the Constitution since the speaker cannot be treated as an authority contemplated for being entrusted with this function by the basic postulates of the Constitution, notwithstanding the great dignity attaching to that office with the attribute of impartiality. 31. It is time that Parliament have a rethink on whether disqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority when such Speaker continues to belong to a particular political party either de jure or de facto. Parliament may seriously consider amending the Constitution to substitute the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies as arbiter of disputes concerning disqualification which arise under the Tenth Schedule with a permanent Tribunal headed by retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, or some other outside independent mechanism to ensure that such disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially, thus giving real teeth to the provisions contained in the Tenth Schedule, which are so vital in the proper functioning of our democracy." 26. The writ petition stands disposed of in terms above. 27. This order be sent to the e-mail address/ID furnished by the respective learned counsels representing the parties.