JUDGMENT Subrata Talukdar, J. - Both the above noted writ petitions lay claim to a decision on an analogous point and therefore, were heard conjointly. Having regard to the point involved, they are being decided by this common judgement. 2. The Eastern Tyre Corporation, a business organisation, is the writ petitioner in WP 4462 (W) of 2019 (hereinafter referred to as WP I) and Mr. Aditya Khemka, an individual, the writ petitioner in WP 7678 (W) of 2019 (hereinafter referred to as WP II), were owners of their respective Motor Vehicles (MVs). Their respective MVs were sold and transferred by them in favour of the respective private respondents in the two writ petitions, being the transferees. The procedure for transfer of ownership and sale of the MVs was in accordance with law, i.e. in the manner provided by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the MV Act), as amended, read with its Rules. 3. Mr. Shraff and Ms. Dhar, Learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in WP I and WP II respectively, have argued that for the purpose of effecting the transfer both Forms 29 and 30 were jointly executed by the parties. It is submitted that with the execution of Forms 29 and 30, the modalities of transfer of the MVs, inter se the parties, stood effectively concluded. It is pointed out that the onus now lay with the transferees, i.e. the private respondents, to deposit the said Forms 29 and 30 before the Registering Authority/the Public Vehicles Department (for short PVD) of their jurisdiction and choice. The choice of the PVD could be exercised by the transferee based on either the place of his residence or, the place from where he carried on his business/work. 4. The present writ petitions centre around the fact that long after the modalities of transfer vide Forms 29 and 30 were officially concluded by the parties, the transferors/the writ petitioners, continue to receive citations for traffic violations as well as notices in respect of alleged offences/incidents involving the respective MVs in question. Therefore, both Mr. Shraff and Ms. Dhar, Learned Counsel, submit that as transferors the petitioners have no further or other legal obligations to discharge connected to their respective MVs after having completed the transfer formalities by executing Forms 29 and 30. 5. Therefore, both Mr. Shraff and Ms. Dhar, Learned Counsel, submit that as transferors the petitioners have no further or other legal obligations to discharge connected to their respective MVs after having completed the transfer formalities by executing Forms 29 and 30. 5. It is also submitted that the factum of executing Forms 29 and 30 was reported by the transferors to their respective PVDs and, as per law, a Note thereof ought to have been uploaded in their respective Registration Certificates (for short RC Books). In such circumstances there is no reason why the transferors should be held liable for any offence/incident involving the MVs in issue following the execution of Forms 29 and 30 and intimation thereof to their respective PVDs, viz. the PVDs where the MVs stood originally registered. 6. Accordingly, the writ petitioners seek a judicial action of Declaration and Mandamus, declaring and granting them immunity from being treated as owners of the MVs in issue and further restraining the State Respondents from taking any penal/coercive action against them in relation to any offence/incident arising out of the MVs in issue subsequent to the execution of Forms 29 and 30 with their attendant formalities duly complied with by the petitioners/the transferors. 7. For the writ petitioners reliance is placed on several provisions of the MV Act namely, Sections 39, 48, 50, 53, 54, 192, 197 and 205. Rule 55 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (for short the CMV Rules) is also relied. 8. On the basis of the above provisions of law which coat the facts involved, the submissions of the writ petitioners may be summarised as follows:- a) That a MV can be considered roadworthy and fit to ply only on the strength of a completed and valid registration. In other words, no case can be made out for plying a MV without a valid registration. b) That although there has been a transfer of ownership of the MVs in issue in the present writ petitions, due to laches on the part of the transferees, there has been no transfer of registration. c) A case has been made out in favour of the writ petitioners seeking a direction on the PVD in issue to suspend the registration of the MV running with an incomplete invalid registration and, in the event the registration still continues to remain incomplete invalid, to cancel the registration. c) A case has been made out in favour of the writ petitioners seeking a direction on the PVD in issue to suspend the registration of the MV running with an incomplete invalid registration and, in the event the registration still continues to remain incomplete invalid, to cancel the registration. d) In the absence of steps taken by the transferees to execute the registration on transfer by reporting execution of Forms 29 and 30 to the PVDs of their choice, the law must presume that it is the transferees who must carry the cross of non-fulfilment of their obligations to register/record the transfer. The law must act on the premise that with the execution of Forms 29 and 30 as