JUDGMENT : 1. Applicants who are six in numbers, have approached this Court by way of filing an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with prayer to quash the entire proceedings in Complaint Case No.491/IX of 2015, (Smt. Tarannum Khatoon @ Sanowar vs. Waris Khan & others) u/s 498A, 323, 504 & 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P. Act, P.S. Naraini, District Banda including summoning order dated 22.12.2015 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda in the aforesaid complaint case. Further prayer has been made to stay the proceedings of the aforesaid case. 2. This Court, on 15.11.2016 has passed the following order : “Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that an opportunity be granted to the parties for reconciliation /settlement of their dispute by way of mediation. Applicants are also willing to settle the matter through mediation. I agree with the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants. The matter is referred to Mediation & Conciliation Centre of this Court. The applicants are directed to deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/by way of demand draft/pay order in the name of Registrar General A/c, Allahabad High Court Mediation & Conciliation Centre within a period of three weeks from today. After deposit of the aforesaid money, office shall send a notice to the opposite party no. 2 fixing a date to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court. The aforesaid amount shall be payable to the opposite party no. 2 on his/her appearance before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre. The Mediation Centre will submit its report in the matter within three months. All the opposite parties may file counter affidavit within four weeks. Rejoinder affidavit may be filed within two weeks thereafter. List this case on 27.2.2017 before the appropriate Bench along with the report of the Mediation Centre. Till the next date of listing before the Court, further proceedings against the applicants in complaint case no. 491/IX of 2015, under Section 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 D.P. Act, P.S. Naraini, District Banda pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda shall remain stayed. If the amount, as directed above, is not deposited by the applicants within the aforesaid period, the stay order shall automatically come to an end and the office shall immediately list this case for further orders before the Court.” 3. If the amount, as directed above, is not deposited by the applicants within the aforesaid period, the stay order shall automatically come to an end and the office shall immediately list this case for further orders before the Court.” 3. In pursuance of the abovementioned order, the parties appeared before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre wherein as per the report of the Centre, the parties were entered in an interim agreement dated 19.2.2017, however, as per the report dated 26.3.2017 of the Centre, final settlement was not done despite the interim agreement dated 19.2.2017, and as such, the mediation was concluded without any agreement/settlement. 4. Opposite party no.2, who is represented by Shri Rajesh Kumar, Advocate has opted not to file any counter affidavit and the statement to this effect was recorded and mentioned in the order dated 8.1.2018 passed by this Court. For reference, the said order is quoted hereinater : “Mediation was not successful. Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 2 states that he will not file counter affidavit in the matter although Vakalatnama filed by him in the Registry is not on record. Office is directed to trace the same and place on record. List this matter on 31.1.2018 under the heading of final hearing. Stay order, if any, shall continue till the next date of listing.” 5. I have heard Shri Adil Jamal, learned counsel for the applicants, Shri Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. 