updated/notified in the records of the original PVDs where the MVs stood registered prior to transfer, on efflux of a reasonable period, the needle of responsibility/burden of liability qua the transfer must shift to the transferees. It is argued that since the law itself provides for a two stage procedure, the consequences of not complying with such procedure at the latter stage post execution of Forms 29 and 30, require to be reasonably applied and proportioned against the erring transferee in the present two cases. e) In support of their submissions, Learned Counsel rely on several judicial authorities namely, 2009 (9) SCC 433; AIR 1999 Delhi 95; 2002 (2) SCC 678 ; and 2009 (4) GLT 7. f) Relying on the above referred authorities, the petitioners submit that it is wholly untenable on the part of the State respondents to argue that since in one of the writ petitions, that is WP I, the MV in issue has been taken by the transferee to the jurisdiction of the PVD of his choice in the State of Jharkhand, no writ petition against the original PVD within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court of which the transfer was executed by signing Forms 29 and 30, can lie. It is pointed out that since the citations in respect of the MVs in issue were raised and despatched against the petitioners connected to the PVDs within the jurisdiction of this Court, the present writ petition is maintainable. g) Learned Counsel for the petitioners argue that the legal position, as settled by the judicial authorities, provide in favour of reading the MV Act as a whole. g) Learned Counsel for the petitioners argue that the legal position, as settled by the judicial authorities, provide in favour of reading the MV Act as a whole. There is no justification in reading a statutory provision in isolation. It is accordingly submitted that the discharge of their lawful obligations by the transferor and transferee qua transfer of the MVs in issue are expected to be simultaneous, coterminous and not severable. Incomplete obligations require visiting the errant party with the consequences of its inaction. Since transfer of MVs is not restricted to and from any part of the country, the PVDs are also under an obligation to ensure that the incomplete part of a transfer is completed, failing which the errant party be visited with the consequences of its inaction. 9. Arguing on behalf of the State Respondents, Mr. Sen, Learned Additional Government Pleader (AGP) (in WP I) and Mr. Nayak, Learned State Counsel (in WP II) submit, upon consulting their records, as follows:- i) That the MV Act read with its Rules, make a transfer effective within the jurisdiction of the PVD where the transfer is intended to take effect. In other words, the transfer is effective within the jurisdiction of the PVD where the transferee submits the documents of transfer, viz. Forms 29 and 30. ii) Ipso facto, having regard to (i) above, it is not the sole prerogative of the PVD in which the MV in issue was registered by the transferor prior to the transfer, to make the transfer effective, unless the PVD of the transferee''s choice records the transfer on presentation of the documents of transfer (i.e. Forms 29 and 30) by the transferee. Thereafter, the fact of such recording shall be communicated by the PVD of the transferee to the PVD of the transferor, which (i.e. the latter) will then issue a No Objection Certificate (NOC). Accordingly the transfer of registration shall stand formally complete. Upon such formal completion and issue of the NOC, the liabilities of the transferor shall cease completely. iii) Learned State Counsel submit that neither inaction nor lack of appropriate action by the State respondents to the two writ petitions can be alleged since, till the transferee records the transfer documents with the PVD of his choice, no legal violation by any State Authority can be alleged. iii) Learned State Counsel submit that neither inaction nor lack of appropriate action by the State respondents to the two writ petitions can be alleged since, till the transferee records the transfer documents with the PVD of his choice, no legal violation by any State Authority can be alleged. iv) Since the MV Act is subject specific, in the absence of any violation of its provisions, the present writ petitions may not be maintainable. Accordingly, no action for a Declaration or Mandamus can be imposed against the respondents. 10. Having heard the parties and considering the materials placed, this Court arrives at the following findings:- A) That the law on the subject of sale of a MV and completion of transfer to operate a MV within the provisions of the MV Act has been unambiguously noticed by a Hon''ble Division Bench (DB) of this Court In Re: Rampukar Shaw vs. Bidur Banerjee & Ors., (2004) 1 CalHN 652 (FMA No. 74 of 2003). The prescient words of the Hon''ble DB which touches upon the MV Act is required to be extracted for the benefit of this discussion:- "1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.5.2002 passed by the Judge, M.A.C.T., 2nd Court, Bankura in a proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act registered as Motor Accident Claim Case No. 26/99/157/97. 2. The claimant/petitioners Bidur Banerjee and two of his minor children made the application on 20.11.97 praying for compensation to the extent of Rs. 5 lacs on the allegation that on 9.11.96 at about 1 p.m. Hansi Chatterjee (Banerjee), the deceased, the wife of the petitioner Bidur and mother of the other petitioners was proceeding on foot towards Bishnupur through Radhanagar. From Bishnupur side suddenly a truck No. WBI-7191 came at an excessive speed and the victim was run over by such vehicle causing severe injuries on her vital parts of the body. After the accident, the victim was referred to Bishunupur Sub-Divisional Hospital where she succumbed to her injuries at about 2 p.m. on the same day. The petitioners have filed the application on the specific allegation that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle, on a further allegation that the victim at the time of her death was aged about 46 years and she was Health Supervisor attached to Radhanagar Primary Health Centre. The petitioners have filed the application on the specific allegation that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle, on a further allegation that the victim at the time of her death was aged about 46 years and she was Health Supervisor attached to Radhanagar Primary Health Centre. Due to the unfortunate death of the victim the two minor petitioners who were aged 9 years and 6 years respectively at the time of such accident lost their mother at their tender age. The petitioners also claimed the compensation for mental agony, financial loss etc. 3. In this proceeding there were 3 O.Ps including the Insurance Company. The Insurance Company (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.) in their written objection clearly stated that they were not liable to pay compensation to the petitioners because the offending vehicle was not insured with the O.P./Insurance Company on the date of accident that is to say on 9.11.96 and such offending vehicle was insured upto 7.11.96. Amongst two alleged owners, O.P. No. 2, the Managing Director of M/s. Cadila Leasing and Finance Co. Ltd. alleged that the Company was not liable to give any compensation because the offending vehicle had already been sold to Rampukar Show on 12.12.88 and the authority concerned was duly intimated about such transfer. The O.P./Company, further disclosed in the written objection that the name of the Company had already been changed to M/s. Glitter Leasing and Finance Company (P) Ltd. O.P. Rampukar Show in his written objection stated that he was not a registered owner of the said vehicle on the date of accident that is to say on 9.11.96 but the said Cadila Leasing and Finance Company continued as the registered owner of the vehicle (emphasis supplied) and also took the plea that the accident caused due to negligence on the part of the victim Hansi Banerjee. 4. In the impugned judgment, the learned Tribunal found that the offending vehicle was insured under the Oriental Insurance Company for the period from 20.11.96 to 19.11.97 and the offending vehicle was transferred on 20.12.88 by O.P./Cadila Leasing Finance Co. 4. In the impugned judgment, the learned Tribunal found that the offending vehicle was insured under the Oriental Insurance Company for the period from 20.11.96 to 19.11.97 and the offending vehicle was transferred on 20.12.88 by O.P./Cadila Leasing Finance Co. Ltd. and O.P. Rampukar Show took possession of the said vehicle from the said Company and that the Company reported the matter to the authority concerned for change of the name of the ownership in favour of Rampukar in the year, 1988 and considering the circumstances, the learned Tribunal further found that there was no evidence that the offending vehicle was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company on 9.11.96 for which such Insurance Company had no liability to pay any compensation for the accident and O.P./Rampukar Show as the owner should pay the compensation. On these findings, the learned Tribunal Judge assessed the total compensation at Rs. 3,60,000/- and directed the O.P. No. 1, the present appellant to pay the amount. 5. As the matter stands now, there is no dispute regarding the finding that the accident complained of took place due to negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle, that the O.P./Insurance Company has no liability to pay such amount as the offending vehicle was not insured with the O.P./ Company at the relevant point of time and as there was no proof that the offending vehicle was insured with any other company, the Tribunal directed one of the alleged owners to pay the compensation. There is also no dispute regarding the quantum of compensation assessed here. Only question for our consideration, in this proceeding is who is the owner of the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time when the accident took place as it is not disputed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the compensation money awarded should be paid by the owner of such vehicle and none else. 6. We have heard submissions made by the learned Advocate for the appellants and also the learned Advocates for O.Ps/Insurance Company/ claimant and another alleged owner of the offending vehicle M/s. Cadila Leasing and Finance Company. Learned Advocate for the O.P./Insurance Company has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Insurance Company is not at all liable to pay any compensation. Learned Advocate for the O.P./Insurance Company