6. Shri Adil Jamal, learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the present application is filed by the relatives of Waris Khan, who is the husband of opposite party no.2 (complainant). Applicants are father-in-law, mother-in-law, elder brothers of husband of opposite party no.2 and their respective wife. Learned counsel further submitted that the husband of opposite party no.2 is not before this Court and he is facing criminal proceedings. Applicants are father-in-law, mother-in-law, elder brothers of husband of opposite party no.2 and their respective wife. Learned counsel further submitted that the husband of opposite party no.2 is not before this Court and he is facing criminal proceedings. Learned counsel read out the contents of the complaint, statement of the complainant recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C. The recorded statements of PW1 and PW2, being father and mother of opposite party no.2, recorded u/s 202 Cr.P.C. as well as the summoning order dated 22.12.2015 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistarte, Banda and stated that the entire allegations against the applicants are general and vague, there is no specific details with regard to nature of harassment and the role played by each of the applicants in harassing the complainants and even the places and dates when the alleged harassment was made are not indicated in the complaint as well as the statements recorded u/s 200 & 202 Cr.P.C. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon a judgment passed by the Apex Court in the matter of “Geeta Mehrotra vs. State of U.P. reported in LAWS(SC) 2012 (10) 53; 2012 (10) SCC 741 and specifically relied upon paragraph no.24, for reference, same is reproduced hereinafter : “24. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.” (emphasis supplied) 7. In view of the abovementioned submissions, learned counsel for the applicants prayed that prayer made in the present application be allowed and the entire proceedings initiated against the applicants in the complaint case in question including summoning order be quashed. 8. Shri Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.2 vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the applicants. He stated that the contents of the complaint, statements recorded u/s 200 & 202 Cr.P.C. discloses offences u/s 498A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P. Act. He further submitted that learned court below has rightly taken cognizance on the basis of the complaint and the statements. He further submitted that the exercise of inherent power to quash proceedings is called for only in case where the complaint does not disclose any offence. He further submitted that the power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly invoked. The High Court may not embark upon an inquiry as to the probability, reliability or the genuineness of the allegations made in a complaint. 9. He further submitted that the power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly invoked. The High Court may not embark upon an inquiry as to the probability, reliability or the genuineness of the allegations made in a complaint. 9. Learned A.G.A. has relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Binod Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar and Another; 2014 (10) SCC 663 wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the scope u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the proceedings has relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna reported in (1976) 3 SCC 736 and held in para 9 (ii) that when proceeding could be quashed : “(ii) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 10. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the record. 10. In the matter of Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd.; (2006) 6 SCC 736 , the Apex Court has summarized the principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings, which are as under : “12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few—Madhavrao Jiwaijirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 , State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194 , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd (1996) 5 SCC 591 ; State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla (1996) 8 SCC 164 , Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999) 3 SCC 259 ; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. Biological E. Ltd (2000) 3 SCC 269 , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168 , M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh (2001) 8 SCC 645 and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque ( 2005) 1 SCC 122. Sharaful Haque ( 2005) 1 SCC 122. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.” (emphasis supplied) 11. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In view of the abovementioned judgments passed by the Apex Court, the High Court can quash a complaint only when allegation made in the complaint even they are taken at their face and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence to make out a case alleged against the accused. While dealing with the complaint case in regard to the matrimonial disputes, the High Court should be more cautious as held in Geeta Malhotra (Supra) as well as in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad and Others; (2000) 3 SCC 693 ; B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and others; AIR 2003 SC 1386 . The Apex Court has held that in case of general and vague allegations and in the absence of specific allegations, the powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised, however, the Apex Court has cautioned that in case there are allegations of overact indicating the complacity of the accused named in the complaint or FIR, the High Court should not interfere with the criminal proceedings. In case, there is a clear abuse of legal and judicial process and the relatives of the main accused have been prima facie implicated falsely, the High Court should not shy away in exercising the powers granted u/s 482 Cr.P.C. 12. In the light of abovementioned legal position, I have to see whether on the basis of the complaint, statement recorded u/s 200 & 202 Cr.P.C., prima facie offence is disclosed or not. In the light of abovementioned legal position, I have to see whether on the basis of the complaint, statement recorded u/s 200 & 202 Cr.P.C., prima facie offence is disclosed or not. The opposite party no.2 in her complaint has mentioned that : 2- ;g fd izkfFkZ;k dks izkfFkZ;k ds firk }kjk viuh lkeF;Z ds vuqlkj nku&ngst nsdj llqjky fonk fd;k x;k Fkk ijUrq mDr lHkh foi{khx.k fn;s x;s ngst ls lUrq"V ugh gq;s ,oa izkfFkZ;k dks xkyh&xykSt ij ekjihV djrs gq;s 2 yk[k :i;s dh vksj ngst dh ekax djus yxsA izkfFkZ;k tc ek;ds llqjky ls okil vk;h rks vius ekrk&firk o ifjokjhtu dh lkjh ckrsa crkbZA 3- ;g fd izkfFkZ;k ds firk us iapk;r cqykdj mDr lHkh foi{khx.kks ls gkFk tksM+dj izkFkZuk fd;k Fkk fd esjh gSfl;r vc nks yk[k :i;s nsus dh ugha gS ,oa izkfFkZ;k dks ;g dgdj nksckjk fonk dj fn;k Fkk fd dqN fnu esa lc Bhd gks tk;sxkA 4- ;g fd izkfFkZ;k thou thus dh xjt ls mDr foi{khx.kksa ds }kjk ngst dh ekax dks ysdj nh tk jgh :gkuh o ftLekuh rdyhQksa dks cnkZ'r djrh jgh ijarq foi{khx.k ugha ekusA 5- ;g fd fnukad 29-09-2013 dks lqcg djhc 10 cts mDr lHkh foi{khx.k mDr ngst dh ekax dks ysdj ,djk; gksdj tku ls ekj Mkyus dh fu;r ls izkfFkZ;k dks ekjus ihVus yxsA izkfFkZ;k dh fpYykgV lqudj eqgYys ds o jkLrs ls fudy jgs reke yksxksa us vkdj izkfFkZ;k dh tku cpk;hA yksxksa ds tkus ds ckn mDr foi{khx.kksa us izkfFkZ;k dks ek= ru esa igus diM+ks ds cPpksa lfgr vius ?kj ls ;g dgdj fudky fn;k fd tc rd vius firk ls 2 yk[k :i;s ugha ykvksaxh rc rd ge rqEgsa vius ?kj esa misf{kr thou th jgh gSA 8- ;g fd blds ckotwn vkilh fj'rsnkjks us iqu% iapk;r dj dksf'k'k dh 'kk;n foi{khx.k eku tk;s] ijarq foi{khx.k ugha ekus vkSj viuh ftn ij ngst dh ekax ij vM+s gq;s gS rc etcwju izkfFkZ;k ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa ;g okn nk;j dj jgh gSA (emphasis supplied) 13. In her statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C. opposite party no.2 has stated that : ^^l'kiFk c;ku fd;k fd esjh 'kknh 11 twu 2007 dks okfjl [kka ls gqbZ Fkh okfjl [kka eSftd xkMh pykrk gS eSus ,d eqdnek ?kjsyw fagalk dks igys fd;k gS dksbZ vf/koDrk ugha fey jgk gSA esjs ifr ,oa llqjkyhtu dYy llqj] lkl jfgfl;k tsB vyhe tsBkuh jsgkuk] vkfjQ] 'kkcknk ngst ds fy, izrkfM+r fd;kA ngst ugha nsus ij xkyh xykSt ekjihV dj Hkxk fn;kA esjs nks cPps gS tks esjs ikl jgrs gSA ngst esa 2 yk[k :i;s dh ekax dh xbZA eSus lwpuk iqfyl dks nh ,oa ,lŒihŒ dks fjiksVZ fd;kA dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha gqbZA^^ (emphasis supplied) 14. PW1 father of opposite party no.2 has stated in his statement recorded u/s 202 Cr.P.C. that : eSus viuh iq=h rjUuqe [kkrwu mQZ luksoj dk fudkg fnukad 11-06-2007 dks Jh okfjl [kka fuoklh jathriqj Fkkuk ujSuh ds lkFk fd;k FkkA ,oa viuh gSfl;r ds vuqlkj nku&ngst nsdj yM+dh dks fonk fd;k FkkA tc esjh iq=h llqjky x;h rks ifr okfjl [kka] llqj] dYyw [kka] lkal jfgf'k;k] tsB vyhe] tsBkuh fjgkuk] ,oa nwljk tsB vkfjQ o tsBkuh 'kkcnk fn;s x;s nku&ngst ls larq"V u gksus ds dkj.k rjUuqe dks ekj ihV xkyh xykSt tSlh ;kruk, nsdj :Œ nks yk[k vkSj pkSFkh esa ysdj ngst ds :i esa vkus dks dgsaA tc esjh iq=h ?kj vkbZ rks lkjh ckrs crk;hA nqckjk tc ifr lfgr llqjky tu iq=h dks ysus vk;s rks eSus iapk;r tksM+dj dgk fd eSa vc vkSj ngst nsus yk;d ugha gwW vk'oklu ds ckn eSusa iq=h dks lc dqN Bhd dqN fnu esa gks tk;sxkA dg dj muds LkkFk fonk dj fn;kA ijarq mDr llqjkyh tu ngst dh ekax dks ysdj esjh iq=h dks izrkfM+Rk djrs jgsA ,oa fnukad 29-9-2013 dks