has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Insurance Company is not at all liable to pay any compensation. Learned Advocate for the respondent/claimants on the other hand has supported the judgment of the Tribunal by submitting that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the award was rightly passed against the appellant. We have already noted that in the present facts and circumstances, the fight here is between the two alleged owners of the offending vehicle. The learned Advocate for the appellant has submitted that the appellant was not the registered owner of the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time and therefore the appellant could not be held responsible to pay the compensation which had been awarded by the Tribunal. The learned Advocate for the O.P./Company on the other hand has submitted that the offending vehicle had been transferred in favour of the appellant long before the accident complained of took place and as per the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the O.P./Company had taken all the steps following the transfer of the offending vehicle. So in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the O.P./ Company was in any way responsible for the accident as the owner of such vehicle. (emphasis supplied). 7. Before we proceed further to consider the question who amongst the owners of the offending vehicle was responsible under the law to pay the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal, it is to be noted here that the learned Tribunal in the judgment has clearly come to a conclusion that the O.P./ Company sold away the offending vehicle to the appellant on 21.12.88 and the learned Judge came to such a finding on the basis of relevant documents like sale-confirmation receipt, sale receipt and delivery receipt which have been marked ExtB, C, D and E. The learned Judge further found that the evidence on record made it clear that the offending vehicle No. WBI-7191 was transferred on 21.12.88 by Cadila Leasing and Finance Company and the appellant Rampukar Show took possession of the said vehicle from the said company. So when the vehicle in question was transferred at that time, the old Act, namely, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force. So when the vehicle in question was transferred at that time, the old Act, namely, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force. The new Act, namely, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force only on 1st July, 1989 that is to say much after the sale and actual transfer of the offending vehicle in favour of the appellant. Now, in this case, the learned Advocate for the appellant has wanted to satisfy us that at the relevant point of time when the accident took place, the appellant was not the owner of the vehicle and for this purpose he has drawn our attention to the definition of "owner" under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under that definition ''owner'' means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. It is contended by the learned Advocate that there is nothing to show in the instant case that at the relevant point of time, the motor vehicle in question was subject of a hire-purchase agreement or an agreement of lease etc, therefore under the law as it stands now, the O.P./Company remained owner at the time when the offending vehicle caused the accident. 8. The learned Advocate for the O.P./Company on the other hand has submitted that the transfer of the vehicle after the sale in favour of the appellant was made long before the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into operation. Therefore, on such transfer the O.P./Company who was the original owner did everything what was required under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to be done by the owner in connection with the transfer and after such actions were taken it cannot be said that the O.P./Company should be held responsible for compensation as registration of the vehicle remained with the O.P./Company for the negligence/inaction on the part of the appellant to get the vehicle in question registered in his name. (emphasis supplied). It is true that if the vehicle in question was transferred on 21.12.88 on sale the previous owner is required to take action as per the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. (emphasis supplied). It is true that if the vehicle in question was transferred on 21.12.88 on sale the previous owner is required to take action as per the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Exhibit-C at page-64 (P.B.) goes to show that appellant took delivery of the vehicle on 21st December, 1988 and kept the same in his possession. The appellant also admits the signature on such letter which has been marked Ext-C(1). It further transpires that after the transfer the O.P./Company wrote a letter to the Motor Vehicles Department, Howrah informing the sale and delivery of the vehicle in question to the appellant on that very day. 9. Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides the procedure as to how the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle is to be reported by the transferor and the transferee. The language of the section clearly indicates that such obligation is cast both upon the transferor and the transferee to report the transfer to the registering authority. It is incumbent upon the transferor to report the fact of transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is to be effected, within fourteen days of the transfer, and he shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee. The transferee has also similar obligation and to forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that the particulars of transfer of ownership may be entered in this certificate of registration. In the instant case, the learned Advocate for the appellant has tried to convince us that the O:P./ Company as the transferor has failed to comply with its obligations under Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and therefore there was no question on the part of the transferee to take any step in the matter and in this way the original owner remained the registered owner even on the date when the offending vehicle met with the accident. It is further submission of the learned Advocate that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, should be so awarded against the O.P./Company and not against the appellant as has been done by the learned Tribunal. It is further submission of the learned Advocate that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, should be so awarded against the O.P./Company and not against the appellant as has been done by the learned Tribunal. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the O.P./Company has tried to convince us that the O.P./Company informed the registering authority on the very date of transfer of the vehicle by writing a letter which remains not marked on the record due to over-sight. As it appears from the evidence of O.P.W-1, S.S. Goel that he proved the letter and on proof the letter in question has been marked Ext-E. Unfortunately only the signature of the appellant in Hindi has been marked Ext. E-1 on such letter. Be that as it may for all practical purposes the letter is a documentary evidence in this case which has been duly proved by the aforesaid witness and from such letter it is evident that the same was received in the office of the registering authority. The learned Advocate for the appellant has tried to convince us that just a letter marked Ext. E will not be sufficient to relieve the original owner from the liability of further action from such owner as required under the law. But we do not find any reason to enter into that question because the provisions contained in Section 31 of the aforesaid Act is nothing to do with the ownership of the vehicle as it is well settled that the transfer of ownership of a vehicle, being a movable property, is governed by the Sale of Goods Act. The said provisions only provide for the regulation of the use of motor vehicle in public places and to impose penalty if the requirements of the Act are not fulfilled. Failure to notify the transfer visits the transferor or even the transferee with certain penal consequences; but it does not make the transfer invalid. In a similar way, the endorsement of transfer in the record of registering authority is also not a condition precedent to the transfer to take effect, nor does it deal with the legality or otherwise of the transfer which must be determined under the general law and also the Sale of Goods Act. The similar view has been taken by the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Paragounda v. Bhimappa and Ors., . The similar view has been taken by the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Paragounda v. Bhimappa and Ors., . In a similar question, the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of Madineni Kondaiah and Ors. etc. v. Yaseen Fatima and Ors. etc., (1986) AIR A.P. 62 , made the following relevant observation : "While considering the question, whether the transfer of vehicle to the purchaser was not complete unless the certificate of registration was issued in the name of transferee, ''the first question we refer Sections 22 and 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 4 of 1939 (hereinafter called the Act.). No doubt, those provisions enjoin both on the transferor and the transferee to report factum of transfer of the vehicle to the registering authority and the owner is required to register the vehicle, we are not persuaded to hold on a careful reading of the said provision that the transfer is incomplete till the registration is effected in favour of the purchaser. The transfer of vehicle is governed by the provisions of Sale of Goods Act. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary payment of price, and delivery of vehicle make the sale complete, and the title passes to the purchaser. The obligation to register the vehicle is for the purpose of controlling and regulating the movement of vehicles by the authorities under the Act and they do not stand in the way of passing title to the purchaser.'' In making such observation, the reported judgment has clearly indicated that reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pannalal v. Chandmal, . (emphasis supplied)." 