lqcg djhc 10-00 cts mDr us ,djk; gksdj esjh iq=h ds Åij feVVh dk rsy Mkydj tku ls ekj Mkyus dh fu;r ls ekjus dh dksf'k'k dh izkFkhZ dh iq=h dks fPkYykus ij eqgYys o jkLrs ds jkgxhj bdVBk gksdj vfHkŒx.k dks yydkjk rc dgha esjh iq=h dh tku cphA mlds ckn llqjkyhtu us esjh iq=h dks ek= igus gq, diM+ks esa cPpks lfgr ?kj ls fudky fn;k vkSj dgk fd tc rd :Œ nks yk[k vkSj ugha ykvksxh rc rd ge rqEgsa ugha j[ksaxsA rc ls esjh iq=h esjs ?kj ij cPpks lfgr jg jgh gSA (emphasis supplied) 15. PW2 mother of opposite party no.2 in her statement has stated that : ^^esjh iq=h rjUuqe dk fookg vkt ls djhc 8 o"kZ iwoZ okfjl iq= dYyq fuoklh jathriqj Fkkuk ujSuh ds lkFk fd;k FkkA fn;s x;s nku ngst ls llqjkyhtu [kq'k ugha FksA ftl dh otg ls ifr okfj'k] llqj dYyw] lkl jfgfl;k] tsB vyhe] tsBkuh jsgkuk ,oa nwljk tsb vkfjQ o tsBkuh lkcnk vk;s fnu ekj ihV djds nks yk[k :Œ dj ekax djrs Fks iapk;r dj le>kus dh dksf'k'k dh ij ugha ekusA vkt ls djhc nks lky iwoZ rjUuqe dks xkyh xykSt o ekjihV djrs gq, feVVh dk rsy Åij Mkydj tku ls ekj Mkyus dh dksf'k'k dhA rjUuqe ds fpYykus ij eqgYys ds yksxksa us vkdj cpk fy;kA blds ckn mDr lHkh llqjkyhtu esjh iq=h dks mlds cPpks lfgr ek= igus diM+ks esa ?kj ls fudky fn;k dgkfd tc rd ngst ds nks yk[k :i;s ugh ykvksaxs rc rd rqEgsa vius ?kj esa ugh j[ksaxsA rc ls esjs ?kj esa rjUuqe vius cPpks ds lkFk jg jgh gSA llqjkyhtu dksbZ [kkst [kcj ugha ys jgs gSA^^ (emphasis supplied) 16. In the abovementioned complaint and statements, it has specifically been mentioned that the applicants have harassed the complainant/opposite party no.2 and demanded dowry of Rs.2,00,000/. They even attempted to cause injuries to opposite-party no.2 earlier also, however, due to negotiations, the complainant was allowed to live with them. There are specific allegations against all the applicants that on 29.9.2013, they have tried to cause injuries to the complainant/opposite party no.2 and they used to demand a dowry of Rs.2,00,000/and also caused physical injuries to victim. The statements of PW1 and PW2 corroborated the allegations made by the complainant/opposite party no.2. 17. The learned court below after considering the contents of the complaint as well as the statements recorded u/s 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. found sufficient ground for proceedings and accordingly summoned all the applicants u/s 204 Cr.P.C. 18. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint case are not general in nature rather the allegations are specific and even the earlier incident has also been specifically mentioned in the complaint as well as the statements. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint case are not general in nature rather the allegations are specific and even the earlier incident has also been specifically mentioned in the complaint as well as the statements. Present case is not a case where it could be said that general allegations are made against the applicants rather this case falls under the categories of cases where even the Apex Court in Geeta Mehrotra (Supra) has directed to adopt a cautious approach. 19. Recently, the Apex Court in Arun Singh and others vs. State of U.P.; 2020 SCC Online SC 164 in similar circumstances has declined to quash criminal proceedings u/s 3/4 D.P. Act. For reference, para 30 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter : “ 30. A reading of the above provisions shows that essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are that the persons accused should have made demand directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or a bridegroom as the case may be any dowry and/or abets the giving and taking of dowry. The allegations of the F.I.R. quoted hereinabove clearly go to show that a demand of dowry of Rs.5 Lakhs was made by the appellants from the complainants and thus it can not be said that no offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act are made out against the appellants. There being direct allegations of demand of Dowry in the First Information Report, the allegations prima facie constitute a commission of an offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act and thus the charges leveled against the appellants under Section 3/4 of the said Act, are not liable to be quashed.” (emphasis supplied) 20. In view of above discussion, it is my considered opinion that present case is a case where the inherent powers should not be used to stifle or scuttle the legitimate prosecution. 21. In view of the above, the present application being sans merit, accordingly dismissed.