10. Now in this case, the vehicle in question had been transferred in favour of the appellant when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in operation. But at the time of accident admittedly the new Act came into being and under Section 2(30) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. "Owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered. It is also not disputed that at the relevant point of time when the accident took place, the offending vehicle stood registered in the name of the O.P./Company. The question, therefore is whether only for that reason the O.P./Company should be held liable for the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal? It is also not disputed that at the relevant point of time when the accident took place, the offending vehicle stood registered in the name of the O.P./Company. The question, therefore is whether only for that reason the O.P./Company should be held liable for the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal? We have already seen that it is established through the evidence that the offending vehicle was transferred in favour of the appellant on 21.12.88 and on that very day, the transferor/company informed the fact of transfer to the registering authority. It may be that in doing so such company did not comply with all the formalities which it should comply in accordance with law. But we have also seen from the discussion above that the said question is not relevant for deciding the ultimate question about the ownership of the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time. Suffice it to note that there is nothing to show that after the transfer of the vehicle in question on 21.12.88, the transferee/appellant took any step to get the vehicle in question registered in his name till the time of the accident on 9.11.96. That being so should the O.P./Company be held responsible for the compensation due to negligence on the part of the transferee/appellant only because the definition in Section 2(30) of the new Act defines the owner as the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered? In our considered opinion, in the facts and circumstances, the proper view would be that unless it is proved that the "registered owner" has ceased to be the owner of the vehicle, he continues to be liable in the event of an accident for the claims of the third party. In other words, the onus to establish cessation of his title in the vehicle by virtue of a bona fide transfer thereof lies upon the registered owner and, unless and until that burden is discharged, he would continue to be liable to meet the liability arising out of an accident involving the vehicle. The said view has been taken in the Full Bench decision of Paragounda v. Bhimappa and Ors., (supra). We have already seen here that the transfer of the offending vehicle in favour of the appellant on 21.12.88 has been proved by the documentary evidence which has been accepted by the learned Tribunal. (emphasis supplied). The said view has been taken in the Full Bench decision of Paragounda v. Bhimappa and Ors., (supra). We have already seen here that the transfer of the offending vehicle in favour of the appellant on 21.12.88 has been proved by the documentary evidence which has been accepted by the learned Tribunal. (emphasis supplied). The specific finding to that effect of the learned Tribunal has not been challenged before us. Coupled with this, we find very important and relevant circumstances like making the prayer for custody of the vehicle by the appellant before the competent Court soon after the accident. All these clearly indicate that the registered owner ceased to be the owner of the offending vehicle at the relevant point of time. 11. That being the position, learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly directed the appellant, as the owner of the offending vehicle to pay the compensation awarded. 12. In the result, the appeal must fail. The appeal is dismissed. But having regard to the circumstances without any cost." B) Applying the principles propounded by the Hon''ble DB (supra) to the facts of the present case, it stands to reason that in both WP I and WP II, the present writ petitioners have successfully discharged their respective onus establishing cessation of their title to the MVs in issue on the basis of a bona fide transfer. It is not the case of the respondents that there is no evidence of the sale/transfer as per law by the writ petitioners in WP I and WP II tendered to the PVDs of their respective jurisdiction. To the contrary no evidence has been brought before this Court to show that the transferees acted and/or took steps to register the MVs in issue as purchased by them. 11. In the above view of the matter and confined to the facts of this case, both the writ petitioners in WP I and WP II shall be entitled to a Declaration ceasing to treat them as registered owners of the MVs in issue from the date of their intimation to the PVDs of their jurisdiction of the formal execution/ transfer/sale of the respective MVs in issue. 12. 12. As a corollary, following such Declaration, a Mandamus would also operate in favour of each of the writ petitioners in WP I and WP II restraining any of the Respondents from inflicting, imposing and/or realising on and from the writ petitioners any penalty/levy/charge/fee connected to their respective MVs in issue in the writ petition. 13. There will be no order as to costs. 14. Both W.P. No. 4462 (W) of 2019 and W.P. No. 7678 (W) of 2019 stand accordingly disposed of. 15. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this judgement, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.